専門職言論(プロフェショナル・スピーチ)と学問の自由 : 民主的能力の価値理論と自由論

廣島法學 Volume 44 Issue 4 Page 126-84 published_at 2021-03-10
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Title ( jpn )
専門職言論(プロフェショナル・スピーチ)と学問の自由 : 民主的能力の価値理論と自由論
Title ( eng )
Professional Speech and Academic Freedom: Democratic Competence Theory and Liberty
Creator
Source Title
廣島法學
The Hiroshima Law Journal
Volume 44
Issue 4
Start Page 126
End Page 84
Journal Identifire
[ISSN] 03865010
[NCID] AN0021395X
Abstract
The omikuji for this year could have read, “You are not determined enough. Study.” Are horoscopes brilliantly predicting the future of our country? We might follow such “announcements” and “prophecy” for advice.
It would seem that experts who give such “advice,” however, are not considered part of a knowledge community whose autonomy is guaranteed by academic freedom. Therefore, if an astrologer communicates a prediction about the future to a customer via a horoscope, it is not categorized as professional speech within the context of academic freedom. Individuals who do not convey the wisdom of the knowledge community do not deserve to be called experts, and professional occupational regulations that regulate such experts do not raise the issue of the First Amendment.
On the other hand, it can be argued that a knowledge community consisting of a network of experts is created for particular forms of speech categorized as professional and that, in general, a respectful attitude and respect for the judgments of the community are required. Thus, the knowledge community is required to verify the knowledge created by experts via scientific methods, have a special interest in the accuracy of that knowledge, and eliminate political interference (knowledge community theory).
Knowledge community theory argues that it is the knowledge community itself that judges the accuracy of knowledge and that the government is not allowed to overwrite that judgment. The reason the government should not judge the accuracy of knowledge is that it is unable to do so. However, if the government should not judge the accuracy of knowledge, even if it had the ability to do so, then a normative requirement to exclude government intervention must be derived from constitutional principles.
Descriptions
本研究はJSPS 科研費JP19K01299の助成を受けたものです。
Language
jpn
Resource Type departmental bulletin paper
Publisher
広島大学法学会
Date of Issued 2021-03-10
Rights
許可なく複製・転載することを禁じる
Publish Type Version of Record
Access Rights open access
Source Identifier
[ISSN] 0386-5010
[NCID] AN0021395X