Mahābhāṣya ad P1.3.1研究(6)
A STUDY OF THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA AD P1. 3. 1 (6)
126.96.36.199. The proposed definition for the term dhātu: kriyāvacano dhātuḥ is applicable to a specific iteml ike √pac, which is known to be expressive of a particular action by virtue of the relation of concurrence (sāmānādhikaraṇya) between the meanings of √kṛ and √pac.
188.8.131.52. The objection is made in vt. 3 (kriyāvacana upasargapratyayapratṣedhaḥ): If the above mentioned definition is accepted, then one will have to deny the term dhātu to an item composed of a upasarga (preverb), dhātu, and pratyaya (affix) by rule. The reason is given in vt. 4 (saṃghātenārthagateḥ): The meaning is understood from their combination.
The point is that on the fundamental premise that meaningfulness results only for what is independently used in common usage, it results only for the combination, which is used to convey a meaning; but for neither a prakrti (base) nor a pratyaya, which are not used independently.
184.108.40.206. The objection is raisedin vt. 5 (astibhavatividyatīnāṃ ca dhātutvam):An additional statement should be made that √as, √bhū, √vid are called dhātu, since they have no relation of concurrence to √kṛ.
220.127.116.11.1-2. The answer to vt. 3 is given in vt. 6 A, B (pratyayārthasyāvyatirekāt prakṛtyantarṣu / dhātoś cārthābhedāt pratyayantareṣu): it is established that both a prakṛti and a pratyaya are meaningful, and not their complex, because of non-difference (avyatireka) of the meaning of the pratyaya when there are different prakṛti-s; and because of the non-difference (abheda) of the root meaning when there are different affixes.
18.104.22.168.3.1. In vt. 61C (siddhan tv anvayavyatirekābhyām) is proposed the method of analyzing a given sound chain into its constituents and attributing given meanings to them, that is, reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka.
22.214.171.124.3.2. The objection is offered: There is no reason to assume that a certain meaning is proper to the prakṛti, another to the pratyaya, and the anvaya-vyatireka method does not work decisively in establishing the meaningfulness in cases where several items denote but one object andi ndividual items have different meanings. The answer to this objection is provided: Even if this were the case, one could not suppose that either a dhtttu or a pratyaya is the expressor of all the meanings ascribed to the dhātu and the pratyaya since they are not at all characterized by a 'generic term' (sāmātnyaśabda), which requires either an item denoting something specific or acontextin ordert od enote something specific.
(To be continued.)