Authenticity and Creation of Selves
in Defoe’s Fictional Autobiographies

Representation of Consciousness in Retrospective Narratives

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Authenticity and Creation of Selves in Defoe’s Fictional Autobiographies:
Representation of Consciousness in Retrospective Narratives

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .................................................. i

Introduction .................................................................. 01

Chapter I  Creating a Sense of Authenticity in Fiction .... 07
  1.1 The concept of authenticity in literature ................. 10
  1.2 Defoe’s use of literary convention ......................... 16
  1.3 Defoe’s psychological realism .............................. 27
  1.4 Criticisms on Defoe’s narrative techniques of authenticity 47

Chapter II  Natural Narrative Schema in the First-person Narrative Style 59
  2.1 First-person autobiographical narrative style .......... 62
  2.2 Point of view in autobiographical memory .............. 67
  2.3 Deictic shift and the REMEMBERING schema .......... 78
  2.4 Representing memory through the RECOUNTING mode .. 81
  2.5 Representing memory through the RELIVING mode ... 100

Chapter III  Representing Consciousness in Narrative .... 125
  3.1 Consciousness, a problematic concept .................. 128
  3.2 Mediacy in narrative ......................................... 131
  3.3 A consciousness representation paradigm ................ 134
    3.3.1 Mediacy and the representation of speech and thought 134
    3.3.2 Mediacy and the representation of perception .......... 146
    3.3.3 Point of view and consciousness representation categories 154
  3.4 Mimetic diegesis I: Free indirect style .................. 162
    3.4.1 The scope of free indirect style ...................... 162
    3.4.2 Free indirect speech and thought .................... 167
    3.4.3 Narrated perception .................................... 177
    3.4.4 The effects of free indirect style .................... 183
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Mimetic diegesis II: Directness of indirect representations of consciousness</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Changes in consciousness representation categories</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV Collective Qualities in the Creation of a Self</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Narrative distance and the qualities of a self</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Robinson Crusoe and spiritual autobiography</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 The effect of spiritual conversion on collective qualities</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Robinson Crusoe and Captain Singleton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Seeming repentance in Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack and Roxana</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V Towards the Creation of Subjective Selves</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 The functions of the self in relation to others in Robinson Crusoe</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Moll Flanders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Picaresque and individual psychology in Captain Singleton</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and other picaresque works</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 The heroines’ subjective psychology in Moll Flanders and Roxana</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Roxana’s self-conscious sinning</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 The role of individual perception in Moll Flanders and Colonel Jack</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Texts</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Dictionaries</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Criticisms</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Daniel Defoe had a wide-ranging career as a writer, but is now most famous for his fiction which he wrote towards the end of his literary career. In the history of English literature, he is regarded as one of the first writers who contributed to creating the new literary genre of the novel, and his first fictional work, *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), is often said to be the first English novel. The early eighteenth century, in which all Defoe’s fictional narratives were written, was a watershed in the history of English literature in that it saw the flourishing of prose fiction, the development of journalism, and most importantly for this thesis, the emergence of the novel. Some critics regard Defoe as an important figure in creating this new form of literature, that is, the novel (Watt 1957; Kettle 1960; Novak 2000), while others place him on the periphery of the history of the English novel (Leavis 1948; Doody 1996; Warner 1998) simply because he was “an outsider: he was of the wrong religious community, the wrong political persuasion, the wrong class” (Novak 2000: 241). Defoe was a Puritan and a merchant belonging to the middle class, but his outsider status seems to have had a great impact on what and how he wrote, making him one of the first influential English novelists. As one Defoe critic, Maximillian Novak, points out, “*Robinson Crusoe* was one of the first literary texts written in English to make a major impact throughout Western Europe”, and it became one of the most widely read and studied English literary texts in the world (2000: 243).

Most of Defoe’s fictional narratives are written in an autobiographical form, which is implied by the titles such as *The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, of York, Mariner* (1719), *The Life, Adventures and Pyracies of Captain Singleton* (1720), *The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders, &c.* (1722), *The History and Remarkable Life of the Truly Honourable
Col. Jaque (1722) or Roxana: or, the Fortunate Mistress. Being a History of the Life and Vast Variety of Fortunes of Mademoiselle de Beleau (1724). Autobiography was a popular and conventional narrative style in the early eighteenth century, in which the writer reveals his/her self by describing his/her experiences at various stages of his/her lives. Defoe’s autobiographical narratives are all fictional, but they were presented not as fictional stories but as personal histories, that is, as records of facts (Mullan 1996: xii). According to Alan Downie (1997: 257), Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, with the exception of Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Colonel Jack (1722), were believed to be genuine autobiographies until the late eighteenth century.1 In the early eighteenth century, it was considered essential to state that a fictional story was really the actual history of a real person, so Defoe always made the editors of his fictional narratives claim that they were presenting a true history. In the preface to Roxana, for example, the editor presented it as “the History of this Beautiful Lady” (Rox: 1, italics original),2 and clearly stated that it is “not a Story, but a History” (Rox: 1, italics original). In this regard, his fictional autobiographies are deeply related to the concept of authenticity in the sense of “being in accordance with fact, as being true in substance” (OED, s.v. authenticity, 2).

Authenticity in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies underlies conventionality and realism.3 For one thing, Defoe could have his narratives easily accepted by the readers of popular literature by using popular conventional forms. The conventional claim that a story is true and genuine made it easier for his readers to recognize which part of the narrative was instructive, as well as to be engrossed in the narrative for their entertainment, both of which were tacitly required in early eighteenth-century writings. The effect of authenticity encouraged readers to be involved in the fictional world if realism, especially psychological realism, was achieved in such a conventional context. In order to present his narratives in an authentic way, Defoe included many personal experiences of his characters in them, both external experiences occurring in their social, political and economic
milieu and internal experiences captured by representations of their inner, psychological states. Defoe’s external or circumstantial realism – that is, his ways of representing external experiences in detail – has been much discussed in previous literary criticisms. However, his internal or psychological realism – that is, his ways of representing internal experiences with verisimilitude – has received much less attention, and it needs to be explicated more deeply so that we can understand better the authenticity in his fictional narratives. His psychological realism is also significant in relation to the historical and literary context of the early eighteenth century. Especially interesting is the relation between his psychological realism and the rise of individualism and the conceptualization of the word consciousness in the late-seventeenth century. This thesis thus investigates Defoe’s narrative techniques for representing the internal (rather than external) experiences of his characters within conventional literary forms in order to create the effect of authenticity.

The present thesis also aims to reveal how the characters’ selves in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies change as his narrative techniques develop. What he meant to represent in his fictional autobiographies is “a consciousness of self” which exists in “a world somewhat different from ours” (Richetti 1975: 8). One of the crucial themes in his fictional autobiographies, therefore, is the creation of certain ideas regarding the self – that is, the more conceptualized and abstract qualities of the self – through an individual character who is embodied and substantial in the fictional world. By so doing, Defoe revealed the relationship between his real world and the fictional world. It is not surprising that his ideas regarding the self are represented differently in each work. As his works progress, he expresses different ideas about the self through the representations of individual characters. This thesis examines the changes in the creation of selves in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, presupposing that his narrative techniques for representing individual characters become more sophisticated, or more precisely handled, as his ideas about the self change. It also illustrates that the conventional
and realistic techniques used in each of his fictional narratives contribute differently to authenticity, which consequently leads to the representation of different ideas about the self through each of his fictional characters. As this thesis focuses on the relationship between Defoe’s authenticity and his creation of selves in his fictional autobiographies, it primarily investigates Robinson Crusoe, Captain Singleton, Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack and Roxana, and it does not discuss Memories of a Cavalier (1720) or A Journal of the Plague Year (1722).

Chapter I discusses the importance of authenticity in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. Authenticity was an important literary concept in the early eighteenth century when fictional stories were considered worthless. The effect of authenticity is enhanced if what is represented in a narrative is rendered in a verisimilar way. In this sense, authenticity tends to be associated with the narrative techniques of realism, especially psychological realism. Authenticity can also be looked at in relation to conventionality. The claim that a narrative is true and genuine should be conveyed in familiar, conventional narrative forms or techniques in order for the narrative to be properly understood by potential readers. This chapter, therefore, approaches authenticity in Defoe’s fictional narratives in terms of conventionality as well as psychological realism, and proposes that it is necessary to analyse the creation of authenticity through verisimilar narrative techniques within conventional frameworks.

Chapter II explores the relationship between authenticity and the first-person autobiographical narrative style. This narrative form is the most important narrative device in terms of the conventional aspects of authenticity, as it closely imitates our natural storytelling schema. We turn our autobiographical memory into autobiographical narrative through the natural cognitive act of remembering, or “our natural schema of REMEMBERING” (Warner 2009: 16). The ways in which we remember may vary, that is, we have different remembering modes, depending on various psychological factors in recollection. This chapter examines the ways in which different remembering modes are evoked in reading Defoe’s
fictional autobiographies, and how his imitation of natural remembering modes contributes to authenticity.

Chapter III turns to narrative techniques for representing consciousness. The effective use of various consciousness representation categories is very much concerned with psychological realism and authenticity in narrative. Traditionally, speech and thought representation has been used as a framework for analysing fictional consciousness in stylistics and narratology. However, consciousness is not exclusive to the conceptual level – that is, speech and thought – but includes the perceptual level. By incorporating the narrative techniques for representing the perceptual level of consciousness into the framework of speech and thought representation, this chapter proposes a paradigm for consciousness representation. It draws critical ideas and concepts from both stylistics and narratology in order to understand better the ways of representing fictional consciousness. According to Dan Shen (2005a; 2005b; 2011; 2014), speech and thought representation and narrative point of view have attracted considerable attention from both stylisticians and narratologists. However, “since the level of presentation contains both organizational (narratological) and language (stylistic) choices, focusing only on one aspect will result in a partial picture of ‘how the story is presented’” (Shen 2005b: 142). By putting equal emphasis on both aspects, textual analyses will give a better understanding of represented consciousness. This chapter thus analyses the representation of consciousness from both linguistic and structural aspects. It illustrates how the narrative techniques for representing consciousness are used in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, and how they create psychological realism and lead to the effect of authenticity in a narrative.

Chapters IV and V demonstrate how the varieties of ideas about the self are represented effectively in each of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies through the narrative schemas and techniques discussed in the previous chapters. As G. A. Starr argues, “[t]o compose any kind of autobiography is to assume one’s own importance” (1965: 3). Through the protagonist’s embodied self that displays his
or her importance, Defoe creates some abstract ideas about the self for the reader’s edification. What this thesis seeks to reveal is the change in these ideas about the self in the later stage of his career. The quality of his characters’ experiences changes from spiritual to psychological, and correspondingly, the represented ideas about the self change from collective to subjective. Chapters IV and V respectively focus on collectivity and subjectivity in the represented experiences. The collective and subjective qualities of the narrative are discussed in relation to two literary genres which were popular in the early eighteenth century, that is, spiritual autobiography and the picaresque novel. These two chapters illustrate how Defoe uses various narrative techniques within these familiar narrative frameworks to represent his ideas about the self, and show how his way of representing them changes during his career as a writer of fiction.
Defoe’s creation of a sense of authenticity in his fiction can be associated with the historical and literary contexts of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Historical and literary expectations of authenticity in this period made a writer “cloak [his/her] artistry, conceal [his/her] creative presence behind a mask of literal verisimilitude”, however much he/she “wished to fabulate in narrative” (Boardman 1983: 2). The prose narratives of this period thus tend to “embody an impossible formal ‘request’, that the reader experience them as both true and fabricated” (Boardman 1983: 33), as in the case with Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. This chapter examines Defoe’s creation of a sense of authenticity in relation to the historical background which made him become interested in representing selves, and his narrative style and techniques that made it possible for him to portray them in his pseudo-autobiographical works.

Defoe’s fiction has been much studied in relation to the origin of the English novel, and ever since Ian Watt’s seminal book, The Rise of the Novel (1957), he has been considered a prominent figure in the history of English literature. Many literary critics have studied and written about the origin of the English novel, endeavouring to identify the political, economic, social, cultural and literary contexts in which this new literary genre appeared. They have shown that the emergence of the novel involves various factors. As Ryoji Kawasaki (2009: 3-6) argues, it has generally been discussed from two different standpoints: some critics explain that the novel is derived from other literary genres such as picaresque novels and romances (Frye 1976; Doody 1996), whereas others regard its origin as stemming from Puritanism and some related social changes in the early eighteenth century (Watt 1957; McKeon 1987; Hunter 1990). Paul Hunter lays stress on the importance of historical factors as “there is no reason at all but custom and habit to think of the
novel as growing out of romance” (1990: 23), but Margaret Anne Doody argues that “Romance and the Novel are one” as the term romance is equated with the term novel in some European languages other than English, and thus it should not be despised as “a term reserved for a certain low section of the bookstore appealing to women only” (1996: 15). I cannot agree entirely with either view because Defoe’s fiction seems to be derived from both roots. Some of his works of fiction have the characteristics of picaresque novels (e.g. Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack) or romances (e.g. Roxana) to a certain extent, while being deeply affected by religious, social and cultural matters in his times. This shows that Defoe’s fiction was affected by both the literary and the historical contexts in which he lived.

Some other critics argue that the novel is not “a natural phenomenon” as the word origin or rise implies but “a construct” made by “publishers and critics as well as writers and readers” (Downie 1997: 256-257), or that the “earlier fictional narratives we now call by the name ‘novel’ were diverse, inchoate, singular acts of institution that could only much later be seen and instituted collectively as a more or less integral genre” (Brown 1997: xviii). What should be emphasised here is that the emergence of the English novel is deeply related to both natural and artistic factors, and this is certainly true of Defoe’s fiction. The early eighteenth century was a period when something different was appearing in prose writings, but the novel did not come into existence suddenly. It gradually became familiar as a genre over a number of generations. In such a context in the history of English literature, Defoe started to write fiction. The present chapter pays due attention to both natural factors – that is, social and cultural backgrounds – and artistic factors – that is, narrative styles and techniques – and argues that he represented selves in his fictional autobiographies because there was a historical context which made him very interested in doing so, and also because the narrative techniques for doing so were available to him. What gives Defoe so special a position in the history of English literature, as Watt (1957: 32-33) observes, is that inspired by individualistic ideas, he represented immediate individual experiences more completely than any
other previous writers had done. Especially important is his ability to represent these experiences subjectively through the eyes of the heroes and heroines, which made it possible for him to involve his readers in his fictional world and let them experience his characters’ experiences vicariously. Equally important is the fact that he could do this because of his effective use of narrative techniques within forms which were familiar at that time, in order to enhance the effect of authenticity.

Section 1.1 discusses authenticity in narrative from two different standpoints: conventionality and realism. The effect of authenticity is created at the authenticating level and the level of narrative discourse in fiction, and it is concerned with the conventional claim of truthfulness in particular literary forms and the realistic representation of experiences. This section stresses the importance of these interdependent aspects of authenticity.

Section 1.2 focuses more specifically on authenticity in the conventional sense, exploring the reading public which Defoe targeted. This reveals why he chose to use familiar forms when representing things which were new and different from what had been expressed in prose writings before, and why his readers accepted and read his narratives as he expected them to do.

Section 1.3 delves more into authenticity in terms of realism. It elucidates the ideological context which encouraged Defoe to be interested in representing the personal experiences of individual characters. It particularly explores the concept of consciousness, which had a great impact on the making of the English novel in the early eighteenth century, as the representations of subjective consciousness gave Defoe the possibility of new narrative techniques.

Section 1.4 reviews Defoe’s narrative techniques as discussed by previous scholars. It gives some critical views on previous studies, arguing that his narrative techniques need explicating more in stylistic and narratological terms, so that in later chapters I can suggest that his narrative techniques for the representation of individual experiences work best when used within conventional frameworks.
1.1 The concept of authenticity in literature

As already mentioned in the introduction, Defoe’s fictional autobiographies were all presented as true personal histories. In the preface to *Moll Flanders*, for example, the editor says, “it will be hard for a private History to be taken for Genuine” (*MF*: 3), and yet emphasises that the author, who is the heroine Moll, is “suppos’d to be writing her own History” (*MF*: 3). Defoe made the editor emphasise the factuality of the narrative. Why did he present his fictional stories as true histories?

As Elizabeth Segel puts it, “[m]en have always tended to divide experience into the real – life – and the unreal – art –” and only the real is considered to be valuable (1972: 50). This seems very much to have been true in the early eighteenth century. Fabricated stories could not be taken seriously because they were not improvable or instructive (Segel 1972; Konigsberg 1985; McKeon 1987). In fact, as Michael Boardman observes, Defoe, in his prefaces, “wanted to maintain the posture that he was only presenting the memoirs of another, in part because storytelling was not yet quite respectable, in part because he believed readers derived more benefit from accounts they believed true” (1983: 108). “To some extent”, Boardman argues, “Defoe always expects his stories to be taken as true, even those in which the evidence is ambiguous because the pleasures of autobiography have been refined into a kind of artful principle” (1983: 63). As such, a “story” is regarded as invented human art, whereas a “history” is supposed to be a representation of real life, and only the latter can be instructive and beneficial to its readers. In the case of *Moll Flanders*, for example, if the authorship is ascribed to Defoe, it is recognized as a made-up story, but if it is ascribed to Moll, it is seen as a true account of her life. This implies that male authorship (Defoe as the author) signifies “artifice” and “verisimilitude”, but female authorship (Moll as the author) signifies “naturalness” and “authenticity” (see Bray 2003: 30-31). The term *authenticity* in this thesis refers to the truthfulness or factuality of the narrative, as in the second sense in *OED* (s.v. *authenticity*, 2, see also Introduction), and *verisimilitude* to an illusion of truthfulness (see *OED*, s.v. *verisimilitude*, 1). As
Defoe’s fictional narratives were presented as true histories, the concept of authenticity and that of verisimilitude are intertwined with each other in a complicated way. Authenticity is associated with the representation of truth. The editors’ claim in Defoe’s fiction that what is presented is a true history means “a denial that the story has been ‘made up’” (Segel 1972: 50, see also Miller 1974). At the same time, according to Maximillian Novak, “[t]he truth, which he never thought to be simple, lay in a kernel of ideas, not in some literal concept of experience”: the truth for him “was certainly a thing to be destroyed by either narrative or fiction or both” (2015: 155). On the other hand, verisimilitude presupposes that what is represented is “not true, or at least not entirely true, in the sense of its having really happened” (Bloomfield 1964: 341). Modern narratives, as Segel argues, “are admittedly ‘made up’. Their authors do not claim to be writing history” (1972: 50). Although they are labeled as “made-up”, the authors of these narratives use some narrative techniques “to preserve the illusion of reality” (Segel 1972: 50). That is, these techniques create in the reader’s mind the illusory feeling that he/she “becomes caught up the plausibility of the events narrated and responds to them on the level of real life” (Segel 1972: 50), which Samuel Coleridge calls the “willing suspension of disbelief” (1817b: 2, italics added). In the early eighteenth century, when made-up stories were not valued very highly, it was important for writers to present their narratives as true histories, at least in appearance, so as to prevent the reader from having any possible disbelief. In doing so, Defoe made “the subjects, techniques, and potential effects of narrative that not only purports to be true but carries with it an illusion of truth so opaque as to be impenetrable” (Boardman 1983: 6). As Boardman argues, Defoe in fact “experiments with ways of subverting his own illusory structures, of including within an overall illusions of historicity the knowledge that the reader is participating in a basically fictional world” (1983: 6). This thesis thus discusses Defoe’s authenticity under which the concept of verisimilitude is veiled, investigating his narrative techniques for making the story seem authentic, that is,
to make it verisimilar.

Early eighteenth-century narratives needed to be instructive and beneficial for their readers, and at the same time, the readers expected them to be entertaining and diverting. Defoe “consistently promulgated ... the neoclassical ideal of uniting ‘Diversion’ and ‘Instruction’ to generate a kind of sweet didacticism” (Boardman 1983: 26), which is repeatedly emphasised in the prefaces of his fictional autobiographies:

(1) *The Editor believes the thing to be a just History of Fact; neither is there any Appearance of Fiction in it: And however thinks, because all such things are dispatch’d, that the Improvement of it, as well to the Diversion, as to the Instruction of the Reader, will be the same; and as such, he thinks, without farther Compliment to the World, he does them a great Service in the Publication.* (RC: 3, boldface added)³

(2) … the *pleasant* and *delightful* Part speaks for it self; the *useful* and *instructive* Part is so large, and capable of so many *improvements*, that it would imploy a Book, large as it self, to make *Improvements* suitable to the vast Variety of the Subject. (*CJ*: 1, boldface added)

(3) *In the mean time, the Advantages of the present Work are so great, and the Virtuous Reader has room for so much Improvement, that we make no Question, the Story, however meanly told, will find a Passage to his best Hours; and be read both with Profit and Delight.*

(*Rox*: 2-3, boldface added)

The expectation that a narrative should be presented as both instructive and entertaining is of great importance as regards authenticity. The inter-relatedness of instructiveness and entertainment lies in the fact that effective instruction and
entertainment rely heavily on the readers’ expectation of, or attitude towards, represented realities in narrative. Authenticity, generally speaking, tends to be associated with realism or narrative techniques of verisimilar representations in previous scholarship. However, as Boardman suggests, Defoe’s core narrative strategies involve both “an unchallengeable illusion of literal verisimilitude” and “a refinement of the attractions available in the literature of personality: diaries, memories, autobiographies” (1983: 21). Readers are more easily instructed and entertained when narrated experiences are presented realistically in familiar, conventional ways. Authenticity should thus be investigated in relation to conventional as well as realistic qualities when discussing Defoe’s fictional narratives.

The need to avoid an accusation of lying has frequently been explained in terms of Puritan disapproval of lying: Defoe’s claim that his narratives are true stems from either “[his] own conscience” or “his desire to avoid offending his audience” (Bell 1985a: 74; see also McKeon 1987: 122-123). “The Puritan ascetic”, according to Hans Häusermann, “considered poetry, the theatre, music, dancing, and art in general to be so many snares of the devil” (1935: 310). In point of fact, in the sequel to Robinson Crusoe, which is titled Serious Reflections During the Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1720), the protagonist Crusoe argues that inventing a story is a crime and “it is a sort of Lying that makes a great Hole in the Heart” (Serious Reflections: 113). Fiction is only justified in Puritanism if its aim is “the edification of others” (Zimmerman 1975: 181). On the one hand, the claim of authenticity shows Defoe’s dislike of lying, but on the other hand, as Ian Bell observes, this claim of authenticity was “[t]he central convention in storytelling” which was “adopted by most tellers, not only Puritans” in Defoe’s times (1985a: 51). He further argues that seeing the claim of authenticity as “a way of getting round the Puritan distaste for fiction” is groundless in that such an argument based on “Defoe’s own conscience” or “his desire to avoid offending his audience” “depends entirely on an implied audience” (1985a: 74). In his view,
Defoe’s potential readers “did not distinguish very carefully between the factual and the fictional”: for such readers, any tale, irrespective of whether it was fictional or non-fictional, was “clearly for diversion” (1985a: 74). Ultimately, for Bell, the “conventional avowals of authenticity” are a way to prepare the readers for being involved in the narrative (1985a: 75). Defoe’s conventional claim of truth seems to be related to what kinds of people were reading his fiction. Bell argues that “Defoe has to be seen as a popular, or populist, author” (1985a: 4). He needed to have his prose narratives easily accepted and read by the popular fiction audience by using the literary conventions of that time.

The claim that a narrative is true is also related to a particular kind of realism. Morton Bloomfield, in the introductory part of his article about the realism in Chaucer, comments on the fundamental nature of medieval realism as follows:

Realism … has a strong conventional element in it, going back in large measure to French models. A medieval writer writes realistically not merely by observing and selecting materials from life around him but also by imitating the features of the realistic style. Realism in Chaucer, and in other medieval writers, is not merely an imitation of life but also of the characteristics of certain kinds of literature. (Bloomfield 1968: 336)

He laments the limited view of many Chaucerian critics who see “realism as a vivid slice of life and as the highest expression of literary art” (1968: 336). As a result, he argues, they tend “to see the dramatic and circumstantial element in Chaucerian narrative to the exclusion of the conventional and stylistic element – details themselves rather than how they were used” (1968: 336). He then suggests a way to look into how realism is achieved in narrative, a kind of realism called “authenticating realism”. Since “[a] basic realism in narrative is concerned with the establishment of an air of truth or plausibility to a tale”, authenticating realism is used “to avoid the accusation of lying” and is “fundamentally concerned with the
truth-claim of the narrative” (Bloomfield 1964: 338). His claim is that “a narrative must not only present a story but an authentication of that story” and thus “[t]he suspension of disbelief is a fundamental process” for the reader “to know that the story is true or presumably true” (1964: 339). Disbelief is suspended with various methods of authentication, such as titles, prefaces, first-person narrators, ordinary individuals, actual names and localities and so on, which he calls “authenticating devices” (1964: 340-341). These devices are used at different levels of the narrative structure. On the one hand, an author authenticates the narrative by putting the truth claim of the narrative on “the level of the real world” or “the authenticating level”, when he/she chooses authenticating devices such as titles, chapter headings, prefaces and first-person narrators outside the fictional world (Bloomfield 1964: 340). On the other hand, other authenticating devices such as “details of background in the tale itself or in the outside of the inner tale – in the world of the frame or the world of the ‘I’ – may be used to gain authenticity” (Bloomfield 1964: 340). These devices function at what I call “the level of the narrator’s discourse”. Authentication at the authenticating level is more concerned with literary convention, as was discussed above, because its role is to make an explicit claim that what is represented actually happened in the real world. Authentication at the level of the narrator’s discourse, in contrast, is more closely related with realism in a traditional sense: it depends largely on narrative techniques for making the narrative seem authentic. Such techniques encourage the reader to perceive as the character does, and consequently give the impression that the experiences in the narrative are real, natural, plausible, and therefore true. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 delve more into Defoe’s authentication, or in Novak’s words “the methods by which Defoe succeeded in creating a sense of the real in fiction” (2015: 2), at the authenticating level and the level of the narrator’s discourse respectively.
1.2 Defoe’s use of literary convention

Defoe used many authenticating devices at the authenticating level. The title pages do not bear his name, but instead, include such phrases as “Written by Himself” (RC: 1) or “Written from her own MEMORANDUMS” (MF: 1). Likewise in the prefaces, as mentioned above, the editors claim that the narrative is true. For example, they explicitly say that “The Editor believes the thing to be a just History of Fact, neither is there any Appearance of Fiction in it” (RC: 3) and “I [the editor] say, It differs from them [the Modern Performances] in this Great and Essential Article, Namely, That the Foundation of This is laid in Truth of Fact; and so the Work is not a Story, but a History” (Rox: 1). Before exploring Defoe’s use of literary convention in greater depth, this section focuses on the readers of his fiction, as the conventional aspect of authenticity is concerned with their perception of his narratives.

In his book, Defoe’s Fiction (1985), Bell insists upon the importance of Defoe’s “relation as storyteller to his readers” and “the storytelling conventions they were habituated to as readers” (1985a: 2). This has to do with “Defoe’s cultural position, and his own perception of that position”, as he was aware that “[t]he audience he was addressing in his fiction did not have such firm distinctions between art and artlessness, fiction and fact, or distortion and verisimilitude” (Bell 1985a: 2). Defoe’s class and religion were those of an outsider in the early eighteenth century. Born into a Puritan merchant family, he was a Puritan of a dissenting nature, and he became interested in various trades and politics. Coming from such a background, he knew very well who his writings should address and what sorts of writing convention he should use. In Bell’s view, “his religious background and his education forced him into opposition to the dominant literary culture of his day, which was predominantly classicist” (1985a: 16). Any reader of early eighteenth century literature could tell the “Ancients” from the “Moderns”: the former was usually “given prominence” whereas the latter was typically “seen as stupid, arrogant and evil” (Bell 1985a: 16-17):
Ancients were aligned with the Classics, satire and retrospection; Moderns were aligned with contemporary writing, celebration and projection. Ideologically, the Ancient sensibility held that the world was in a state of irreversible decline, and that the individual’s role was to alert others to that decline, and to become reconciled to it, however reluctantly or spiritedly. The Modern sensibility put much more emphasis on improvement, and on man’s ability to impose order on the world by the exertion of his mind and will.

(Bell 1985a: 17)

The Moderns suited Defoe’s spiritual and ideological background in that they stressed that the individual is responsible for his/her direction. His writings were, therefore, seen as different from Swift’s or Pope’s, who are classified as the Ancients of the day. According to Bell, it is also clear that Defoe mainly read the Moderns, “especially if we remember his great familiarity with travel literature, writing about economics and trade and dissenting literature” (1985a: 38). His Modern taste for writing and his class awareness are closely related to each other. As Bell observes, the characters in his fiction “[move] into and out of” the class of either “[t]he middle sort, who live well” or “[t]he working trades, who labour hard but feel no want”

(4) He told me it was for Men of desperate Fortunes on one Hand, or of aspiring, superior Fortunes on the other, who went abroad upon Adventures, to rise by Enterprize, and make themselves famous in Undertakings of a Nature out of the common Road; that these things were all either too far above me, or too far below me; that mine was the middle State, or what might be called the upper Station of Low Life, which he had found by long Experience was the best State in the World, the most suited to human Happiness, not exposed to the Miseries and Hardships,
the Labour and Sufferings of the mechanick Part of Mankind, and not embarrass’d with the Pride, Luxury, Ambition, and Envy of the upper Part of Mankind. He told me, I might judge of the Happiness of this State, by this one thing, viz. That this was the State of Life which all other People envied, that Kings have frequently lamented the miserable Consequences of being born to great things, and wish’d they had been placed in the Middle of the two Extremes, between the Mean and the Great; that the wise Man gave his Testimony to this as the just Standard of true Felicity, when he prayed to have neither Poverty or Riches.

(RC: 6)

Accordingly, Defoe’s potential readers are of “the middle State”: “Those above would have been unlikely to take an interest in anything as undignified as a romance, and those below would be illiterate, and too poor to obtain books anyway” (Bell 1985a: 6). As Crusoe’s father says, “the middle State” is “the State of Life which all other People envied” in Defoe’s fiction. They “provide a reassurance that the ‘middle station’ is the most secure one” (Bell 1985a: 6): his fiction implies that either moving up or down from the middle class leads to disaster and/or misery. In short, his class and religious background affected his liking for the Modern kind of writing and his attitude towards his readers.

Defoe was also aware of the tendency that “many readers, especially those from the less educated strata of society, began with religious reading and passed on to wider literary interests” (Watt 1957: 50). He thus needed to combine “religious and secular interests” (Watt 1957: 50) in his writings as he sought to address the middle-class reader. The result was the emergence of narratives with “a problematic nature”, in which “the paradox and anguish of surviving in a secular world with a religious ideology” were described (Richetti 1975: 3). According to Watt, “[t]his compromise, between the wits and the less educated, between the belles-letters and religious instruction, is perhaps the most important trend in eighteenth-century
literature” (Watt 1957: 50). The Modern kind of writing, which we now call the novel, in this sense is associated with secularization and popularization as well as individualism. This was not possible before the end of the seventeenth century, when the predominant world view was not “centred on the social relationship between individual persons” and when “the individual was not conceived as wholly autonomous, but as an element in a picture which depended on divine persons for its meaning, as well as on traditional institutions such as Church and Kingship for its secular pattern” (Watt 1957: 84). Therefore, it was necessary for Defoe, who sought to provide ordinary middle-class readers with Modern popular literature, to incorporate his moral and religious views into familiar literary patterns which gave his readers an expected kind of reading. His use of colloquial language rather than high-flown literary language also enabled readers from less educated classes to understand and enjoy his books.

Defoe’s way of writing fiction encourages his readers to become engrossed in the fictional world. In Bell’s words, “[t]he experience of reading one of Defoe’s pseudo-autobiographies is that of observation and semi-participation in an adventure” (1985a: 5). Defoe was very skillful at encouraging his readers “to respond sympathetically to things that [they] might normally judge harshly” (Zimmerman 1975: 184). The following elaborates on the relationship between the ways of involving the reader in the fictional world and conventional literary forms.5 I have already mentioned the conventional truth claim which is made on the title pages and in the prefaces of his fictional autobiographies. In order to make his narratives familiar and conventional, Defoe also employed some narrative genres that were popular at the time. For example, he used the narrative frame of travelogue in Robinson Crusoe and Captain Singleton, and he wrote seafaring scenes in Colonel Jack, Moll Flanders, and Roxana. His heroes and heroines move around England and/or the world as their stories proceed.

