広島平和科学 26 巻
2004 発行

米ロ間戦略核削減と「備蓄」問題 : いわゆる「モスコワ条約」(SORT)の意義を考える

The reduction of US-Russian strategic nuclear weapons and the issue of 'Reserve' stockpiles : Reconsidering the significance of the SORT
山田 浩
全文
184 KB
hps_26_1.pdf
Abstract
On May 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and V. Putin signed in Moscow (come into force: June 2004) a treaty, under which the U.S. and Russia will reduce the aggregate number of their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 ? 2,200 for each by December 31, 2012. The Bush Administration has made clear that it will reduce only “operationally deployed" warheads and will not count the “reserve" warheads. Russia disagrees with this interpretation of the treaty, but its objections were neglected. The “reserve" of the nuclear weapons includes the warheads removed from service and placed in storage, warheads on delivery undergoing overhaul or repair and warheads production capacity. The issue of the “reserve" became a greater concern in keeping with the development of the strategic nuclear weapons reduction as START-I and II did. The U.S. plans to continue to maintain “reserve" stockpiles consisting of thousands of nuclear weapons in various stages of readiness. This has the effect of leaving the U.S. in better position than Russia to rapidly reconstitute its strategic nuclear forces by “uploading" stored nuclear warheads and thereby achieve a significant strategic advantage over Russia.