It is said that the processes of learning are those of knowledge acquisition. Pedagogy is, then, designed in accordance with various theories of knowledge. In this paper, against the recent exaggeration about the representationalistic theory of knowledge, I argue strongly for the significance of a theory dealing with noncognitive foundations of knowledge acquisition, through tracing L. Wittgenstein's On Certainty.
The first section is an overview of the foundationalistic theory of knowledge and its relation to skeptism. It is shown that the traditional theory of knowledge consists of foundationalism and mentalism.
In the second section, I take up G. E. Moore's argument against skeptism, since this argument had influence on Wittgenstein's On Certainty.
Illustrated, in the third section, is Wittgenstein's distinction between normal empirical statements and Moore's those which Wittgenstein called "world pictures". World pictures are not objects of inquiry but its foundations, which are never doubted.
How world pictures are given is described in the last section. It is made clear that world pictures are noncognitive foundations of knowledge acquisition. Such foundations are given to us without refering to them. We noncognitively obtain them through actions.