Travel literature was very popular in Defoe’s time. Hunter asserts that “[i]t is hard to imagine readers responding to any Defoe or Smollett novel, or to some
sections in almost any other novelist, without awareness of vast numbers of factual or quasi-factual predecessors” (1990: 351). In his view, travel literature was “a powerful enabling presence for the novel, perhaps nudging it in particular directions involving cultural and historical differentiation” (1990: 351). It had an enormous impact “on readers – and therefore on expectations of writing about most contemporary places and subjects” (Hunter 1990: 351-352). The increasing popularity of travel books was partly derived from “England’s growing interest in foreign (especially exotic) cultures” (Hunter 1990: 352). As Michael McKeon explains, “[t]he conflation of scientific and mercantile ‘improvement’ in the ambitions of the Society gave to foreign travel the energized excitement of a flourishing industry” (1987: 101). Hunter observes that early novelists’ attempt to “capitalize on the contemporary popularity of travel books” is often seen in their choosing “the topics of interest to readers of travel books – information about societies that are very different and often far away” (1990: 353). The exotic or strange elements in travel books not only fascinated readers but also contributed to the narrative’s authenticity. McKeon argues about “the paradoxical formula ‘strange, therefore true’” in his observations of apparition narratives (1987: 86). This formula is rationalized “on strictly psychological grounds, which demonstrates the fundamental priority, for this epistemology, of the claim to historicity in explicit opposition to the effect of verisimilitude” (McKeon 1987: 86). This “strange, therefore true” formula is similarly applied to travel narratives, in which strange and surprising adventures are typically presented as true. In point of fact, the title page of Robinson Crusoe contains the phrase “STRANGE SURPRIZING ADVENTURES” (RC: 1), and it also claims the book’s authenticity. However strange and surprising they may be, travel books provide the readers “with the comfortable feeling that they have been here – or somewhere very like it – before” (Hunter 1990: 354) by showing both a world in which things are very different and the familiar world in which things are much the same.

Another literary convention Defoe used is that of picaresque novels, that is,
tales about a roguish but appealing hero or heroine. We find this genre in *Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack, Roxana*, and to a lesser extent *Captain Singleton*. The picaresque tradition is generally thought to have originated in Spanish literature, and *La vida de Lazarillo de Tormes* (1554) by an anonymous writer is considered to be the first picaresque novel. According to McKeon, “it is only with Alemán’s *Guzmán de Alfarache* (1599, 1604) that the genre of the picaresque becomes self-conscious, retrospectively celebrating and reviving *Lazarillo* as the founding and authorizing text of a [picaresque] tradition” (1987: 97). “The Spanish picaresque”, he observes, “began to be directly influential in England after the 1570s and the first English translation of *Lazarillo*” (1987: 97). J. A. Garrido Ardila laments the neglect of Spanish picaresque novels in the study of the English novel, because he sees that in England “[t]he mass commercialisation of Spanish picaresque novels in the eighteenth century came as a consequence of some literary and historical circumstances that were mimetic of those in seventeenth-century Spain” (2015b: 118). Ardila explains the relationship between seventeenth-century Spain and eighteenth-century England as follows:

The social conditions of Spain exemplified by the picaresque were in many ways similar to those of eighteenth-century England. The increasing delinquency in England prompted the literary portrayal of low life. The growing population contributed to geographical mobility, and the migration from the country to the city caused rampant urban growth. This contributed to the increase of unemployment, with many inhabitants in large cities turning to delinquency. The rapid expansion of the turnpike road system facilitated travel and put many more people on the roads. The gradual consolidation of the British Empire and the popularisation of sea voyages also contributed to the geographical mobility of the rogues. (Ardila 2015b: 118)

For Ardila, therefore, the literary tradition of the Spanish picaresque novel
significantly influenced the rise of the English novel. In terms of the quality of the picaresque, he insists on the importance of realism and verisimilitude. One of the characteristics of the picaresque genre, he points out, is that in the picaresque novel “its protagonist is a picaro, a picaro being a literary type who (i) is born to a family of the underclass, normally new Christians, a condition that determines his future, (ii) undergoes a progressive psychological change, (iii) is a social outsider who tries [his/her] hand at several professions living by his or her wits, (iv) normally engages in unlawful activities, and (v) is a cunning trickster who deceives others” (2015a: 14-15). These qualities of a picaro, especially his/her psychological development, require “a coherent narrative structure and a verisimilar plot” (Ardila 2015b: 127). Most importantly, the “interplay between two levels of consciousness” is persistent in the picaresque (McKeon 1987: 98). What is significant about English criminal tales developed from the Spanish picaresque is that “the richest native development of that characteristic narrative tension which reflects equally the bold experiments of the picaresque and the risky undertakings of spiritual biography and autobiography” (McKeon 1987: 98). I will discuss more fully this tension between a picaro’s experiences and his/her reflections about them in Defoe’s narratives in Chapters IV and V.

Last but not least, the most important authenticating device at the authenticating level in Defoe’s narratives was “the tone of the narrator’s voice” (Bloomfield 1964: 339) in the first-person autobiographical form. The first-person autobiographical narrative style was a common way to present an invented story as a true history in the early eighteenth century. Autobiography, together with memoirs and letters, seems to have been the best way available to “imitate the most authentic and authenticated kinds of writing” (Konigsberg 1985: 21). Comparing third-person and first-person narratives, Ira Konigsberg claims that:

Narratives told in the third person, even though they may claim to be histories, have the aura of storytelling, of something made up. In part, this is because the
narrator does not directly partake in the actions, and much of what [he/she] describes either has come to [him/her] indirectly or must be imagined by [him/her]. First-person narration seems to be authentic because here is the person who was engaged in the action, actually telling us [his/her] experiences. We believe in the existence of the voice talking to us because we hear it; if the person in the story is the same as the person describing the story, then we are more ready to believe in [him/her] as well. (Konigsberg 1985: 21)

He continues that the voice of the narrator embodies “the existence” of him/her as “an actual person”, so we readily believe in him/her (1985: 21-22). In this sense, the narrator’s voice or tone becomes important for the impression of authenticity. Bloomfield argues that “in every narrative there is the tone of the narrator’s voice which serves as a kind of control and a guarantee of authenticity or on some occasions deliberate inauthenticity” (1964: 339). The narrators of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies use what he called “easy, plain, and familiar language” (Bell 1985a: 11), that is, the colloquial English of that time so that these works could be easily read as true by people in “the lower orders” (Bell 1985a: 12). Konigsberg in fact observes that “Moll’s language seems to us real in that it is close to speech and not at all ‘literary’” (1985: 22, italics added).

For Defoe, “an appearance of authenticity in a first-person account of events” (Novak 2015: 17) was so important that he “was reluctant to surrender the notion of an authentic narrator” (Novak 2015: 146). According to Novak, he “believed that what could be constructed as a seemingly convincing reality might do better than an unrealized, poorly rendered, factual account” (2015: 146). First-person narrating is a useful device to create the effect of authenticity. Its advantages are that it “provides the simplest access to that inner world of thought, feeling, and process, and for the early novelists the first-person angle … seemed the most ‘natural’ way to explore the nature of a self” (Hunter 1990: 327), and that it “afford[s] a desirable sense of reality and immediacy” (Starr 1965: 35). First-person narrating seems
natural and real because it is used in natural kinds of writing such as diaries, journals and autobiographies. Some critics (Bell 1985a; Hunter 1990) have pointed out the need to take due notice of the conventions which readers expected when discussing Defoe’s fiction, especially his early fictional autobiographies. Based on his extensive philological research, Hunter says that there existed “tens of thousands of ‘authors’ of texts” (1990: 311) such as diaries, autobiographies and letters, notes and anecdotes in eighteenth-century England, and further argues that:

Literary history has not taken into account the effects upon readership of this large class of authors or quasi-authors, people who brought to their reading of works with strong diaristic and autobiographical strategies (works like Moll Flanders, Clarissa, and Evelina) a certain formal familiarity and intense personal recognition.

Whether or not novelists consciously imitated the structures of autobiography, their shared knowledge of habits of mind and formal expectations conditioned the way they told their stories and made the truth claims of their fiction structurally more plausible. And for readers, whether or not consciously counted on or even taken into account, their own writing experience made them better prepared formally and more richly expectant than popular reading publics are usually said to be. …

For someone like Defoe who grew up in a literate atmosphere of Dissent, the awareness of recorded experience, habits of self-examination, and repeated readings of life experiences in quest of meaningful patterns clearly affected the way he organized things when he came to write lives, factual and fictional.

(Hunter 1990: 312, italics added)

As Hunter argues, therefore, the first-person narrative style often found in natural kinds of writing such as diaries and autobiographies was for Defoe an important way to represent selves when he wrote about his characters’ lives, not only for the
sake of realism and achieving a kind of immediacy but also in terms of conventionality.

Keeping a diary was thought to be a kind of duty in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, because people “believed that their eternal salvation was closely linked to the events of their everyday lives – that ‘reading’ one’s life analytically could provide awareness of one’s spiritual status” (Hunter 1990: 303). The proliferation of diaries was most evident among Protestants, especially Puritans. According to Hunter, “[t]he perceived need to keep a record of one’s daily life … was apparently very intense” in Puritanism (1990: 305). People kept diaries or journals to develop “the habit of observing and interpreting every outward and inward occurrence for the sake of its spiritual significance” (Starr 1965: 6).

On the one hand, diaries and journals are important in that they had some indirect influence on the formation of the novel because of their close attention to details. On the other, as Hunter suggests, their importance has to do with “habituating readers to the process and with forming, conforming, and furthering habits of mind for both readers and writers” (1990: 309). Defoe’s self-consciousness about the habit of reading and diary-keeping is especially evident in Robinson Crusoe, in which “analysis of the details of a hero’s life often takes an openly diaristic form” and “diaristic analysis is set in overt juxtaposition with later summary reflection on the same events as an exercise in interpretation” (Hunter 1990: 309). For example, Crusoe writes in his diary:

(5)  

(a) _July 4_. In the Morning I took the Bible, and beginning at the New Testament, I began to seriously to read it, and impos’d upon my self to read a while every Morning and every Night, not tying my self to the Number of Chapters, but as long as my Thought shou’d engage me: …

(b) … And I add this Part here, to hint to whoever shall read it, that whenever they come to a true Sense of things, they will find Deliverance from Sin a much greater Blessing, than Deliverance from Affliction.

(c) But leaving this Part, I return to my Journal. (RC: 82-83)
The first part (5a) describes Cruse’s diaristic analysis, which continues extensively, and it eventually leads to summary reflection as expressed in (5b). It then goes back to diaristic analysis as implied in (5c), which pattern is repeated in his journal.

Both Anglicans and Dissenters agree that “an event may … bear outward marks of its meaning or function” (Starr 1965: 94). Diaries and journals are full of descriptions of daily events, because “[r]egarding and weighing spiritually each episode in one’s life” in one’s diary was thus “a duty sanctioned” (Starr 1965: 9) by thankfulness or prudence. As they were “private document[s] intended only for one’s own self-scrutiny” (Hunter 1990: 313), diaries and journals just record daily happenings and do not necessarily have to be organized. By the early eighteenth century, however, private writings written primarily for one’s self-instruction became “something circulated to others for their possible spiritual enhancement and edification” (Hunter 1990: 313). They were “shift[ed] into the public realm” (Hunter 1990: 303), because “the ‘lives’ of others could provide useful examples for contemporaries struggling with an increasingly complex, increasingly urban, increasingly encroaching reality” (Hunter 1990: 313). Autobiographies, particularly spiritual ones, thus became different from diaries and journals in that they were intended to be read by the public. Indeed, as G. A. Starr points out, the crucial difference between a spiritual autobiography and a diary is that the former has “an element of pattern and direction” (1965: 36) while the latter does not. In the form of spiritual autobiography, “Defoe exploited the psychological potentialities of conventional religious notions – fear, guilt, agonies of repentance, and wrestlings with conscience” (Zimmerman 1975: vii). Ultimately, the main theme of spiritual autobiography is religious conversion. According to Starr, Christians believe that even though “[c]ircumstances vary” on the surface, “they actually confirm and heighten the constant, general features of religious experience” (1965: 13). One’s individual experiences can be adapted and assimilated to others’ for the same spiritual significance. Private writings such as diaries and journals were thus made public in the form of (spiritual) autobiography.
To sum up, the greatest advantage of first-person telling is that it evokes these natural story-telling conventions in the reader’s mind. The use of the natural and familiar first-person form, and/or other conventional forms such as the travelogue and the picaresque novel, enables the reader to expect familiar narrative development. The writer can thus more effectively make sure what kinds of instruction and diversion their readers can expect from their narratives. The combination of these narrative forms “fuse[s] into a unity under the realist surface of the narrative but provide a text that opens itself to a myriad of possible readings” (Novak 2015: 22). However, these are not the only reasons why Defoe employed a variety of conventional literary forms. Bell argues that “[f]or readers, this juxtaposition of the familiar and the strange, of predictability and hazard, and of stability and mobility, offers some reassurance that life is both comprehensible and potentially exciting” (1985a: 52). This refers to what Defoe writes in his narratives, that is, the content of his novels, but I think the “juxtaposition of the familiar and the strange, of predictability and hazard, and of stability and mobility” also applies to how he writes, that is, his narrative techniques. By juxtaposing the familiar and the strange, or more specifically, incorporating the strange into the familiar, he succeeded in using new and strange narrative techniques in a way that did not impose heavily on his readers, yet still made the readers’ involvement possible. Chapter II will examine more closely the relationship between his first-person autobiographical narrative style and authenticity.

1.3 Defoe’s psychological realism
Defoe also creates the impression of authenticity in his fiction at the level of the narrator’s discourse through the literary technique of realism, and for that, various cultural factors are concerned. Especially important is the rise of individualism, which was “based, not on the tradition of the past, but on the autonomy of the individual, irrespective of [one’s] particular social status or personal capacity”
Watt remarks on the importance of individualism in early modern literature as follows:

… the rise of individualism is of great importance. By weakening communal and traditional relationships, it fostered not only the kind of private and egocentric mental life we find in Defoe’s heroes, but also the later stress on the importance of personal relationships which is so characteristic both of modern society and of the novel – such relationships may be seen as offering the individual a more conscious and selective pattern of social life to replace the more diffuse, and as it were involuntary, social cohesions which individualism had undermined. (Watt 1957: 177)

For Watt, “Defoe, whose philosophical outlook has much in common with that of the English empiricists of the seventeenth century, expressed the diverse elements of individualism more completely than any previous writer” (1957: 62). As a result, his novels represent the economic, social, political and religious experiences of ordinary individuals. He made, in Watt’s words, “an assertion of the primacy of individual experience” (1957: 15) in his fictional autobiographies.

Watt asserts that “of the many historical causes for its emergence two are of supreme importance – the rise of modern industrial capitalism and the spread of Protestantism, especially in its Calvinist or Puritan forms” (1957: 60). He describes the various effects of capitalism on the rise of individualist society, one of which is related to the theme of this thesis, namely the ideological attitude towards labour in economic individualism. According to him, “economic specialisation” (1957: 71) in labour played an important role in making the novel possible, partly because the more specialised the social and economic structure, the greater the number of significant differences of character, attitude, and experience in contemporary life which the novelist can portray, and which are
of interest to [his/her] readers; partly because, by increasing the amount of leisure, economic specialisation provides the kind of mass audience with which the novel is associated; and partly because this specialisation creates particular needs in that audience which the novel satisfies. (Watt 1957: 71)

The needs he mentions here refer to “the substitute experiences” (Watt 1957: 71), that is, the desire to experience vicariously other human interests that people have lost in their daily lives as a result of economic specialization. In the case of Robinson Crusoe, for instance, “much of its appeal obviously depends on the quality of the ‘occasions for independent effort’ in the economic realm which it offers Defoe’s hero, efforts which the reader can share vicariously” (Watt, 1957: 71). Economic individualism affected people’s interests, leisure and needs, and the sense of loss it engendered created a social context which made it pleasant to experience other people’s lives as if they were one’s own.

Watt argues that not only economic individualism and its related ideologies but also spiritual individualism affected Defoe’s fiction. It is acknowledged that Protestantism, especially Puritanism, did much to shape individualist society. “Christianity in general”, Watt points out, “was essentially an inward, individualist and self-conscious kind of religion, and its effects were strongest in Puritanism, with its stress on the inner light” (1957: 177). The spread of Puritanism is thus closely associated with the emergence of individualism. Watt traces the essential element of Protestantism to a change in religious view in Christianity, insisting that:

it is certainly true that if there is one element which all forms of Protestantism have in common it is the replacement of the rule of the Church as the mediator between man and God by another view of religion in which it is the individual who is entrusted with the primary responsibility for [his/her] own spiritual direction. Two aspects of this new Protestant emphasis – the tendency to increase consciousness of the self as a spiritual entity, and the tendency to a
kind of democratisation of the moral and social outlook – are particularly important to *Robinson Crusoe* and to the development of the presuppositions on which the formal realism of the novel is based. (Watt 1957: 74)

In short, the Protestant idea of seeing the individual as having a direct relationship with God was conducive to the rise of individualism. This was a significant change of view in Defoe’s time, because it meant that people were gradually changing from an authority-based way of seeing the world to a more individually oriented one. Critics do not agree on whether the rise of the novel can be attributed to capitalism and Protestantism, but capitalism and Protestantism, especially Puritanism, in relation to individualism, definitely had an impact on Defoe’s fiction. In this historical context, it seems quite natural for him to have become interested in personal experiences.

Defoe’s fiction describes individuals moving through time and space in both the external milieu and the internal world peculiar to those individuals, and for him, the experiences in one’s daily life were of primary importance for one’s spiritual direction. It is evident that the “subjective and individualist spiritual pattern” (Watt 1957: 75) is very important in his fiction. For example:

*Robinson Crusoe* initiates that aspect of the novel’s treatment of experience which rivals the confessional autobiography and outdoes other literary forms in bringing us close to the inward moral being of the individual; and it achieves this closeness to the inner life of the protagonist by using as formal basis the autobiographical memoir which was the most immediate and widespread literary expression of the introspective tendency of Puritanism in general.

(Watt 1957: 75)

Also important in his argument here is that he has linked the protagonist’s psychological experiences (the “closeness to the inner life of the protagonist”) with
the use of the autobiographical narrative style ("autobiographical memoir"). By using the first-person autobiographical style, he shows how each protagonist grows spiritually and psychologically – that is, the way in which the authorial "I" behaves and feels changes in the course of his/her life. Every fictional autobiography is told through the cognitive act of remembering and reflecting based on the individual’s memories. In other words, retrospection always requires a subject of consciousness through which personal memories are recollected. This story-telling framework is therefore important for the realization of psychological realism in Defoe's fiction (see Chapter II).

Defoe’s ability of representing personal experiences – both external and internal ones – in a realistic way has often been commented on. According to Thomas Keymer, the modernist novelists Virginia Woolf and James Joyce greatly admired this ability of his, calling him a “genius for fact” (2007: viii) and “the greatest precursor of the realist movement” (2007: ix). As Monika Fludernik observes, “the realist novel has been conceived as starting with Defoe” (1996b: 37) since Watt’s The Rise of the Novel (1957). In this seminal study, Watt suggests what he calls “formal realism”, which refers to:

the narrative embodiment of a premise that Defoe and Richardson accepted very literally, but which is implicit in the novel form in general: the premise, or primary convention, that the novel is a full and authentic report of human experience, and is therefore under an obligation to satisfy its reader with such details of the story as the individuality of the actors concerned, the particulars of the times and places of their actions, details which are presented through a more largely referential use of language than is common in other literary forms.

(Watt 1957: 32)

Watt’s concept of the formal realism of the novel, which Defoe and Richardson applied “much more completely than had been done before” (1957: 33), is based
on an “immediate imitation of individual experience set in its temporal and spatial environment” (1957: 32). For Watt, Defoe “occup[ies] a very central position between the subjective and the external orientations of the novelist” (1957: 295). His use of formal realism has resulted in the immediate rendering of “the individual ego” and “the material world”, which has led to “a greater reality in his novels than in previous fiction” (Watt 1957: 295). His autobiographical narrative style, according to Watt, is “so well suited to reflect the tension between the inner and the outer world” (1957: 295). Indeed, Defoe was interested in “external events”, “the fluctuations of his narrator’s psyches”, and “a kind of fascinating interaction between world and mind” (Boardman 1983: 4). As Novak observes, he creates “an illusion of the real”, depicting the contemporary world through the consciousness of his individual characters (2000: 248). His narratives “derived their power directly from the representation of characters experiencing a vividly realized world. Only in these works did he exert a constant effort at rendering that distinctive way in which his characters interacted with their environments” (Novak 2015: 39).

Although Defoe’s realism has been associated with both the internal and the external worlds of his characters, earlier studies tend to “think of Defoe in terms of circumstantial realism rather than psychological realism” (Novak 1973: 121). Woolf made a pioneering comment in this respect when she pointed out in *The Common Reader* (1957 [1919]), as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, that Defoe was not “a mere journalist and literal recorder of facts with no conception of the nature of psychology” (1957 [1919]: 127). More recent studies have come to emphasise the importance of psychological realism in his fiction. Watt admires his “psychological closeness to the subjective world of the characters” (1957: 297), while also emphasising his circumstantial realism. Boardman repeatedly mentions the significance of the representation of “psychology”, “thought and emotion” and “inner life” (1983: 42, 43, 46). More recently, Novak (1973; 2000; 2008; 2015) has argued that “Defoe was surely interested in rendering the social and political milieu in which his characters moved, but he was more

Fludernik (1996b) argues that realism should be identified in terms of human psychology:

The motivational aspect of realism links with the novel’s increased psychologism. Novels spend more space on explaining characters’ motives, and they also portray characters’ deep-seated emotions and fears, reflections and enthusiasms in verisimilar terms. Unlike the generally mannered and formalistic soliloquy of the Renaissance romance, novelistic renderings of characters’ minds move away from the rhetorical set piece to a representation that evokes more individualistic emotions. Realism therefore links up with an individual’s very personal experience and the verisimilar rendering of it in the text. (Fludernik 1996b: 37)

Here, Fludernik uses the term realism as being linked “not to the nineteenth-century movement of Realism but to the novel’s mimetic evocation of reality both from a sociological and psychological perspective” (1996b: 37). For her, it refers neither to “the too restrictive generic definition of realism as a late nineteenth-century literary style and movement” nor to “external realism” which describes “the mere occurrence of realistic detail as distinguishing feature”, but to “internal realism” in which “the psychological realm” of characters is described (1996b: 38). This thesis stresses the importance of psychological realism following Novak (1973; 2000; 2008; 2015) and Fludernik (1996b) in the formation of realism in Defoe’s fiction.

Konigsberg (1985) and Kawasaki (2007; 2009) similarly lay stress on the importance of psychological realism in Defoe’s fiction. They have pointed out that he intentionally uses revolutionary narrative techniques to represent individual psychology in order to portray external reality subjectively. Konigsberg (1985) describes the development of narrative techniques from Defoe to Austen. For him, visualization and internalization are fundamental to the creation of the novel, and
thus “the true nature of the novel’s ‘realism’” lies “in the nature of the reader’s involvement” (1985: 3). He observes that:

Something happened to fiction in the eighteenth century that made the reader respond to narrative as never before, something more than an inclusion of ‘details’ and ‘a more largely referential use of language’, something that involved the reader deeply with the characters and their world.

(Konigsberg 1985: 3)

He believes the cause of this change is “a radical alteration in point of view” (1985: 7). “Point of view”, he explains, “became a means not merely to allow the reader to see what a character sees but also to perceive with the character, to have [his/her] mind filled with the character’s sights, ideas, and responses” (1985: 7). Defoe initiated what Konigsberg calls “visual narration” (1985: 12), that is, the representation of the external world filtered through the point of view of the character, so the reader can be involved in the internal experiences of that character. Kawasaki also comments that Defoe was interested in representing the inner thoughts of a character who has to make a moral choice (2009: 250). What he thinks revolutionary about Defoe’s narrative techniques is his ability not only to render past experiences objectively but also to represent the external world through a first-person narrator’s subjective interpretation through the handling of narrative point of view (2009: 262). Especially, he thinks that the shift in point of view from the narrator to the character is indispensable to represent the character’s psychology. For him, Defoe’s ability to render images of the real and represent his characters’ consciousness by using this new narrative technique is the reason why he is regarded as one of the most important figures in English literature. As Novak observes, Defoe actually “composed under the impression that what he was doing was entirely new”, while “he derived certain techniques from some already existing traditions” (2015: 16).
It has been repeatedly noted that the novel has been more closely associated with individual psychology than any other literary genre, and Defoe’s fictional autobiographies are prime examples of this critical view. “O! what a felicity is it to Mankind … that they cannot see into the Hearts of one another!” ([MF: 152]) says Moll Flanders to herself, when she consents to marry a bank clerk, who believes that she is an honest woman, and sees tears come to his eyes. Indeed, we cannot “see into the Hearts of one another” in real life, but we can see into the hearts of the characters in a novel. As Konigsberg says, one of the novel’s crucial differences from earlier fiction is its ability to represent “psychological states in a credible way that permitted the reader to internalize the thought processes of the character” (1985: 4).

Many literary critics have explored representation of consciousness as an important literary practice for expressing psychological experiences in the novel. For example, Hunter argues that one of the factors that differentiates the novel from romance is “the degree and quality of self-consciousness in novels, a strikingly different awareness of the processes of thought and feeling that affect individuals in relation to their world and their experiences in it” (1990: 23-24). According to the narratologist F. K. Stanzel, representations of consciousness are “especially prominent in the novel”, although it is found in all literary genres (1984: 126-127). David Lodge, who is a literary critic as well as a novelist, regards literature as “the richest and most comprehensive” “record of human consciousness” (2002: 10), and says that the novel in particular can “[create] fictional models of what it is like to be a human being, moving through time and space” (2002: 14). What the novel can do is not limited to mere descriptions of events that are consciously experienced. As the stylistician Joe Bray suggests, “[f]rom its beginnings, the novel has been associated with some kind of an attempt to render individual psychology, to delve into the minds of its characters” (2003: 1, italics added). In Lodge’s words, it can capture “the dense specificity of personal experience” (2002: 10, italics added). The representations of the density of conscious human experiences are also discussed in
terms of realism in fiction. As discussed above, Fludernik argues that “[t]he motivational aspect of realism links with the novel’s increased psychologism” (1996b: 37). As such, the novel has been associated with individual consciousness in literary criticism.

Consciousness may seem like a common word which has been used for centuries, but the history of it is relatively new. Etymologically speaking, it consists of the stem conscious, from the Latin con (with), sci (know) and -ous (of the nature of) plus the suffix -ness. According to OED, the first recorded use of it is in 1632 with the meaning “[i]nternal knowledge or conviction; knowledge as to which one has the testimony within oneself; esp. of one’s own innocence, guilt, deficiencies, etc.” (s.v. consciousness, 2). From the Middle English period till the nineteenth century, the equivalent word for this meaning of consciousness was conscience (see OED, s.v. conscience, 1). The most common modern sense of the word consciousness is found in the fifth sense in OED: “[t]he totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings, which make up a person’s conscious being”, the first record of which dates back to 1690 (s.v. consciousness, 5. a). This implies that writers before the seventeenth century, such as Shakespeare and Chaucer, were not familiar with the word consciousness, though the representation of what we call consciousness today can be found in literary texts written before the seventeenth century. However, those who lived before the word appeared were perhaps not consciously aware of the notion of consciousness, so they did not conceptualize it and give it a name. In the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s words, the emergence of the word in the seventeenth century suggests that “[a]lthough the bard [Shakespeare] understood deeply the nature of extended consciousness and virtually planted it in literary form within Western culture, he could never name it as such” (1999: 232). Kawasaki (2009) similarly observes that it was in the late seventeenth century that consciousness is recognized and named as consciousness. This explains, he argues, the fact that the representation of characters’ consciousness before the late seventeenth century is limited to the religious context,
and that it was difficult and rare before then for writers to represent a character’s subjective consciousness outside the religious context (2009: 192).

Damasio observes that “[t]he preoccupation with what we call consciousness now is recent – three and a half centuries perhaps – and has only come to the fore late in the twentieth century” (1999: 231). Although the emphasised focus on consciousness began to gain attention very recently, the notion of consciousness has been of great concern for philosophers since the emergence of the word in the late seventeenth century. Indeed, the fact that the word consciousness was created in this period implies that there was a growing interest in individual interiority at that time. Those who lived in the late seventeenth century were so interested in the notion of consciousness that they gave a name to it, and it was often discussed by the philosophers of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

It is no coincidence that a new literary genre, which was later called the novel, emerged in the early eighteenth century, soon after the concept of consciousness was given a name. Many critics imply that one of the key reasons for the rise of the novel may be explained in relation to the emergence of this word. As discussed above, the eighteenth century saw the rise of individualism, in which “a Protestant, capitalistic, imperial, insecure, restless, bold, and self-conscious culture found itself confronting a constructive, authoritarian, hierarchical, and too-neatly-sorted past” (Hunter 1990: 7). It also saw “the rise in literacy, the expansion of print media, and the increased circulation of texts, goods, and people” and the “democratization of the institution of life writing” (Smith and Watson 2010: 115). In such a period, the way in which people saw their world was gradually changing, and individual consciousness became “the central focus of the universe” (Konigsberg 1985: 9).

This change can be observed in the adaptation of casuistry in the period. Hunter explains that “[t]he traditional purpose of casuistry was to examine how moral and ethical generalities apply to specific circumstances” (1990: 290). He adds that this traditional purpose became less distinct in the mid-seventeenth century, when it began to be applied to “highly particular circumstances and specific
situations within a context of changing assumptions about human nature”: casuistry turned into “a version of the developing ‘individualism’” (1990: 290). According to Starr, Defoe “is aware that life is infinitely various, that every new situation poses new problems, and that these problems must be dealt with on their own terms” (1971: viii). John Richetti similarly argues that:

Casuistry is the source of both the fragmentation and coherence of Defoe’s fiction; it is a habit of mind which operates on case histories by accepting and examining all the data of experience and finally extracting the morally coherent possibilities, discovering moral structure in what seems to be randomly selfish or instinctive action. (Richetti 1975: 6-7)

The concept of consciousness was crucial in the acceptance of casuistry in empirical terms in this period. Casuistry “rests on an assumption that something definable as conscience or consciousness is at the core of individual identity” (Starr 1971: ix), and it is “[t]he extension of casuistry into the weekly popular press” with the initiation of presenting “a distinct shift toward individual psychology” that might “[reduce] casuistry almost to a one-by-one consideration of issues – an ‘abuse’ from a purist perspective” (Hunter 1990: 292, italics added). People gradually began to see reality less in terms of a providential relationship with God, and more in terms of a relationship between their internal world and the external world. From the late seventeenth century onwards, people have believed that what we know about reality comes from our knowledge of the internal and external world. For example, John Locke says in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding:

Our Observation employ’d either about external, sensible Objects; or about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

(Locke 2008 [1694]: II. I, ii, italics original)
He regards consciousness as “the perception of what passes in a Man’s own mind”, because human knowledge cannot “go beyond [his/her] Experience” (2008 [1694]: II. I, xix). In France “Descartes had gone inside the human mind to discover reality, but he saw there innate ideas of the empirical world that derived from the same divine source as that reality”, but Locke denied innate principles and “put the burden of knowing reality on man’s shoulders” (Konigsberg 1985: 8). In other words, for Locke, the world was defined not in innate but in empirical terms.

Locke’s empiricism influenced Defoe’s philosophical attitude. According to Watt, “Defoe’s style reflects the Lockean philosophy in one significant detail: he is usually content with denoting only the primary qualities of the objects he describes – their solidity, extension, figure, motion and number – especially number: there is very little attention to the secondary qualities of objects, to their colours, sounds or tastes” (1957: 102). I do not think this is the only “significant detail” which Defoe’s narratives represent, for Locke’s influence can also be seen in Defoe’s representations of consciousness (see Chapter III). Consciousness “made the present moment the center of human attention” in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century (Hunter 1990: 194), and the importance of the individual consciousness “as the central focus of the universe” (Konigsberg 1985: 9) was reflected in the narratives of the period.

