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ID 32163
本文ファイル
別タイトル
Relational Aspect of the Concept of a Person : Analytic-Philosophical Critique on the Reductive Arguments about Personhood in Bioethics
著者
杉田 浩崇
キーワード
the concept of a person
severely disabled children
Michael Tooley
the firstperson authority
the third-person criterion
人格概念
重度障害児
マイケル・トゥーリー
一人称権威
三人称規準
NDC
哲学各論
抄録(英)
This paper examines the reductive arguments about personhood in bioethics in order to illustrate a relational aspect of the concept of a person. First, the paper investigates Michael Tooley's claim that we cannot resolve the problem of abortion unless we define the concept of a person that entitles an individual to the right to life. According to him, self-consciousness is the crucial ingredient of that definition. Thus, a severely disabled child or a fetus might not have the right to life because it is unable to be aware of itself. Second, this paper, by focusing on analytic-philosophical approaches to John Locke's conception of a person, shows an interdependent relationship between the first-person authority and the third-person criterion in our ascribing consciousness to another person. Analytic-philosophical approaches suggest (1) that self-consciousness is not necessary to express oneself, and (2) that the first-person authority for expressing oneself must be judged from the third-person criterion which consists in an observable behavior. This suggestion implies that we should pay attention to the interdependent relationship when we ascribe consciousness to children in bioethical and educational contexts.
掲載誌名
広島大学大学院教育学研究科紀要. 第三部, 教育人間科学関連領域
60号
開始ページ
93
終了ページ
102
出版年月日
2011-12-22
出版者
広島大学大学院教育学研究科
ISSN
1346-5562
NCID
SelfDOI
言語
日本語
NII資源タイプ
紀要論文
広大資料タイプ
学内刊行物(紀要等)
DCMIタイプ
text
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
publisher
部局名
教育学研究科
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