The 'Hold-up' Problem with Political Entrepreneurship for Collective Action : An Incomplete-Contract Approach to Collective Goods

廣島大學經濟論叢 Volume 27 Issue 1 Page 71-88 published_at 2003-07
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Title ( eng )
The 'Hold-up' Problem with Political Entrepreneurship for Collective Action : An Incomplete-Contract Approach to Collective Goods
Creator
Ueda Yoshifumi
Source Title
廣島大學經濟論叢
The Hiroshima Economic Review
Volume 27
Issue 1
Start Page 71
End Page 88
Journal Identifire
[ISSN] 0386-2704
[NCID] AN00213519
Abstract
The organizing work is a prerequisite for any collective action, but it must be undertaken with a fear of being 'held - up' due to its relation-specific and non-verifiable nature. If compensation for that work is not assured, the incentive for that work is lost. By examining a three-stage game model to illustrate the whole process of providing a collective good, I derive the results (i) that the possibility of collective action depends on whether or not political entrepreneurs can solve the 'hold-up' problem with leadership for collective action, and (ii) that a group optimality can be attained under the leadership of a financially-independent type of political entrepreneur under the condition of costless re-negotiation.
Keywords
Organizing Work
Political Entrepreneur
Collective Action
Collective Goods
Incomplete Contract
NDC
Society [ 360 ]
Language
eng
Resource Type departmental bulletin paper
Publisher
The Economics Society of Hiroshima University
国立情報学研究所
Date of Issued 2003-07
Publish Type Version of Record
Access Rights open access
Source Identifier
[ISSN] 0386-2704
[NCID] AN00213519