One important characteristic of consciousness is its subjective nature. In both science and philosophy, it is considered to be a biological phenomenon which has evolved over millions of years (see, for example, Dennett 1993 [1991]; Damasio 1999; Searle 2002; Humphrey 2011; and Dehaene 2014). For example, consciousness, in John Searle’s view, should be regarded “as part of our ordinary biological history, along with digestion, growth, mitosis and meiosis” (2002: 7). Stanislas Dehaene similarly observes that “[c]onsciousness is an elaborate functional property and as such is likely to have been selected, across millions of years of Darwinian evolution, because it fulfills a particular operational role” (2014: 91). As a biologically evolved function, it co-exists with the organisms in our body
in which it functions. Damasio explains this function in terms of the relationship between the organism (“that within which consciousness occurs”) and the object (“any object that gets to be known in the consciousness process”\(^{13}\)) (1999: 20). Although it is a biological phenomenon, consciousness has some features which are different from other biological phenomena. Its most crucial feature, according to most scholars, is its subjectivity. In other words, it is regarded as a private, subjective, first-person phenomenon:

There is a sense in which each person’s consciousness is private to that person, a sense in which [he/she] is related to [his/her] pains, tickles, itches, thoughts and feelings in a way that is quite unlike the way that others are related to those pains, tickles, itches, thoughts and feelings. (Searle 2002: 7)

Consciousness is an entirely private, first-person phenomenon which occurs as part of the private, first-person process we call mind. (Damasio 1999: 12)

The fact that consciousness is subjective means that it always has a point of view. The philosopher Daniel Dennett observes that consciousness and point of view are not separable: “[e]vents in consciousness … are ‘by definition’ witnessed; they are experienced by an experiencer, and their being thus experienced is what makes them what they are: conscious events” (1993 [1991]: 29, italics original). He later explicitly states that “[w]henever there is a conscious mind, there is a point of view” (1993 [1991]: 101, italics original). The linguist Wallace Chafe similarly points out that consciousness is constantly oriented from the point of view of an experiencer (1994: 30, 132).

The notion of subjectivity is closely associated with the idea of the self, which has also been actively discussed since the seventeenth century. It is an evident fact that the notion of consciousness appeared when there was increasing interest in the self. Stephen D. Cox observes that “[n]othing is more common in eighteenth-
century literature and philosophy than the search for the ‘true self’, a self that is often rather conveniently regarded both as an individual’s ‘real’ identity, and as the principle from which [he/she] can derive the greatest moral significance. Yet this essential self proves very difficult to discover and express” (1980: 7, also qtd. in Laden 1987: 14-15). As Marie-Paule Laden points out, “[t]his notion of an ‘essential self’ derives primarily from Cartesian thought, and beyond from the philosophy of Aristotle” (1987: 15). However, in the eighteenth century, the idea of the self was discussed in terms not only of “Cartesian consciousness”, but also of “the empiricist flow of sensations” (Laden 1987: 8). Again, Locke appears as a prominent figure in this respect. The Cartesian approach to the notion of the self raised some questions for Locke, so he attempted to solve the problem of the self in an empirical way:

The Cartesian cogito did not solve the problem of the subject for most philosophers of the eighteenth century. Descartes’s assertions concerning man’s innate ideas were called into question even by the end of the seventeenth century, with the publication in 1690 of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke’s empiricism proved as influential as Descartes’s philosophy in the eighteenth century’s attempts to determine the nature of the self. (Laden 1987: 15)

In particular, a new chapter entitled “Of Identity and Diversity” (II. XXVII) in the second edition of Locke’s Essay (1694) is of importance in this regard, as it initiated “the modern theory of personal identity” (Sorabji 2006: 94) and “vigorous discussion about consciousness and its relationship to personal identity” (Bray 2003: 10). Bray points out that for Locke, consciousness in the sense of “relating to oneself”, as is found in the philosophical sense in OED (“the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections” (s.v. consciousness, 4. a)), is “the vital criterion of personal identity” (2003: 11). In order to explain where personal
identity exists, Locke tells us that what he calls a person is:

a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it
self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it
does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it
seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without
perceiving, that [he/she] does perceive. (Locke 2008 [1694]: II. XXVII, ix)

Locke’s “person”, as he later says, is “the name for this self” (2008 [1694]: II.
XXVII, xxvi, italics original). Personal identity, or the identity of the self, is
explained as the same man having the same self at different times, or in terms of
“psychological links” (Sorabji 2006: 94, 105) or “psychological continuity” (Bray
2003: 12),\(^\text{15}\) which is what Locke calls “consciousness”. As quoted by Bray (2003:
12), Watt comments on Locke’s personal identity thus (II. XXVII, ix-x): “Locke
had defined personal identity as an identity of consciousness through duration in
time; the individual was in touch with [his/her] own continuing identity through
memory of [his/her] past thoughts and actions” (1957: 21). Memory is important
for psychological continuity since it was regarded as “the basis of personal identity”
in Locke’s time (Konigsberg 1985: 5). Richard Sorabji has a similar view regarding
the role of memory, and thus observes that “[a]mong the psychological links
stressed by Locke, the one most emphasized by him and most attended to nowadays
was memory” (2006: 94, italics original). He then argues that “[s]elf-creation
through memory involves dangers that do not beset self-creation through conscious
choice” (2006: 108), and goes on to give some reasons for this:

For what past actions people can bring to consciousness may depend on how
comfortable or uncomfortable it would be to bring to consciousness, as if one
were remembering them, various past actions. No doubt, Locke did not intend
to allow this. Rather it is a criticism of his theory that it does not seem to
exclude a self-serving inability to remember discreditable actions, and ability
to bring to consciousness creditable actions as if one were remembering them.
… Locke cannot reply that he means to be speaking only of remembering
actions that really were mine. For on his theory, for them really to be mine is
for them to be able to be brought to consciousness as if remembered. Nor can
he say that for them to be really mine is for them to be genuinely remembered.
For genuine memory presupposes the idea that the previous experience of
them was really mine, and so cannot be used to explicate the idea of being
really mine. Locke is rightly careful to avoid appealing to genuine memory
and speaks of consciousness instead. (Sorabji 2006: 108-109, italics original)

If self-creation is dependent on “how far our consciousness can extend” (Sorabji
2006: 108) to the past, or in other words, if the identity of the self is created through
remembering, there is always a choice made by that self’s consciousness. This
naturally causes the self to be divided into at least two functions: the self that
remembers and the self that is remembered. In point of fact, Locke himself was
aware of this distinction, as Bray emphasises (2003: 12-14). Bray insists on the
importance of “Locke’s belief that identity of person and self is created only ‘as far
as … consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought’”
(Locke 2008 [1694]: II. XXVII, ix, qtd. in Bray 2003: 12, Bray’s italics). Locke’s
implicit acknowledgement that consciousness cannot always be connected to past
states of the self is evident when he says in his Essay that:

if it be possible for the Man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at
different times, it is past doubt the same Man would at different times make
different Persons; which, we see, is the Sense of Mankind in the solemnest
Declaration of their Opinions, Humane Laws not punishing the Mad Man for
the Sober Man’s Actions, nor the Sober Man for what the Mad Man did,
thereby making them two Persons; which is somewhat explained by our way
of speaking in English, when we say such an one is not himself, or is besides himself; in which Phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or, at least, first used them, thought, that self was changed, the self same Person was no longer in that Man. (Locke 2008 [1694]: II. XXVII, xx)

What is clear from both explicit and implicit views on the relationship between personal identity and consciousness is that the possibility that a man can be two or more different selves arises from the fact that he may have a kind of consciousness that is outside the reach of memory, as well as the fact that consciousness is a selective memory. This possibility, as Bray argues, has “important consequences for the representation of consciousness in the novel, especially in first-person narratives” (2003: 14). In this respect, Laden is right when she regards “the eighteenth century’s preoccupation with the problem of the subject or the ‘self’” as “a preoccupation not without links to the contemporary flourishing of first-person narratives” (Laden 1987: 14). She also makes an important remark in discussing René Lesage’s Gil Blas (1715-35) and Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722), namely that the self in autobiographical narratives in the early eighteenth century is:

a copy of an attempted copy of the model available, the ‘real self’. But for the real self, which has never possessed a distinct identity, the autobiographical self has another function. It must project that coherence and identity lacking in the author, and trace the evolution that culminates in the self at the time of writing. This kind of autobiography resembles the falsified archive, the rewritten history of a totalitarian power; and not surprisingly, since it emanates from the author’s efforts at totalization. Through writing the individual shapes [him-/herself]. (Laden 1987: 49, italics added)

The problem of personal identity or self is always “a contentious issue in the context of any autobiography, memoir or other confession as such works are the public
attestation of a subjective experience” (Borsing 2017: 117). In *Serious Reflections*, Defoe expresses his idea regarding human life that “[e]verything revolves in our minds by innumerable circular motions, all centering in *ourselves*” (*Serious Reflections*: 2, italics added). The representation of selves that have different functions in the first-person narrative is, therefore, a prominent feature of his fictional autobiographies. Autobiography “becomes an attempt to create self and soul” (Zimmerman 1975: 5), and for Defoe, “the self is composed and recovered in autobiographical fiction” (Marshall 2004: 917). Defoe uses the first-person narrative style in, for example, *Robinson Crusoe*, so that Crusoe can represent himself as himself, “convert[ing] the self itself to autobiography” and “compos[ing] the self in the print of autobiography” (Marshall 2004: 917). As will be discussed further in Chapter II, the imitation of a real self is so characteristic of the first-person narrative that this narrative style enhances the effect of authenticity in a different way from the third-person narrative.

Interestingly, what the present-day science of consciousness is trying to do is to explain such subjective conscious states objectively. Dehaene explains that this tendency gives us an idea about the essential characteristic of consciousness:

> Not only does it [introspection] provide valuable data, which can often be confirmed objectively, by behavioral or brain-imaging measures, it also *defines* the very essence of what a science of consciousness is about. We are looking for an objective explanation of subjective reports: signatures of consciousness, or sets of neuronal events that systematically unfold in the brain of a person whenever [he/she] experiences a certain conscious state. By definition, only [he/she] can tell us about it.

(Dehaene 2014: 42, italics original)

Therefore, even if you have “the data from all of these high-powered scans” and “the equally high-powered computers to analyze the wealth of data in some
meaningful way”, and “obtain a remarkable set of correlates of the contents of the image in mind”, you will never gain someone else’s “experiences of that image” (Damasio 1999: 306, italics original).\textsuperscript{17}

This subjective nature of consciousness is also evident in the consciousness represented in novels. What is unique about consciousness in the novel is that we can have access to other people’s consciousness in a quite different way from the way in which we do so in our daily lives. Although consciousness is a private, internal phenomenon, we can observe it externally through “public manifestations” (Damasio 1999: 83) in real life. Damasio explains that “[t]hose manifestations do not describe the internal process in the same direct way that a spoken sentence translates a thought, yet there they are, available to observation, as correlates and telltale signs of the presence of consciousness” (1999: 83).\textsuperscript{18} In the novel, however, we can see other people’s interior states directly, even though they are fictional, and we can feel as if we were experiencing their conscious states:

In the novel, readers can peek into traditionally secret spaces – physical, mental, or emotional – and if readers are made to feel voyeurs and violators of traditional mores in doing so, they still are allowed to peep and encouraged to think that their curiosity is natural and appropriate to art. (Hunter 1990: 38)

Indeed, as Lodge explains, the novel “creates fictional models of what it is like to be a human being, moving through time and space” (2002: 14). Therefore, “[t]he novel’s achievement is in allowing us to be in someone else’s ‘senses’ and our own at the same time, and it is in relation to this dual purpose that narrative technique must be understood” (Konigsberg 1985: 6). What narrative techniques can do is to represent “the entire spectrum of mental phenomena – thought, states of mind, emotions, perceptions, sensations, and so on” which are not linguistic by nature, or in other words, to “access and linguistically articulate these phenomena in characters’ minds, even if the characters do not do so themselves” (Rundquist 2014:}
Defoe’s psychological realism through the narrative techniques of consciousness representation at the level of the narrator’s discourse is important for the embodiment of subjective reality. It encourages the reader’s involvement in the narrative by rendering the protagonist’s immediate experiences. Unlike authenticating realism which directly claim to be true, psychological realism does not directly claim the authenticity of the narrative, but enhances the effect of authenticity because realistic representations give credibility, plausibility and contemporaneity to the narrative. Although Defoe’s psychological realism has been emphasised by some critics, his narrative techniques for representing his characters’ consciousness do not seem to have been fully explored. The next section reviews previous studies which examine his narrative techniques for the subjective rendering of his characters’ consciousness, after which Chapters II and III will demonstrate more fully his narrative techniques of psychological realism within conventional frameworks.

1.4 Criticisms on Defoe’s narrative techniques of authenticity

When creating a narrative, we need narrative techniques. Konigsberg explains that “[n]arrative techniques are not used merely to give us an emotional experience but to have us learn by extending our own experience and hence broadening our awareness about human nature, about the world in which we live, and about ourselves” (1985: 17). While the importance of Defoe’s use of literary convention and psychological realism has been noted by some critics, as mentioned above, neither his narrative techniques for achieving this kind of realism nor the effect of using such techniques within conventional forms has yet been explored adequately. Defoe was considered to be on the periphery of the history of English literature until Watt’s The Rise of the Novel was published in 1957, but since then, he has been studied in a more sophisticated manner. His works tend to be examined in relation
to political, economic, scientific or social themes, or in terms of individualism or colonialism (Kawasaki 2009: 252), but despite such “subtle and intelligent attention” (Bell 1985a: 1) to them, his narrative techniques have received much less attention than the above-mentioned themes.

Among the studies that seek to identify his narrative techniques for psychological realism, Watt sees the prominent feature of Defoe’s narratives as the “immediate imitation of individual experience” (1957: 32); Starr as the “subjective interpreting of the external world” (1974: 284); Richetti as his “intensely mimetic fiction” (1975: 11); Snow as the “remarkable quality of immediacy” (1976: 178); and Konigsberg as the “individual’s perception of reality” (1985: 21). What they all regard as important in Defoe’s narratives is the mimetic quality or the immediate representation of an individual’s subjective experiences. Defoe understood very well that “getting at ‘the thing itself’” (Novak 2015: 44) is impossible. Instead of aiming at “getting at ‘the thing itself’”, he sought “the methods of deceiving the eye and the mind into accepting the presence of the representation as something that might have existed” (Novak 2015: 44). In this regard, his verisimilitude, that is, his ways of creating a sense of reality in his fiction, has been prominently commented on by literary critics (see, for example, Secord 1973; Hardy 1977; Merrett 2013; Borsing 2017). Novak, for example, observes that “Defoe’s real technical achievement involved slowing down the pace of first-person narrative by forcing on single actions and characters and, through various devices of repetition, offering new angles of vision” (1973: 132). He also admires Defoe’s “willingness to display emotions and to create characters who display emotions” (2015: 221). However, these critics, including Novak, do not delve into the details of his narrative techniques in their studies. Kawasaki (2009) laments this inadequate attention to Defoe's narrative techniques, because, in his view, it is his revolutionary narrative techniques for representing his characters’ subjective experiences mimetically that made the novel possible. To my knowledge, Kawasaki (2009) is the only study with textual analyses which exclusively focuses on Defoe’s narrative
techniques.

Kawasaki (2009) explores Defoe’s narrative techniques in order to explain the formation of the English novel in terms of narrative techniques. He illustrates how Defoe uses different narrative techniques from those in spiritual autobiographies, romances and books about conduct of the day. As already mentioned in 1.3, he praises Defoe for representing the external world through a first-person narrator’s subjective consciousness with his skillful handling of narrative point of view, while at the same time giving an objective description of the narrator’s experiences. In order to explain the significance of these narrative techniques used by Defoe, Kawasaki uses a framework for language representation called “displaced immediacy”, which the linguist Wallace Chafe puts forward in his book, *Discourse, Consciousness and Time: The Flow and Displacement of Conscious Experience in Speaking and Writing* (1994). The following pages explore Chafe’s framework for representing consciousness with language, because Kawasaki’s approach to Defoe’s narrative techniques cannot be properly examined unless this framework is explained, and also because what Chafe suggests in his book is of particular interest as he seeks to identify the relationship between different kinds of consciousness and their representation in language (see 3.1 below).

According to Chafe, there are two types of conscious experiences: they can be either “immediate” or “displaced” (1994: 32). He calls the immediate mode of consciousness “extroverted consciousness”, that is, “a consciousness that is immediately affected by the environment” (1994: 197). It includes conscious experiences through perceiving, acting and evaluating (Chafe 1994: 32, 197). He explains that “what we experience is perceptual” as most conscious experiences are “perceptual-like events and states, along with the people and objects that participate in them”, and that “[w]e are also conscious of our own actions: the things we do, the things we have done, and the things we might do” (1994: 31, italics original). What he calls “evaluations” refers to “all aspects of conscious experience that involve emotions, opinions, attitudes, desires, and the like” (1994: 31). On the other
hand, the displaced mode of consciousness, which he calls “introverted consciousness”, comes from “introspection”, which refers to “meta-awareness of what consciousness is doing” (1994: 31). It includes the cognitive acts of remembering (“the construction of experiences that were immediate at some earlier time but do not belong to the current environment”) and imagining (“experiences constructed by the conscious mind itself”) (Chafe 1994: 32).

In spoken language, people may verbalize their conscious experiences which “are directly related to their immediate environments” (Chafe 1994: 196). In such a case, they are speaking in the immediate mode. Chafe explains that consciousness is connected to language production because it “provides the ideas that are represented”, and also is “responsible for representing them” (1994: 198). The former function of consciousness is called “represented consciousness” and the latter “representing consciousness” (Chafe 1994: 198). In speaking in the immediate mode, these functions are performed by the same extroverted consciousness. When, however, people talk about their conscious experiences based on their memory or imagination, they use what Chafe calls “the displaced mode” (1994: 198) of speaking. In this case, the two functions of consciousness mentioned above are operated by the same introverted consciousness: distant extroverted consciousness is only accessible through remembering or imagining.

Chafe focuses on the differences in “continuity” and “detail” between extroverted consciousness and introverted consciousness (1994: 201-205). In terms of continuity, extroverted consciousness is characterized by “a continuous, uninterrupted flow”, in which “[a]ny segment of it is experienced as part of a connected sequence, flowing out of what happened just before and into what will happen just after” (Chafe 1994: 202). In contrast, introverted consciousness has an “islandlike quality”, that is, it refers to “isolated segments of experience whose antecedents and consequences are inaccessible” (Chafe 1994: 202). This is why we need to give “an orientation or setting” when we speak based on our memory or imagination; otherwise “consciousness is unable to function” (Chafe 1994: 202).
This has also to do with the fact that “what is available to an introverted consciousness tends to be less shared” (Chafe 1994: 200), and as it is less shared, it needs orienting. The amount of access to details which consciousness can potentially focus on also differentiates the quality of extroverted consciousness from that of introverted consciousness. Extroverted consciousness “can be richly detailed” because it is based on immediate perceiving, acting and evaluating, whereas introverted consciousness “is relatively impoverished” because it depends on displaced remembering and imagining (Chafe 1994: 204).

The difference between immediacy and displacement is evident in the use of deixis in language representation. According to Chafe, deictic elements in language are divided into two types: the deictic elements “expressed by spatiotemporal adverbs”, such as here/there and now/then, mark “the relation between the extroverted consciousness and the represented consciousness”, while those “expressed by tense and person” mark “the relation between the extroverted consciousness and the representing consciousness” (1994: 206, italics original). In spoken language, these two types of deixis are aligned with each other, as represented consciousness and representing consciousness operate in the same consciousness. In the case of the immediate mode, for example, if one says “I’m working now”, the temporal deictic now which indicates the here-and-now of the represented consciousness and the present tense whose here-and-now is located in the representing consciousness are congruent with each other. Similarly, in the sentence “I was working then”, the deictic then (represented consciousness) and the past tense (representing consciousness) are congruent in the introverted consciousness, so this is linguistic evidence for the displaced mode.

The so-called historical present and direct speech are special cases in which represented consciousness and representing consciousness are (partly) split into extroverted consciousness and introverted consciousness respectively. In the displaced mode, a speaker can “pretend to be representing experiences that are closer to those of an extroverted consciousness” (Chafe 1994: 208) by using either
or both of these devices to create the illusory quality of immediacy to or involvement in what is being represented. Another special case is the use of the so-called free indirect style, but Chafe does not discuss this style in spoken language because it is predominantly used in written language (1994: 212). However, many stylisticians and narratologists point out that free indirect style can also be found in spoken language (cf. Fludernik 1993; Adamson 1994; 1995a; 1995b), and some critics even argue that it originates from spoken language (cf. Adamson 1994). I will examine this style further in relation to the representation of consciousness in Chapter III.

According to Chafe (1994), the above-mentioned congruity between represented consciousness and representing consciousness falls apart in written language, as the represented consciousness is separated in space and time from the representing consciousness in written language. “The separation is possible”, he argues, “because the desituatedness of writing weakens, as it were, the hold of the representing consciousness” (1994: 226). More specifically:

In conversations the language emerging from the mouth of the speaker expresses what is passing through the consciousness of that person then and there. A situated representing consciousness maintains a tight grip on the represented consciousness. But when writing removes copresence and interaction, the hold is weakened and the represented consciousness is free to migrate to a different time and place. (Chafe 1994: 226-227)

Chafe calls such a mode in writing “displaced immediacy” (1994: 227). So, in written first-person fiction, the representing consciousness locates itself in the proximal introverted consciousness belonging to the fictional narrator (I as narrator), but the represented consciousness is located in the distal extroverted consciousness belonging to the same narrator who is spatio-temporally distant (I as character). As Chafe argues, “displaced immediacy is a departure from the ordinary structure of
consciousness [i.e. immediate mode or displaced mode]” (1994: 227). The two kinds of consciousness are related through the “pretense of unconstrained remembering” (Chafe 1994: 227), and thus unlike ordinary displacement, displaced immediacy in writing can have a greater amount of continuity and details. Chafe himself admits that displaced immediacy can be found in spoken language when the historical present or direct speech is used. However, he argues that it is “more global and complex in its manifestations and effects than either of those other devices, and unlike them, it is more at home in written language than in spoken” (1994: 227). Written third-person fiction is only different from first-person fiction in that what relates the two kinds of consciousness in the former is not the pretense of “unconstrained remembering” (Chafe 1994: 227) but the pretense of “unconstrained empathizing” (Chafe 1994: 250). This is a brief overview of Chafe’s language representation framework based on the functions of consciousness.

How does Kawasaki relate Chafe’s displaced immediacy to Defoe’s narrative techniques? In his view, Defoe was the first English writer who consciously used displaced immediacy (2009: 164). According to Kawasaki, Defoe’s The Family Instructor (1715, 1718), from the third part of Volume I onwards, shows a shift in narrative point of view from the narrator to a character (2009: 232-239), though it is still very much pioneering. He argues that this shift has resulted in the creation of a narrative filtered through that character’s consciousness (2009: 236). In other words, a large part of The Family Instructor is written in displaced-immediate mode. He quotes the following passage, regarding the use of direct speech and the historical present in narrative as linguistic evidence for displaced immediacy:

When her Husband was gone, and she had sat a While, and mused upon what she had done; her Passion began to abate, and Reason to take Place again in her Soul; and first her Unkindness to her Husband began to shew it self to her; I believe says she to her self; I have anger’d him heartily; well it can’t be help’d now, let him ev’n take it if he will.
But a little further thinking brought her more to her self, *and then* her Affection to him stirred in her, she breaks out again. But *why should I treat him thus? He never was unkind to me in his Life, he has been the tenderest Husband that ever Woman had, and has taken me with Circumstances ill enough, I’ll go and heal it all again, take him in my Arms, and speak kindly to him.* (*The Family Instructor*, I: 288, qtd. in Kawasaki 2009: 236)²⁰

Kawasaki (2009: 6, 236) observes that this kind of displaced immediacy was already found in spiritual autobiographies (e.g. John Bunyan’s *Grace Abounding* (1666)) and Romances (e.g. Aphra Behn’s *Oroonoko* (1688)). Defoe, who was well acquainted with these kinds of writings, must have learned this technique from them and used it in his books about conduct (Kawasaki 2009: 236). By so doing, he could represent the inner mind of a character based on detailed recollection of him/her (Kawasaki 2009: 236-239).

Kawasaki then illustrates that Defoe’s handling of narrative point of view is more artistically and consciously achieved in his fiction. This ability of Defoe is of particular importance especially in terms of psychological realism. As Starr argues, his narrative “is indeed ‘realistic’, but in a special and limited sense: his characters tell us directly rather little about themselves or their external world, but they create an illusion of both by projecting themselves upon their world in the act of perceiving it” (1974: 280). His narrative, according to Starr, “does considerably more subjective interpreting of the external world than critics have recognized” (1974: 284). Kawasaki agrees with Starr (1974) on this point, observing that in *Robinson Crusoe* the narrator Crusoe encourages the reader to imagine his past emotions by representing at the same time his subjective response at the point of recollection (2009: 260). In discussing the narrative techniques used in *Robinson Crusoe*, therefore, Kawasaki illustrates how Defoe artistically does so, using the verbs of perception and thought:
I cast my Eyes to the stranded Vessel, when the Breach and Froth of the Sea being so big, I could hardly see it, it lay so far off, and considered, Lord! how was it possible I could get on Shore?

After I had solac’d my Mind with the comfortable Part of my Condition, I began to look round me to see what kind of Place I was in, and what was next to be done, and I soon found my Comforts abate, and that in a word I had a dreadful Deliverance: (RC: 41, qtd. in Kawasaki, 2009: 265)

In this passage, verbs of perception and thought such as see, look and consider are used, by means of which, according to Kawasaki, the reader is invited to perceive and think from Crusoe’s point of view after he has landed on a desolate island (2009: 265). Kawasaki argues that Defoe searched for a different type of narrative from The Family Instructor, in which the narrative proceeds based primarily on the character’s conversation, when he wrote Robinson Crusoe, because it represents the life of an individual who was cast away on a remote island. He concludes that Defoe discovered the advantages of using verbs of perception and thought, direct speech and the historical present and of addressing the reader consciously in order for them to be more involved in the narrative, when writing pseudo-autobiographies.

The most significant point Kawasaki makes in his analysis of Defoe’s narrative techniques is the importance of the individual’s inner life being represented. He tells us that it is necessary to explore Defoe’s psychological realism in more depth, and that it is worth exploring. What seems to be defective about his argument, however, is that it fails to capture precisely what Defoe is doing in his narratives because it is lacking in narratological insights, even though he aimed to analyse Defoe’s narrative techniques.

One crucial shortcoming of Kawasaki’s analysis is that he tries to illustrate the significance of Defoe’s narrative techniques by applying Chafe’s displaced immediacy, but Chafe’s framework is built not for explaining various narrative structures but for “a more comprehensive understanding of immediate and
displaced consciousness and their relation to language” (Chafe 1994: 196). Chafe is aware that his study has a different motive from the narratologists, as it “is aimed at understanding the nature of the mind as determinable through consciousness and language, whereas narratologists have been concerned with categorizing or typologizing written fiction in terms of criteria that are applicable either to whole works or to their parts” (1994: 268). Chafe’s model is a language representation model based on different kinds of consciousness, and therefore it does not seem to be the best framework for Kawasaki to use in explaining the development of narrative from earlier prose fiction to the novel in the early eighteenth century. It is also problematic to macro-structurally apply Chafe’s language representation model to Defoe’s narrative techniques in that his displaced immediacy refers to written fiction in general, but as Chafe himself admits, in a more specific sense, it corresponds to “what Stanzel would call the reflector mode” (1994: 269). Indeed, critics have described Defoe’s narratives using phrases such as “immediate imitation of individual experience” (Watt 1957: 32), “subjective interpreting of the external world” (Starr 1974: 284), and “remarkable quality of immediacy” (Snow 1976: 178). These expressions, as well as the term “displaced immediacy”, imply reflectoral writing and free indirect style, which are the predominant narrative techniques that are characteristic of modernist novelists such as Virginia Woolf and Katherine Mansfield. However, Defoe’s narratives are usually not regarded as examples of the reflector mode of narrative in narratological terms. His ability to capture an individual’s internal and external realities through his/her point of view is very mild, pioneering, undeveloped and unrevealing compared to that of the modernist novelists. In other words, his fiction is not written in displaced immediacy at the global level, although at the local level it does display this quality.

Another crucial shortcoming about Kawasaki’s argument is that his claim about the significance of Defoe’s narrative techniques is not supported by adequate linguistic and narratological evidence. Defoe does use displaced immediacy to some extent in his narratives, and the use of direct speech, the historical present and
so on does indeed contribute to showing this quality. However, they were commonly used in other kinds of writings before Defoe’s time, and thus they cannot be regarded as new techniques which he was the first writer to employ in narrative. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that displaced immediacy or the reflector mode is linguistically evident in the use of free indirect style, but Kawasaki does not investigate or even mention this narrative technique at all throughout his book.

It is not possible to represent selves in a mimetic way in narrative without sophisticated narrative techniques. This thesis therefore sheds further light on Defoe’s narrative techniques and examines how he actually used various narrative techniques, including displaced immediacy. His narrative techniques for representing selves are far more complicated than Kawasaki (2009) makes out. This thesis seeks to reveal the ways in which Defoe incorporated the quality of immediacy which critics have repeatedly emphasised into familiar, conventional literary forms, and to confirm the effects of doing so. In my view, Defoe’s narrative techniques are outstanding in that he presents selves to the reader not only by representing their internal and external worlds, but also by doing so within the literary conventions of the day.

Subsequent chapters will investigate Defoe’s narrative techniques which seem to be closely related to the effect of authenticity, and will illustrate how he used them to represent selves in his narratives. In a recent study, Dorothee Birke makes an interesting point, observing that the use of a list is one way to create immediacy in narrative because list making is “a multifaceted instrument for the psychologization of the protagonist” (2016: 304). Chapters II and III analyse Defoe’s narrative techniques including his ability to create immediacy from different standpoints from Birke’s – standpoints which are deeply concerned with authenticity in the sense of both conventionality and psychological realism. Chapter II focuses on the different story-telling schemas used in the first-person narrative style, and investigates the creation of authenticity in narrative in terms of the global level of narrative. Hunter asserts that “credibility and probability – but of a global
rather than local kind – are crucial to the novel” (1990: 33). However, both credibility and probability of a local kind are, in my view, equally important in novels, or at least in Defoe’s fiction. Chapter III thus examines narrative techniques for creating the effect of authenticity at the local level of narrative, focusing on the representations of fictional consciousness. Chapters IV and V then demonstrate narrative development in terms of the change in abstract ideas about the self represented in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. It has been pointed out that “[i]n the course of writing his novels, Defoe’s technical skill increased” (Zimmerman 1975: 17, see also Boardman 1983; Bell 1985a; 1985b). These chapters illustrate how his technical skill increased in representing selves, focusing respectively on the collective and subjective qualities of the selves in his narratives.
The first-person autobiographical narrative style is one of the most crucial devices with which Defoe creates the effect of authenticity in his fiction. In terms of the conventional sense of authenticity, this style makes the claim of truthfulness “structurally more plausible” (Hunter 1990: 312) than any other narrative styles. Early eighteenth-century readers knew “how to see” the first-person narrative as it had already become “a form of discourse readily available because of widespread prior knowledge of its purposes and expectations” (Hunter 1990: 45). More specifically, they knew that “a major function of autobiography ... was to clarify for the autobiographer the patterns and meanings that could presumably be discovered by the close observation of the details of life”, and that “to recount events as personal experience was to raise the questions of meaning and significance that a diarist faced in reviewing his or her own life” (Hunter 1990: 45). In such a way, “the epistemological function of first-person narrative was deeply imbedded in the form” itself (Hunter 1990: 45), and readers could understand how to see it without being instructed. Also, the first-person autobiographical narrative style contributes to authentication in terms of realism because it “directly show[s] the central character responding to external reality” (Konigsberg 1985: 21). This was not possible through the third-person narrative style in the early-eighteenth century. Most third-person narratives were “omniscient, and distant from the characters and their perceptions of the world” and the third-person narrative “dramatizing the internal perspective of the character”, that is, the third-person narrative in the reflector mode, “was not a developed or a consistent technique” in the early eighteenth century (Konigsberg 1985: 21). The first-person form makes what is represented seem even more real
and authentic because “if the person in the story is the same as the person describing the story, then we are more ready to believe in [him/her] as well” (Konigsberg 1985: 21). Ultimately, any autobiographer can claim “by [his/her] announcement of genre that [he/she] presents the reader some version of a real human being – perhaps as extravagant a figure as any novelistic hero but asserted to be no fiction” (Spacks 1976: 1). With these points in mind, in this chapter I will probe more deeply into the relationship between the creation of the effect of authenticity and the first-person autobiographical narrative style.

