The organization of R&D and environmental policy : So does emission subsidy reduce emissions?
この文献の参照には次のURLをご利用ください : http://doi.org/10.15027/33354
ID | 33354 |
本文ファイル | |
著者 | |
キーワード | Emission subsidy
Emission tax
Emission reduction
Environmental R&D
Cournot duopoly
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NDC |
経済
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内容記述 | This paper reexamines the Poyago-Theotoky model and provides additional investigation that was conducted under a corrected environmental damage parameter. As new findings, we obtain the following. First, social welfare under a time-consistent emission tax (emission subsidy) policy is always welfare-enhancing rather than the case of laissez-faire. Second, if the environmental damage parameter is sufficiently small, then the equilibrium emission tax rate is invariably negative. It is therefore an emission subsidy. Moreover, total emissions under the emission subsidy become smaller than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is low. However, total emissions under the emission subsidy become greater than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is high.
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掲載誌名 |
IDEC DP2 Series
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巻 | 2巻
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号 | 13号
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開始ページ | 1
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終了ページ | 10
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出版年月日 | 2012-09
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出版者 | 広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
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SelfDOI | |
言語 |
英語
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NII資源タイプ |
紀要論文
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広大資料タイプ |
学内刊行物(紀要等)
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DCMIタイプ | text
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フォーマット | application/pdf
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著者版フラグ | publisher
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部局名 |
国際協力研究科
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他の一覧 |