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ID 28869
本文ファイル
著者
Nishizaki, Ichiro
Oyama, Toshihisa
キーワード
Social norms
Reputation
Simulation
Adaptive agents
NDC
数学
抄録(英)
With the existence of the social customs or norms, Naylor demonstrates a possibility of stable long-run equilibria of support for a strike in a labor market, and this implies that at least some individuals will behave cooperatively and hence the prisoners' dilemma could be escaped. In this paper, using an agent-based simulation model in which artificial adaptive agents have mechanisms of decision making and learning based on neural networks and genetic algorithms, we compare the results of our simulation analysis with that of the mathematical model by Naylor. In particular, while Naylor's model is based on rationality as it relates to individual utility maximization, agents behave adaptively in our agent-based simulation model; agents make decisions by trial and error, and they learn from experiences to make better decisions.
掲載誌名
Computational Economics
34巻
1号
開始ページ
37
終了ページ
65
出版年月日
2009-03-12
出版者
Springer
ISSN
0927-7099
NCID
出版者DOI
言語
英語
NII資源タイプ
学術雑誌論文
広大資料タイプ
学術雑誌論文
DCMIタイプ
text
フォーマット
application/pdf
著者版フラグ
author
権利情報
Copyright (c) 2009 Springer
関連情報
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
関連情報URL
部局名
工学研究科