広島大学文学部紀要 Volume 44
published_at 1984-12-24

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭaの否定詞論

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭ on the meaning of the negative particle naÑ
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present a Japanese translation of the nañarthanirṇaya ("final determination of the meaning of the negative particle naÑ") in the Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra of K(auṇḍabhaṭṭa). As well, I shall also present my own exposition of the important points in question.

The Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra is a major work on semantics and philosophy of grammar in the Pāṇinian tradition; it post-dates Bhartṛhari. So far, S. D. Joshi, M. M. Deshpande and J. A. Gune have treated other nirṇaya-s concerning dhātvartha, nāmārtha and lakārārtha respectively, but the nirnaya at hand has not yet been discussed.

The negative particle naÑ functions as either vācaka (signifier) or dyotaka (co-signifier), and āropa (superimposition) and abhāva (non-existence) are assigned to it as its meanings. With regard to śābdabodha-s ('verbal cognition') associated with naÑ-contained expression-especially negative compounds-K. analyses them into the following three forms: viz. (āropa+M), (abhāva+M) and (M+abhāva). These represent viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva-s between the meaning of naÑ and that of the items in construction with naÑ.

K. endeavours to formulate his meaning analyses in such a way that they accord with Pāṇini's grammatical system. The following three instances of naÑ-contained expressions are to be accounted for: (a) sarvanāmatā in "asarva", (b) ekavacanotpatti in "aneka" and (c) puruṣavacanavyavasthā in "atvaṁ bhavasi".

In order to account for such expressions, what is important is the position which the nañartha takes in relation to the śābdabodha. In the case where the nañartha is regarded as a viśeṣaṇa, there will be no difficulty in accounting for these expressions. However, when it is a viśeṣya, then the explanation becomes somewhat farfetched, and moreover, in this latter instance, we must renounce the view that naÑ functions as a vācaka.

K. seems to be of the opinion that abhāva is definitively established as a nañartha on the basis of our experience and on the authority of the Mahābhāṣya. But, concerning the cognitional position of abhāva, K. does not seem to make any definite pronouncements.