アメリカ合衆国における検察官の訴追裁量の特徴と問題点 : 企業犯罪のケースを中心に

In the United States, prosecutors regularly resolve corporate criminal cases through the use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), which enable prosecutors to impose criminal sanctions without convicting the firm. Prosecutors regularly intervene in corporations’ internal affairs by pressuring firms to adopt structural reforms ostensibly designed to reduce the likelihood of future wrongdoing. There is a view that such an approach is practical from the standpoint of economic rationality and that it would protect more interests such as stakeholders than imposing penalties on public companies themselves.
However, some scholars claim that rule of law will reduce if prosecutors use it too often and that justice in criminal justice will not work, and a skeptical of the content of the agreements concluded between prosecutors and corporations themselves. In order to scrutinize why such conflicts have arisen, the author will review the characteristics and problems of the U.S. criminal justice system per se and then investigate what problems have arisen in the context of corporate crime.
Finally, the author examines the sanctioning function of the “market,” attracting attention in recent years, and summarizes some of the appropriate ways to sanction corporations.