Ever since the end of the last century, the United States has-displayed great sympathy for the plight of strife-ridden China. There is, however, a great leap between feelings of sympathy and a policy which seeks to bestow great-power status. When did the American government initiate its policy to make China a great-power? For what reasons was this policy selected? The purpose of this paper is to investigate Roosevelt's concept of postwar Asia through an examination of these questions. There were several reasons behind the efforts of the Roosevelt administration to raise China to great-power status. It will be recalled that American public opinion was very sympathetic towards China. There was also the influence of the 'sister republic' image. More important than these reasons, however, was the military fact that China was in the war against Japan and holding down over twenty divisions of the Japanese Army. A President who was unable to send substantial aid could at least confer great nation status and thereby give hope to his Chinese allies. Roosevelt also believed that through this policy he could show support for the liberation movements that were springing up throughout Asia. Another important element in Roosevelt's decision to adopt this policy was the importance of a non-European leading member to the new international organization were this body to be truely universal. By reason of the above considerations, Roosevelt initiated his policy to make China a great-power immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. While it is usually thought that this policy did not come into being until the latter half of 1943, this writer would like to point out that Roosevelt was already beginning to feel disillusioned with the Chiang regime by this period. Roosevelt's plan to make China a great nation was on a descending course. By the final period of the war, Roosevelt's plan to establish a new Asian order with a U. S.-Chinese union at its center and supported by co-operation with the Russians and British, was