Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations
IDEC DP2 Series 10 巻 8 号
1-53 頁
2020-12 発行
アクセス数 : 357 件
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今月のアクセス数 : 4 件
今月のダウンロード数 : 1 件
この文献の参照には次のURLをご利用ください : https://doi.org/10.15027/50131
| ファイル情報(添付) | |
| タイトル ( eng ) |
Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations
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| 作成者 | |
| 収録物名 |
IDEC DP2 Series
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| 巻 | 10 |
| 号 | 8 |
| 開始ページ | 1 |
| 終了ページ | 53 |
| 抄録 |
I study a self-enforcing mechanism for an international organization that interacts repeatedly over time. A random shock determines which countries would be in favor of or against taking a collective action. Thus, if the organization wants to take the action, incentives must be provided. I show that the optimal stationary equilibrium is equivalent to a mechanism characterized by voting weights. I study how this optimal mechanism depends on the discount factor. In particular, I show that within a class of parameter cases, the optimal mechanism mimics the way voting power is distributed among UN members via Security Council seats.
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| 著者キーワード |
Political Economy
Mechanism Design
Impatient Players
Security Council
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| 内容記述 |
This study is based on the first chapter of my doctoral dissertation at Yale University.
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| 言語 |
英語
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| 資源タイプ | 紀要論文 |
| 出版者 |
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
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| 発行日 | 2020-12 |
| 出版タイプ | Version of Record（出版社版。早期公開を含む） |
| アクセス権 | オープンアクセス |
