The 'Hold-up' Problem with Political Entrepreneurship for Collective Action : An Incomplete-Contract Approach to Collective Goods
廣島大學經濟論叢 Volume 27 Issue 1
Page 71-88
published_at 2003-07
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この文献の参照には次のURLをご利用ください : https://doi.org/10.15027/824
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Title ( eng ) |
The 'Hold-up' Problem with Political Entrepreneurship for Collective Action : An Incomplete-Contract Approach to Collective Goods
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Creator |
Ueda Yoshifumi
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Source Title |
廣島大學經濟論叢
The Hiroshima Economic Review
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Volume | 27 |
Issue | 1 |
Start Page | 71 |
End Page | 88 |
Journal Identifire |
[ISSN] 0386-2704
[NCID] AN00213519
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Abstract |
The organizing work is a prerequisite for any collective action, but it must be undertaken with a fear of being 'held - up' due to its relation-specific and non-verifiable nature. If compensation for that work is not assured, the incentive for that work is lost. By examining a three-stage game model to illustrate the whole process of providing a collective good, I derive the results (i) that the possibility of collective action depends on whether or not political entrepreneurs can solve the 'hold-up' problem with leadership for collective action, and (ii) that a group optimality can be attained under the leadership of a financially-independent type of political entrepreneur under the condition of costless re-negotiation.
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Keywords |
Organizing Work
Political Entrepreneur
Collective Action
Collective Goods
Incomplete Contract
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NDC |
Society [ 360 ]
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Language |
eng
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Resource Type | departmental bulletin paper |
Publisher |
The Economics Society of Hiroshima University
国立情報学研究所
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Date of Issued | 2003-07 |
Publish Type | Version of Record |
Access Rights | open access |
Source Identifier |
[ISSN] 0386-2704
[NCID] AN00213519
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