子どものための哲学をめぐる諸問題

This paper explores several issues in philosophy for children, the conduct of philosophical dialogues in the classroom, i.e. the role of dialogue, the significance of narrative in philosophy for children, and the possible discussion of higher order concepts in the classroom.

In the first part the question is answered which consequences the adoption of dialogue as a means of doing philosophy has for our conception of philosophy: it excludes a scientistic view of philosophy, but relates doing philosophy to the notion of truth. Subsequently a distinction is made between four types of rational dialogue and their relation to truth is explored. Finally, the insistence of co-operation in philosophical dialogue is related to a particular view of philosophy as the common effort to constitute a common world of experience.

In the second part a preliminary investigation into the significance of narrative as an introduction to philosophical dialogue is made. The observation is made that narrative plays a cardinal role in Chinese philosophy. Usually a distinction is made between systematic and episodic memory and the situation and time in which we acquire systematic knowledge is considered of no importance for the content of the knowledge acquired. At the utmost narrative can function as an aidé-memoire. However, if we abandon our view of experienced time as unilinéaire, fictional narrative can gain importance as an extension of our daily experience.

In the third part we turn to higher order concepts, notably the concepts of abduction and of trustworthy testimony (hearsay), which both have attracted comparatively few attention in Western epistemology.