According to some philosophers, Hegel’s philosophy, especially his science of logic, is metaphysical. However recently, other philosophers (for example, R. Brandom) have presented non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy. Is the non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy persuasive? In this article, I aim to elucidate that Hegel had already anticipated some of the important ideas of late 19th- and 20th-century linguistic philosophy, i.e., the context principle and the difference between logic and (superficial) grammar, by analyzing both his criticism of traditional metaphysics and his original theory of “judgment.” Through this discussion, I will elucidate how Hegel understood “judgment.” Finally, I will present a persuasive non-metaphysical or “naturalistic” interpretation of Hegel’s speculative philosophy (“naturalistic,” but not in the sense of “physicalistic”).