The first-person narrative imitates a natural kind of writing in the real world (see 1.2). The first-person narrator tells his/her experiences based on his/her memory, which means that the act of remembering is always required in first-person storytelling. In Chantelle Warner’s words, it necessarily evokes “our natural schema of REMEMBERING” (2009: 16) in the reader’s mind. This chapter focuses on two different naturally-occurring perspectives in our real-life cognitive schema of REMEMBERING, through which the first-person narrator tells his/her own past experiences. The ways in which we remember past experiences have much been discussed in cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychologists have pointed out that there are at least two different modes in the REMEMBERING schema: people may take the position of a detached observer (“observer” perspective) or re-experience the event as if they were in the original situation (“field” perspective) (Nigro and Neisser 1983). Cognitive psychologists are primarily concerned with “psychodynamic implications for understanding memory” (McIsaac and Eich 2002), and seek to identify psychological factors for choosing a particular perspective when remembering events. Their empirical studies show that people tend to choose either an observer or a field perspective according to their psychological attitudes towards the recalled experience (e.g. emotionality, self-awareness). In stylistics and narratology, it is similarly argued that the REMEMBERING schema is divided into two narrative modes: the displaced mode of “REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING” and the immediate
mode of “REMEMBERING AS RELIVING” (Warner 2009). Their main concern, however, is the linguistic representation in these different narrative modes (e.g. deixis, modality).

Integrating these corresponding concepts in cognitive psychology, stylistics and narratology, this chapter examines the ways in which the narrative schema of REMEMBERING is related to the effect of authenticity in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. Through analysis of the linguistic features of the RECOUNTING and RELIVING modes, it demonstrates how he imitated the naturally occurring distinction between the remembering modes (i.e. observer memory and field memory) so that he could present his characters’ personal memories to his readers as if the experiences described had actually happened to the characters.

Section 2.1 first explores the characteristics of the first-person autobiographical narrative style in comparison with the third-person narrative style. It argues why the first-person autobiographical narrative style is the best way to imitate the natural REMEMBERING schema, pointing to important narratological concepts such as narrative distance and narrative point of view.

Section 2.2 investigates point of view in autobiographical memory. The distinction between the observer and field perspective discussed in cognitive psychology has to do with our memory, that is, our natural cognitive schema of REMEMBERING. When it is applied to a storytelling schema, we also have two distinctive narrative modes which are similar to the distinction between the observer and field perspective: REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING and REMEMBERING AS RELIVING. These are narrative schemas based on the distinction between points of view in autobiographical memory, which is why the distinction between the narrative modes becomes important in interpreting first-person narratives.

Section 2.3 briefly explores the relationship between the linguistic representations of different narrative modes and deixis. Deictic expressions are
crucial in understanding the temporal, spatial and psychological relationship between the language represented and the representing subject. This section gives an overview of how the deictic shift from our subjective deictic centre to others or our former selves commonly and naturally occurs in our daily interactions and in storytelling.

Sections 2.4 and 2.5 examine closely the use of temporal deixis, in particular tense, in the RECOUNTING mode and the RELIVING mode respectively. In the former, the speaker or narrator, “I”, can remember “my” experience from “my” present perspective, detaching “myself” from that experience as an observer. In the RELIVING mode, however, this “I” can recollect “my” experience as if “I” were back there, as if “I” were reliving it in the very field where that experience actually happened to the old “me”. These sections analyse the ways in which the two narrative modes are marked by the use of tenses in Defoe’s narratives. I will then suggest that the existence of these natural narrative modes is one of the factors which create the effect of authenticity in his fiction.

2.1 First-person autobiographical narrative style
The terms first-person narrative and third-person narrative which I have used up until now need explaining here. The crucial difference between the “first-person” narrative and the “third-person” narrative is the ontological relationship between the narrator and the character(s). In his seminal book, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method (1980), Gérard Genette argues that “the presence (explicit or implicit) of the ‘person’ of the narrator” is “invariant because the narrator can be in [his/her] narrative (like every subject of an enunciating in [his/her] enunciated statement) only in the ‘first person’” (1980: 244, italics original). In this strict sense, it is not enough for him to use the terms first-person and third-person to designate these different narrative situations, although these expressions are very common in narrative theory. For Genette, narrative situations must be
distinguished according to “whether or not the narrator can use the first person to designate one of [his/her] characters” (1980: 244, italics original). Genette thus distinguishes these two types of narrative, depending on the presence or absence of the narrator in the fictional world. He calls a narrative “with the narrator present as a character in the story [he/she] tells” the homodiegetic narrative, and a narrative “with the narrator absent from the story [he/she] tells” the heterodiegetic narrative (1980: 244-245). I use the terms first-person and third-person as equivalent to Genette’s homodiegetic and heterodiegetic respectively. In the homodiegetic type, a narrative in which the narrator is the hero/heroine is termed an autodiegetic narrative (Genette 1980: 245), and Defoe’s fictional autobiographies belong to this type. In other words, in the autodiegetic or first-person autobiographical narrative, the narrator and the character (the hero/heroine) are the same entity, and both of them are expressed with the same pronoun “I”.

In one sense, the narrator-I and the character-I are the same entity as they are the same human being, and they share the same pronoun. But in another, they are different entities because they are not in the same spatial, temporal and psychological phases of the self (Galbraith 1994: 125). Narratologists, therefore, distinguish the “I” as narrator from the “I” as character (the hero/heroine), and these two “I’s” are respectively termed the narrating self and the experiencing self (Stanzel 1971: 61). Put differently, the entity expressed by the first-person pronoun “I” has two functions as different selves in a first-person autobiographical narrative: the narrating self is the person who tells its past experiences, while the experiencing self is the one whose immediate experiences are represented by the more knowing narrating self. As Dorrit Cohn (1978: 143) argues, the narrating self’s relationship to the experiencing self in a first-person autobiographical narrative can be equated, broadly speaking, with a narrator’s relationship to a leading character in a third-person narrative. Like the narrator in the third-person narrative, the narrating self in the first-person narrative can
signify either the “distance” which separates itself from the experiencing self or its “near-cohesion” with the experiencing self (Cohn 1978: 143; also Stanzel 1984: 213).

While the similarities between the first-person narrative and the third-person narrative are important, they should not blur the obvious and essential dissimilarities between them. What crucially differentiates the first-person autobiographical narrative from the third-person narrative is the “existential relationship” (Cohn 1978: 144) between the two selves or the “existential threads” (Stanzel 1984: 213) which bind together the two selves referred to by the same first-person pronoun. This existential relationship between the two selves becomes particularly important in the first-person narrative for two reasons. Firstly, the narrating self has limited access to the consciousness of the past self, because it “imitates the temporal continuity of real beings” (Cohn 1978: 144). The narrating self has to depend on its past memories when representing its past consciousness. Secondly, the narrating self is always “free to slide up and down the time axis that connects [the] two selves” (Cohn 1978: 145). The narrating self can easily attribute subjectivity to the past self because of normal “assumptions about the continuity of personal identity” (Adamson 1995b: 204). As such, the first-person autobiographical narrative imitates the relationship between the present self and the past self of a real person, and thus it is significantly different from the third-person narrative, and it gives realistic effects in a different way from the third-person narrative. Since it is based on the existential relationship of a real person, the first-person narrative can imitate the real-life schema and hence contribute to creating an effect of authenticity.

The existential relationship between the two selves creates “the internal tension” (Stanzel 1984: 212) between the two selves, which is, according to F. K. Stanzel (1984), the most prominent feature of the first-person autobiographical narrative. As Joe Bray points out, the existential relationship makes it impossible for the narrating self to “completely hand over the narrative to the past,
experiencing self” (2003: 27). The internal tension between the two selves is necessarily created in this narrative style because they “must be yoked” by the first-person pronoun “however strong the tensions trying to pull them apart” (Bray 2003: 27). Stanzel (1984: 212-213) argues that the internal tension can be examined in terms of the narrative distance which separates the different phases of the self in temporal, spatial and psychological terms. The narrative distance is an important index in interpreting first-person autobiographical narratives, because it “is generally a measure of the intensity of the process of experience and education to which the narrating self was subjected before it began the narration of its story” (Stanzel 1984: 213). The narrative distance varies from “identification to complete estrangement between the narrating and the experiencing self” (Stanzel 1984: 213). As one of the examples of “estrangement”, Stanzel mentions Defoe’s *Moll Flanders*, claiming that:

The earlier quasi-autobiographical first-person novel frequently ends with a total change in the moral personality of the first-person character. Estrangement is dominant here in the form of a turning away from the earlier self, as in Hans Jakob Christoph von Grimmelshausen’s *The Adventurous Simplicissimus* and Defoe’s *Moll Flanders*. Often, however, little consideration is given in these novels to the continuity of the psychological development of the personality of the first-person narrator. The numerous commentaries which the morally transformed Moll Flanders makes on her earlier life as a thief, prostitute and bigamist, for example, create the impression that Defoe has yoked together in a single person Moll Flanders’s experiencing self and the reflections of the authorial ‘I’, an entirely different person. The history of the quasi-autobiographical first-person novel is the history of the more and more convincing psychological integration of the experiencing and the narrating self. (Stanzel 1984: 213)
According to Stanzel, the narrative distance between the two selves is traditionally regarded as a macro-structurally total estrangement in early quasi-autobiographical first-person narratives like *Moll Flanders*. However, it has often been pointed out that Moll fails to be “morally transformed” and that Moll’s experiencing self and narrating self are inseparable (Bell 1985b; Laden 1987). In *Moll Flanders*, it is also important to argue the significance of the narrative distance which micro-structurally changes as the story unfolds. It may be true that the spatio-temporal distance cannot be substantially changed once the narrating self begins to tell its story (unless it is a kind of science fiction in which time travel is possible). But psychological distance is not always stable when the narrating self remembers past experiences. I agree with Stanzel, therefore, that the psychological continuity between the two selves has been disregarded in spite of its importance in interpreting the first-person autobiographical narrative. However, Stanzel’s comment about *Moll Flanders* that “Defoe has yoked together in a single person Moll Flanders’s experiencing self and the reflections of the authorial ‘I’, an entirely different person” (italics added) makes me pause. The fluctuating psychological distance between the narrating self and the experiencing self throughout the story reduces the impression that two entirely different people (the two selves) are yoked together in a single entity expressed as “I”. In contrast, it gives the completely opposite impression that Defoe has yoked together the two selves to show the continuity of the “I”. I will discuss further the psychological continuity between the narrating self and the experiencing self in *Moll Flanders* in Chapters IV and V of this thesis.

Stanzel also correlates the narrative distance in the first-person narrative with the narrating self’s memory as follows:

The shorter the narrative distance, the closer the narrating self stands to the experiencing self. The horizon of knowledge and perception of the experiencing self becomes narrower and the effect of memory as a catalyst
capable of clarifying the substance of experience is correspondingly limited. Here the close connection between the delimitation of the horizon of knowledge and the effect of memory in the first-person narrative becomes clearly apparent. (Stanzel 1984: 214)

In other words, the narrower the narrating self’s point of view in remembering, the shorter the narrative distance between the two selves becomes; and in contrast, the broader the narrating self’s point of view in remembering, the wider the narrative distance becomes. Point of view in remembering affects the narrative distance between the narrating self and the experiencing self. The following sections elaborate on the function of point of view in autobiographical memory in the first-person narrative. A narrative seems authentic when the first-person autobiographical form is used, because such a narrative is based on our natural schema of REMEMBERING and the ways in which people remember memories within this schema are interwoven in the tissue of the narrative.

2.2 Point of view in autobiographical memory

Retrospection is essential in the autobiographical narrative, as we have to remember our past experiences in order to tell the story of our life. Remembering has been much studied in cognitive psychology since the late twentieth century. The cognitive psychologists Georgia Nigro and Ulric Neisser (1983) most famously made a distinction between two types of retrospection in terms of the standpoint from which one sees one’s memories. On the one hand, there are some memories in which “one seems to have the position of an onlooker or observer, looking at the situation from an external vantage point and seeing oneself ‘from outside’” (Nigro and Neisser 1983: 467). On the other hand, there are other memories in which “the scene appears from one’s own position; one seems to have roughly the field view that was available in the original situation and one
does not ‘see oneself’” (Nigro and Neisser 1983: 467-468). The former type of memory is labelled as “observer memory” and the latter as “field memory” (Nigro and Neisser 1983). The following example shows these two kinds of point of view in autobiographical memory:

I see myself dancing at a party at the university. I remember my clothes and my legs (the way they moved). Suddenly, I am ‘inside my own body’ looking out. A guy I know a little walks by me and says as he passes: ‘You look good today’. (Berntsen and Rubin 2006: 1193)

This is the transcription of a memory recorded by a female student who participated in Berntsen’s study (1996), which is quoted in Dorthe Berntsen and David C. Rubin (2006: 1193). As Berntsen and Rubin (2006) point out, she remembers her past experience from the “observer” point of view in the first part of the example. She sees herself dancing as an observer or spectator might do. Her observer point of view is reflected in the ways in which she describes her memory: the use of the perception verb see indicates that she tells her past experience like a reporter who observes the situation, and the use of the verb remember clearly shows the fact that she is recollecting her physical situations. When a man enters the scene, however, she changes her way of remembering her experience and remembers it as if she sees it in the original field, or where she was then. In this example, she actually states that she is suddenly inside her own body, and implies that the following representation of her memory is remembered from the field perspective. When she is inside her own body, she does not use any perception verbs and does not signal the fact that she is recollecting her memory. The past actions, moreover, are rendered in the present tense (‘walks’, ‘says’, “passes”). This example illustrates that the broad and observer-like perspective can be narrowed down to and focused on the original perspective within the same memory.
The primary concern for cognitive psychologists is to investigate “a qualitative characteristic of personal memories” (Nigro and Neisser 1983: 467) in real-life situations. They assume that the observer/field distinction in autobiographical memory has “important psychodynamic implications for understanding memory” (McIsaac and Eich 2002: 146). Their experimental data indeed shows that the different perspectives in autobiographical memory are meaningfully related to psychological factors. For example, observer perspective tends to be found in memories with a high level of emotional self-awareness or self-consciousness either at the time of recollection or during the original event (Nigro and Neisser 1983; Robinson and Swanson 1993; McIsaac and Eich 2002). Observer memories, therefore, are more likely to be a concrete report of the recalled experience and contain more information about objective circumstances such as actions, physical appearances and spatial layouts involved in that experience (Nigro and Neisser 1983; McIsaac and Eich 2004). In contrast, field perspective is more likely to occur when one attempts to recall emotions and feelings (e.g. pride, shock, anxiety, fatigue, accomplishment, panic, upset, and horror) (Nigro and Neisser 1983). Field memories include more accounts of physical sensations and psychological states experienced during the original event than observer memories (McIsaac and Eich 2004). In general, “memories recalled from a field perspective are ... experienced as more emotional and/or contain more information on emotional and other subjective states” than observer memories (Berntsen and Rubin 2006: 1195).

There are several important psychological implications for understanding memory in terms of the observer/field distinction. One is that the observer and field perspectives occur naturally in real life situations. While it is possible to control one’s point of view in recalling a particular experience (Nigro and Neisser, 1983: 469; McIsaac and Eich 2002; Berntsen and Rubin 2006), point of view in autobiographical memories is often natural and automatic (Nigro and Neisser 1983: 471; Berntsen and Rubin 2006: 1193-1994). As Nigro and Neisser
point out, “[p]eople may deliberately adopt an observer perspective when they are trying to be ‘detached’ about a past event; they may prefer a field perspective when they are trying to reexperience their original feelings” (1983: 469). If, however, people take either perspective automatically, this means that the observer perspective occurs naturally “when they are trying to be ‘detached’ about a past event” and the field perspective is taken “when they are trying to reexperience their original feelings”.

Perspective-switching in the process of recollection is also natural and common (Berntsen and Rubin 2006: 1194; Sutton 2010: 28). As Berntsen and Rubin point out, “a field or observer perspective need not be stable during the same memory, but may change as the remembered event unfolds and changes” (2006: 1194). John A. Robinson and Karen L. Swanson (1993) were the first to investigate the relationship between the switching of perspective and emotionality. According to their experimental findings, switching from field to observer perspective is likely to produce reduced ratings for emotionality, but switching from observer to field has little effect on ratings for emotionality. Following Robinson and Swanson (1993), Berntsen and Rubin (2006) have examined the relation between the observer/field perspective and emotional autobiographical memory. Their findings replicate Robinson and Swanson’s (1993) results: “changing from field to observer perspective led to reduced emotional and sensory reliving of the memories, whereas changing from observer to field was not accompanied by increased reliving” across all the emotions which were experimented on (afraid, in love, sad, positive surprise, ashamed, happy, angry, proud) (Berntsen and Rubin 2006: 1210).

It was, in fact, found by Heather J. Rice and David C. Rubin (2009) that people can experience more than one perspective during the retrieval of a single memory. This fact, according to them, raises new questions such as “How do individuals experience multiple perspectives?” (Rice and Rubin 2009: 887):
One possibility is that individuals switch from one distinct perspective to another distinct perspective. However, it may be that they experience multiple perspectives simultaneously. Informal conversations with participants suggest it is the former, but future investigations should examine these alternatives. If individuals do, in fact, switch between perspectives, examining how often and how quickly these switches occur will further our understanding of the phenomenological experience of perspective.

(Rice and Rubin 2009: 887)

As a way to “further our understanding of the phenomenological experience of perspective”, I suggest focusing on the linguistic features of narratives representing autobiographical memories. Although it is acknowledged in cognitive psychology that autobiographical narratives “impose a perspective” (Berntsen and Rubin 2002: 639), point of view in autobiographical memory has been little studied in terms of its linguistic representations. Some exceptions which I am aware of are Heather K. McIsaac and Eric Eich (2002; 2004) and Eric Eich et al. (2009). These studies primarily attempt to investigate the relationship between the perspectives and contents of autobiographical memories. Based on verbatim transcriptions of their subjects’ recorded memories, the memories are divided into eight to eleven content categories according to sentences, phrases or words referring to:

- Affective reactions (e.g. it was fun making the mosaic; I felt very happy and alert)
- Physical sensations from any sensory modality (e.g. the modeling clay felt soft; the parfait tasted sweet)
- Psychological states (e.g. I wondered how long my walk was taking; I was confused by some of the game’s instructions).
- First-person accounts (e.g. I, me, mine)
• Self-observations (e.g. I can see myself running up the stairs; I seem to be looking over my own shoulder)
• Third-person accounts (e.g. he, they, Joanne walked into the room)
• Physical actions (e.g. I sat down at the counter; I walked out the door)
• Associated ideas (e.g. my brother likes lemon pie and the dessert task made me think of him; playing with the mosaics reminded me of my childhood)
• Peripheral details of the environment (e.g. there were lots of old textbooks on the shelf; the sky was filled with billowy clouds)
• Spatial relations between objects and/or people (e.g. the sink was to the right of the fridge; Helen stood in front of the flagpole)
• Perceptual details (e.g. the clay was teal blue; there were at least three kinds of bread)


According to their findings, the first four categories (affective reactions, physical sensations, psychological states and first-person accounts) are more likely to be associated with field memories, and the next two categories (self-observations and third-person accounts) with observer memories. Physical actions, associated ideas, peripheral details and spatial relations do not show a consistent result across the three (or for some of them two) studies, and perceptual details tend to be equally included in both observer and field memories. Their findings suggest that “what one remembers about events of the past depends in part on which retrieval mode or vantage point one adopts at the present” and that point of view “influence[s] the subjects’ own experience of remembering” (McIsaac and Eich 2002: 148). This implies that one may deliberately choose either perspective depending on what one wants to recollect (Nigro and Neisser 1983: 469, 478). As such, the main concern in these studies is how the contents of the representations are related to the observer/field perspective. Therefore, while these studies investigate
point of view in autobiographical memory based on linguistic representations, they do not tell us how the different perspectives are reflected in our use of language, except for the use of the first or third person mentioned above. Investigating the linguistic representations of autobiographical memory further will provide us with more ways to explain the distinction between the observer and field perspective and how the switching of perspective occurs in our autobiographical memory.

Referring to McIsaac and Eich’s (2002) study, Berntsen and Rubin (2006) associate the correlation between the field perspective and first-person accounts and that between the observer perspective and third-person accounts with the different types of narrator perspective in literary analysis. While “a third-person ‘objective’ narrator … only reports what is visible from the point of view of an external observer”, “a first-person participant narrator tells the story as experienced through his/her own eyes and can thus report his/her internal states” (Berntsen and Rubin 2006: 1209). They suppose therefore that:

Knowing literature, the college students in McIsaac and Eich’s (2002) study may have understood the instruction to verbally describe their memories from either a field or observer perspective as an instruction to use a first-person participant narrator and a third-person objective narrator position, respectively. This interpretation is supported by the finding that none of the participants in the field condition used third-person referents while talking about their memories while several of the participants in the observer condition used third-person pronouns “he” or “she” when describing the events. ...

McIsaac and Eich’s (2002) findings are consistent with well-established knowledge of narrator perspective in the field of literature ... and open an interesting area of research related to autobiographical memory. ... The relation between narrator perspective, field/observer perspective and reliving
qualities in autobiographical memory is a topic for future research.

(Berntsen and Rubin 2006: 1209-1210)

As Berntsen and Rubin suggest here, “[t]he relation between narrator perspective, field/observer perspective and reliving qualities in autobiographical memory” needs explicating, but I do not agree with their correlating simply the observer/field distinction with the distinction between the third-person narrator and the first-person narrator. In my view, the correlation between third-person references and the observer perspective is not directly linked with a third-person (i.e. heterodiegetic) narrator position, and likewise the correlation between first-person references and the field perspective is not linked to a first-person (i.e. homodiegetic) narrator position. As the subjects describe their own experiences from either the observer or the field perspective, the distinction between observer and field should be discussed within the first-person autobiographical story-telling schema. The observer/field distinction in autobiographical memory is therefore more closely associated with the distinction between the narrating self and the experiencing self, rather than the distinction between the third-person narrator and the first-person narrator.

The observer/field distinction can be found in fictional autobiographical memory, as the fictional autobiographical narrative imitates personal continuity in real life. The broader perspective of the better-knowing narrating self becomes restricted to the narrower point of view of the experiencing self when the narrative distance between the two selves gets shorter. Correspondingly, the story-telling schema of remembering changes from a distant mode to an immediate mode. When the narrating self detaches itself from the experiencing self, it describes its past experiences in its own words. In other words, the narrating self recounts what it remembers from its present perspective, which almost corresponds to an observer perspective. On the other hand, when the narrating self gradually enters into the consciousness of the experiencing self, it
sees the past experiences it remembers from the point of view of the experiencing self, which parallels a field perspective, and relives them through the consciousness of the experiencing self. Warner calls the former type of story-telling mode “REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING” and the latter type “REMEMBERING AS RELIVING” (2009: 17). The following is a passage from Verena Stefan’s autobiographical novel Shedding (1977 [1975]) quoted in Warner (2009: 15), by which she illustrates the use of the two different narrative modes within the REMEMBERING schema. The scene described is Stefan’s first sexual experience:

‘Can you today?’ he asked.
I hadn’t even thought about that. i nod, calculate feverishly, did i even make a record of my menstruation of the last months in the calendar? whatever, surely nothing could happen the first time.
Dampness and coolness between the legs. is that wet from him or from me? as he sleeps, I slide stealthily to the side, examine the sheet. the moon, the only thing that can still be depended on, gives me light. i see the dark flecks. it appears to have happened. yet, the pain continues into the following night. does it always last so long?

(Stefan 1977 [1975]: 14, qtd. in Warner 2009: 15)

According to Warner’s analysis, the narrating self’s act of telling is linguistically indicated in the first sentence (“‘Can you today?’ he asked.”) by the use of the past tense (“asked”), “which positions the speaker in a different temporal plane than the ‘he’ who is posing the question and the former self who is receiving it”, and by the use of textual deixis, that is, “the use of direct speech notation including quotation marks” (2009: 15). The second paragraph initiates a shift in point of view. It represents the consciousness of the past, experiencing self through free indirect thought, a narrative technique to weave the past self’s
subjectivity into the narrative. The past tense still dominates in this paragraph ("hadn’t even thought", “did i even make”), but the subjectivity of the experiencing self is indicated notably by the interrogative mood, subjective expressions ("whatever", “surely”, “could”), and the present tense (“nod”, “calculate”). Stefan here seems “to be recounting the experiences from a position perceptually located within the events” (Warner 2009: 15), or in other words, she is recounting the experiences while reliving them. The reliving quality is then further enhanced in the third paragraph, in which the narrative tense shifts into the present tense (“slide”, “examine”, “can”, “gives”, “see”, “appears”, “continues”). The words “semantically related to physical sensation” (“Dampness”, “coolness”, “pain”) also underline “the immediateness of the experience” (Warner 2009: 15). As the narrative mode is shifted from RECOUNTING to RELIVING in this passage, the point of view in autobiographical memory also changes from the narrating self’s observer-like perspective to the experiencing self’s original field one.

Both the RECOUNTING mode and the RELIVING mode are extensively found in Defoe’s fictional first-person autobiographical narratives. The following short passage from Moll Flanders occurs just after Moll has explained to the old lady, her mistress in Colchester, that nothing improper had happened between one of her sons and herself:

(1) Away goes the old Lady to her Daughters, and tells them the whole Story, just as I had told it her, and they were surpris’d at it, you may be sure, as I believ’d they would be; (MF: 44)

Moll’s memory is represented firstly from the field perspective through the RELIVING mode: the use of the so-called historical present (“goes”, “tells”) and the root-transformation (“Away goes the old Lady”) indicate the subjectivity of Moll as character, and enhance the feeling of the immediacy of her past
experiences. When she begins to explain how the old lady told what Moll had said to her daughters (“just as I had told it her, ...”), however, the point of view is changed into the observer perspective and accordingly the narrative mode is shifted to the RECOUNTING mode. The past tense (“had told”, “were surpris’d”, “believ’d”) and the inserted comment in the present tense (“you may be sure”) foreground the act of telling. I will observe the relationship between the tense use and the narrative mode more closely in the following sections.

This distinction in the REMEMBERING schema can be associated with the distinction between the teller mode and the reflector mode of narrative suggested by Stanzel (1981; 1984). The opposition teller-reflector constitutes the continuum of mode, one of Stanzel’s three narrative situations. Stanzel’s mode is concerned with what mediates the narrative to the reader. The distinction between the teller mode and the reflector mode refers to the distinction between the representation of a story through the narrative act of a teller character (the apparent presence of a narrator) and the representation through the consciousness of a reflector character (the illusionary non-presence of a narrator). What should be noted here is that Stanzel’s mode opposition does not coincide completely with his opposition person (the opposition of the narrator’s ontological relationship to the characters between identity (i.e. first-person narrative) and non-identity (i.e. third-person narrative)), and both third- and first-person narrative may have the teller/reflector distinction. Warner’s REMEMBERING schemas should be distinguished from Stanzel’s modes in that they are the narrative modes based on the natural ways of recollection in real-life cognitive activities, and therefore specific to the first-person autobiographical narrative. Autobiographical memory may be recalled from different perspectives depending on how far we stand from the remembered experience. In other words, the imitation of personal continuity in real life evokes two different naturally occurring points of view in remembering past experiences: the narrating self can either tell past events from a broader perspective or re-experience them as they happened to the eyes of its past self.
Such a *natural* adaptation of point of view in autobiographical memory is what the narrator in third-person narratives cannot achieve due to the ontological relationship it holds with its characters. It has been pointed out that the distinction between the observer perspective and the field perspective may be found outside the activity of personal remembering (Crawley and French 2005; Sutton 2010). This means that it can be applied to any cognitive activity in a third-person narrative. However, we should first correlate the observer/field distinction and the narrative mode within the cognitive act of remembering, as Warner’s REMEMBERING schema does.

According to Dorthe Berntsen (2002), most studies in cognitive psychology “have measured the effects of emotion on the accuracy of the memory and have tended to disregard other aspects of remembering, such as accessibility, durability, or the quality of reliving an event” (2002: 1010). In the following sections, focusing on the linguistic representation of the different narrative modes, I will investigate how the narrating self naturally remembers his/her past experiences – that is, how the narrator naturally changes his/her point of view within the REMEMBERING schema – in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. Examining the linguistic indices for different points of view will illustrate that “the quality of reliving” in autobiographical memory is reflected in linguistic representations.

### 2.3 Deictic shift and the REMEMBERING schema

In autobiographical memory, the different ways of remembering are of great importance. Especially when one remembers a particular episode of one’s life, as the philosopher Mark Rowlands argues, what is important is “not that episodes are remembered, but the *way in which* episodes are remembered. An episode is remembered as one I formerly witnessed, orchestrated or otherwise experienced” (2017: 49, italics original). One can in fact remember one’s past experiences as one formerly “witnessed” them (i.e. from the observer perspective, in the
RECOUNTING mode), or “experienced” them (i.e. from the field perspective, in the RELIVING mode). The differences in these modes are often reflected in their linguistic representations when they are narrated.

Linguistic expressions are basically oriented subjectively to the position of a speaker in time and space. Deixis refers to the linguistic expressions designating person, time and space (e.g. “I”, “now”, “here”) whose meaning is understood in relation to the subjective position of the speaker in a particular context. As Karl Bühler notably argues, deictic expressions are “fulfilled and made definite in the deictic field of language” (2011 [1934]: 94) and thus organized from the location of a speaker (I-here-now), or the “Ich-origo (I-deixis)” in Bühler’s term, which is now commonly referred to as the deictic centre. For example, when the deictic word now is used, it means “some span of time including the moment of utterance”, and the present tense “predicates a property that holds at the time of speaking” (Levinson 2004: 114).

According to Bühler, such subjective orientation of language takes root in our everyday use of language (2011 [1934]: 94, 118):

it must be simply accepted, this coordinate system of ‘subjective orientation’, in which all partners in communication are and remain caught up. Each, conducting [him- or herself] in [his/her] own system, is well oriented and understands the others’ behaviour. If I am standing as the commander nose to nose in front of gymnasts lined up in a row, convention requires that I choose the commands ‘forwards, backwards, right turn, left turn’ not according to my own orientation system, but to that of the others, and the translation is psychologically so simple that every group leader learns to master it. It is a fact that it works, that it works without intellectual acrobatics, and no logic will be able to change anything about that; and if it understands its rule task, it will not try. (Bühler 2011 [1934]: 118)
It is not difficult for a speaker to shift his/her perspective to that of a listener of utterances, or for a listener to shift his/her perspective to that of a speaker of the utterances in real-life physical co-present situations. This “translation” (Bühler 2011 [1934]: 118) or deictic shift can occur not only in relation to perceptual deixis (referring to the deictic expressions in physically shared situations), but also when one refers to remembered or imagined time and space that are not present at the point of interlocution. Bühler (2011 [1934]) calls our ability of deictic shifting to the fictive deictic centre “deixis am phantasma”.

The deictic shift commonly occurs both in everyday interactions and in story-telling. Warner observes that “[w]hen we tell stories about others or even about ourselves, we regularly shift our perspective from that related to our subjective deictic centre of here and now to the theres or then of other people or of our former selves” (2009: 14). The latter case applies to the autobiographical narrative act. We can tell our own story, either keeping the perspective of our present selves, or shifting “our perspective from our subjective deictic centre of here and now to the theres or then ... of our former selves”. In the first-person autobiographical narrative, “one of the most common deictic shifts is the temporal shift” (Warner 2009: 15). This narrative style, as explained above, holds an existential relationship between the present and past self because it imitates the temporal continuity of a real being. The narrating self, therefore, tends to “regularly move between the present time of the narrating instance and events from the narrator’s past” (Warner 2009: 15). In Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, the temporal shift in narration is very common and it indicates that his narratives effectually imitate the natural schema of REMEMBERING. The following two sections demonstrate the relationship between the narrative modes and Defoe’s use of tense in narration.
2.4 Representing memory through the RECOUNTING mode

The RECOUNTING mode, as briefly explored in the previous section, refers to a natural narrative schema in which the narrating self represents its past experiences from its detached, present perspective. In Cohn’s words, what is represented is “focalized through the narrating self (and in this sense told from an external perspective)” (1981: 180, italics original), and she terms such a kind of narrative “dissonant” first-person narration. One of the most obvious linguistic indices of dissonance in the first-person autobiographical narrative is the use of the narrative past tense. Temporality in narrative is complex. As Monika Fludernik points out, what we see in a narrative is “a complex network of time, chronology and tense which in turn correspond with the duration, sequentiality and linguistic marking (textual form) of temporality as manifested in narrative texts” (2003: 119). “Tense”, Fludernik argues, “needs to be located among the linguistic phenomena on the textual surface structure, on the level of narrative discourse” (2003: 121).

What this section focuses on is how the varieties of tense forms appear in narrative discourse.

