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比較論理学研究 15 号
2018-03-25 発行
『タットヴァサングラハ』「自律的真理論検討」章の研究（1） : 〈真〉としての本性的な能力
A Study of the Svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā of the Tattvasaṃgraha (1): Arguments about pramāṇa’s Innate Capacity
石村 克
Abstract
The present study aims at providing a Japanese translation of the Svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā of the Tattvasaṃgraha (TS) by Śāntarakṣita and its pañjikā (TSP) by Kamalaśīla. The Svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā (TS2810–3122) deals with Kumārila’s theory of intrinsic validity (svataḥprāmāṇya), according to which the validity (prāmāṇya) of all cognitions is intrinsic (svatas) while their invalidity (aprāmāṇya) is extrinsic (paratas). This paper covers the section comprised of TS 2810–2845, where Śāntarakṣita is concerned with Kumārila’s view that the validity is an innate capacity (svābhāvikī śaktiḥ) such as that to make known the cognized (meyabodha). The following is a synopsis of the section in question.
1. Refutation of Kumārila’s view of the validity of a cognition as an innate cognitive capacity
1.1. Introduction (TS 2810–11)
1.2. Bṛhaṭṭīkā (TS 2812–15):
1.2.1. Argument 1: all pramāṇas intrinsically possess validity that is an innate capacity such as that to make known the cognized (svābhāvikī meyabodhādike śaktiḥ) (TS 2812)
1.2.2. Argument 2: the validity is established independently (anapekṣatva) of another pramāṇa (TS 2813–15)
1.3. Counterarguments against arguments 1 and 2 (TS 2816–45)
1.3.1. Counterarguments against argument 1 (TS 2816–2831)
1.3.1.1. Assumption 1: the ‘innate’ capacity is eternal (nitya) or causeless (ahetu) (TS 2816–25)
1.3.1.1.1. Examination from the viewpoint that a capacity is distinct from its possessor (avyatirekapakṣa) (TS 2816–23)
1.3.1.1.1.1. Argument for the above-mentioned viewpoint (TS 2816–17)
1.3.1.1.1.2. Conclusion: the capacity is not innate (TS 2818)
1.3.1.1.1.3. prasaṅga (a): If the capacity were innate, the undesired consequence would follow that a pramāṇa is eternal or causeless (TS 2819–20)
1.3.1.1.1.4. prasaṅga (b): If a pramāṇa were eternal or causeless, the undesired consequence would follow that a pramāṇa itself and its effect are not temporary (TS 2821)
1.3.1.1.1.5. [Objection] Invalidation of prasaṅga (b) from the viewpoint of the manifestation (abhivyakti) theory (TS 1822)
1.3.1.1.1.6. Rejection of the manifestation theory (reference to the Śrutiparīkṣā) (TS 1823)
1.3.1.1.2. Examination from other viewpoints: a capacity is distinct from its possessor (vyatirekapakṣa); a capacity is both distinct and non-distinct from its possessor (ubhayātmakapakṣa); a capacity is neither distinct nor non-distinct from its possessor (anubhayātmakapakṣa) (TS 2824–25)
1.3.1.1.2.1 prasaṅga (c): If the capacity were innate, the undesirable consequence would follow that a pramāṇa is eternal
1.3.1.2. Assumption 2: the ‘innate’ capacity is produced at the same when a pramāṇa is produced by its cause (TS 2826–31)
1.3.1.2.1 Pointing out a logical fallacy in the thesis of argument 1: siddhasādhyatā (TS 2826–28)
1.3.1.2.2 prasaṅga (d): If a capacity were not innate, the undesirable consequence would follow that a capacity and its possessor are distinct from each other (TS 2829)
1.3.1.2.3 prasaṅga (e): If a capacity were not innate, the undesirable consequence would follow that no entity can possess a capacity (TS 2830–31)
1.3.2. Counterarguments against argument 2 (TS 2832–41)
1.3.2.1. An argument for extrinsic validity (parataḥprāmāṇya) (TS 2832–37)
1.3.2.1.1 Śāntarakṣita’s claim: the cognitive capacity cannot be established independently of another pramāṇa (TS 2832–33)
1.3.2.1.2 Presenting a reason: a non-pramāṇa and a pramāṇa are similar to each other in that they have a vivid appearance (TS 2834)
1.3.2.1.3 Two means of establishing the cognitive capacity: the experience of practical efficacy (arthakriyājñ āna) and the recognition of a good quality of a cognitive cause (kāraṇaguṇajñāna) (TS 2835)
