The "Bargaining Power" Theory of the State : A Synthesis of Economic Approaches to the Origin of the State <Articles>

廣島大學經濟論叢 Volume 32 Issue 3 Page 93-111 published_at 2009-03-19
アクセス数 : 658
ダウンロード数 : 95

今月のアクセス数 : 0
今月のダウンロード数 : 0
File
HER_32-3_93.pdf 861 KB 種類 : fulltext
Title ( eng )
The "Bargaining Power" Theory of the State : A Synthesis of Economic Approaches to the Origin of the State <Articles>
Creator
Ueda Yoshifumi
Source Title
廣島大學經濟論叢
The Hiroshima Economic Review
Volume 32
Issue 3
Start Page 93
End Page 111
Journal Identifire
[ISSN] 0386-2704
[NCID] AN00213519
Abstract
Based on the recent historical and archaeological studies of the early states in irrigation societies, I demonstrate the hypothesis that the states were brought into being by the selfish motives of the chieftains of irrigation societies for securing the better terms of trade with external societies providing new necessary goods vital to survival of those societies. The logic of the hypothesis is proved in the analytical framework of a two-stage bargaining game and that of a hierarchical cooperative game. The main results of the analysis are corroborated by some historical evidences.
Keywords
Constitutional Approach
States
Economic Associations
Game Model
NDC
Economics [ 330 ]
Language
eng
Resource Type departmental bulletin paper
Publisher
広島大学経済学会
Date of Issued 2009-03-19
Publish Type Version of Record
Access Rights open access
Source Identifier
[ISSN] 0386-2704
[NCID] AN00213519