The Rational Origins of the State : The "Necessary Accident" Theory of Early-States' Building Subsumed under the Kantian Categorical Frameworks <Articles>

Ueda Yoshifumi

廣島大學經濟論叢

The Hiroshima Economic Review

[ISSN] 0386-2704

[NCID] AN00213519

The early state came into existence as the necessary result of the innovation of metal tools under the condition that the selfish motives of preceding communities' chieftains for making the transaction of external trade more profitable by resorting to a military force, the net-benefit of whose use could be sure to be increased by innovating bronze weapons, later taken over by iron ones. Though the main propositions are based on the recent empirical studies of ancient history and evolution anthropology, they are subsumed under the categorical frameworks of the transcendental philosophy. To prove them, some expected hypotheses are inferred and deducted by the analysis of a two-stage game comprised of both the "network game with hierarchies" abstracting an irrigation economic community and the "two-stage bargaining game" modeling the process of bargaining in a foreign trade, both of which are modeled in accordance with the Kantian categorical frameworks

State

Bargaining Power

Sovereignty

Game Model

経済 [ 330 ]

英語

広島大学経済学会

Copyright (c) 2011 広島大学

[ISSN] 0386-2704

[NCID] AN00213519