One conundrum regarding tense in narrative discourse is that whereas “temporality is conceptualized in the common-sense ‘objective’ manner that we take for granted” on the story level of narrative, “a cognitive order of temporality is instituted which is based, not on sequentiality or chronology, but on holistic structures of narrative comprehension” on the discourse level of narrative (Fludernik 2003: 119). In other words, the meanings of tense in narrative discourse do not parallel our normal understanding of time. Therefore, when we read a narrative text, “the understanding of temporality becomes increasingly divorced from objective or scientific notions of time and moves towards more psychological, subjective and contextually malleable conceptions of temporality”, and becomes in turn “closer to the experience of time than to the notion of clock-time extending from the past into an infinite future” (Fludernik 2003: 120, italics original).
Fictional narrative texts, as they are unreal, increase the sense of the detachment from real-life objective clock-time. The events described in the past tense in fictional texts did not actually happen in the real-life past. The German narratologist, Käte Hamburger, thus suggests in her seminal influential book, *The Logic of Literature* (1973 [1957]), that the past tense in fiction signifies the here-and-now of a fictional character instead of designating real-life antecedence or pastness, and coined the term *epic preterite* to refer to this past tense in fiction. The epic preterite, in Hamburger’s strict definition, only appears in a third-person fictional narrative when the past tense is simultaneously used with deictics signifying the deictic centre of a fictional character such as *now*, *yesterday* and *tomorrow*, as in “Tomorrow was Christmas” (Hamburger 1973 [1957]: 73). In this sentence, the past tense “was” does not have “the morphological ‘past-tense’ meaning of deictic pastness or anteriority” but signals “a presentifying and fictionalizing meaning of the preterite” (Fludernik 2003: 122). Put more simply, the epic preterite “does not indicate a past at all” and “it creates no time at all, no past, it obliterates time” (Pascal 1962: 3).

For Hamburger, the epic preterite is peculiar to the third-person fictional narrative, and the past tense in the first-person narrative (and even the first-person fictional narrative) does not have an epic quality because the first-person narrative should be seen as “the *statement system of language*” (1973 [1957]: 60) existing in the real world. Her radical thesis was contested by Stanzel (1959), whose revisions of Hamburger’s thesis are summarized in Fludernik (2003) as follows:

Stanzel (1959), in his revisions of Hamburger, developed these insights on the epic preterite to establish that Hamburger’s theses were appropriate for a context of consonant thought representation, especially free indirect discourse, in which the (epic) preterite could collocate with character deixis (*here, now* expressive markers). As a consequence, the quality of the past tense as a deictic past was lost. Stanzel’s major insight, therefore, concerns
the further specification that Hamburger’s epic preterite correlates with the representation of figural consciousness. In contrast to Hamburger, Stanzel also claims that the past tense in third-person novels is a *deictic* past, but is deictic in relation to the present of the discourse of the authorial narrator rather than to the empirical author. Only in figural contexts [i.e. in the reflector mode] does the deictic centre shift to a protagonist’s psyche. In such a context the fictional protagonist becomes a ‘reflector’ whose point of view (or deictic centre) determines the fictional representation.

(Fludernik 2003: 122, italics original)

In fact, as Stanzel and other scholars have demonstrated, the epic preterite can occur in a first-person narrative when used in the context of reflector-mode properties.

In traditional first-person narratives including Defoe’s, however, the teller mode dominates as the holistically primary narrative mode. When a narrative features a distinct teller figure, “the preterite does ... not have an ‘epic’ function” but “carries temporal associations” in terms of the point of view of the narrating self (Bronzwaer 1970: 83). In other words, “[f]irst-person narratives, deictically speaking, do have a deictic past tense in relation to the moment of utterance/writing of the teller figure, the first-person narrator” (Fludernik, 2003: 122-123). The epic preterite, in a strict sense, should therefore be distinguished from what Fludernik (2003) calls “narrative past tense”. The narrative past tense, according to Fludernik, refers to “the past tense as the regular tense in narrative clauses” (2003: 123). It indicates “an unspecified past” (Fludernik 2003: 123), that is, it is deictic, but does not have a natural, real-life deictic quality, which therefore functions as a marker of fictionality. Pastness signified by the narrative past tense in the first-person narrative is unspecified in that it cannot be located in the real-life time axis, and therefore is not based on real-life precedency, but it is still deictic in relation to the narrating self’s deictic centre.
The fact that the narrative past tense in the first-person narrative narrated by a distinct teller figure can signify pastness is one of the greatest advantages of this narrative style with respect to the creation of authenticity. Defoe makes use of the normal assumption about natural, real-life temporality and imitates our natural narrative schema. He virtually specifies when the story begins or ends (e.g. “I was born in the Year 1632, in the City of York” (RC: 5); “Written in the Year 1683” (MF: 285); “I was brought to England by my Parents, who fled for their Religion about the Year 1683” (Rox: 5)) by the use of the narrative past tense. This gives the impression that the narrated story is real in the sense that it actually happened. The narrative past tense in Defoe’s fiction shows that the hero/heroine is telling his/her past experiences from his/her present moment in the RECOUNTING mode, the narrative schema which signifies that I am telling you my own story in the past now.

The RECOUNTING mode is foregrounded in the following example which describes what Crusoe went through after he was captured by Turkish pirates and taken to the port of Sallee (Salé) as a prisoner:

(2)  

(a) The Usage I had there was not so dreadful as at first I apprehended, nor was I carried up the Country to the Emperor’s Court, as the rest of our Men were, but was kept by the Captain of the Rover, as his proper Prize, and made his Slave, being young and nimble, and fit for his Business. (b) At this surprising Change of my Circumstances from a Merchant to a miserable Slave, I was perfectly overwhelmed; and now I look’d back upon my Father’s prophetick Discourse to me, that I should be miserable, and have none to relieve me, which I thought was now so effectually brought to pass, that it could not be worse; that now the Hand of Heaven had overtaken me, and I was undone without Redemption. (RC: 18)
The past tenses in (2a) (“had”, “was”, “apprehended”, “was … carried”, “were”, “was kept … and made”) indicate the pastness of the events in relation to the narrating self’s here-and-now. The distal deictic “there” also suggests that the narrating self is not at Sallee at the time of telling. The temporal and spatial gap between the present self’s narrating and the past self’s experiencing foregrounds the act of telling, which consequently evokes the storytelling schema of REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING. In the second sentence (2b), however, some of the past tenses occur together with the proximal deictic now (“now I look’d”, “was now … brought”, “now … had overtaken”). These past tenses are thus the epic preterite as defined by Hamburger. In this case, does the past tense lose the function of designating pastness? In narrative theory, it seems to be generally agreed that the epic preterite loses its temporality. As discussed above, the “[t]exts that have a prominent teller figure employ the preterite as a deictic signaling of pastness in relation to the time of the teller figure’s writing or speaking” (Fludernik 2003: 123). But narratologists insist that in the reflector-mode narrative in which there is no teller figure, “the past tense has no deictic anchoring in relation to an extradiegetic present. It is anchored in the consciousness of the reflector character, and in relation to this deictic centre it signals simultaneity. In reflector mode texts the preterite therefore has no deictic meaning of pastness” (Fludernik 2003: 123). In the case of Defoe’s first-person narratives, although reflector-mode properties are found fairly extensively, such as the proximal deictic now in (2b) above, they are written in the teller mode with a prominent teller figure at the macro-structural level, and the epic quality of the past tense (i.e. the adeictic quality of the past tense when used with here-and-now deixis) seems to be undermined compared to the epic preterite proper in the pure reflector-mode narrative. The past tenses in (2b), therefore, should not be regarded as completely adeictic at all: they signify the pastness of the events in relation to the deictic centre of the narrating self, though the deictic quality (i.e. pastness) becomes less apparent due to the presence of here-and-now deixis that signals the
deictic centre of the experiencing self. Such contradictory collocation of the past tense and the proximal deixis is most famously associated with the instances of so-called free indirect style (see Chapter III), which should be interpreted as the intermediary narrative mode between pure RECOUNTING and RELIVING.

The use of the narrative past tense as in (2a) is the familiar usage of the past tense in traditional past-tense narratives, and therefore does not need more explaining here, except to point out that it is one of the most evident markers of the RECOUNTING mode. In the following, I turn to the use of the present tense in the RECOUNTING mode, which is not discussed in Warner (2009), who proposed the narrative schema of REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING. Another distinct characteristic of the RECOUNTING mode is that the consciousness of the present, narrating self can be represented in this narrative mode. One popular subject matter in Defoe criticism has been to theorize how the narrating selves in his fiction “construct a stable self in a world of unstable values and against the existential limits of extreme situations” (Brown 1997: 200). This has been mostly studied in relation to “his fiction’s participation in the economic imperialism and colonialism of his time” (Brown 1997: 200). Narratologically speaking, the ways in which Defoe’s narrators construct a self are very significant in his narratives. It has been pointed out that the narrating self’s telling is important in a realistic kind of writing:

In realism, events do not just happen in an objective temporal sequence; they are told, a fact which implies a teller. In its construction of a consistent and uniform world out of the material of single narrating consciousness which coordinates into one single mnemonic sequence the various points of view which are themselves coordinated mnemonic sequences.

(Emmark 1981: 517, italics added)

Warner similarly insists on the importance of a narrating figure in writing which
aims to appear authentic, arguing that the reader must “be able to locate those experiences [represented in the text] in the same ‘body’ that is telling the story” (2009: 13). As Michael Boardman observes, “[a] sense of ‘this really happened’ does not arise from eliminating all traces of selfhood in a narrator” (1983: 39). In fact, there is always the presence of the narrating self, whether explicit or implicit, in Defoe’s fiction. G. A. Starr, in discussing Defoe’s narrative style, claims that “everything and everyone mentioned matters to the narrator, and it makes for a certain kind of realism that all should be so plausibly filtered through the narrator’s consciousness” (1974: 294, italics added). Defoe’s fictional narratives are basically organized through the consciousness of the narrating self rather than that of the experiencing self. Fludernik similarly argues that:

For thematic reasons sixteenth-century and seventeenth-century narrative (and Defoe’s fictional oeuvre) foreground not the experiencing self of the protagonist but the protagonists ability to – literally – plot, to get the better of their antagonists in tricks, intrigues, and knavery. In that framework, which is already heavily influenced by the dramatic tradition (if one only thinks of the Jacobean stage), the protagonist’s moves and their originality acquire prime importance. (Fludernik 1992a: 86)

Although some critics recognize the importance of the consciousness of the narrating self as above, they do not explain how this importance is embodied in Defoe’s narratives. Other critics even tend to disregard the consciousness of the narrating self. Wallace Chafe (1994), for example, claims during his discussion about the first-person narrative that:

Since language of this kind [i.e. the first-person narrative] expresses the content of a distal represented consciousness [i.e. the experiencing self’s consciousness], the content of the representing consciousness itself [i.e. the
narrating self’s consciousness] is unacknowledged. Its presence is manifested in the use of past tense and first person, but its own experience remains unexpressed. Although we may understand the language is being produced by a narrator who has an unconstrained ability to relive experiences of [his/her] distal consciousness, the narrator’s consciousness as [he/she] produces the language is irrelevant. (Chafe 1994: 234) For Chafe, the consciousness of the narrating self in the first-person narrative is “irrelevant” and there are only “a few passages during which the represented consciousness briefly snaps back into congruence with the representing consciousness, reminding us explicitly that the latter does exist” (1994: 234). However, this is not true at all of a first-person narrative with a prominent teller figure, so I cannot agree with Chafe on this point. The role of the narrating self’s consciousness is indispensable in this type of narrative, which is verified by the many passages which represent the consciousness of the present, narrating self. With this point in mind, I will illustrate how the narrating self’s consciousness is represented through the use of the present tense in the RECOUNTING mode.

The present tense is the tense which signifies the present. It is basically used in association with “the present moment of time (the moment of speech)” (Leech 1971: 1, see also Declerck 1991: 89-90). The timespan of the present time is variable, and “cannot be measured in any objective way” (Declerck 1991: 90). In the extremely strict sense, this moment when I am writing this is the present moment now: as time is constantly moving towards the future, this present moment now becomes the past in the next moment. However, our cognition of time is not that strict: the present time which we call now can be expanded psychologically. Depending on the situation, we may recognize a few hours in a day as now, a few days in a week as now, a season in a year as now, a few years in our life as now, or the era we live in as now, as long as it is associated with the present moment of speech. Renaat Declerck observes that it “receives its maximal
interpretation in so-called universal statements (expressing an eternal truth)” (1991: 90). In fact, the present tense is used not only when “an event is simultaneous with the present moment” (“instantaneous” use), but also in universal statements and the expressions of states (“unrestrictive” use), and habits (“habitual” use) (Leech 1971: 1-6). According to Geoffrey Leech, the time which is associated with the present moment means that “[t]he state or event has psychological being at the present moment” (1971: 1, italics original). This “psychological being at the present moment” does not necessarily have to be “actual being at a time” (Leech 1971: 1, italics original), and so the present tense may signify a time other than present in the actual sense. One of the most widely-known cases is the so-called historical present, through which past events are represented “as if they were happening now” (Leech 1971: 1, italics original). The present tense may also refer to the future when future events are “regarded as already predetermined” (Leech 1971: 1, italics original).

According to Fludernik, there are at least three types of present tense usage and these need to be distinguished in narrative texts:

(a) the deictic use of the present tense to refer to the narrator’s and/or reader’s here-and-now;
(b) the intermittent use of the present tense in a past tense context; and
(c) the consistent use of the present tense (either in the entire text, or in long passages of text).

(Fludernik 2003: 124)

Type (a) is the present tense which represents the now of the narrating self deictically. It is thus associated with the narrating self’s representing consciousness. More specifically, it “covers the narrator’s communications with the reader/narratee and comprises authorial commentary, gnomic and proverbial statements and addresses to the narratee” (Fludernik 2003: 124). Type (b) is the
case of the so-called historical present. The present tense which belongs to type (b) “consists in brief shifts from the past tense into the present tense to performatively highlight major junctures of the tale in conversational narrative ... and to mark episode beginnings or climaxes in written texts” (Fludernik 2003: 124). I will turn to this type of present tense in the next section. The present tense belonging to type (c) is labeled the “narrative present” (Fludernik 1996; 2003; 2012). In Fludernik’s definition, the term narrative present refers to “the use of the present tense (in lieu of the traditional past tense) for long units of a fictional text, frequently an entire novel or short story” (2003: 123). The present-tense narrative (i.e. the narrative written in the narrative present) blurs “the deictic distinction between present-tense nows and past-tense thens”, which is “implicated in the loss of even more crucial narratological distinctions: that of story and discourse” (Fludernik 1996: 254). The present-tense narrative consequently “foregrounds the fictive quality of the text” (Fludernik 2012: 83; see also Cohn 1999: 106). This is a narrative technique that can be traced back to the novels of at least the late nineteenth century, such as Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield (1850) and A Tale of Two Cities (1859), in which some entire chapters are written in the narrative present, and it became increasingly popular during the twentieth century. Some notable examples are J. M. Coetzee’s novels such as Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) and Disgrace (1999). This narrative technique seems to have appeared in the late nineteenth century, so any instances of the narrative present in the eighteenth century have not been discussed in criticisms. Defoe’s texts of fiction do not have any narrative present tense proper, although some of the historical present tenses are extended to a large part of a passage, which could be a sign of the narrative present quality (see 2.5 below).

What this section focuses on is the present tense of type (a), which renders the consciousness of the narrating self. The narrating self’s presence in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies is made apparent in this use of the present tense as well as in the use of the narrative past tense discussed above. The narrating selves in
Defoe’s narratives create their own stories not only by recounting past events but also by representing their own consciousness in the process of telling their stories. The present tense that signifies the present consciousness of the narrating self is found everywhere in his narratives. First of all, the use of the deictic present tense frequently occurs with epistemic verbs such as think, believe, seem, and suppose:

(3) ... yet it seems they were resolv’d not to part with the Men neither, not doubting but a farther Evidence would at last come in; and in order to this, I think Publication was made, that such Prisoners being taken, any one that had been robb’d by them might come to the Prison and see them. (MF: 246)

(4) I believe I was frequently removed from one Town to another, perhaps as the Parishes disputed my supposed Mother’s last Settlement. (CS: 2-3)

(5) I suppose I did nothing else for two or three Hours, till the Fit wearing off, I fell asleep, and did not wake till far in the Night; (RC: 75)

These present-tense epistemic verbs literally indicate that the narrating self is expressing its own thoughts and beliefs. Similarly, the deictic present tense is often used when the narrating self is aware of its own act of remembering past events or of telling a story:

(6) I remember that there was a strange Concurrence of Days, in the various Providences which befell me; and which, if I had been superstitiously inclin’d to observe Days as Fatal or Fortunate, I might have had Reason to have look’d upon with a great deal of Curiosity. (RC: 113)
(7) **I remember** that one cold Winter Night we were disturb’d in our Rest with a Constable, ... (CJ: 9)

(8) Had we continued thus, **I confess** we had had much to boast of; but as wise man say, it is ill venturing too near the brink of a Command, so we found it; ... *I told him, (I repeat it with shame and horror of Soul)* that I cou’d find in my Heart to discharge him of his Engagement for one Night and no more. (MF: 97-98)

(9) **I confess**, it was an agreeable Surprize to me, and I was exceeding glad to see him, who was so honourable, and so kind to me, and who indeed, had sav’d my Life: (Rox: 135)

Also common in Defoe’s narratives is the use of the present tense in parenthetical clauses, which reminds the reader of the narrating self’s act of telling:

(10) These Thoughts took me up many Hours, Days; nay, *I may say*, Weeks and Months; and one particular Effect of my Cogitations on this Occasion, *I cannot omit*, viz. One Morning early, lying in my Bed, ...

        (RC: 133)

(11) However, I did the Child no harm, I did not so much as fright it, for I had a great many tender Thoughts about me yet, and did nothing but what, *as I may say*, meer Necessity drove me to. (MF: 163)

(12) Besides I should add at the Close of this Affair, that the Prince did not, *as I may say*, turn me off rudely, and with Disgust; (Rox: 110)
(13) I was doing something she had set me to, \textit{as I remember}, it was Marking some Shirts, ... \((MF: 10)\)

(14) Well, upon the perswasions of this Lad, I walk’d out with him; a poor innocent Boy, and \textit{(as I remember,} my very Thoughts perfectly well) I had no Evil in my Intensions; \((CJ: 19)\)

(15) \textbf{...} and having been exceedingly fatigu’d, I fell fast asleep, and slept as comfortably as, \textit{I believe}, few could have done in my Condition, and found my self the most refresh’d with it, that \textit{I think} I ever was on such an Occasion. \((RC: 42)\)

(16) My Hedge was began and carry’d on, \textit{I believe}, about fifty Yards, when this Thought occurr’d to me, \textbf{...} \((RC: 124)\)

(17) This they understood presently, and three of their Women and two Boys ran away up the Land, and came back in about Half a Quarter of an Hour, with several Pots made of Earth pretty enough, and bak’d, \textit{I suppose}, in the Sun; \((CS: 46-47)\)

The use of these clauses often occurs with the present-tense verbs expressing the act of telling or remembering as in (10) to (14). Parenthetical clauses are also frequently used with the present-tense verbs expressing mental states of the narrating self as in (15) to (17), for which the label “first-person epistemic parentheticals” has been used in pragmatics \((\text{Brinton 1996; 2008; 2017})\). First-person epistemic parentheticals “expressing epistemic, evidential, or evaluative stance” \((\text{Thompson 2002: 131})\) were first identified and discussed by Urmson \((1952)\) \((\text{Brinton 2008: 220; 2017: 127-128})\). The verbs, such as \textit{believe, suppose} and \textit{think} in the extracts above, used in the present tense and with the
first-person pronoun in parentheticals have developed varieties of meanings including epistemic, subjective, evidential and interpersonal meaning. They do not give their original stance of “psychological descriptions” (Urmson 1952: 482, qtd. in Brinton 2008: 220) but instead “indicate the evidential situation in which the statement is made” (Urmson 1952: 485, qtd. in Brinton 2017: 127) and “function as signals guiding the hearer to a proper appreciation of the statement in its context, social, logical, or evidential” (Urmson 1952: 495, qtd. in Brinton 2017: 127). While the original stance of these verbs (i.e. cognitive/thought operation) is weakened or lost, these parenthetical verbs connote the mental states and attitudes of the representing subject. The representing subject in the first-person autobiographical narrative is the narrating self, the protagonist “I” as narrator, and thus those epistemic parentheticals necessarily foreground the RECOUNTING mode rather than the RELIVING mode. Furthermore, the interpersonal meaning of the parentheticals – for they are “the markers of orality and involvement” (Brinton 2017: 134) – creates a sense of authenticity as they show that there is a person who is telling the story.12

The deictic present tense in the parenthetical clauses, as Fludernik (2003: 124) observes, may be an address to the reader:

(18) The same Night that I was sent to Newgate, I sent the News of it to my old Governess, who was surpriz’d at it you may be sure, and spent the Night almost as ill out of Newgate, as I did in it. (MF: 230)

(19) I was surpriz’d, you may be sure, when she came and told me one Evening, all the Particulars, except that of having set her Man to watch: (Rox: 219-220)

(20) I set Friday to Work to boiling and stewing, and made them a very good Dish, I assure you, of Flesh and Broth, having put some Barley and Rice also into the Broth; (RC: 203)
(21) I dress’d me to all the Advantage possible *I assure you*, and for the first time us’d a little Art; (*MF*: 196-197)

(22) ... and when I came back, I found him in Circumstances very differing from what I left him in, besides his being my principal Manager for near twenty Years, *as you shall hear in its Place.* (*CJ*: 173)

(23) Being *French* born, I danc’d, *as some say*, naturally, lov’d it extremely, and sung well also, and so well, that, *as you will hear*, it was afterwards some Advantage to me: (*Rox*: 6)

Such second-person epistemic parentheticals as in (18) to (23) similarly foreground the RECOUNTING mode in narrative, and contribute to the sense of authenticity. They are less frequent than first-person epistemic parentheticals in Defoe’s narratives, though.

Occasionally, a direct address to the reader occurs with present-tense verbs expressing the narrating self’s psychological states or actions:

(24) *I believe the Reader* of this will not think strange, if I confess that these Anxieties, these constant Dangers I liv’d in, and the Concern that was now upon me, put an End to all Invention, and to all the Contrivances that I had laid for my future Accommodations and Conveniencies.

(*RC*: 149)

(25) ... *but I leave the Readers* of these things to their own just Reflections, which they will be more able to make effectual than I, who so soon forgot my self, and am therefore but a very indifferent Monitor.

(*MF*: 106)
Perhaps, the most extremely detached perspective taken by the narrating self is expressed when he/she says that something is inexpressible:

(26) I was elevated to the highest degree in my Thoughts at this Advancement, and *it is impossible for me to express* the Joy of my Mind upon this Occasion; but there came a difficulty upon me, that shock’d me so violently, and went so against my very Nature, that I really had almost forfeited my Place about it; (*CJ*: 127)

(27) *I cannot explain* by any possible Energy of Words, what a strange longing or hankering of Desires I felt in my Soul upon this Sight; breaking out sometimes thus: O that there had been but one or two; nay, or but one Soul sav’d out of this Ship, to have escap’d to me, that I might but have had one Companion, one Fellow-Creature to have spoken to me, and to have convers’d with! In all the Time of my solitary Life, I never felt so earnest, so strong a Desire after the Society of my Fellow-Creatures, or so deep a Regret at the want of it. (*RC*: 158)

According to Barbara Hardy, “the topos of inexpressibility” as in (26) and (27) is used to “[draw] attention to the complex nature of emotional experience” (1985: 22). Inexpressibility is almost always concerned with mental attitudes ("the Joy of my Mind" in (26), “a strange longing or hankering of Desires” in (27)), and represents strong psychological experiences which cannot be named even from the detached point of view of the narrating self. Linguistically speaking, the detached perspective of the narrating self is reflected in the use of the present tense ("it is impossible for me to express" in (26), “*I cannot explain*” in (27), italics added). Both examples of inexpressibility articulate “intensity of experience and the naivety of character” (Hardy 1985: 23). Especially, (27) is more associated with the articulation of inexpressible psychology. Though the
narrating self explicitly says it is impossible to express his past desires in words, he nevertheless attempts to express them in words in the subsequent clauses, using what is called free indirect thought (“O that there had been but one or two; … one Fellow-Creature to have spoken to me, and to have convers’d with!”). According to Hardy, this implies “an acute observation about language as cause, as well as effect, of feeling” (1985: 23-24).

All the present tenses from (3) to (27) refer to the narrating self’s representing consciousness. They are associated not with the original perspective of the experiencing self, but with the displaced perspective of the narrating self during recollection. They consequently show that it is the narrating self who is recounting the story, and function as a linguistic marker for the storytelling schema of REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING, which is naturally evoked in the mind of the reader.

In the same vein, the consciousness of the narrating self can be represented by the present tense used for gnomic statements or generalizations. Such present tenses often become instructions to the reader in Defoe’s novels:

(28) In a Word, The Nature and Experience of Things dictated to me upon just Reflection, That all the good Things of this World, are no farther good to us, than they are for our Use; and that whatever we may heap up indeed to give others, we enjoy just as much as we can use, and no more. The most covetous gripping Miser in the World would have been cur’d of the Vice of Covetousness, if he had been in my Case; for I possess’d infinitely more than I knew what to do with. (RC: 110)

In this passage, the contents of Crusoe’s “just Reflection” is represented in the present tense, which implies that Crusoe as narrator still believes in the dispensation of Nature that “all the good Things of this World, are no farther good to us, than they are for our Use; and that whatever we may heap up indeed to give
others, we enjoy just as much as we can use, and no more”. This is what he leaned from “The Nature and Experience of Things” and therefore it becomes instructive to the reader who may seek to enjoy more than he/she can use. Crusoe’s instructions as a whole seem more reliable than Moll’s or Roxana’s, because they are based on his experiences in the course of his spiritual development (see Chapter IV).

In other books, however, in which the hero/heroine is a picaro, instructions made by the narrating self are not as reliable as they seem. For example, in *Moll Flanders*, Moll says the following about a trap which a good-looking young woman is likely to fall into as follows:

(29) I was more confounded with the Money than I was before with the Love; and began to be so elevated, that I scarce knew the Ground I stood on: I am the more particular in this part, that if my Story comes to be read by any innocent young Body, they may learn from it to Guard themselves against the Mischiefs which attend an early Knowledge of their own Beauty; if a young Woman once thinks herself Handsome, she never doubts the Truth of any Man, that tells her he is in Love with her; for if she believes herself Charming enough to Captivate him, tis natural to expect the Effects of it. (*MF*: 21)

Although the use of the present tense in (29) suggests that what is represented is meant to be instructive to the reader, it only seems to be instructive. What Moll says does not actually refer to general, gnomic or universal truths at all but to what she subjectively thinks is true. Any reader can recognize that she is not a trustworthy person as she is never truly penitent in her life. What she says is therefore only seemingly true to the reader, so it tends to lose its instructive quality. Similar examples are found everywhere in *Moll Flanders* and *Roxana*:
(30) I cannot but remind the Ladies here how much they place themselves below the common Station of a Wife, which if I may be allow’d not to be Partial is low enough already; I say they place themselves below their common Station, and prepare their own Mortifications, by their submitting so to be insulted by the Men before-hand, which I confess I see no Necessity of.

This Relation may serve therefore to let the Ladies see, that the Advantage is not so much on the other Side, as the Men think it is; and tho’ it may be true, that the Men have but too much Choice among us; and that some Women may be found, who will dishonor themselves, be Cheap, and Easy to come at, and will scarce wait to be ask’d; (MF: 62)

(31) And here I must take the Liberty, whatever I have to reproach myself with in my after-Conduct, to turn to my Fellow-Creatures, the Young Ladies of this Country, and speak to them, by way of Precaution, If you have any Regard to your future Happiness; any View of living comfortably with a Husband; any Hope of preserving your Fortunes, or resorting them after any Disaster; Never, Ladies, marry a Fool; any Husband rather than a Fool; with some other Husbands you may be unhappy, but with a Fool, you will be miserable; with another Husband you may, I say, be unhappy, but with a Fool you must; nay, if he wou’d, he cannot make you easie; every thing he does is so awkward, every thing he says is so empty, a Woman of any Sence cannot but be surfeited, and sick of him twenty times a-Day: (Rox: 7-8)

Here is not the place to discuss further why what is represented as an instruction in the present tense is only seemingly instructive. I will discuss this seemingness, especially in Moll Flanders and Roxana, in more detail in 4.4. It is sufficient to observe here that regardless of their instructive qualities, such present tenses are
used to convey the consciousness of the narrating self and thus evoke the RECOUNTING schema and observer perspective in the reader’s mind.\textsuperscript{15}

### 2.5 Representing memory through the RELIVING mode

The RELIVING mode is the natural narrative schema in which past experiences are remembered from the original field perspective as if they were re-experienced at the time of remembering. It is a narrative style “focalized through the \textit{experiencing} self”, which Cohn gives the label “consonant” first-person narration (1981: 180, italics original). Empirical data in cognitive psychology shows that the field perspective is by nature dominant in autobiographical memory. This leads to the tendency to think that it is a privileged perspective “with regard to [its] emotional impact and role” (Sutton 2010: 34). When the remembered experiences are expressed in organized narratives (especially in literary texts), however, the act of narrating plays an important role. Historically speaking, the RECOUNTING mode has thus been the dominant story-telling mode when remembered experiences are represented in literary texts. For example, it dominates in Defoe’s narratives as observed in the previous section. In the case of the third-person narrative, reflectoral narrative techniques become well-established towards the nineteenth century and more sophisticated and popular in modernist novels. The same holds true for the first-person narrative. The narrative techniques for representing memory through the field perspective in the RELIVING mode were less developed in the early eighteenth century, which implies that the observer perspective rather than the field perspective was more reflected in its language representation. However, first-person reflectoral narrative techniques, that is, the RELIVING mode, have been used effectually at the micro-structural level of narratives since the first novels were written, though it was not the predominant narrative mode at the macro-structural level. While it is not the dominant narrative mode in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, the natural
narrative schema of REMEMBERING AS RELIVING is effectually used especially in the representations of his characters’ psychological experiences. This section examines Defoe’s use of the RELIVING mode, focusing on the so-called historical present tense, and explains why it evokes the reliving quality in the narratorial context.

The historical present tense, although it is morphologically a present tense, is different from other types of present tenses in that it is used to refer to the past. According to J. M. Steadman, the origin of the English historical present can be traced back to the Middle English period. Based on his philological research, he concludes that:

1. The historical present does not occur in Old English.
2. It is, however, very common in the Latin writings written in England during the Old English period.
3. The Old English translators consistently and repeatedly avoided translating a historical present of the Latin by an English historical present.
4. The historical present appeared first in English at the beginning of the thirteenth century; it became fairly common before the end of the century; and by the end of the fourteenth century it was used with the greatest freedom.

(Steadman 1917: 21)

The historical present is one of a grammatical device by which narrators can speak of past events and actions in their narratives (Steadman 1917; Jespersen 1933; Leech 1971; Schiffrin 1981; Declerck 1991). It is the present tense used to talk about the past, and so, as a rule, it occurs in alternation with the past tense. Some critics who have noted this fact have examined the functions and effects of the historical present in relation to tense switching (Wolfson 1979; 1982; Schiffrin
Fludernik, for example, observes that the historical present is different from the narrative present, that is, the consistent use of the present tense throughout the whole text or chapter(s), because the historical present should alternate with the past tense (Fludernik 1991; 1992a; 1996b; 2003; 2012).

It has been repeatedly pointed out by literary critics that one of the characteristics of the historical present is its “substitutability with the past tense” (Wolfson 1979: 170), because it has the same referential meaning as the past tense. It is substitutable with the past tense in terms of referential information, but its functions and effects are different from those of the past tense. The functions and effects of the historical present are traditionally explained in relation to the dramatic (or presentifying) qualities and involvement (or reliving) qualities for both the storyteller (the speaker or narrator) and the hearer or reader. “Several discussions”, as Deborah Schiffrin observes, “suggest that the HP [historical present] is used to increase the dramatic impact of the story by making the audience feel as if it had been present at the time of actual experience, seeing events as they actually happened” (1981: 46). In other discussions, it is argued that “the speaker becomes so involved in the telling of the story that [he/she] narrates events as if they were being relived, and as if they were occurring simultaneously with their retelling” (Schiffrin 1981: 46). The dramatic hypothesis, argues Nessa Wolfson, is “so prevalent and so widely accepted that it must be considered THE traditional interpretation”, which applies to “virtually every account of the English verb system” (1979: 169, capitalization original), such as Jespersen (1933), Leech (1971) and Quirk et al. (1972). This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the historical present “moves past events out of their original time frame and into the moment of speaking”, that is, “it is formally equivalent to a tense which indicates events whose reference time is not the moment of the experience, but the moment of speaking” (Schiffrin 1981: 46, see also Fleischman 1990: 75-78).
It is true that the historical present “has a reliving function in relation to the surrounding past-tense context – whatever the precise function in the specific context may be” (Fludernik 2003: 124). However, as Fludernik claims, the presupposition that “the historical present tense had one particular meaning or use” (1991: 367, italics original) is misleading. This relates to one of the problematic approaches to analysis of the historical present: previous scholarship tends to lack a diachronic perspective and to disregard important factors such as the kind of narrative genre, period and language. In Wolfson’s words, “[m]any scholars have not only disregarded distinctions of genre within the same language, but have actually seen HP [historical present] as having one and the same function in a variety of languages and at many periods in history” (1979: 168). The studies of the historical present tense from the late twentieth century onwards, therefore, have come to focus more specifically on the historical present in a particular genre, language and/or period. Wolfson (1979; 1982), for example, investigates the ways in which the historical present functions in conversational narratives in modern American English. Fludernik (1991; 1992a) diachronically examines the use of the historical present in English literature from the medieval to modern period. She discusses the transition of the use and meaning of the historical present in English literature in relation to the historical present in present-day spoken English. In the following, I briefly explore the historical transition of the historical present tense usage discussed by Fludernik (1991; 1992a), which is the only diachronic analysis of the historical present that I know of. By so doing, I will illustrate how various the uses of the historical present tense can be, and I will discuss Defoe’s use of the historical present tense in relation to its historical development.

