このエントリーをはてなブックマークに追加
ID 14429
本文ファイル
著者
Nihous, Gérard
Saito, Kimio
キーワード
game theory
environmental problems
Kyoto Protocol
CO2 Ocean Sequestration Field Experiment
NDC
公害・環境工学
抄録(英)
This paper uses elementary arguments from game theory to consider the interaction between protago-nists involved in environmental problems. It is argued that 'generic' global problems often result in aPrisoner's dilemma, with the status quoas equilibrium. Also, a brief consideration of the KyotoProtocol confirms that if developing countries were asked to join, their dominant strategy would be torefuse, and that the recent withdrawal of the United States leaves other signatories in a precarious posi-tion. Finally, the paper focuses on a specific recent project, the CO2 Ocean Sequestration FieldExperiment, to demonstrate that many of the difficulties hampering the resolution of global-scale envi-ronmental problems have to be dealt with at local levels as well.
掲載誌名
国際協力研究誌
11巻
1号
開始ページ
25
終了ページ
41
出版年月日
2005-01
出版者
広島大学国際協力研究科
ISSN
1341-0903
NCID
SelfDOI
言語
英語
NII資源タイプ
紀要論文
広大資料タイプ
学内刊行物(紀要等)
DCMIタイプ
text
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
publisher
部局名
国際協力研究科
他の一覧