Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations

IDEC DP2 Series Volume 10 Issue 8 Page 1-53 published_at 2020-12
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Title ( eng )
Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations
Creator
Source Title
IDEC DP2 Series
Volume 10
Issue 8
Start Page 1
End Page 53
Abstract
I study a self-enforcing mechanism for an international organization that interacts repeatedly over time. A random shock determines which countries would be in favor of or against taking a collective action. Thus, if the organization wants to take the action, incentives must be provided. I show that the optimal stationary equilibrium is equivalent to a mechanism characterized by voting weights. I study how this optimal mechanism depends on the discount factor. In particular, I show that within a class of parameter cases, the optimal mechanism mimics the way voting power is distributed among UN members via Security Council seats.
Keywords
Political Economy
Mechanism Design
Impatient Players
Security Council
Descriptions
This study is based on the first chapter of my doctoral dissertation at Yale University.
Language
eng
Resource Type departmental bulletin paper
Publisher
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
Date of Issued 2020-12
Publish Type Version of Record
Access Rights open access