孟子性善説の可能性と限界
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ID | 26810 |
本文ファイル | |
別タイトル | A possibility and limitation on Mengzi (孟子)'s Seizensetu (性善説 = the ethical doctrine that human nature is essentially good)
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著者 | |
NDC |
東洋思想
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抄録(英) | Mengzi (孟子) thought that there is no essential difference between Junzi (君子) and Xiaoren (小人). And he advanced human nature is essentially good as a ethical existence. By this view all humans have a possibility to become a Shengren (聖人). As a result, human nature became all equal before Seizensetu (性善説). But, it also means Mengzi limits the human nature's other possibilities.
And Mengzi advanced three methods of learning, Qiu Fangxin (求放心), Gua Yu (寡欲), Yang Qi (養気). But Mengzi never explained these methods concretely. It means that Mengzi's Thought lacks a thought of concrete method. This is a structural limitation on Mengzi's Thought. |
掲載誌名 |
哲学
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号 | 46号
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開始ページ | 111
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終了ページ | 124
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出版年月日 | 1994-10-25
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出版者 | 広島哲学会
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ISSN | 0495-2200
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NCID | |
言語 |
日本語
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NII資源タイプ |
紀要論文
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広大資料タイプ |
学内刊行物(紀要等)
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DCMIタイプ | text
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フォーマット | application/pdf
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著者版フラグ | publisher
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部局名 |
文学研究科
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他の一覧 |