Wie verstand Hegel das „Urteil“ ?: Zu Hegels Kritik an der traditionellen Metaphysik

How Did Hegel Understand the “Judgment”?: Hegel’s criticism of the traditional metaphysics

Hazama Tomoki

広島大学大学院文学研究科論集

The Hiroshima University studies, Graduate School of Letters

According to some philosophers, Hegel’s philosophy, especially his science of logic, is metaphysical. However recently, other philosophers (for example, R. Brandom) have presented non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy. Is the non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy persuasive? In this article, I aim to elucidate that Hegel had already anticipated some of the important ideas of late 19th- and 20th-century linguistic philosophy, i.e., the context principle and the difference between logic and (superficial) grammar, by analyzing both his criticism of traditional metaphysics and his original theory of “judgment.” Through this discussion, I will elucidate how Hegel understood “judgment.” Finally, I will present a persuasive non-metaphysical or “naturalistic” interpretation of Hegel’s speculative philosophy (“naturalistic,” but not in the sense of “physicalistic”).

Urteil

Semantik

Kontextprinzip

Anti-Atomismus

Isomorphie

judgment

context-principle

anti-atomism

isomorphism

Western philosophy [ 130 ]

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広島大学大学院文学研究科

[ISSN] 1347-7013

[NCID] AA11643449