The organization of R&D and environmental policy : So does emission subsidy reduce emissions?
IDEC DP2 Series Volume 2 Issue 13
Page 1-10
published_at 2012-09
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この文献の参照には次のURLをご利用ください : https://doi.org/10.15027/33354
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Title ( eng ) |
The organization of R&D and environmental policy : So does emission subsidy reduce emissions?
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Creator | |
Source Title |
IDEC DP2 Series
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Volume | 2 |
Issue | 13 |
Start Page | 1 |
End Page | 10 |
Keywords |
Emission subsidy
Emission tax
Emission reduction
Environmental R&D
Cournot duopoly
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Descriptions |
This paper reexamines the Poyago-Theotoky model and provides additional investigation that was conducted under a corrected environmental damage parameter. As new findings, we obtain the following. First, social welfare under a time-consistent emission tax (emission subsidy) policy is always welfare-enhancing rather than the case of laissez-faire. Second, if the environmental damage parameter is sufficiently small, then the equilibrium emission tax rate is invariably negative. It is therefore an emission subsidy. Moreover, total emissions under the emission subsidy become smaller than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is low. However, total emissions under the emission subsidy become greater than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is high.
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NDC |
Economics [ 330 ]
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Language |
eng
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Resource Type | departmental bulletin paper |
Publisher |
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
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Date of Issued | 2012-09 |
Publish Type | Version of Record |
Access Rights | open access |