チャンドラキールティの法処色理解をめぐって

On Candrakīrti’s Understanding of dharmāyatanarūpa

掬月 玄

比較論理学研究

The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic

[PISSN] 1880-6376

[NCID] AA12025285

This article examines Candrakīrti’s understanding of matter included within the category of mental object (dharmāyatanarūpa). Bhāviveka asserts that objects in the dream exists from the point of view of worldly convention (saṃvṛti) and criticizes the Yogācāra’s vijñaptimātra theory. Objects in the dream is a kind of dharmāyatanarūpa. On the other hand, Candrakīrti criticizes that theory in a different way. He says in Madhyamakāvatāra 6.52 that dharmāyatanarūpa and mental consciousness (manovijñāna) are nonexistent from the point of view of the nobles (ārya). He does not make it clear whether dharmāyatanarūpa exists from the point of view of worldly convention.
’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson ’grus declares that Candrakīrti accepts the existence of dharmāyatanarūpa. According to this interpretation, there is no difference in the understanding of dharmāyatanarūpa between Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka. This interpretation shows that Candrakīrti asserts that the mental faculty, dharmāyatanarūpa, and mental consciousness equally exist from the point of view of worldly convention. In other words, it shows that he thinks that these are established in reliance on one another.

日本語

広島大学比較論理学プロジェクト研究センター

[ISSN] 1880-6376

[NCID] AA12025285