Advance Disposal Fee vs. Disposal Fee: A Monopolistic Producer’s Durability Choice Model
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Tomoda, Yasunobu 大学院社会科学研究科 広大研究者総覧
advance disposal fee
This study examines how waste disposal fee collection timing affects the durable goods producer’s choice of built-in durability under a monopoly. We categorize the disposal fee policies into two types: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. We compare an ADF policy with a DF policy using a durable-goods monopoly model. This study shows that a DF policy has two opposing effects on built-in durability. Firstly, the DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase built-in durability in order to delay the households’ disposal and to discount the future payment for the disposal fee. Secondly, the DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally to avoid the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce built-in durability in order to avoid market saturation and associated future price cuts. As a result, on the one hand, a DF policy can make the producer produce the more durable product compared with an ADF policy; on the other hand, however, a DF policy may increase the amount of waste generated, and lead to an additional environmental damage.
This research has been supported by MEXT/JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 18K01634,18K01596 and 19K01606.
Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, Hiroshima University
School of Economics, Hiroshima University