Fludernik published a series of articles on the historical present in the early 1990s. In the first one titled “The Historical Present Tense Yet Again: Tense Switching and Narrative Dynamics in Oral and Quasi-Oral Storytelling” (1991), she discusses the use of the historical present tense in present-day conversational
narratives. Fludernik (1991) draws much from Wolfson (1979; 1982) and Schiffrin (1981), the most preeminent studies of the oral historical present tense in discourse analysis. In their studies, it is argued that it is not the historical present tense *per se* but the tense switching between the past and the historical present that is significant. In Wolfson’s view, the tense switching is significant because it is used “in order to separate the actions [that occurs in an incessant series] into events, to introduce a focus and permit the narrator to give [his/her] own interpretation of what happened” (1979: 178). Schiffrin (1981) considers that there is a difference in function between the shift from the past to the historical present and the shift from the historical present to the past. When the tense shifts from the past to the historical present, the function of the historical present tense becomes internally evaluative, serving to “[allow] the narrator to present events as if they were occurring at that moment, so that the audience can hear for itself what happened, and can interpret for itself the significance of those events for the experience” (Schiffrin 1981: 59).

Fludernik (1991), like Wolfson (1979; 1982) and Schiffrin (1981), regards the tense switching between the past and the historical present as important. For Fludernik, however, the functions of the tense switching do more than simply signal a break in events. She specifies the functions of both the switch into and out of the historical present. On the one hand, the switch from the past to the historical present functions as a signal which indicates what she calls “narrative turn” and its “tellability”. According to her, the points within a story at which the historical present occurs have to do with the turn and tellability of an event (see also Fludernik 1992a; 1992b). She insists that “[t]he turn is important in terms of plot function because it marks, not only what is commonly regarded as the peak of climax of an episode, but also the experientially important and significant incidence” (1991: 374). “Tellable events”, she argues, “are frequently those that describe the weird things that happen to the experiencer” (1991: 391). When one reaches an important or memorable event, therefore, he/she tends to make a
narrative turn in order to highlight the event from another, and the historical present is used to mark this turn and its tellable quality as in the following examples:

(32) Well, we were getting dressed to go out one night and I was, we were just leaving, just walking out the door and the baby was in bed, and all of a sudden the doorbell rings and Larry says, ‘There’s somebody here for you’, and I walk in the living room and she’s there with both kids. (Wolfson 1979: 174)

(33) And Mrs. Katz freaked out today because I had t’ give her a reinstatement card and you know Mrs. Karts. She – I had – I had t’ get her t’ sign the card and she looked at it and she goes ... ‘Sandy! Sandy!’ hhhh ... (Schiffrin 1981: 49)

A storyteller “points up the tellability of a story by means of evaluative devices – ways of drawing attention to key characters and events” (Johnstone 1987: 43, see also Schiffrin 1981: 59), and the switch into the historical present serves this role in oral storytelling.

On the other hand, the switch from the historical present to the past on the plot line signifies “narrative ‘point’ – the consequences, results and reactions that occur in the wake of turns” (Fludernik 1991: 377), as in (34) and (35) (indicated by italicized boldface), while “going into the off-plot level, it signals embedded orientation” (Fludernik 1991: 376) as in (35) (indicated by underlining):

(34) ... and this black thing flies out. And my father’s beating it. Here, that was only a sto – sock! (Schiffrin 1981: 60)
(35) And he looks up indigestion and he pulls out these pills and he says, ‘It says to take two.’ Well, I don’t like to take pills. In the course of a year, aside from this Moderil now, if I take ten aspirins, it’s a lot. I don’t like to take pills. I’m rarely sick. So it says take two, I said, ‘Oh, I’ll take one.’ So I took one and I had really been miserable. I had heartburn, I couldn’t believe this was happening to me. I took the pill and immediately I had relief. (Wolfson 1982: 49-50)

The noted effect of the switch into the historical present tense, therefore, cannot be gained unless it co-exists with this switch back to the past tense. In oral storytelling, episodes come out of the storyteller’s mouth one after another exactly as they happened to him/her, and the switch into and out of the historical present show its incessant dynamics, which Fludernik calls “dynamicity” (1992a: 86).

Fludernik (1991; 1992a) then compares the use of the historical present tense in present-day oral narratives with its use in Middle English oral narratives and early modern quasi-oral narratives. The dynamic use of the historical present tense in present-day oral narrative is similar to that which can be found in English narrative texts from the medieval to the early modern period, since all of them imitate the pattern of natural storytelling. The most evident feature of natural oral storytelling is that it consists of a series of episodes, and this feature is found in medieval narrative verse and early narrative prose. Fludernik therefore contends that “there exists an underlying narrative structure which allows the use of the present tense at specific points within a narrative episode” and she argues that these points refer to narrative turns correlated with tellability (Fludernik 1992a: 77):

(36) Whan she [Grisildis] this herde, aswowne doun she felleth
    For pitous joye, and after hire swownynge
    She bothe hire yonge children to hire calleth,
And in hire armes, pitously wepynge,

*Embraceth* hem, and tendrely kissynge

Ful lyk a mooder, with hire salte teeres
She bathed bothe hire visage and hire heeres.

*(Canterbury Tales: E 1079-1085, qtd. in Fludernik 1992a: 97)*16

In this passage, as she explains, the beginning of the episode is signified by the use of the when-clause and the historical present tense (“falleth”) which occurs within an adverbial preposing (“doun she falleth”). A set of tellable incidences in the episode is expressed by the other historical present tenses (“calleth”, “Embraceth”), and the consequence is marked by the past tense (“bathed”), which is a prototypical pattern of oral storytelling.

In the literary use of the historical present tense, “episode beginnings make up for a high percentage of the historical present tense” (Fludernik 1991: 376), because by doing so the narrator can visualize narrative turns in a longer narrative. This, according to Fludernik, is “a pervasive feature of early modern English episodic narrative” (1992a: 84), to which Defoe’s fiction belongs. She illustrates the use of the historical present as an episode opener with this passage from Defoe’s *Moll Flanders*:

(37) She [Moll’s old governess] laid her Scheme another way, and without acquainting me of it, but she was resolv’d to find it out, if possible; so she *goes* to a certain Friend of hers who was acquainted in the Family, that she guess’d at, and told her Friend she had some extraordinary business with such a Gentleman (who by the way was no less than a Baronet, and of a very good Family) and that she knew not how to come at him without somebody to introduce her: Her Friend promis’d her very readily to do it, and accordingly *goes* to the House to see if the Gentleman was in Town.
The next Day she comes to my Governess and tells her that Sir —— was at Home, but that he had met with a Disaster and was very ill, and there was no speaking with him; what Disaster, says my Governess hastily, as if she was surpriz’d at it?

(MF: 191, qtd. in Fludernik 1992a: 84-85)

Fludernik comments that “[t]he conceptual structure of tense distribution in early narrative prose can be identified with the very pattern of differential tense usage that applies to natural storytelling” (1992a: 85). This use of the historical present tense, therefore, “can be explained as an extension and application of it [the historical present in oral storytelling] to written narrative” (Fludernik 1991: 387). “‘Turns’, whether at the climax or beginning of episodes”, she argues, “consistently correlate with the reportability [i.e. tellability] of ‘turns’ and their subjective, evaluative nature” (Fludernik 1992a: 85).

The literary use of the historical present tense imitates the oral pattern to a certain extent, as was shown above. It is used to mark a narrative turn and its tellability. However, as Fludernik (1992a: 97) observes, the literary use does not entirely repeat the oral pattern because the written and the spoken language are essentially different from each other. Let me explore Fludernik’s (1992a) thesis, whose main point is that the narrative development from the medieval to the early modern narrative involves two crucial phases and that the different functions of the historical present have greatly to do with this development. The first phase is “a breakdown of the episodic narrative pattern” (Fludernik 1992a: 86) in early modern narrative prose and fiction. Although both oral narrative and early narrative prose and fiction share the episodic feature, the crucial difference between the two is that whereas the former is “a description of personal experience”, the latter is “a relation of episodic plot moves” (Fludernik 1992a: 82). The oral narrative by nature expresses “events befalling the experiencing consciousness”, but the written narrative prose deals with the incidences which
are “more than often purposeful actions by the protagonist rather than events that unexpectedly befall him or her” (Fludernik 1992a: 82). According to Fludernik, early narrative prose and fiction tend to foreground “not the experiencing self of the protagonist but the protagonist’s ability to – literally – plot”, in which framework “the protagonist’s moves and their originality acquire more importance” (1992a: 86). Authenticity then plays an important role when this teleological function of storytelling begins to replace the oral pattern. When introduced into the written medium, the oral episodic pattern “undergoes a restructuring process”, and its “experiential core” is substituted for the new teleological function (Fludernik 1992a: 86). The passage (37) from Moll Flanders above shows this restructuring: what it describes are not the happenings that befell Moll as her experiential core but of the purposeful events that make up her life story.

What is also collapsed is the “brevity” (Fludernik 1992a: 86) of the oral narrative. This is the second phase of the narrative development from the medieval to the early modern narrative. Fludernik argues that in longer written texts, it “becomes difficult to handle larger structural units” if there are numerous episodes as in the oral episodic narrative (1992a: 86). In her view, the medieval narrative tends to solve this problem by narratorial commentary or evaluation which indicates the transition from one episode to another. However, this method is less and less used in the early modern narrative. The episodes are linked together without leading to any significant results or resolution, which is typically signaled by the past tense in the oral pattern, and as a consequence, the result part and the incipit part of the following episode are combined and absorbed into a linear plot, which is indicated by the successive use of the historical present tense (Fludernik 1992a: 87). For example, in the following passage from Colonel Jack, in which Jack tells his master in a plantation in Virginia about how he handles the negroes, the historical present is used incessantly:
(38) For a good while, he [Mouchat] stood as if he had been Thunderstruck, and stupid; but looking steadily at me, tho’ not speaking a Word, at last he Mutters to himself with a kind of a Laugh, Ay, ay, says he, Mouchat see, Mouchat no see; me wakeé me no wakeé; no hangeé, no hangeé, he live truly, very live; and on a sudden he runs to me, snatches me away as if I had been a Boy of ten Years old, and takes me up upon his back, and run away with me, till I was fain to cry out to him to stop; then he sets me down, and looks at me again, then falls a Dancing about me, as if he had been bewitch’d, just as you [the Master] have seen them do about their Wives and Children when they are Merry. (CJ: 142-143)

The first present tense (“Mutters”) expresses the beginning of the episode. The third present tense (“runs”) combines “the result slot” with “the incipit of the following sub-episode” (Fludernik 1992a: 86), which is apparent from the preposed adverbial phrase (“on a sudden”). As a result, Mouchat’s successive actions are rendered only in the historical present tenses – except for “stood” at the beginning of (38), which is the result part of the previous episode, and “was”, which is “the backgrounded off-plot material” (Fludernik 1992a: 86). This linking by means of the historical present turns the traditional micro-structural episodic units into the new larger structural units of what Fludernik calls a “scene” (1991; 1992a). A “scene” in Fludernik’s definition refers to “uninterrupted series of the present tense for descriptive purposes” (Fludernik 1991: 389), which makes the narrative more complicated than episodic narratives because it is usually not sequentially ordered.

Also important for the portrayal of scenes, whether action scenes or non-action scenes, is “the renewed eighteenth-century interest in the figural psyche”, which “allows narrative to recapture the experiential quality” (Fludernik 1992a: 87). This makes it possible to use the present tense either for “highlight[ing] descriptions of breathtaking events” or just “descriptively”
Fludernik regards Defoe’s fictional narratives as belonging mainly to the first phase. Defoe’s narratives in fact have strong episodic qualities as they basically imitate natural storytelling, and contain many dynamic historical present tenses. However, they also contain the rather non-dynamic use of the historical present as in the passage (38), which can be considered as the precursor of the descriptive or non-dynamic historical present tense – the so-called historical present tense of nineteenth-century fiction. In point of fact, according to Fludernik (1991; 1992a), the first examples of the non-dynamic use in English literature can be traced back to Chaucer. Both the dynamic use and the non-dynamic use of the historical present tense have a reliving quality “in relation to the surrounding past-tense context” (Fludernik 2003: 124). However, it is the non-dynamic use of the historical present tense that can keep displaying the reliving quality through the point of view of the experiencing self. Let me elaborate the reliving quality of the historical present tense, that is, the ways in which this quality is created by means of the historical present tense.

Fludernik contends that “the historical present tense pattern is a device that focusses attention on decisive turns, rather than a technique for ‘making present’ and ‘making vivid’ what is recounted” in English literature (1992a: 98-99). She also argues that the historical present tense has a reliving function (2003: 124). These claims are not incompatible with each other. The historical present has the reliving quality not necessarily because it makes the represented actions or states actually present or vivid, but because the actions or states which are expressed in the historical present tense are virtually co-temporal with the here-and-now in another mental space created by the historical present tense. A problematic approach to the present tense, according to the cognitive linguist Ronald Langacker, is that:

Traditional semantics is objectivist in spirit, ignoring construal and the subjective basis of factors like bounding. In describing tense, it is usual to
focus exclusively on the temporal relation between the actual time of speaking and the full duration of an actual event occurrence. No attention is paid to fictivity or the myriad viewing arrangements which mediate between objective circumstances and the formulation of linguistic expressions. In short, traditional assumptions leave out essentially everything needed for a viable account. (Langacker 2001: 271)

Langacker insists on the importance of “virtual or fictive entities” in normal language use (2001: 265, italics original). As a storyteller, “one can easily assume the spatial and temporal vantage point” (Langacker 2001: 265) of the narrated other (whether the other character or his or her past self), transferring his or her own point of view to this narrated other (see 2.3). Such a mental transfer to a fictive or virtual point of view is much discussed and attested in the mental space theory (see Fauconnier 1994; 1997; Fauconnier and Turner 2002). Langacker explains the non-present use of the present tense including the historical present tense in the wake of the mental space theory. Once the point of view is transferred to a different mental space, the moment of utterance is “fictively located inside the mental space” and “a process conceived as occurring in this space is fictively viewed as coincident with the speech event” (Langacker 2001: 271). In other words, the actual entity (i.e. the storyteller) psychologically moves to a different mental space, transferring his/her vantage point to another fictive entity (i.e. another character or the storyteller’s past self). The historical present tense is a linguistic device that indicates this mental transfer. Therefore, it does not as a rule bring the described event to the actual time of speaking and in this sense make the event vivid (i.e. the so-called presentifying function), but it signals the co-temporality of the event with the time of speaking in the virtually created mental space. The described event is then felt as if it were happening at the same time of speaking in that space, the very effect of which should be correlated with the reliving quality of the historical present tense.
As such, the historical present \textit{per se} has the quality of reliving – though the specific function as a whole may be variable depending on the context it is used – but this quality can be retained only when it is used successively: otherwise, the transferred deictic centre located in a fictive entity shifts back to that of the actual entity. The dynamic use of the historical present in the first-person autobiographical narrative then exhibits a reliving quality only \textit{very temporarily}, because it frequently shifts back to the past tense. Consequently, it clearly indicates the narrating self’s act of telling, and foregrounds the RECOUNTING mode rather than the RELIVING mode. On the other hand, the non-dynamic use of the historical present tense keeps exhibiting the reliving quality, and foregrounds the RELIVING mode rather than the RECOUNTING mode. In the following, I will illustrate the existence and distribution of both the dynamic and the non-dynamic use of the historical present in Defoe’s narratives. My analysis will show how closely the dynamic and the non-dynamic use of the historical present tense are related with each other and how their functions are effectively combined in his narratives.

Defoe does in part imitate the historical present in the oral pattern:

(39) However I \textit{went} out again, the next Night, and then I \textit{met} with a little Adventure, which had like to have cost me dear; as I \textit{was} standing near a Tavern Door, there \textit{comes} a Gentleman on Horse back, and \textit{lights} at the Door, and wanting to go into the Tavern, he \textit{calls} one of the Drawers to hold his Horse; he \textit{stay’d} pretty long in the Tavern, and the Drawer \textit{heard} his Master call, and \textit{thought} he would be angry with him; seeing me stand by him, when he \textit{call’d} to me, here Woman, \textit{says he}, hold this Horse a while, till I go in, if the Gentleman comes, he’ll give you something; \textit{yes says I}, and \textit{takes} the Horse, and \textit{walks} off with him very soberly, and \textit{carry’d} him to my Governess. (MF: 211-212)
The Case was thus, having had such good Luck at the Custom-House the Day before, he takes his Walk thither again, and as he was in the Long Room gaping and staring about him, a Fellow lays hold of him, and calls to one of the Clerks, that sat behind, here, says he, is the same young Rogue, that I told you I saw Loitering about t’other Day when the Gentleman lost his Letter Case, and his Goldsmith’s Bills; I dare say it was he that stole them; immediately the whole Crowd of People gather’d about the Boy, and Charg’d him point Blank! (CJ: 28)

These passages show Defoe’s dynamic use of the historical present: the past tense and the present tense alternate in these passages. The switch into the historical present tense marks the turns and their tellability, and the switch back to the past tense indicates the narrative points in which the resultant actions are expressed. The use of the historical present tense can mark the reliving quality, but when used dynamically, it foregrounds the presence of the representing consciousness. Indeed, as Fludernik points out, the historical present tense, as a historical present, only occurs in literary narrative which “has a distinct teller character” (1991: 391). The RELIVING mode is momentarily evoked by the presence of the historical present, but the dynamic use of the historical present, as a whole, stresses the presence of the narrating self and foregrounds the RECOUNTING mode.

Regarding the dynamic use of the historical present tense, the says/said alternation needs more explicating here. It is the most common tense switching in Defoe’s narratives. The says/said alternation has been regarded as puzzling because, as Barbara Johnstone argues, dialogue introducers like say and go are “semantically neutral place makers, indicating only that what follows is supposed to be taken as someone’s exact words” (1987: 42). In other words, “[u]nlike verbs like yell, shout, whisper and so on, say and go do not carry any information about the exact nature of the verbal event, beyond the fact that it was verbal” (Johnstone 1987: 42). This has caused many critics to puzzle over the seemingly random
tense switching between *says* and *said*. In her analysis of the oral narrative, Wolfson concludes that *say* as a dialogue introducer is “an anomaly” (1979: 179; 1982: 52). She claims that:

The only apparent explanation for this extremely common and highly unstable alternation between *say* and *said* has to do with the fact that it is so common. ... The verb is so pervasive in all reportings of direct speech. The loss of significance through overuse is a well known linguistic phenomenon and it may be at work here; the *say*/*said* alternation may have lost its significance and distinctive meaning. (Wolfson 1982: 52)

Other critics, however, consider that the tense switching between *says* and *said* can be explained in certain ways. Schiffrin, though she does not argue the *says*/*said* alternation in particular, observes that using the historical present tense in a reporting clause is one of the ways in which “the narrative framework replaces the situation of speaking in order to make the reported material more immediate” (1981: 58). The historical present tense, as she illustrates, is thus more frequently used in the reporting clauses of direct speech than those of indirect speech.

Johnstone (1987) finds a general *he says/I said* pattern in her conversational-narrative data. This pattern seems to be generated by “the general requirements imposed on storytellers by virtue of the fact that they are telling stories” (Johnstone 1987: 43-44). In telling a story, a storyteller has to manage two levels of “footing” or different points of view: “the level of the storytelling interaction” (i.e. the narrating self’s point of view) and “the level of the interaction in the story” (i.e. the experiencing self’s point of view) (Johnstone 1987: 44). The tense choice in dialogue introducers, according to Johnstone, is one of the ways to manage these different points of view in a story. Dialogue introducers have a special status in that they are not only part of the successive
actions constructing the story’s backbone, “but also part of the dialog that is embedded in the story, in the sense that introducers serve as special cues for the interpretation of the dialog that follows them” (Johnstone 1987: 44). For example, as Schiffrin (1981) suggests, the utterances introduced by the historical present tense become more immediate. The tense switching between says and said therefore should be understood in terms of “two overlapping requirements on a storyteller” (Johnstone 1987: 47):

One is the requirement to justify a long, relatively uninterrupted conversational turn by providing a pointful story, and highlighting the point by means of evaluative devices like the HP [historical present]. The other is the teller’s need to create a persona for him- or herself, a persona mirrored in reported interactions with others. (Johnstone 1987: 47)

The says/said alternation, concludes Johnstone, is “a resource for marking whose talk is more crucial to the point of the story, what the relationships between the reported speakers are and how they evolve in the course of the reported events, and who the real authors of the constructed words are” (1987: 50).

Fludernik (1991) also argues that the patterns of the says/said alternation can be identifiable:

The concepts of tellability and narrative ‘turn’, vague though they are, greatly help to illuminate the vexed problem of says/said alternation. Tellable events are frequently those that describe the weird things that happen to the experiencer. Rather than being a mere device of participant tracking, the says/said alternation can therefore make some very subtle comments about the status of participants in relation to the ‘point’ of the story.

(Fludernik 1991: 391)
Therefore, the *says/said* alternation may be different from other tense choices because of its lack of lexical meaning, but like other verbs it is not random. Although the tense choice, whether between *says* and *said* or between other verbs, depends largely on the storyteller’s discretion, the reasons for tense switching, if it happens, can be explained from one or some of the factors discussed above.

In literature, the *says/said* alternation is also “a standard pattern already in Shakespeare and Defoe, since it mimetically recreates what is believed to be the colloquial standard” (Fludernik 1991: 392). One can easily find dynamic tense switching between *says* and *said* in Defoe’s narratives:

(41) When he was gone, *Amy* chang’d her Countenance indeed, and look’d as merry as ever she did in her Life; Dear Madam! *says she*, what does this Gentleman mean? Nay, *Amy, said I*, he means to do us Good, you see, don’t he? I know no other Meaning he can have, for he can get nothing by me: I warrant you, Madam, *says she*, he’ll ask you a Favour by and by: No, no, you are mistaken, *Amy*, I dare say, *said I*; you heard what he said, didn’t you? Ay, *says Amy*, it’s no matter for that, you shall see what he will do after Dinner: Well, well, *Amy, says I*, you have heard Thoughts of him, I cannot be of your Opinion; I don’t see any thing in him yet that looks like it: As to that, Madam, *says Amy*, I don’t see any thing of it yet neither; but what should move a Gentleman to take Pity of us, as he does? Nay, *says I*, that’s a hard thing too, that we should judge a Man to be wicked because he’s charitable; and vicious because he’s kind: O Madam, *says Amy*, there’s abundance of Charity begins in that Vice, and he is not so unacquainted with things, as not to know, that Poverty is the strongest Incentive; a Temptation, against which no Virtue is powerful enough to stand out; he knows your Condition as well as you do: Well, and what then? Why then he knows too that you are young and handsome, and he has the surest Bait in the
World to take you with.

Well, Amy, said I, but he may find himself mistaken too in such a thing as that: Why, Madam, says Amy, I hope you won’t deny him, if he should offer it.

What d’ye mean by that, Hussy, said I? No, I’d starve first.

I hope not, Madam, I hope you would be wiser; I’m sure if he will set you up, as he talks of, you ought to deny him nothing; and you will starve if you do not consent, that’s certain.

What, consent to lye with him for Bread? Amy, said I, How can you talk so?

Nay, Madam, says Amy, I don’t think you wou’d for any thing else; it would not be Lawful for any thing else, but for Bread, Madam; why nobody can starve, there’s no bearing that, I’m sure.

Ay, says I, but if he would give me an Estate to live on, he should not lye with me, I assure you. (Rox: 27-28)

The dynamic tense switching between says and said continues for a while after this passage. This dynamicity conveys the oral and colloquial quality of the episodic narrative. Like Johnstone’s generic he says/I said pattern, Amy’s speech is here always introduced by the reporting clause in the historical present tense whereas Roxana’s (i.e. the storyteller’s) is introduced in the past tense. Amy talks about what Roxana cannot expect at all, like one who can better understand the real situation. She has an authoritative voice in this context even though Roxana is her mistress, and so what Amy says marks narrative turns. There are also a few exceptions of says I in (41). Roxana’s own utterances introduced by says I represent her opinions about the landlord which are different from Amy’s, and thus they are highlighted to make the interaction much more dynamic by means of the historical present tense. Roxana, as the storyteller, not only makes subtle evaluations of what happens to her in order to make her story what Johnstone
calls “pointful”, but also represents the status relationship between Amy and herself in this particular interaction.

In the following examples (42) to (45), the use of the historical present tense has a more non-dynamic quality compared to the examples (39) to (41), in that the historical present tenses in the plot line are used at the end of the paragraphs and do not switch back to the past within the same episode unit:

(42) He staid, however, at home all that Day, and lay at home that Night; early the next Morning he gets out of Bed, goes to a Window which look’d out towards the Stables, and sounds his French Horn, as he call’d it; which was his usual Signal to call his Men to go out a hunting.

(Rox: 12)

(43) This young Gentleman had fir’d his Inclination, as much as he had my vanity, and as if he had found that he had an opportunity, and was sorry he did not take hold of it, he comes up again in half an Hour, or thereabouts, and falls to Work with me again as before, only with a little less Introduction. (MF: 21)

(44) O Jemy! said I, come back, come back, I’ll give you all I have; I’ll beg, I’ll starve with you, and thus I run Raving about the Room several times, and then sat down between whiles, and then walking about again, call’d upon him to come back, and then cry’d again; and thus I pass’d the Afternoon; till about seven a-Clock when it was near Dusk in the Evening, being August, when to my unspeakable Surprize he comes back into the Inn, but without a Servant, and comes directly up into my Chamber. (MF: 129)
(45) ... and if any Accident had happened to us, we might at last have been very miserable; supposing we had lost our Goods and saved our Lives only, and had then been left naked and destitute, and in a wild strange Place, not having one Friend or Acquaintance in all that part of the World? The very thoughts of it gives me some horror, even since the Danger is past. (MF: 275)

The historical present tense is used in the last part of the paragraphs in these examples. Such a distributive pattern is fairly common in Defoe’s narratives. Structurally speaking, the closing part of a paragraph is correlated with the result unit, self-evidently because it is the end of that paragraph. The historical present tenses in the examples above designate narrative turns, both at the beginning of episodes and at particularly breathtaking events. At the same time, they describe the events which constitute the result part of the successive events. Paragraphs ending with the historical present tense, which signifies that the paragraph end is represented through the point of view fictively transferred to the experiencing self, tend to be evocative of the figural psyche. Such historical present tenses can then be used more non-dynamically in the narrative, highlighting the point of view of the experiencing self:

(46) he very Gravely comes up to the Horse, hits him a Blow or two, and calls him Dog for running away; gives the Man 2d. that cach’d him for him, Mounts, and away he comes after me. (CJ: 93)

(47) Here Child, says Amy, take one of ’em in your Hand, and I’ll bring the rest; so she gives her the least, and the Wench goes in mighty innocently, with the Little One in her Hand, upon which Amy turns the rest in after her, shuts the Door softly, and marches off as fast as she cou’d.

(Rox: 19)
Away I went, and coming to the House I found them all in Confusion, you may be sure; I run in, and finding one of the Maids, Lord! Sweetheart, said I, how came this dismal Accident? Where is your Mistress? And how does she do? Is she safe? And where are the Children? I come from Madam — to help you; away runs the Maid, Madam, Madam, says she, screaming as loud as she cou’d yell, here is a Gentlewoman come from Madam — to help us: The poor Woman half out of her Wits, with a Bundle under her Arm, and two little Children, comes towards me, Lord, Madam, says I, let me carry the poor Children to Madam —, she desires you to send them; she’ll take care of the poor Lambs, and immediately I takes one of them out of her Hand, and she lifts the tother up into my Arms; ay, do, for God sake, says she, carry them to her; O thank her for her kindness: Have you any thing else to secure, Madam? says I, she will take care of it: O dear! ay, says she, God bless her, and thank her, take this bundle of Plate and carry it to her too; O she is a good Woman; O Lord, we are utterly ruin’d, utterly undone; and away she runs from me out of her Wits, and the Maids after her, and away comes I with the two Children and the Bundle.

(MF: 171-172)

Of all the historical present tenses in Defoe’s quasi-autobiographical narratives, the series of historical present tenses in (48) is its most non-dynamic use. The paragraph begins with the past tense (“I went”, “I found”), and it contains a parenthetical “you may be sure” in (48a). They clearly signify the narrating self’s detached perspective from the original experience, which means that the RECOUNTING mode is foregrounded in (48a). In the rest of the passage (48b), however, past events are all represented in the present tense – except for “said” in the third line – and there is no switch back to the past. Since the historical present tense, which signifies the co-temporality of the events with the experiencing self’s
speech time in the transferred mental space, is used many times in succession, this non-dynamic use of the tense underlines “the immediateness of the experience” (Warner 2009: 15). The passage thus renders the tense situation of the fire and Moll’s dexterous stealing immediately as if in the original situation.

Defoe’s use of the historical present tense seems to have a more non-dynamic quality than Fludernik argues, like those in nineteenth-century fiction. This implies that his narratives exhibit a great deal of figural psyche and experiential quality at the micro-structural level, though they are teller-mode narratives at the macro-structural level. His use of the historical present tense tends to have both a dynamic and a non-dynamic quality, as in the examples (42) to (45), and thus is used to signal both the representing consciousness of the narrating self and the represented consciousness of the experiencing self. In other words, he creates authentic effects by having a teller character always present throughout the story, while at the same time describing what the past self experienced in the original field immediately. The representation of figural psyche as such is also very much related to the creation of the novel in the early eighteenth century.

The meaning and function of the historical present tense are variable according to various factors such as narrative genre (oral or literary) and literary history. In any case, the historical present per se has a reliving quality, but its meaning depends on the context in which it is used. It is the non-dynamic use of the historical present tense that keeps evoking the reliving quality and consequently foregrounds the RELIVING mode rather than the RECOUNTING mode. The dynamic use of the historical present tense brings the presence of the narrating figure into relief, as it frequently alternates with the past tense. Consequently, this foregrounds the RECOUNTING mode rather than the RELIVING mode. In this sense, the RELIVING mode evoked by the use of the historical present tense is limited in Defoe’s narratives. The more extensive evocation of the RELIVING mode in his narratives can be found in the
representation of consciousness, in which tense use plays also plays a crucial role. As Fludernik observes, the tense shift no longer serves a “foreground/background” or marked/unmarked function in the represented consciousness (2012: 87). In contrast, the tense shift in consciousness representation possibly “alerts the reader to a new perspective or simply encourages a different way of reading what follows” (Fludernik 2012: 87). The following chapter will examine the linguistic features of various categories of consciousness representation which stimulate these functions.

As illustrated in this chapter, Defoe enhances the effect of authenticity by manipulating two different natural narrative modes, that is, REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING and REMEMBERING AS RELIVING. Authenticity is created by the presence of the narrating self as we can easily believe what is represented if it comes directly from the experiencer. Authenticity is also closely related to the immediate representation of past experiences, because by doing so the reader can feel that the narrating self is reliving its past experiences as if in the original situation. As Warner suggests, “in order for the work to feel authentic to the reader the gap between the act of narrating and the embodied experience of that which is being narrated must somehow be eroded” (2009: 20, italics original). As a result, the represented experiences can seem much more real.