1.3.2.1.4 Exemplification: the capacity of a poisonous substance (viṣa), etc. (TS 2836–37)
1.3.2.2. Pointing out a logical fallacy in the thesis of argument 2: svavacanavirodha (TS 2838–39)
1.3.2.3. How the cognitive capacity is is different from how it is established (TS 2840–41)
1.3.3. Pointing out a logical fallacy in the reasons of arguments 1 and 2: anaikāntika (TS 2842–45)
1. Refutation of Kumārila’s view of the validity of a cognition as an innate cognitive capacity
1.1. Introduction (TS 2810–11)
1.2. Bṛhaṭṭīkā (TS 2812–15):
1.2.1. Argument 1: all pramāṇas intrinsically possess validity that is an innate capacity such as that to make known the cognized (svābhāvikī meyabodhādike śaktiḥ) (TS 2812)
1.2.2. Argument 2: the validity is established independently (anapekṣatva) of another pramāṇa (TS 2813–15)
1.3. Counterarguments against arguments 1 and 2 (TS 2816–45)
1.3.1. Counterarguments against argument 1 (TS 2816–2831)
1.3.1.1. Assumption 1: the ‘innate’ capacity is eternal (nitya) or causeless (ahetu) (TS 2816–25)
1.3.1.1.1. Examination from the viewpoint that a capacity is distinct from its possessor (avyatirekapakṣa) (TS 2816–23)
1.3.1.1.1.1. Argument for the above-mentioned viewpoint (TS 2816–17)
1.3.1.1.1.2. Conclusion: the capacity is not innate (TS 2818)
1.3.1.1.1.3. prasaṅga (a): If the capacity were innate, the undesired consequence would follow that a pramāṇa is eternal or causeless (TS 2819–20)
1.3.1.1.1.4. prasaṅga (b): If a pramāṇa were eternal or causeless, the undesired consequence would follow that a pramāṇa itself and its effect are not temporary (TS 2821)
1.3.1.1.1.5. [Objection] Invalidation of prasaṅga (b) from the viewpoint of the manifestation (abhivyakti) theory (TS 1822)
1.3.1.1.1.6. Rejection of the manifestation theory (reference to the Śrutiparīkṣā) (TS 1823)
1.3.1.1.2. Examination from other viewpoints: a capacity is distinct from its possessor (vyatirekapakṣa); a capacity is both distinct and non-distinct from its possessor (ubhayātmakapakṣa); a capacity is neither distinct nor non-distinct from its possessor (anubhayātmakapakṣa) (TS 2824–25)
1.3.1.1.2.1 prasaṅga (c): If the capacity were innate, the undesirable consequence would follow that a pramāṇa is eternal
1.3.1.2. Assumption 2: the ‘innate’ capacity is produced at the same when a pramāṇa is produced by its cause (TS 2826–31)
1.3.1.2.1 Pointing out a logical fallacy in the thesis of argument 1: siddhasādhyatā (TS 2826–28)
1.3.1.2.2 prasaṅga (d): If a capacity were not innate, the undesirable consequence would follow that a capacity and its possessor are distinct from each other (TS 2829)
1.3.1.2.3 prasaṅga (e): If a capacity were not innate, the undesirable consequence would follow that no entity can possess a capacity (TS 2830–31)
1.3.2. Counterarguments against argument 2 (TS 2832–41)
1.3.2.1. An argument for extrinsic validity (parataḥprāmāṇya) (TS 2832–37)
1.3.2.1.1 Śāntarakṣita’s claim: the cognitive capacity cannot be established independently of another pramāṇa (TS 2832–33)
1.3.2.1.2 Presenting a reason: a non-pramāṇa and a pramāṇa are similar to each other in that they have a vivid appearance (TS 2834)
1.3.2.1.3 Two means of establishing the cognitive capacity: the experience of practical efficacy (arthakriyājñ āna) and the recognition of a good quality of a cognitive cause (kāraṇaguṇajñāna) (TS 2835)
1.3.2.1.4 Exemplification: the capacity of a poisonous substance (viṣa), etc. (TS 2836–37)
1.3.2.2. Pointing out a logical fallacy in the thesis of argument 2: svavacanavirodha (TS 2838–39)
1.3.2.3. How the cognitive capacity is is different from how it is established (TS 2840–41)
1.3.3. Pointing out a logical fallacy in the reasons of arguments 1 and 2: anaikāntika (TS 2842–45)
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広島大学比較論理学プロジェクト研究センター研究成果報告書（2017年度）
本稿は、2015年度仏教伝道協会日本人留学生奨学金制度の支援を受けた研究の成果の一部である。
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