Simulation Analysis Using Multi-Agent Systems for Social Norms

Computational Economics Volume 34 Issue 1 Page 37-65 published_at 2009-03-12
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Title ( eng )
Simulation Analysis Using Multi-Agent Systems for Social Norms
Creator
Nishizaki Ichiro
Oyama Toshihisa
Source Title
Computational Economics
Volume 34
Issue 1
Start Page 37
End Page 65
Abstract
With the existence of the social customs or norms, Naylor demonstrates a possibility of stable long-run equilibria of support for a strike in a labor market, and this implies that at least some individuals will behave cooperatively and hence the prisoners' dilemma could be escaped. In this paper, using an agent-based simulation model in which artificial adaptive agents have mechanisms of decision making and learning based on neural networks and genetic algorithms, we compare the results of our simulation analysis with that of the mathematical model by Naylor. In particular, while Naylor's model is based on rationality as it relates to individual utility maximization, agents behave adaptively in our agent-based simulation model; agents make decisions by trial and error, and they learn from experiences to make better decisions.
Keywords
Social norms
Reputation
Simulation
Adaptive agents
NDC
Mathematics [ 410 ]
Language
eng
Resource Type journal article
Publisher
Springer
Date of Issued 2009-03-12
Rights
Copyright (c) 2009 Springer
Publish Type Author’s Original
Access Rights open access
Source Identifier
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
[ISSN] 0927-7099
[DOI] 10.1007/s10614-009-9170-x
[NCID] AA10883684
[DOI] http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10614-009-9170-x