The different modes in the narrative schema of REMEMBERING imitate the natural distinction in real-life schema, that is, the distinction between observer and field perspective in autobiographical memory. The distinction in point of view in autobiographical memory is a natural one, so the imitation of this natural distinction itself therefore naturally enhances the authenticity effect of a narrative. Defoe’s fictional autobiographies are macro-structurally categorized as narratives told in the RECOUNTING mode, as the tense use indicates. At a closer look, however, he effectively uses both the natural narrative schemas of REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING and REMEMBERING AS RELIVING in
his fiction, imitating the distinction between the natural, real-life cognitive remembering modes, that is, the observer and field perspectives. By naturally evoking both narrative modes, he enhances the effect of authenticity in his narratives. This chapter has illustrated this fact by looking at tense usage in narration. The next chapter will closely examine the ways in which the different narrative modes are used on a smaller scale, focusing on the relationship between narrative modes and categories of consciousness representation.
CHAPTER III REPRESENTING CONSCIOUSNESS IN NARRATIVE

From its first beginnings, the novel has gradually developed as novelists have attempted to explore the depths of human psychology and represent them in words. These attempts have produced many narrative techniques for accessing human consciousness, which is invisible to others. Defoe’s fiction is no exception to this. The representations of consciousness in his fiction are indeed rich, as he excelled in expressing his characters’ inner states in words. This chapter approaches authenticity in narrative in terms of Defoe’s psychological realism. It focuses on his narrative techniques for representing consciousness, and examines how they convey the effect of authenticity to the reader and how important it was for him to portray his characters’ psychology in his fictional autobiographies.

One important aspect of consciousness representation is that it always involves a representing subject and a represented subject: consciousness is represented by someone representing. In other words, two deictic centres are involved in the represented consciousness. In the case of the first-person autobiographical narrative, the narrating self represents its own present consciousness or the consciousness of its past self when it remembers and tells its past experiences. This implies that there is always internal tension between the two selves, which, as explained in 2.1, is the most prominent feature of the first-person autobiographical narrative. As with the unstable point of view in autobiographical memory in real life (see 2.2), the internal tension in narrative tends to fluctuate and is not always stable. Different modes of representing consciousness embody the variations in the internal tension woven into the narrative.

In stylistics and narratology, modes of consciousness representation have been investigated in terms of speech and thought representation as constituting a
systematic continuum according to this oscillating relationship between the two selves. The most acknowledged distinction in speech and thought representation is between direct speech and thought and indirect speech and thought. Direct speech/thought is labeled “direct” because it is supposed to replicate the exact words and expressions coming from the deictic centre of the represented subject. In this sense, the consciousness represented through direct speech/thought is immediate and mimetic. On the other hand, indirect speech/thought is labeled “indirect” because there is an interference by the representing subject in the consciousness represented. The deictic centre of the representing subject is operative in this mode, and the consciousness represented becomes mediate and diegetic. The balance between mimesis and diegesis linguistically embodied by the distinction in speech and thought representation categories is thus associated with the fluctuating relationship between the representing subject and the represented subject, which correspond with the internal tension between the narrating self and the experiencing self in the first-person autobiographical narrative.

Section 3.1 explores the concept of consciousness, which has attracted much attention as a problematic concept not only in stylistics and narratology but also in other disciplines such as philosophy and cognitive science. Although it is not easy to give a universally acceptable definition of consciousness, this section explores various qualities relating to it. In particular, it suggests that the distinction between the perceptual and conceptual levels of consciousness is fundamentally important in order to examine the linguistic representation of fictional consciousness.

Section 3.2 explains briefly the narratological concept of mediacy. In classical narratology, mediacy refers to the narrative transmission of story into discourse by means of narration, and the narrator is the mediator of this transmission in narrative texts. Although mediacy has been revisited from an interpretative perspective in post-classical narratology, the approach to mediacy in
relation to the narrative transmission is still effective in the analysis of fictional consciousness, as the oscillating internal tension between the two selves is often reflected in the degree of mediacy in narrative.

Section 3.3 proposes a paradigm for consciousness representation by developing the scalar model of speech and thought representation suggested in stylistics and narratology, taking due notice of the degree of mediacy discussed in 3.2. This section also pays separate attention to the representation of the perceptual level of consciousness in order to propose a way to look into fictional consciousness in greater detail. It then briefly demonstrates the relationship between the consciousness representation categories and point of view in our natural narrative schema of REMEMBERING discussed in Chapter II.

Section 3.4 illustrates and examines the formal, functional and semantic features of free indirect style. Ever since Charles Bally (1912) first identified linguistic representations such as “He stopped. Was that the car he had seen here yesterday?” (Pascal 1977: 8) as a distinct linguistic form and named it “le style indirect libre”, free indirect style has won a place as the most influential narrative technique for representing fictional consciousness. This section explains why this style is important in creating the effect of authenticity in Defoe’s narratives.

Section 3.5 concentrates on more diegetic modes of consciousness representation than free indirect style, which have been less explored in stylistics and narratology. The unequal focus on free indirect style raised serious questions for some post-classical narratologists. Alan Palmer, for example, insists on the importance of more diegetic modes of consciousness representation, that is, what he calls “thought report” that represents “such states of mind as emotions, sensations, dispositions, beliefs, attitudes, intensions, motives, and reasons for action” (2004: 13). This section, like Palmer, pays due attention to diegetic modes of consciousness representation such as thought report, as they are extensively used and qualitatively rich in content in the novels of the eighteenth century, which was a time when the representation of characters’ consciousness in reflector
mode was not fully developed. The mimetic elements which some diegetic modes can contain are as important for understanding fictional consciousness as those in free indirect style.

Finally, Section 3.6 focuses on changes in consciousness representation categories to illustrate how they influence the creation of authenticity in the sense that the character actually experienced the represented consciousness. This section shows that the gradience which the diegetic and mimetic modes have with each other is an important way to look into the internal tension which is always changing in the course of the narrative.

3.1 Consciousness, a problematic concept

Consciousness has been associated with the knowledge that comes from experiences since the late seventeenth century, when it was first conceptualized as a distinct word. As discussed in 1.3, according to the eighteenth-century philosopher John Locke, we are conscious of thinking when we know it from our experiences (2008 [1694]: II. I, xix). Locke’s view of consciousness is reflected in ideas about it today. The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, for example, says “[c]onsciousness occurs when we know” (1999: 148), and that “consciousness is a state of mind in which there is knowledge of one’s own existence and of the existence of surroundings” (2012 [2010]: 167, italics original). For Damasio, consciousness is associated with knowledge of what is happening in one’s internal world and the external world. Some narratologists and linguists associate consciousness more with experience than with knowledge. For the narratologist Monika Fludernik, “[c]onsciousness comprises both lived experientiality\(^1\) and intellectual attempts to deal with experience, and it includes the comprehension of actancy\(^2\) just as it necessarily embraces an understanding of mental processes” (1996b: 49-50). Put more simply in the linguist Wallace Chafe’s words, consciousness is “what we experience” (1994: 27), and it consists of experiences
of perceptions, actions, evaluations, and introspections (1994: 31). It is difficult to define consciousness “in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions” or “in the Aristotelian fashion by way of genus and differentia” (Searle 1992: 83), but we can conclude from these views on consciousness that we have consciousness by the knowledge of our experiences perceived in the external world and conceptualized in the internal world.

When it comes to its linguistic representation, consciousness is likely to be automatically associated with internal or conceptual qualities such as thought and belief. The external or perceptual qualities of consciousness tend to be disregarded, though they are also important constituents of conscious experiences. The psychologist Irvin Rock, for example, views perception as intelligent: perception “is based on such thoughtlike mental processes as description, inference, and problem-solving, although these processes are rapid-fire, unconscious, and nonverbal” (1984: 234, quoted in Searle 1992: 231, italics added). Another psychologist, Nicholas Humphrey, also insists on the thought-like nature of perception (1992: 24-30). In fact, perception was considered to have similar qualities to thought as early as the seventeenth century. Locke, for example, saw thought and perception as the same thing when explaining the relationship between the soul and ideas as follows:

To ask, at what time a Man has first any Ideas, is to ask, when [he/she] begins to perceive; having Ideas, and Perception being the same thing. I know it is an Opinion, that the Soul always thinks, and that it has the actual Perception of Ideas in it self constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the Soul, as actual Extension is from the Body; which if true, to enquire after the beginning of a Man’s Ideas, is the same, as to enquire after the beginning of [his/her] Soul. For by this Account, Soul and its Ideas, as Body and its Extension, will begin to exist both at the same time. (Locke 2008 [1694]: II. I, ix, italics original)
Visual perception was considered especially important in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. For most philosophers in this period, thoughts were equated with visual perceptions, and discussed in visual terms (Konigsberg 1985: 11). The visual perception verb *see* can mean “[t]o perceive mentally” or “to apprehend by thought” (*OED*, s.v. *see*, v. 3. a), as well as referring to visual perception. This metaphorical use of the verb *see* reflects the idea that what we see is what we know. *OED* explains that “[a]s the sense of sight affords far more complete and definite information respecting external objects than any other of the senses, mental perceptions are in many (perh. in all) languages referred to in visual terms, and often with little or no consciousness of metaphor” (s.v. *see*, v. 3. a). The verb *see* in this sense has been used since the Middle English period, but according to Hiroshi Takayama, a phrase such as “I see that” reflects the increasing interest in visual perception in the eighteenth century (2007: 120-122).

To my knowledge, Chafe’s approach to consciousness is the only systematic attempt to explain how language representation works in terms of different levels of consciousness. As discussed in 1.4, human consciousness can focus either on immediate experiences or on displaced ones. It should be clear from the different representation modes explored in 1.4 that the distinction between immediate consciousness and displaced consciousness almost corresponds to that between the perceptual and conceptual levels of consciousness. The terms *immediate* and *displaced* imply the distance which the experiencer takes from the experienced consciousness, or the degree of mediacy. Therefore, these terms may also be used to refer to the mimetic/direct and diegetic/indirect modes of consciousness representation respectively. I prefer to use the terms *perceptual* and *conceptual* rather than *immediate* and *displaced* when referring to the different levels of consciousness, and reserve the latter terms for referring to the ways in which consciousness is represented.

Another distinction in the qualities of consciousness is discussed in terms of its reflectivity. In his article “Reflections on the Foundations of Narrative Theory”
Shigeyuki Kuroda discriminates between “reflective and spontaneous consciousness” (1976: 121) in explaining the use of the Japanese word *zibun*. Following Kuroda, Ann Banfield (1981; 1982) makes a distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness. For her, reflective consciousness corresponds to thoughts and non-reflective consciousness to sense perceptions (Banfield 1981: 63-65; 1982: 196-199). However, based on Banfield’s earlier account of this distinction, Laurel Brinton counter-argues that there are reflective perceptions as well as non-reflective thoughts (1980: 368-369). Some critics consider consciousness representation in terms of articulation or verbalization (e.g. Banfield 1981: 75; 1982: 211; Fludernik 2009: 82-83; Rundquist 2014: 164, 170). For example, Banfield argues that “[i]f thought may sometimes ‘take the form’ of words, it need not; but non-reflective consciousness can never be inner speech and still remain non-reflective” (1982: 211). The problems of reflectivity and articulation are very important in analysing fictional consciousness, but hard to deal with in terms of linguistic constructs. Eric Rundquist states that it is difficult to entirely determine “[t]he verbality of a character’s thought” by linguistic style (2014: 164). Many different qualities of consciousness have been identified and discussed, but in this thesis, I regard the distinction between the perceptual and the conceptual levels of consciousness as a primary distinction, and refer to other dichotomous distinctions where necessary.

### 3.2 Mediacy in narrative

Whenever something is represented in any kind of art, there is a mediator who represents and communicates it to the receiver. In narrative, the mediator is called a *narrator*, and “the voice of a narrator is audible” (Stanzel 1984: 4) to the reader of the narrative. F. K. Stanzel (1984) calls this phenomenon “mediacy”. In other words, the term *mediacy* refers to the presence of a narrator in a narrative. Mediacy in classical narratology presupposes that there is always a *story* (i.e.
what happened in the fictional world) first, and then it is rendered into discourse (i.e. textual realization of the story by means of narration) by a narrator.\textsuperscript{7} This has been counter-argued by the postclassical narratologist Richard Walsh, who points out that this is not always the case from an explicative perspective, arguing that “[discourse] is what we come to understand as a given (fictional) narrative, and [story] is how we come to understand it” (2007: 68). Both approaches to the relationship between story and discourse should not be discarded entirely, however. A narrative is regarded as a narrative through the process of the act of narrating and reading: a narrator communicates with the reader by means of the transmission of the story into discourse and at the same time the reader conceptualizes the story from the narrative discourse.

The priority of the story or plot is also questioned from a generative perspective in post-classical narratology in that “many plot details are not known to authors when they start to write” (Fludernik 2010: 108). But still, the narratological concept of mediacy seems effectual even at a generative level if it is discussed from a micro-perspective. Even though one may not have the entire plot in one’s mind, what one wants to represent when writing always comes before one actually represents it in words, however short the time gap may seem to be. The following sections thus investigate how the degree of mediacy in the traditional sense affects the modes of consciousness representation, and how the use of the different modes influences the reader’s interpretation of the narrative.

“Absence is absolute, but presence has degrees”, says Gérard Genette, when he explains that there are different types of homodiegetic narratives, the narrative style in which the narrator is present in the fictional world (1980: 245). This also applies to mediacy because it means the presence of a narrator. Mediacy has degrees whenever there is a narrator. The degree of mediacy can be discussed in terms of the perceptibility of the presence of the narrator on the part of the reader. Sometimes the presence of the narrator is perceived by the reader, whereas at other times it is willingly suspended and instead an illusory sense of im-mediacy
is created in the reader’s mind.

Although degree or extent in general is “difficult – if not impossible – to measure” (Stanzel 1984: 7), the degree of mediacy has been studied in terms of point of view in narrative. I have been using the term *point of view* without clearly defining it so far, but it needs some clarification at this point. “Point of view” is a problematic term because it “has by no means been consistently applied” (Stanzel 1984: 9) in narrative theory. According to Stanzel, the term *point of view* in narrative theory refers to a “standpoint from which a story is narrated or from which an event is perceived by a character in the narrative”, and so it is used in two distinct contexts in narratology: “to narrate, that is to say, to transmit something in words; and to experience, to perceive, to know as a character what is happening in the fictional space” (1984: 9). The two functions of point of view discussed by Stanzel almost correspond to the distinction between “who sees?” and “who speaks?” made by Genette (1980: 186). The degree of mediacy is closely related to point of view in narrative, and it affects the ways in which consciousness is represented in narrative. The following sections focus on narrative techniques for representing consciousness in relation to mediacy. As a framework for investigating the degree of mediacy in consciousness representation categories, I will use the scalar model of speech and thought representation suggested in stylistics and narratology, and seek a way to incorporate the representation of the perceptual level of consciousness into this model. The next section aims to suggest a paradigm for *consciousness* representation. As a basic framework for analysing fictional consciousness, it first explores previous scholarship on speech and thought representation, showing that what differentiates the modes of speech and thought representation is closely concerned with the degree of mediacy in the represented speech and thought. Then I will propose a similar though different framework for representing perception.
3.3 A consciousness representation paradigm

3.3.1 Mediacy and the representation of speech and thought

The representation of characters’ speech and thought occupies a large part of fictional texts. Without giving any evidence, I think it is correct to say that there are few fictional narratives that do not have any characters’ utterances or thoughts. This view might be supported by the fact that the representation of speech and thought has been repeatedly explored in literary criticisms as “a crucial issue in narrative poetics” (Fludernik 1993: 3) and has often been examined in terms of its “effects on the reader” (Ikeo 2016: 356). The representation of characters’ speech and thought in narrative has often been discussed together under the heading of “speech and thought representation” or “discourse representation” due to their formal similarities. While most critics agree that speech and thought are formally very similar, some stylisticians and narratologists (e.g. Hernadi 1972; Cohn 1978) have identified differences between them in terms of their effects. For example, Cohn points out the arguable parallelism between “spoken discourse” and “silent thought” (1978: 11):

Speech is, by definition, always verbal. Whether thought is always verbal is to this day a matter of definition and dispute among psychologists. Most people, including most novelists, certainly conceive of consciousness as including ‘other mind stuff’ (as William James called it), in addition to language. This ‘stuff’ cannot be quoted – directly or indirectly; it can only be narrated. One of the drawbacks of this linguistic approach is therefore that it tends to leave out of account the entire nonverbal realm of consciousness, as well as the entire problematic relationship between thought and speech.

(Cohn 1978: 11)

In stylistics, Geoffrey Leech and Mick Short (1981) systematically distinguished the contextually independent but formally parallel scales of speech and thought
representation for the first time, which has been helpful to analysts in investigating their different effects (Semino and Short 2004: 9-16; Fludernik 2011: 40; Bray 2014: 222-223). Manfred Jahn also refers to this problem, saying that “[e]ven if it is true that speech and thought have very similar textual representations, they do not remain mutually exclusive categories, both ontologically and in their fictional existence” (1992: 349).

The fact that speech and thought are similar in their linguistic constructs implies that linguistic realization of thought assumes inner speech. In other words, because thought has a potentiality for verbalization, its representation in language can take similar forms to the representation of speech. However, it has been scientifically proved that “thought is possible without inner speech” (Palmer 2004: 93). For example, people with aphasia cannot comprehend language, but they have “a wordless thought process” (Damasio 1999: 109). According to Chafe, “[r]epresentations of speech always go back to distal language, but representations of thought are less committed in that respect”, and thought can be both verbal and non-verbal (1994: 219, italics original). Fludernik also observes that “not all consciousness is necessarily verbal; a parallelism between forms of speech representation and the representation of consciousness is therefore misleading” (2011: 40).

What language does is to “[make] it possible to transcend immediate perceptions, actions, and evaluations and [allow] a person to experience secondhand what others experienced firsthand” (Chafe 1994: 237). Speech, therefore, can be an articulation of experienced consciousness which might originally be non-verbal, such as perceptions and actions. As Diane Blakemore argues, “since an utterance is a public representation which has a propositional form, it can be used to represent another representation which has a propositional form – or, in other words, a thought” (2010: 579). In point of fact, speech does not transmit thought merely “by duplicating” it (Blakemore 2010: 579). Speech is “an interpretation of thought to the extent that its propositional form resembles the
communicator’s thought, or, in other words, to the extent that it shares logical and contextual implications with that thought” (Blakemore 2010: 580). Not only something that is represented as speech but also the ways in which it is represented in narrative convey the interpretation of that speech on the part of the representing subject. Therefore, when varying speech representation categories are used in a narrative by a narrator, it implies that the alternation is manipulated within the consciousness of the narrator so as to reflect non-verbal aspects of consciousness such as his/her mental attitudes or those of characters (see 3.6 below). In this sense, speech may not be an ingredient but a function of consciousness which works in the course of conceptualization or verbalization of conscious experiences.

The effects produced by mediacy differ between speech representation and thought representation due to the different qualities of speech and thought; nevertheless, the degree of mediacy is similarly reflected in modes of speech and thought representation because they are similar in formal terms. The following is a passage from Robinson Crusoe, which shows the fluctuation between various speech and thought representation categories. The context of the passage is that the younger Crusoe (the experiencing self) is beginning to have positive thoughts about his solitary condition on the remote island two years after his arrival there:

(1) (a) But now I began to exercise my self with new Thoughts; (b) I daily read the Word of God, and apply’d all the Comforts of it to my present State: (c) One Morning being very sad, I open’d the Bible upon these Words, I will never, never leave thee, nor forsake thee; (d) immediately it occur’d, That these Words were to me, (e) Why else should they be directed in such a Manner, just at the Moment when I was mourning over my Condition, as one forsaken of God and Man? (f) Well then, said I, if God does not forsake me, of what ill Consequence can it be, or what matters
it, though the World should all forsake me, seeing on the other Hand, if I had all the World, and should lose the Favour and Blessing of God, there wou’d be no Comparison in the Loss. (RC: 97)

Direct speech and thought (DST) and indirect speech and thought (IST) are the most explicit distinctions in the modes of speech and thought representation. The DST sentence (1f) represents the highly articulated thought of the younger Crusoe. It has a reporting clause (“said I”, here used to mean “I said inwardly”) and a juxtaposed reported clause in the present tense (”Well then, … if God does not forsake me, of what ill Consequence can it be, or what matters it, …”). What he said to himself is rendered exactly as the experiencing self uttered the words, or in other words, mimetically or im-mediately. On the other hand, the IST sentence (1d) expresses the cognition of the experiencing self diegetically or mediately, from the deictic centre of the narrating self. It consists of a reporting clause (“it occurr’d”) and a subordinated reported clause (“That these Words were to me”), in which the past tense that explicitly shows the presence of the narrating self is used.

The sentence (1e) is categorized as free indirect speech and thought (FIST). Prototypically in this mode, the tense and person are aligned with the surrounding narration, which shows the presence of the narrating self, while other deictic expressions are aligned with the deictic centre of the experiencing self and so are evocative of its subjective point of view.11 The coocurrence of the narrative past tense together with the interrogative mood suggests that (1e) indicates that two different deictic systems are actively operating in one sentence. The grammatical and syntactical characteristics of FIST were discussed as early as the beginning of the twentieth century (cf. Bally 1912). According to Reiko Ikeo (2016: 357), however, the first scalar approach to speech and thought representation was proposed in the late twentieth century in an article entitled “Dual Perspective: Free Indirect Discourse and Related Techniques” by Paul Hernadi (1972). Hernadi
applied Plato’s dichotomy of diegesis and mimesis and the idea of mixed speech to his analysis of speech and thought representation modes as a primary concern. The narratologist Brian McHale (1978) admired Hernadi’s tripartite scale which features direct discourse (mimesis), indirect discourse (diegesis) and free indirect discourse (integration of diegesis and mimesis). Hernadi’s model is regarded as innovative because he placed FIST between IST and DST (McHale 1978: 258). These three categories had already been identified as syntactically different at an earlier time, but “his inversion of the traditional priority of syntactical over representational categories”, according to McHale, enabled later scholars to arrange “his three types as points on a continuum along which other types of representation may be located” (1978: 258). One drawback of his model is that it fails to “explain cases outside these three categories” (Ikeo 2016: 357): it does not adequately explain the degree of mediacy in represented speech or thought. The most important point it made is that Hernadi distinguishes speech from thought as well as perception, and investigates them separately.

McHale was inspired by Hernadi’s scalar model and Norman Page’s “degrees of indirectness” (1988: 33), and in his seminal article, “Free Indirect Discourse: A Survey of Recent Accounts” (1978), he proposed a more detailed scale “from the ‘purely’ diegetic to the ‘purely’ mimetic” (1978: 258). This is a seven-category scale basically for speech representation. With this model, one can identify “various distinguishable forms of discourse presentation in its gradational scheme without privileging one category over another” (Ikeo 2016: 357), and can explain the complexity of speech representation in terms of the degree of mimesis. It is a brilliant model, but as Ikeo points out, it is “rarely used in analysing actual cases of discourse presentation” because it “fails to give sufficient specification for each category, especially in the more indirect forms” (2016: 358). This is one of the difficulties in making a systematic model of speech and thought representation: if there are fewer categories, one cannot explain the gradational variation of speech and thought representation, but if there are more categories,
the model is too complex and one cannot use them in practice.

In the same year when McHale published the above-mentioned article, Cohn, another leading narratologist, published an influential book, *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction* (1978), in which she proposed a different scalar model mainly for thought representation. She distinguished three modes of thought representation: *psycho-narration* (“the narrator’s discourse about a character’s consciousness”), *quoted monologue* (“a character’s mental discourse”), and *narrated monologue*13 (“a character’s mental discourse in the guise of the narrator’s discourse”) (1978: 14). Her terminology is based on the distinction between the narrator’s language (narration) and the character’s language (monologue). The mixture of these two, therefore, becomes “narrated monologue”. Her equal devotion to the three modes as well as to both the third- and first-person narrative has been very beneficial to the study of thought representation in fiction, and her three categories are still used in the field of narratology.14 She arranged these three categories according to the extent which each category can cover in terms of the kinds of a character’s consciousness:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unconsciousness</th>
<th>Consciousness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>psycho-narration</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>narrated monologue</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>quoted monologue</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Cohn 1978: 140)

Violeta Sotirova points out that one drawback of Cohn’s model is that “it lumps together traditional quoted thought with interior monologue” in terms of their formal structure and historical origin (2011: 173). As Sotirova states, Leech and
Short’s model (1981), which will be explored below, was an improvement on Cohn’s model because it differentiates *direct thought* (DT) – quoted monologue in Cohn’s term – from *free indirect thought* (FDT) – interior monologue which refers to the “inchoate, free-associative and grammatically incomplete” representation of consciousness (2011: 173-174) – as representing formally and historically different phenomena. In the same vein, Cohn’s psycho-narration as “the narrator’s discourse about a character’s consciousness” (1978: 14) can cover very broad ways of representing consciousness, namely all diegetic representations of consciousness from the point of view of the narrator. The term *psycho-narration* is useful as an umbrella term for any diegetic representations of consciousness that can represent both non-conscious and conscious mental phenomena. On the analytical level, however, psycho-narration needs to be more specific in formal, functional and semantic terms. One last drawback of Cohn’s model is that she deliberately neglects the representation of perception (McHale 1981: 187). Although she is aware of the narrative techniques for representing characters’ immediate perceptions, she does not delve into such techniques in her analysis.

In stylistics, the clinal model of speech and thought representation suggested by Leech and Short (1981) has been regarded as “the first stylistic treatment to bring a fully analytical approach to the topic, introducing a model that has proved influential over the subsequent three decades” (Bray 2014: 222), and it is actually used as “the most analytically specific account” (Semino and Short 2004: 3). In their model, more indirect or diegetic categories are proposed with clear syntactical definitions, and the speech and thought representation categories are arranged in a linear continuum according to the degree of mediacy as in Figure 3.1:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[N]</th>
<th>NRSA</th>
<th>IS</th>
<th>FIS</th>
<th>DS</th>
<th>FDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[N]</td>
<td>NRTA</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>FIT</td>
<td>DT</td>
<td>FDT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **N**: Narration
- **NRSA**: Narrator’s Representation of Speech Act
- **NRTA**: Narrator’s Representation of Thought Act
- **IS**: Indirect Speech
- **IT**: Indirect Thought
- **FIS**: Free Indirect Speech
- **FIT**: Free Indirect Thought
- **DS**: Direct Speech
- **DT**: Direct Thought
- **FDS**: Free Direct Speech
- **FDT**: Free Direct Thought

**Figure 3.1** Leech and Short’s original continuum of speech and thought representation

*Narration* (N) refers to sentences describing actions or events that do not contain any representation of speech or thought. *Narrator’s representation of speech act* (NRSA) and *narrator’s representation of thought act* (NRTA) refer to reports which indicate that speech or thought act(s) occurred (Leech and Short 2007: 259-260, 271). They are the more diegetic forms than IST in terms of mediacy, because they do not by definition render the contents of speech or thought. The Leech and Short model was expanded in Elena Semino and Mick Short (2004), in which more diegetic categories than NRSA and NRTA were suggested:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[N]</th>
<th>NV</th>
<th>NRSA</th>
<th>IS</th>
<th>FIS</th>
<th>(F)DS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[N]</td>
<td>NI</td>
<td>NRTA</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>FIT</td>
<td>(F)DT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **NV**: Narrator’s Representation of voice
- **NI**: Narration of Internal states
- **(F)DS**: (Free) Direct Speech
- **(F)DT**: (Free) Direct Thought

**Figure 3.2** Leech and Short’s continuum of speech and thought representation revised by Semino and Short (2004)
Narrator’s representation of voice (NV) is a newly-proposed speech representation category in which “we are informed that someone engaged in verbal activity, but we are not given any explicit indication as to what speech acts were performed, let alone what the form and content of the utterances were” (Semino and Short 2004: 44). Another new category, narration of internal states (NI) refers to the representation of the character’s internal states “without any indication that he or she engaged in anything that could be described as a specific thought act” (Semino and Short 2004: 46). These new categories are placed further left on the continuum than NRSA or NRTA. Cohn’s psycho-narration roughly corresponds to IT, NRTA, and NI, narrated monologue to FIT, and quoted monologue to DT and FDT. Each category is prototypically represented as in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1  Example sentences of speech and thought representation categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third-person Narrative</th>
<th>First-person Narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N  He was with her.</td>
<td>I was with her.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV He shouted.</td>
<td>I shouted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRSA He promised his return.</td>
<td>I promised my return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS He said that he would be with her the following day.</td>
<td>I said that I would be with her the following day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS He would be with her tomorrow.</td>
<td>I would be with her tomorrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS He said, “I’ll be with you tomorrow”.</td>
<td>I said, “I’ll be with you tomorrow”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDS I’ll be with you tomorrow.</td>
<td>I’ll be with you tomorrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI He was confused.</td>
<td>I was confused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRTA He wondered about her feelings for him.</td>
<td>I wondered about her feelings for me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT He wondered if she was happy with him.</td>
<td>I wondered if she was happy with me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIT Was she happy with him?</td>
<td>Was she happy with me?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DT He thought, “Is she happy with me?”</td>
<td>I thought, “Was she happy with me?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDT Is she happy with me?</td>
<td>Is she happy with me?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

142
The first part of (1) quoted earlier contains these more diegetic modes of thought representation. The sentence (1a) is categorized as NRTA, which tells us that there was a cognitive act of the experiencing self (“exercise my self with new Thoughts”). The sentence (1b) and the latter part of (1c) are N,17 and the actions of the experiencing self are narrated in them (“I daily read the Word of God”, “[I] apply’d all the Comforts …”, “I open’d the Bible”). The earlier part of (1c) contains NI which represents the younger Crusoe’s state of mind (“being very sad”). As explained above, the latter part of (1) contains more mimetic categories. The passage (1) thus shows the movement from the left end to the right end of Leech and Short’s model. The narrator’s presence (i.e. mediacy) is linguistically the greatest for the categories on the left side of the scale, and becomes less perceivable toward the right side of the scale. All Crusoe does for his first two years on the island is to lament his misfortune in having no means to escape from it. The passage (1) perfectly captures the cognitive process in which he changes the way he thinks about this situation with various thought representation categories. The effects of changes in speech and thought representation categories will be discussed in greater detail in 3.6.

Leech and Short’s scalar model regards the boundary between the categories as fuzzy and blurred. The model emphasises their gradational and clinal nature, yet gives the defining features of each category in terms of “a combination of linguistic evidence and pragmatic functions” (Ikeo 2016: 358), which makes the model more applicable to the practical analysis of fictional texts than other models. However, Leech and Short’s model is not flawless. One of the most serious problems it seems to have is that the categories are arranged in a lineal cline, in which any kind of mixture between non-adjacent categories, for example, between DT and NRTA, cannot, at least theoretically, occur. From a different point of view, Sotirova (2013: 38) also poses a question about the position of one particular category, NI. In Semino and Short’s (2004) revised version of the Leech and Short model, NI is positioned between NRTA and N, which means that it is a
category with more narratorial control than NRTA or IT. Sotirova first brings up “a very different evocative effect” between NI and NV, the corresponding category in speech representation, in respect of the character’s point of view which they evoke (2013: 38). While NV like “They conversed quietly with one another” represents the fact that some speech occurred, NI like “He could not bear to think or to speak” is “more closely aligned with the character’s inner psyche and point of view, in spite of the possibility of the state not being articulated by the character” (Sotirova 2013: 38). Sotirova then argues that sentences of NI seem to be “more subjective and evocative of the character’s point of view than for instance sentences of Indirect Thought where the presence of a reporter is clearly signaled by the reporting clause” (2013: 38). If so, where should we put NI on the cline? Again, Leech and Short’s continuum fails to find a suitable place for this category, because the categories are arranged linearly.

Michael Toolan regards FIST as “mixings or mergings of narratorial indirectness with characterological directness” (2001: 131). For him, however, it is not a mere blend of DST and IST because “the mode it most crucially complements or contrasts with is neither [DST] nor [IST] but PN [pure narrative]” (2001: 131). Based on this view, he schematizes the continuum of speech and thought representation as follows:

```
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
|        |  PN    |  FIST  |  DST   |
|        +--------+--------+--------|
| IST    +--------+--------+--------|
```

(Toolan 2001: 131)

He explains that pure narrative and DST are “most sharply distinct” categories, whereas IST and FIST are “intermediate” ones (2001: 131). FIST is different from IST in that it is “closer to both [pure narrative] and [DST] than [IST] is to either of these”, which causes FIST to be confused more with pure narrative than with DST or IST in narrative texts (Toolan, 2001: 131). Toolan’s model, although
it is not a linear scale, cannot explain how the degree of mediacy changes among these categories.

