この文献の参照には次のURLをご利用ください : https://doi.org/10.15027/31066
広島大学大学院教育学研究科紀要. 第三部, 教育人間科学関連領域 59 号
2010-12-24 発行
ウィトゲンシュタイン哲学と言語習得論 : 共同注意概念の批判的検討
Wittgenstein Philosophy and a Theory of Language Acquisition : Examining the concept of joint attention
平田 仁胤
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine, in terms of Wittgenstein Philosophy, the concept of joint attention that is endorsed by Jerome Seymour Bruner and Michael Tomasello. Bruner and Tomasello appreciate the problem of indeterminacy of reference suggested by Wittgenstein's notion of ostensive definition and family resemblances. They insist that the concept of joint attention is crucial to solve the problem. However, the concept can be criticized for not considering two points. (1) It fails to see that intentions emerge ex post facto because it presupposes a substantive view of intention. (2) It also fails to recognize that intentions emerge in a certain context. In conclusion, this paper points out that the concept of joint attention need to be examined by Wittgenstein's considerations of intention.
About This Article
著者キーワード
joint attention
indeterminacy of reference
intention
共同注意
指示の不確定性
意図
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