身体的主体としての人間とは誰のことなのか <研究論文 : 学習開発学の今>

学習開発学研究 Issue 8 Page 245-254 published_at 2015-03-16
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Title ( jpn )
身体的主体としての人間とは誰のことなのか <研究論文 : 学習開発学の今>
Title ( eng )
Who is the Human Being as a Bodily Subject? <Research Article>
Creator
Legrand Dorothée
Source Title
学習開発学研究
Journal of Learning Science
Issue 8
Start Page 245
End Page 254
Journal Identifire
[PISSN] 1883-8200
[NCID] AA1244667X
Abstract
I consider what constitutes the human being as a bodily subject. Against any conception of a subject as embodied only in a contingent or secondary manner, contemporary research in neurosciences, cognitive sciences, psychology, anthropology, philosophy invigorate the view that the body participates constitutively to subjectivity: being a subject requires being a body, inescapably. This voice, however, is heard in various ways and the term ‘body’ ends up holding contrastive meanings. Hence the question: What does constitute bodily subjectivity? Is it neural maps of the body, cognitive representations of the body, conscious experiences of the body, bodily practices? While focusing on the bodily subject, the phenomenological approach mostly pushes materiality in the background-like a reader privileges meaning over its materialization in letters. Such view has thus forcefully and convincingly defended that one’s body is not reducible to mere materiality. It is however just as important to underline that one’s body is just as much irreducible to subjectivity, as it wouldn’t be a body without its materiality. If it is accepted that the subject is bodily, and that the body is material, the question arises, how does materiality participate in subjectivity? To address this question, I consider the structure of self-experience from a phenomenological point of view, and ask: how can the subject be experienced without being reduced to the material body and without being separated from the material body? I propose that bodily self-consciousness goes beyond the skin boundary of the body proper, as it corresponds to the experience of the world as disclosed by the body. At a primary level, self-experience is thus given by the subject’s relation to otherness. I conclude by considering how this view may shed light on the subject’s relation to others, and on the consequences of the rupture and restoration of such intersubjectivity in psychopathological cases.
Keywords
Subjectivity
Materiality
Otherness
Phenomenology
Psychopathology
主体性
物質性
他者性
現象学
精神病理学
Descriptions
本稿は、2013年4月18日に行われたDorothée Legrandの講演会(広島大学大学院教育学研究科・学習開発学講座)の内容に加筆・修正を加えたものの全訳である。
NDC
Special treatises on philosophy [ 110 ]
Language
jpn
Resource Type departmental bulletin paper
Publisher
広島大学大学院教育学研究科学習開発学講座
Date of Issued 2015-03-16
Rights
Copyright (c) 2015 広島大学大学院教育学研究科学習開発学講座
Publish Type Version of Record
Access Rights open access
Source Identifier
[ISSN] 1883-8200
[NCID] AA1244667X