Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations
IDEC DP2 Series Volume 10 Issue 8
Page 1-53
published_at 2020-12
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この文献の参照には次のURLをご利用ください : https://doi.org/10.15027/50131
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Title ( eng ) |
Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations
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Creator | |
Source Title |
IDEC DP2 Series
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Volume | 10 |
Issue | 8 |
Start Page | 1 |
End Page | 53 |
Abstract |
I study a self-enforcing mechanism for an international organization that interacts repeatedly over time. A random shock determines which countries would be in favor of or against taking a collective action. Thus, if the organization wants to take the action, incentives must be provided. I show that the optimal stationary equilibrium is equivalent to a mechanism characterized by voting weights. I study how this optimal mechanism depends on the discount factor. In particular, I show that within a class of parameter cases, the optimal mechanism mimics the way voting power is distributed among UN members via Security Council seats.
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Keywords |
Political Economy
Mechanism Design
Impatient Players
Security Council
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Descriptions |
This study is based on the first chapter of my doctoral dissertation at Yale University.
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Language |
eng
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Resource Type | departmental bulletin paper |
Publisher |
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
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Date of Issued | 2020-12 |
Publish Type | Version of Record |
Access Rights | open access |