孟子性善説の可能性と限界
哲学 Issue 46
Page 111-124
published_at 1994-10-25
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| File | |
| Title ( jpn ) |
孟子性善説の可能性と限界
|
| Title ( eng ) |
A possibility and limitation on Mengzi (孟子)'s Seizensetu (性善説 = the ethical doctrine that human nature is essentially good)
|
| Creator | |
| Source Title |
哲学
Tetsugaku : The Journal of Hiroshima Philosophical Society
|
| Issue | 46 |
| Start Page | 111 |
| End Page | 124 |
| Abstract |
Mengzi (孟子) thought that there is no essential difference between Junzi (君子) and Xiaoren (小人). And he advanced human nature is essentially good as a ethical existence. By this view all humans have a possibility to become a Shengren (聖人). As a result, human nature became all equal before Seizensetu (性善説). But, it also means Mengzi limits the human nature's other possibilities.
And Mengzi advanced three methods of learning, Qiu Fangxin (求放心), Gua Yu (寡欲), Yang Qi (養気). But Mengzi never explained these methods concretely. It means that Mengzi's Thought lacks a thought of concrete method. This is a structural limitation on Mengzi's Thought. |
| NDC |
Oriental thought [ 120 ]
|
| Language |
jpn
|
| Resource Type | departmental bulletin paper |
| Publisher |
広島哲学会
|
| Date of Issued | 1994-10-25 |
| Publish Type | Version of Record |
| Access Rights | open access |
| Source Identifier |
[ISSN] 0495-2200
[NCID] AN00150441
|
