専門職言論(プロフェショナル・スピーチ)と学問の自由 : 民主的能力の価値理論と自由論
廣島法學 44 巻 4 号
126-84 頁
2021-03-10 発行
アクセス数 : 369 件
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この文献の参照には次のURLをご利用ください : https://doi.org/10.15027/50938
ファイル情報(添付) |
HLJ_44-4_126.pdf
14.3 MB
種類 :
全文
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タイトル ( jpn ) |
専門職言論(プロフェショナル・スピーチ)と学問の自由 : 民主的能力の価値理論と自由論
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タイトル ( eng ) |
Professional Speech and Academic Freedom: Democratic Competence Theory and Liberty
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作成者 | |
収録物名 |
廣島法學
The Hiroshima Law Journal
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巻 | 44 |
号 | 4 |
開始ページ | 126 |
終了ページ | 84 |
収録物識別子 |
[ISSN] 03865010
[NCID] AN0021395X
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抄録 |
The omikuji for this year could have read, “You are not determined enough. Study.” Are horoscopes brilliantly predicting the future of our country? We might follow such “announcements” and “prophecy” for advice.
It would seem that experts who give such “advice,” however, are not considered part of a knowledge community whose autonomy is guaranteed by academic freedom. Therefore, if an astrologer communicates a prediction about the future to a customer via a horoscope, it is not categorized as professional speech within the context of academic freedom. Individuals who do not convey the wisdom of the knowledge community do not deserve to be called experts, and professional occupational regulations that regulate such experts do not raise the issue of the First Amendment. On the other hand, it can be argued that a knowledge community consisting of a network of experts is created for particular forms of speech categorized as professional and that, in general, a respectful attitude and respect for the judgments of the community are required. Thus, the knowledge community is required to verify the knowledge created by experts via scientific methods, have a special interest in the accuracy of that knowledge, and eliminate political interference (knowledge community theory). Knowledge community theory argues that it is the knowledge community itself that judges the accuracy of knowledge and that the government is not allowed to overwrite that judgment. The reason the government should not judge the accuracy of knowledge is that it is unable to do so. However, if the government should not judge the accuracy of knowledge, even if it had the ability to do so, then a normative requirement to exclude government intervention must be derived from constitutional principles. |
内容記述 |
本研究はJSPS 科研費JP19K01299の助成を受けたものです。
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言語 |
日本語
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資源タイプ | 紀要論文 |
出版者 |
広島大学法学会
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発行日 | 2021-03-10 |
権利情報 |
許可なく複製・転載することを禁じる
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出版タイプ | Version of Record(出版社版。早期公開を含む) |
アクセス権 | オープンアクセス |
収録物識別子 |
[ISSN] 0386-5010
[NCID] AN0021395X
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