The purpose of this paper is to show how the Mādhyamika scholar Bhāviveka (ca. 490–570) criticizes the Yogācāra’s concepts of prajñapti (“the conventional designation”) and nimitta (“the causal basis”). In his Xian yang sheng jiao lun 顕揚聖教論VII 10, Asaṅga (ca. 330–405) formulates an argument to prove the existence of the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) of things from the viewpoint of the Yogācāra theory. On the grounds that the conventional designation must have its causal basis, Asaṅga argues that there exists the dependent nature of things as it serves as the causal basis of the designation. The same idea is also expressed in the Tattvārtha Chapter 真実義品of the Bodhisattvabhūmi 菩薩地(ca. 230–300), which makes the point that a causal basis of the conventional designation is something that exists as a real entity (vastu). The idea refuted in both texts is that all the entities are the mere conventional designation (prajñaptimātram eva sarvam), which is quite often attributed to the Mādhyamika school. The Mādhyamika scholar Bhāviveka, in the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and the Dasheng zhangzhen lun 大乗掌珍論, criticizes the Yogācāra’s idea that a causal basis of the conventional designation must be existent by quoting the passages in question from the Xian yang sheng jiao lun and the Bodhisattvabhūmi. According to Bhāviveka, an entity that arises dependently to others exists at conventional level. Since such entity serves as the causal basis of the designation, the Yogācāra’s idea in question should be refuted.