The fears and concerns about the future of the international order call for middle power cooperation and collaboration. Although the research on middle powers has increased, African middle powers are understudied. This study addresses this research gap by focusing on South Africa’s strategies in dealing with the Second Congo War. These strategies were analyzed using a framework that comprises material, normative and ideational considerations and led to two major findings. First, Pretoria has moved from Mandela’s non-intervention approach to a combination of soft and hard measures under Mbeki, making South Africa the principal peace negotiator and peacemaker in the conflict. A combination of factors such as efforts toward African revival, conformity to self-conceived roles, and other economic and material concerns explain this shift. Second, South African strategies under Mbeki were a combination of multilateral and bilateral initiatives. While the country has supported UN-led and regional efforts, it has also individually assisted the DRC in capacity building. Despite the skillfulness of its leaders in mediating the conflict, suspicions about South Africa’s intention and handling of regional crises are still a matter of concern. The country needs to reassure the skeptics to take heed of the global call for middle power coalitions.