このエントリーをはてなブックマークに追加
ID 26810
本文ファイル
別タイトル
A possibility and limitation on Mengzi (孟子)'s Seizensetu (性善説 = the ethical doctrine that human nature is essentially good)
著者
NDC
東洋思想
抄録(英)
Mengzi (孟子) thought that there is no essential difference between Junzi (君子) and Xiaoren (小人). And he advanced human nature is essentially good as a ethical existence. By this view all humans have a possibility to become a Shengren (聖人). As a result, human nature became all equal before Seizensetu (性善説). But, it also means Mengzi limits the human nature's other possibilities.

And Mengzi advanced three methods of learning, Qiu Fangxin (求放心), Gua Yu (寡欲), Yang Qi (養気). But Mengzi never explained these methods concretely. It means that Mengzi's Thought lacks a thought of concrete method. This is a structural limitation on Mengzi's Thought.
掲載誌名
哲学
46号
開始ページ
111
終了ページ
124
出版年月日
1994-10-25
出版者
広島哲学会
ISSN
0495-2200
NCID
言語
日本語
NII資源タイプ
紀要論文
広大資料タイプ
学内刊行物(紀要等)
DCMIタイプ
text
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
publisher
部局名
文学研究科
他の一覧