Mahābhāṣya ad P1.3.1研究(7)
A STUDY OF THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA AD P1. 3. 1 (7)
126.96.36.199.4(.1-2). The objection has been made in vt. 3 (kriyāvacana upasargapratyayapratiṣedhaḥ) that if the definition of the term dhātu: kriyāvacano dhātuḥ is accepted, then one will have to deny the term dhātu to a complex item consisting of an upasarga and a dhātu. Now this objection is met in vt. 7 (kriyāviśeṣaka upasargaḥ) : An upasarga is a qualifier of an action. In this Vārttika, Kātyāyana wishes to imply that a meaning supposed to be in reference to an upasarga is not an action itself but its qualifier, so that the term dhātu is applied neither to an upasarga nor to such a complex item as mentioned above.
In order to illustrate this, Patañjali adduces three types of instances: prapacati, adhyeti or adhīte, and pratiṣṭhate.
i) prapacati This is a typical example to show that an upasarga is in reference to a qualifier of an action: The upasarga pra qualifies the action of cooking as understood when pac is separately used from the pra. In connection with this, it is to be noted that Pāṇinīyas hold that an upasarga has the property of revealing a qualifier of an action (kriyāviśeṣadyotaka).
ii) adhyeti, adhīte These are the instances in which a dhātu does not deviate from an upasarga. In these examples, it is hard to say of the upasarga adhi that it qualifies the action which would be understood if the dhātu iK or iN were used independently, since there is no possibility of their occurring without adhi. In order to solve this sort of difficulty, Patañjali points out the fact that adhi deviates from those dhātu-s and thereby suggests that if it is definitely determined, in the instances where adhi is used with other dhātu-s, that adhi reveals qualifiers of actions, as does pra in prapacati, then it will be established that the adhi in the present instances also has the same nature. As stated below, when establishing that the pra in pratiṣṭhate has the revealing property, Patañjali is said to resort to inference. The same is true of the adhi in the present instances.
iii) pratiṣṭhate This is the instance in which, although an upasarga and a dhātu deviate from each other, an action understood when a dhātu is used independently is different from the one understood when it is used with an upasarga. In the present instance the act of staying is understood from tiṣṭhati and the act of going from pratiṣṭhate, so that one cannot say of the Pra that it serves to qualify an action. For an action to be qualified, which should be understood when sthā is used separately from the Ira, is not found here. As explained by Bhartṛhari and his followers, by resorting to two kinds of inference: dṛṣṭānumāna and sāmānyatodṛṣtānumāna, Patañjali makes out that the upasarga pra in pratiṣṭhate is a revealer of a qualifier of the act of going and that the dhātu sthā there can denote that act as well as the action of staying, whereby he establishes that the sthā alone denotes the action of going.
(To be continued.)