The purpose of this paper is to clarify the philosophical ground of Rudolf Steiner’s educational thought, focusing on his understanding of Fichte’s theory of the “I.” First, the construction of the theory of the “I” in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (The Science of Knowledge) is generalized on the basis of Steiner’s interpretation. In Fichte's theory, it is thought that reason as “absolute knowledge” is not divided dualistically and that recognition is able to transform with the “I” monistically. In light of this, Steiner expects the possibility of an epistemology that involves the movability of consciousness. Steiner focuses on Fichte’s two methods for finding the pure concept of the “I”and observing our own selves, discovering in them the significance of the “introspective approach.” Next, Steiner’s criticisms of the epistemological range and passivity of Fichte’s theoretical “I” are described. Steiner criticizes Fichte’s theory for its division between theoretical “I” and practical “I,” and for the spring from unconstraint to constraint. Thus, Fichte’s theory is rejected by Steiner on the basis that it requires us to accept a divine categorical imperative from outside, like Kant’s. Steiner insists that such an intellectual intuition is not a part of any true epistemology.