身体的主体としての人間とは誰のことなのか <研究論文 : 学習開発学の今>
学習開発学研究 Issue 8
Page 245-254
published_at 2015-03-16
アクセス数 : 1421 件
ダウンロード数 : 1187 件
今月のアクセス数 : 4 件
今月のダウンロード数 : 4 件
この文献の参照には次のURLをご利用ください : https://doi.org/10.15027/36784
File |
JEducSci_8_245.pdf
851 KB
種類 :
fulltext
|
Title ( jpn ) |
身体的主体としての人間とは誰のことなのか <研究論文 : 学習開発学の今>
|
Title ( eng ) |
Who is the Human Being as a Bodily Subject? <Research Article>
|
Creator |
Legrand Dorothée
|
Source Title |
学習開発学研究
Journal of Learning Science
|
Issue | 8 |
Start Page | 245 |
End Page | 254 |
Journal Identifire |
[PISSN] 1883-8200
[NCID] AA1244667X
|
Abstract |
I consider what constitutes the human being as a bodily subject. Against any conception of a subject as embodied only in a contingent or secondary manner, contemporary research in neurosciences, cognitive sciences, psychology, anthropology, philosophy invigorate the view that the body participates constitutively to subjectivity: being a subject requires being a body, inescapably. This voice, however, is heard in various ways and the term ‘body’ ends up holding contrastive meanings. Hence the question: What does constitute bodily subjectivity? Is it neural maps of the body, cognitive representations of the body, conscious experiences of the body, bodily practices? While focusing on the bodily subject, the phenomenological approach mostly pushes materiality in the background-like a reader privileges meaning over its materialization in letters. Such view has thus forcefully and convincingly defended that one’s body is not reducible to mere materiality. It is however just as important to underline that one’s body is just as much irreducible to subjectivity, as it wouldn’t be a body without its materiality. If it is accepted that the subject is bodily, and that the body is material, the question arises, how does materiality participate in subjectivity? To address this question, I consider the structure of self-experience from a phenomenological point of view, and ask: how can the subject be experienced without being reduced to the material body and without being separated from the material body? I propose that bodily self-consciousness goes beyond the skin boundary of the body proper, as it corresponds to the experience of the world as disclosed by the body. At a primary level, self-experience is thus given by the subject’s relation to otherness. I conclude by considering how this view may shed light on the subject’s relation to others, and on the consequences of the rupture and restoration of such intersubjectivity in psychopathological cases.
|
Keywords |
Subjectivity
Materiality
Otherness
Phenomenology
Psychopathology
主体性
物質性
他者性
現象学
精神病理学
|
Descriptions |
本稿は、2013年4月18日に行われたDorothée Legrandの講演会(広島大学大学院教育学研究科・学習開発学講座)の内容に加筆・修正を加えたものの全訳である。
|
NDC |
Special treatises on philosophy [ 110 ]
|
Language |
jpn
|
Resource Type | departmental bulletin paper |
Publisher |
広島大学大学院教育学研究科学習開発学講座
|
Date of Issued | 2015-03-16 |
Rights |
Copyright (c) 2015 広島大学大学院教育学研究科学習開発学講座
|
Publish Type | Version of Record |
Access Rights | open access |
Source Identifier |
[ISSN] 1883-8200
[NCID] AA1244667X
|