The 'Hold-up' Problem with Political Entrepreneurship for Collective Action : An Incomplete-Contract Approach to Collective Goods

廣島大學經濟論叢 27 巻 1 号 71-88 頁 2003-07 発行
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タイトル ( eng )
The 'Hold-up' Problem with Political Entrepreneurship for Collective Action : An Incomplete-Contract Approach to Collective Goods
作成者
Ueda Yoshifumi
収録物名
廣島大學經濟論叢
The Hiroshima Economic Review
27
1
開始ページ 71
終了ページ 88
収録物識別子
[ISSN] 0386-2704
[NCID] AN00213519
抄録
The organizing work is a prerequisite for any collective action, but it must be undertaken with a fear of being 'held - up' due to its relation-specific and non-verifiable nature. If compensation for that work is not assured, the incentive for that work is lost. By examining a three-stage game model to illustrate the whole process of providing a collective good, I derive the results (i) that the possibility of collective action depends on whether or not political entrepreneurs can solve the 'hold-up' problem with leadership for collective action, and (ii) that a group optimality can be attained under the leadership of a financially-independent type of political entrepreneur under the condition of costless re-negotiation.
著者キーワード
Organizing Work
Political Entrepreneur
Collective Action
Collective Goods
Incomplete Contract
NDC分類
社会 [ 360 ]
言語
英語
資源タイプ 紀要論文
出版者
The Economics Society of Hiroshima University
国立情報学研究所
発行日 2003-07
出版タイプ Version of Record(出版社版。早期公開を含む)
アクセス権 オープンアクセス
収録物識別子
[ISSN] 0386-2704
[NCID] AN00213519