What I propose is a model which is similar to Cohn’s diagram quoted earlier, though the categories are not arranged between the two poles of consciousness and non-consciousness, but are arranged according to the degree of mediacy on my scale. It can at the same time show the relationship between the various categories of diegetic/indirect representations of consciousness and those of mimetic/direct representations of consciousness. As Figure 3.3 shows, I put NI close to N, as the term Internal Narration suggests. As Sotirova argues, it may convey a character’s more subjective and immediate point of view than other indirect modes (IT and NRTA) because it often captures “pre-verbal states of the character” (2013: 39). Although she questions “the understanding of internal states as closely related to narration and as stemming entirely from the narrator” (2009: 170), NI shares many grammatical and syntactical features with N, though it represents a character’s mental states. It is true that the representation becomes more evocative of a character’s point of view when his/her internal states are represented compared with sentences that do not represent mental states in narrativized context. However, NI is not always more subjective than, say, IT as Sotirova (2013) argues. NI also has degrees of mediacy depending on the context in which it is used. For example, when used in the context of FIT in the reflector mode of narrative, it is indeed more closely related with figural consciousness, but if it appears in the context of N in the teller mode of narrative, it is more likely to be associated with the narrator’s deictic centre. Like NI, there exist various sorts of minglings of mimetic elements (directness) with diegetic elements (indirectness), whose specific linguistic features will be examined in depth in 3.5. The effect of using NI and other intermediate forms within indirect representations of consciousness will be argued in relation to direct modes in the analysis of actual texts in 3.6.
This model is for the representation of the conceptual level of consciousness. For those whose main concern is discourse representation, perception is not included in their analysis because it is by nature non-verbal (Semino and Short 2004; Marnette 2005; Leech and Short 2007). In terms of consciousness representation, however, perception should be taken into account, and also, it should be investigated separately from speech or thought representation as perception and speech/thought belong to different levels of consciousness. To my knowledge, no scholars have created a system for the representation of perception similar to the system for speech and thought representation based on mediacy. The next sub-section will consider how mediacy fluctuates in the representation of the perceptual level of consciousness.

### 3.3.2 Mediacy and the representation of perception

The narrative technique for representing perception which has been examined in stylistics and narratology is *narrated perception* (NP) (Cohn 1978; Fludernik 1993; Pallarés-García 2012). This is a narrative technique for rendering a character’s immediate perceptions of his/her external world as they are experienced by him/her (Fehr 1938: 98; Cohn 1978: 133-134; Brinton 1980: 370; Fludernik 1993: 306; Palmer 2004: 49; Schmid 2010: 162; Pallarés-García 2012: 306).
Bernhard Fehr, one of the earliest critics who paid separate attention to the representation of perception, gives the following examples to explain this unique linguistic device:

(a) “Here comes Jack”, said Fred.
(b) On turning round Fred saw Jack coming across the street towards him.
(c) “Look!” Fred turned round. Jack was coming across the street towards him.

(Fehr 1938: 98)

The example (a) (“‘Here comes Jack’, said Fred”) is a mode in which Fred’s perception is represented as an utterance, or in other words, his perception is represented in DS. The example (b) (“On turning round Fred saw Jack coming across the street towards him”) is a report about Fred’s perception, that is, the narrator mediately represents Fred’s visual experience from his/her point of view. In (c), Fred’s perception is represented in a way which is completely different from both (a) and (b). The first part of (c) (“‘Look!’ Fred turned round”) describes Fred turning around to see something. This part functions as what Fehr calls a “perception indicator” (1938: 98) or “window opener” (1938: 99), by which Fred is interpreted as the subject of consciousness: it linguistically indicates that Jack’s coming across the street is perceived through that consciousness. A perception indicator signals to us that the following sentence represents what is perceived by the subject of consciousness, just as a reporting clause in speech and thought representation (e.g. “he said”, “he thought”, etc.) functions as a signal of speech or thought. In other words, it helps the reader to interpret the following sentence not as a mere narrator’s description of an event, but as a representation of the immediate perceptual experience filtered through the consciousness of the represented subject. The sentence “Jack was coming across the street towards him” is therefore interpreted as rendering Fred’s immediate visual perception about
Jack as he experienced it when turning around, and such a sentence is labelled NP. The NP sentence in (c) also contains one of the most typical linguistic features of NP, that is, the past progressive. It is often used in NP sentences because it “can be taken to reflect the simultaneity of the act of perception and the perceived reality” (Pallarés-García 2012: 171).

NP shares many formal features with FIST. Like FIST, the tense and person are usually aligned with the surrounding narration, but other deictic expressions are aligned with the deictic centre of the experiencing self in NP. This causes a problematic tendency in stylistics and narratology: NP has often been confused with FIT, or regarded as a mere aspect of free indirect discourse by literary critics who have not delved deeply enough into consciousness, even though the representation of perception in language is fundamentally very different from the representation of speech or thought. The use of the term free indirect perception is an indication of this fallacy. By using the term free indirect, one can guess at this technique by analogy with FIST, and indeed, NP shares many features with FIST in formal terms. In this sense, it does not seem wrong to name such a technique “free indirect” perception instead of NP, but this term implies that it is a grammatically mingled form of “direct” and “indirect” modes of perception. Is there such a category as “direct perception” or “indirect perception”? With the help of the grammar of direct and indirect discourse, we can construct sentences of “direct perception” and “indirect perception” which are analogous to DST and IST:

Indirect perception  He saw that she was waving at him.
Free indirect perception  She was waving at him (, he saw).
Direct perception  He saw, “She is waving at me.”

As is obvious from the examples above, we do not have a linguistic system to represent perception which is similar to the representation of speech or thought.
This has been pointed out by Fehr: “Perception replicas … cannot be translated into an oratio recta [i.e. direct speech] that sounds natural” (1938: 102). Therefore, even if we invent a sentence like “He saw, ‘She is waving at me.’” with a verb of perception, it is not a direct replica of perception, but a mere “invention of a pedant” (Fehr 1938: 102). In short, perception cannot be represented in the grammatical mode of direct discourse. Direct replicas of perception can be partly achieved in the form of NP, because it is a linguistic device which creates an illusory sense of im-mediacy on the part of the reader, and in my view, more direct replicas than NP can be possible by the use of the so-called historical present (c.f. 2.5). When it is used in representing external conscious experiences of the subject of consciousness in a figural context, the historical present can be interpreted as the representation of perceptual experiences directly perceived by that subject.

Banfield (1982: 205-206) explains that verbs of perception do not occur in parentheticals except when they have a figural, metaphorical meaning. In other words, parentheticals with verbs of perception are metaphorically interpreted as representing the conceptual level of consciousness. The same explanation applies to verbs of perception in the reported clause of the indirect mode. We can say “He saw that she was unhappy”, but this does not inform us of his pure visual perception but rather his understanding of the situation: the verb “saw” is used metaphorically, not literally. However, the use of a perception verb as a reporting verb of indirect discourse as in “He saw that she was unhappy” implies that his cognition of her happiness is based on his visual perception. In this sense, the cases in which a perception verb is used as a reporting verb may be regarded as an intermediate mode between the perceptual and conceptual levels of consciousness.

In Defoe’s narratives, perception verbs are often used metaphorically, as in the following examples:
(2) I was no sooner stepp’d down upon the firm Ground, but I plainly saw it was a terrible Earthquake, for the Ground I stood on shook three Times at about eight Minutes Distance, … (RC: 69)

(3) I perceiv’d by this, that he knew nothing of the miserable Circumstances I was in, and thought that having got some Intelligence of his being there, I had come to upbraid him with his leaving me; (MF: 247)

(4) I resisted her Offer, however, of treating us for the whole Week; and I oppos’d it so long, that I saw evidently that she took it ill, and wou’d have thought herself alighted, if we had not accepted it; (Rox: 245)

On the other hand, in the sentences (5) to (7), perception verbs are used with more literal meanings, that is, they are more likely to be interpreted as referring to the characters’ perceptions than those in the sentences (2) to (4):

(5) But I soon found it was impossible to avoid it; for I saw the Sea come after me as high as a great Hill, and as furious as an Enemy which I had no Means or Strength to content with; (RC: 39)

(6) I was in the House with him, as I have observ’d, and I saw evidently that he was preparing to go back to Paris; (Rox: 154)

(7) … but it is impossible to describe the Confusion I was in, when I plainly saw that the farthest of the two, him whose Face look’d towards the Coach, was my Friend, the Dutch Merchant of Paris. (Rox: 218)

More generally, however, we use the sentence structure used in (b) (“Fred saw Jack coming across the street towards him”) when expressing perception
indirectly or diegetically, as discussed above. This is a report of perception in which the presence of the narrator (i.e. mediacy) is evident because of the explicit use of a perception verb.

Perception is a part of consciousness which does not presuppose articulation, and therefore, it is difficult as well as illogical to apply the direct/indirect grammatical system of speech and thought representation which presupposes (possible) articulation. Even so, we should take into account other modes of perception representation than NP in textual analysis as they are significant in both quality and quantity in narrative texts. Broadly speaking, there are at least three ways of representing perception, which I call 1) perception report, 2) narrated perception (NP) and 3) perception replica. Table 3.2 below shows example sentences of these categories.

Table 3.2  Example sentences of perception representation categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception Report</th>
<th>Third-person Narrative</th>
<th>First-person Narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(He looked out of the window.) He saw her waving at him.</td>
<td>(I looked out of the window.) I saw her waving at me.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrated Perception</td>
<td>(He looked out of the window.) She was waving at him.</td>
<td>(I looked out of the window.) She was waving at me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception Replica</td>
<td>(He looked out of the window.) She is waving at him./ She waves at him.</td>
<td>(I looked out of the window.) She is waving at me./ She waves at me.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perception report explicitly indicates the act of perception by the use of a perception verb in a sentence; NP renders perceptual experiences without explicitly indicating the act of perception in a narrativized context; and perception replica is the replication of perceptual experiences through mimetic elements, such as the use of the present tense. The degree of mediacy diminishes toward the latter modes of perception representation. I have already stressed the importance of the degree of mediacy in speech and thought representation, and it is also very
important in perception representation for understanding fictional consciousness. Figure 3.4 shows the perception representation scale based on mediacy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>mediacy</th>
<th>im-mEDIATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception replica</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4 Perception representation scale based on mediacy

Let me illustrate the use of different categories of perception representation in combination with thought representation categories. The context of the passage below is that Crusoe finds some savages’ canoes on the shore one morning, and decides to observe them from the top of a hill.

(8) … (a) here [at the Top of the Hill] I observ’d by the help of my Perspective Glass, that they were no less than Thirty in Number, that they had a Fire kindled, that they had had Meat dress’d. (b) How they had cook’d it, that I knew not, or what it was; but they were all Dancing in I know not how many barbarous Gestures and Figures, their own Way, round the Fire.

(c) While I was thus looking on them, I perceived by my Perspective, two miserable Wretches dragg’d from the Boats, where it seems they were laid by, and were now brought out for the Slaughter. (d) I perceived one of them immediately fell, being knock’d down, I suppose with a Club or Wooden Sword, for that was their way, and two or three others were at work immediately cutting him open for their Cookery, while the other Victim was left standing by himself, till they should be ready for him. (e) In that very Moment, this poor Wretch seeing himself a little at
Liberty, Nature inspir’d him with Hopes of Life, and he started away from them, and ran with incredible Swiftness along the Sands directly towards me, I mean towards that part of the Coast, where my Habitation was. (RC: 170)

At the beginning of the first paragraph of (8), it is explicitly reported that the younger Crusoe is observing what the savages are doing. The report of perception in (8a) signals the ongoing perceptions of the experiencing self in the next sentence. In (8b), what he could not see is topicalized to stress his inability to see and understand everything (“How they had cook’d it, that I knew not”), and his ongoing perception is represented through NP with the use of the past progressive (“they were all Dancing”). When mentioning his inability to understand the second time (“I know not”), the narrating self uses the present tense, which indicates that the older Crusoe still does not know how many different ways the savages were dancing in. A temporal shift like this is regarded as a natural deictic shift in first-person autobiographical narratives (Warner 2009: 15). The narrating self naturally moves between the present and the past when telling a story. The natural movement on the time axis like this is also seen in the use of the present tense, as in “it seems” in (8c), “I suppose” in (8d) and “I mean” in (8e).

The perceptions of the experiencing self are again reported in (8c), but at the same time, mimetic qualities are beginning to be incorporated, which is indicated by the use of the past progressive (“While I was thus looking on them”) and the proximal deictic now (“[they] were now brought out”). The narrating self uses the epistemic verb seem in the present tense (“where it seems they were laid by”). This haziness of memory on the part of the narrating self indicates that he is entering into his past memory but he still cannot be sure of the details of what he saw. In the following sentence (8d), the narrating self continues to report his past perceptions, and as in the previous report, mimetic quality is linguistically indicated by the use of the present participle (“being knock’d down”). The phrase
“two or three” also reflects the haziness of the experiencing self’s perceptions in the past. In the last sentence (8e), the prepositional phrase “In that very Moment” functions as an indicator which shows that the next clause is likely to represent im-mediately the experiencing self’s perceptions. These figural perceptions are indicated by the use of deictic and evaluative words, such as “this poor” and “incredible”. The prepositional phrase “towards me” also reflects the deictic centre of the experiencing self, because the narrating self rephrases it in an adeictic way to make it clear in which direction the “poor Wretch” is moving from the point of view of the narrating self (“I mean towards that part of the Coast, where my Habitation was”). The inserted clause in (8e), “Nature inspir’d him with Hopes of Life”, is a representation of inferred thought based on his observation. This simultaneous representation of perceptual and conceptual levels of consciousness enhances the effect of authenticity, because it imitates the natural alternation in human cognition. The use of NP, though tentative and very subtle, promotes the sense that the narrating self is reliving his experiences, as well as the illusory sense of im-mediacy on the part of the reader.

Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 have explored the relationship between the narratological concept of mediacy and the modes of consciousness representation at the conceptual level and the perceptual level respectively. The following sub-section illustrates how these varied categories of representing consciousness can be associated with point of view in narrative.

3.3.3 Point of view and consciousness representation categories

Different types of point of view which are used by narrators in narratives have often been associated with consciousness representation categories. Paul Simpson (1993: 21-43), for example, deals with speech and thought representation as preliminaries to his discussion about point of view in narrative. The interrelatedness of these two stylistic and narratological concepts has been pointed
out in more recent studies of narrative point of view:

New theories and frameworks in the area [narrative point of view] continue to be proposed regularly, especially the relationship between point of view and the categories of speech and thought representation. (Bray 2016: 341)

… the differing types of viewpoint – spatial, temporal, ideology and particularly psychological – are often depicted in narrative through a stylistic technique known as *speech and thought presentation*. Essentially, speech and thought presentation encompasses the various ways in which events, actions and states in a narrative can be described through, variously, direct or indirect speech or thought representation or the narrative report of a speech or thought act. (Neary 2014: 178, italics original)

This sub-section shows how consciousness representation categories and narrative point of view are closely related to each other.

According to some critics, Defoe seems to have intentionally used narrative techniques for representing individual consciousness in order to capture realistic external and internal images (Konigsberg 1985; Novak 2000; Kawasaki 2009). His first-person narratives contain varying categories of speech, thought and perception representation as narrative techniques for representing this consciousness. When the better informed narrating self remembers its past experiences from the detached observer perspective, it can tell what happened with its own language by using indirect modes of consciousness representation, such as speech report (NV, NRSA, IS), thought report (NI, NRTA, IT) and perception report. Mediacy, that is, the presence of the narrating self in the representation, is naturally and easily perceived by the reader in such categories of consciousness representation, because the past tense, which indicates that the narrating self is at a distance from the narrated events, is used in these categories:
During this Scene of Life, I had time to reflect on my past Hours, and upon what I had done in the World, and tho’ I had no great Capacity of making a clear Judgment, and very little reflections from Conscience, yet it made some impressions upon me; (CJ: 119)

I had no Spleen at the sawcy Rogue, nor were his Submissions any thing to me, since there was nothing to be got by him; so I thought it was as good to throw that in generously as not, so I told him I did not desire the Ruin of any Man, … (MF: 210)

I star’d at him, as if I was frighted, for I thought all his Face look’d like a Death’s-Head; and then, immediately, I thought I perceiv’d his Head all Bloody; and then his Cloaths look’d Bloody too; and immediately it all went off, and he look’d as he really did; (Rox: 52-53)

The narrating self’s point of view is dominant in (9), which is linguistically shown by the use of NRTA (“I had time to reflect on my past Hours, and upon what I had done in the World”, “I had … very little reflections from Conscience”) and NI (“it made some impressions upon me”) in alternation with N (“During this Scene of Life”, “tho’ I had no great Capacity of making a clear Judgment”). Similarly in (10), the narrating self’s thought is reported in the form of IT (“I thought it was as good to throw that in generously as not”). IT is used between N (“I had no Spleen …”) and IS (“I told him I did not desire …”), so the presence of the narrating self is perceived even more strongly and explicitly by the reader in this passage. The same is true when verbs of perception are used in the past tense as in (11). Here the perceptual experiences of the experiencing self are represented through the report of perception (“I star’d at him”, “I perceiv’d his Head all Bloody”). Since the presence of the narrating self is linguistically apparent in these categories of consciousness representation, the reader also takes the observer perspective taken.
by the narrating self, and feels that he/she is listening to the story being told.

The narrating self’s detached, observer-like perspective is sometimes emphasised by the use of auxiliary verbs or adverbials which explicitly indicate that the narrated events are being repeated or summarized:

(12) … when I began to regret the want of Conversation, I would ask my self whether thus conversing mutually with my own Thoughts, and, as I hope I may say, with even God himself by Ejaculations, was not better than the utmost Enjoyment of humane Society in the World. (RC: 115)

(13) He went on a good way with me, and I thought once or twice he was in earnest, … (MF: 111)

(14) And, in short, I resolv’d upon both, the Manner and Discription of which, it may not be improper to give an Account of. (RC: 50)

The consciousness of the experiencing self is represented through IT in (12) and in (13), and through NRTA in (14) from the point of view of the narrating self. The narrating self’s point of view as an observer in his/her memory is stressed by the use of the auxiliary verb “would” in (12), and the adverbial phrase “once or twice” in (13) and “in short” in (14). The auxiliary verb “would” expresses a past habit, “once or twice” shows the repetition of the thought act, and “in short” summarizes what has passed in the younger Crusoe’s mind. These are expressions which only the narrating self can use when it recollects its past experiences. Apparent mediacy in the representation of consciousness is further emphasised by the parenthetical phrases “as I hope I may say” in (12) and the additional comment on the manner and description (“the Manner and Discription of which, it may not be improper to give an Account of”) in (14). In this way, representing the consciousness of the experiencing self through diegetic categories brings about
increased mediacy and the displacement of the narrating self from the past memory, and thus it naturally evokes an observer perspective in the narrated events.

In contrast, the narrating self puts itself in the field of original experiences in its mind and relives them when it remembers from the experiencing self’s point of view. This reliving of experiences conveys the narrating self’s psychological attachment to the past self. When the experiencing self’s point of view is foregrounded in this kind of remembering, its consciousness is represented partly through FI(S)T and NP, and partly through direct modes such as DST, FDST, and perception replica with the present tense.

(15) But now my Case as bad as before; for when I came to him, what cou’d I do? I had Money and Jewels, to a vast Value, and I might leave all those with him; that I might indeed, do; and so I might with several other Merchants in Paris, who wou’d give me Bills for it, payable at London, but then I ran a Hazard of my Money; and I had no-body at London to send the Bills to, and so to stay till I had an Account that they were accepted; for I had not one Friend in London, that I cou’d have recourse to, so that, indeed, I knew not what to do. (Rox: 111)

(16) … going thro’ Aldersgate-street there was a pretty little Child had been at a Dancing-School, and was going home, all alone, and my Prompter, like a true Devil, set me upon this innocent Creature; (MF: 162)

The immediate consciousness of the experiencing self is represented through FIT in (15) and NP in (16). Although it is represented in the past tense, the thought or perception of the experiencing self is rendered almost im mediately with the use of syntactical features of directness (the interrogative mood in (15)) and expressive linguistic indices such as the past progressive (“was going”) in (16).
There are fewer indicators of the narrating self’s presence in these passages than in those containing more diegetic categories, such as (9) to (14). These consciousness representation categories are used when the narrating self gradually enters the consciousness of the experiencing self, or in other words, when the perspective in autobiographical memory is changing from the observer to the field. What is important during this process is that the reader also feels as if he/she is directly looking into the experiencing self’s consciousness and is pseudo-experiencing the events in the fictional world as experienced by that self. For example, FIT “creates the illusion of a fiction that ‘tells itself’, without the ministrations of a narrator” (Cohn 1978: 169), and thus it is frequently used to display empathy with the experiencing self not only on the part of the narrating self but also on the part of the reader, rather than to create some distance between the experiencing self and the narrating self or the reader (Cohn 1978: 168; Stanzel 1984: 224). Stanzel calls this effect “the illusion of immediacy” (1984: 126). The reader feels the presence of the narrating self less, and the sense of mediaicy is virtually suspended when the narrating self is reliving its past experiences. In other words, the narrating self’s reliving of experiences can be perceived by the reader through the illusion of immediacy (Nakao 2016: 3-4).

Theoretically speaking, mediaicy can be completely suspended when consciousness is represented entirely from the experiencing self’s point of view. Direct modes of consciousness representation, such as DT and FDT, are considered to have this effect, because the past conscious experiences of the narrating self are vividly recollected and im-mediately represented from the experiencing self’s point of view in these categories:

(17) *Unhappy Wretch*, said I to myself, *shall my ill-got Wealth, the Product of prosperous Lust, and of a vile and vicious Life of Whoredom and Adultery, be intermingled with the honest well-gotten Estate of this innocent Gentleman, to be a Moth and a Caterpiller among it, and bring
the Judgements of Heaven upon him, and upon what he has, for my sake! Shall my Wickedness blast his Comforts! Shall I be Fire in his Flax! and be a Means to provoke Heaven to curse his Blessings! God forbid! I’ll keep then asunder, if it be possible. (Rox: 259)

(18) Well, you are in a desolate Condition ‘tis true, but pray remember, Where are the rest of you? Did not you come Eleven of you into the Boat, where are the Ten? Why were not they sav’d and you lost? Why were you singled out? Is it better to be here or there? (RC: 54)

The thoughts of the experiencing self are represented through DT in the first half and FDT in the latter half of (17), and through FDT in (18). The reader gets direct verbal replicas of the experiencing self’s consciousness in these examples. According to Stanzel, reporting clauses of DT do not destroy the illusion of immediacy, because they are “reduced to impersonal formulas” (1984: 143). Therefore, the reader does not perceive them as strongly displaying the narrating self’s point of view (Stanzel 1984: 187-189). One point that should be mentioned here is the question of whether the direct representations of speech (DS and FDS) have similar direct or mimetic effects on the part of the reader as those of thought (DT and FDT). Stanzel argues that “[d]ialogues of characters without introductory verbs of the type ‘he said’, etc., and without explanatory authorial ‘stage directions’ are non-narrative parts of the text”, and so such dialogues (i.e. FDS) should not be regarded as im-mediate, scenic representation (1984: 143). He argues, however, that dialogues accompanied by reporting clauses or stage directions are “[s]cenic presentation as a narrative form” (1984: 143) and that reporting clauses or stage directions which are purely functional do not, as a rule, “destroy the reader’s illusion that [he/she] is experiencing the narrated event directly, in actu, as it were” (1984: 143). For Stanzel, therefore, the illusion of immediacy is evoked either by “the scene with extensive dialogue and brief
impersonal allusions to the context and the accompanying action” (1984: 143-144), or by “the reflection of the fictional events in the consciousness of a fictional character” (1984: 144). In Stanzel’s typological circle of narrative situations, the illusion of immediacy with the latter type is considered to be characteristic of the reflector-mode of narrative, and that with the former type does not usually signify the reflector-mode. I therefore agree with Stanzel that “[d]ialogue as a non-narrative structural element” (1984: 67), that is, FDS, (and in my view, dialogue as a narrative structural element, that is, DS, as well) does not classify a text on his typological circle. However, I do not agree that free direct modes of speech representation should be excluded from the structural elements of the narrative, simply because dialogues in the form of FDS do not determine the classification of a text on the typological circle. However minimal it may seem, mediacy can be perceived in FDS (even though it does not contain any reporting verbs), in that it is represented in language and appears in a text as such. Therefore, I do not modify the arrangement of the speech and thought representation categories in which FDS as well as FDT are placed on the right end of the scale. They are the most im-mediate and mimetic categories representing consciousness from a character’s point of view which evoke the field perspective in represented experiences.

This sub-section has briefly overviewed the relationship between consciousness representation categories and narrative point of view. Point of view shifts from the narrator (or the narrating self) to the character (or the experiencing self) as consciousness representation categories change from diegetic ones to mimetic ones, which means that the narrative distance between them is shortened, and the narrator’s presence is backgrounded for the mimetic categories. What seems to be attractive to cognitive psychologists, as well as to stylisticians and narratologists, is free indirect style (FIS, FIT and NP), as it represents a transitional phase from the observer to field perspective. In point of fact, this style has attracted much attention in stylistics and narratology due to its subjective
power in narratorial context. The next section will investigate in further detail why free indirect style evokes the figural point of view in linguistically narratorial context, and why it is used when the narrating self is entering the consciousness of the experiencing self and reliving past experiences in the first-person autobiographical narrative. This will lead to an explication of the psychological realism in Defoe’s narratives.

3.4 Mimetic diegesis I: Free indirect style

3.4.1 The scope of free indirect style

This section focuses on one particular mode of consciousness representation, that is, free indirect style, which “allows for the character’s thoughts, emotions and perceptions to be woven into the tissue of the narrative, giving the reader the impression that they have direct access to the character’s consciousness” (Sotirova 2013: 28). This style is, according to Rundquist, “the broadest and most stylistically problematic” category available for representing fictional consciousness (2014: 159). As already mentioned briefly in 3.3, it maintains linguistic features of the narrator’s subjectivity in terms of tense and person, yet it also exhibits a character’s subjectivity through elements such as proximal deixtics, expressive constructs and lexis, and so on. This curious linguistic style was first identified as an independent stylistic device by a French school, and named le style indirect libre (literally, “free indirect style”) by Bally (1912a; 1912b). The equivalent term in German is erlebte Rede (literally, “experienced speech”) which was suggested by Etienne Lorck (1921).26 In English, critics have suggested a variety of names: “substitutionary speech” (Fehr 1938), “narrated monologue” (Cohn 1966; 1978), “represented speech and thought” (Brinton 1980; Banfield 1982; Ehrlich 1990), “verbatim indirect speech and thought” (Chafe 1994), and “empathetic narrative” (Adamson 1995a; 1995b; 2001). However, free indirect speech and thought (or discourse) is the English term used by most critics.27 I
have used the term *free indirect speech and thought* elsewhere in this thesis, being aware of the various terms mentioned above, and also the view that free indirect speech and thought are not a mere syntactical mixture of the “direct” and “indirect” representation modes (Adamson 1994: 195; Toolan 2001: 131; Sotirova 2009: 180). This is not only because the term is the one most commonly used in stylistics and narratology, but also because it can capture its peculiar features in terms of both linguistic constructs and semantic significance. According to Pascal, *libre* (free) in Bally’s terminology originally “indicate[s] freedom from conjunctions and from introductory verb” (1977: 31), but it also has the implication of “other and astonishing liberties” “in the relation of the statement to the fictional character and narrator, in the tense-system, in the language, in the word-order” (Pascal 1977: 31). The term *indirect* may lead to an understanding that the free indirect mode is a variant of the indirect mode, but the advantage of using *indirect* is that, in Pascal’s words, “it indicates that both a narrator and a character are involved” (1977: 32). Although *indirect* does not convey “the mingling, even fusion” of two different points of view (the narrator’s and the character’s) (Pascal 1977: 32), this peculiar aspect of duality can be captured when it is combined with the other term *free*.

As these various terms imply, free indirect style traditionally refers to both free indirect *speech* and free indirect *thought*. Note, however, that “free indirect style” in recent studies is regarded as covering “a range of mental activities at different levels of consciousness” (Rundquist 2014: 160, see also Rundquist 2017). For Sotirova (2004), it includes FIS, FIT and NP. In her more recent study (Sotirova 2011; 2013), she also includes the representation of internal states in this style, suggesting that NI is “more subjective and evocative of the character’s point of view” (2013: 38), or in other words, closer to free indirect thought, than indirect thought in that it “[allows] access to pre-conscious, pre-verbal states of the character” (2013: 38-39). Rundquist gives a similar but slightly different view on what is included in this style. He suggests that it contains three sub-categories,
namely FIT, NP and consonant psycho-narration, which represent respectively “reflective thought, perceptions and states of mind” (Rundquist 2014: 160). At an earlier stage of study about this style, Vaheed Ramazani (1988) includes consonant psycho-narration into free indirect style (using the phrase “free indirect mode” instead of “style”), as Rundquist (2014) does.

In this thesis, I use the umbrella term free indirect style for a stylistically distinct category which includes FIS, FIT and NP. Using the term free indirect to cover these three categories is strictly speaking inappropriate, as NP has a different structural origin from FIST (see 3.3.2). However, I regard NP as a part of this style because it is very close to FIT in its forms as well as its semantics. Consonant psycho-narration and NI are better discussed under the more diegetic modes of consciousness representation as they are close to N in their grammatical and syntactic features, although their semantic effects of “exhibit[ing] unsubordinated indications of figural subjectivity” (Rundquist 2014: 167-168) are similar to those of FIS, FIT and NP. While it does have certain semantic connotations, the term free indirect has more grammatical and syntactical connotations. I therefore hesitate to include NI and consonant psycho-narration in free indirect style as they can be regarded as semantically “free indirect” but not formally so. In this thesis, I give priority to formal (particularly grammatical and syntactic) features in categorizing and referring to the modes of consciousness representation, because in that way I can discuss the degree of mediacy in consciousness representation categories more systematically. This does not mean, however, that I disregard the important semantic features of more diegetic categories which represent characters’ subjectivity as free indirect style does (see 3.5).

Free indirect style is a stylistic device of particular importance in relation to the representation of consciousness due to “the exceptional degree to which it grants readers access to characters’ mental experience” (Rundquist 2014: 159), and also due to its stylistic power to create “the illusion of immediacy, that is, the
apparent suspension of mediacy” which is required for the “[r]ealistic presentation of consciousness” (Stanzel 1984: 127). The presence of the narrator, who functions as a mediator to create mediacy in narrative, is suspended, and the sense of im-mediacy – that is, the illusory feeling on the part of the reader that there is no narrator and he/she is looking directly into a character’s consciousness – is in turn created by this narrative technique.

It is “a noted fact”, as Fludernik points out, that the representation of consciousness in the reflector mode “increases towards the end of the nineteenth century and becomes a constitutive feature of Modernist prose” (1996b: 169). Jane Austen’s *Emma* (1816) is generally considered to be the first work in which we find the extensive use of a particular character’s point of view to represent consciousness (Fludernik 1996b: 170; Sotirova 2013: 27-28), and in Modernist fiction such as the works of Virginia Woolf and James Joyce, we see “the climax of a technical achievement” for representing consciousness (Fludernik 1996b: 170). For this reason, the “linguistic make-up” for representing consciousness “has been illustrated by stylisticians with examples drawn primarily from Modernist narratives” (Sotirova 2013: ix). This has inevitably led to the exclusive focus on the third-person narrative and the neglect of the first-person narrative: Modernist writers extensively used consciousness representation in their narratives, “relinquish[ing] authority from the narrator to the character” (Sotirova 2013: ix). However, the consciousness novel did not appear suddenly at the end of the nineteenth century. Mikhail Bakhtin observes that “[n]ew forms of artistic visualization prepare themselves slowly, over centuries; a given epoch can do no more than create optimal conditions for the final ripening and realization of a new form” (1984 [1963]: 36). Representation of consciousness, as Fludernik argues (1996b: 129-177), has been a central concern for writers since the Middle English period, and has gradually evolved over centuries. According to her, verbalized thought was used to represent characters’ consciousness in Middle English texts: “Chaucer and Caxton can apparently ‘look into’ their protagonists’ minds”, but
“they tend to portray these minds by means of soliloquial discourse rather than in narrativized shape” (1996b: 166). Towards the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, writers began to portray the internal states of their characters in depth not only in “soliloquial” but also in “narrativized” forms.

For Fludernik, “the makings of the consciousness novel” can be observed in Aphra Behn’s early novels in the late seventeenth century, and “its intermittent resurgence” is found in writings before Austen (1996b: 169-171). According to Fludernik, “[t]he history of the rise of the consciousness novel” (1996b: 170) has two phases:

- a formal phase in which the linguistic foundations of reflectoral writing are already available, and a second phase in which the rendering of consciousness attains increasing structural prominence and results in a highly sophisticated use of this technique. (Fludernik 1996b: 170)

This thesis focuses on the first phase and shows that linguistic devices for representing consciousness by means of pioneering “reflectoral writing”, that is, free indirect style, were used effectively by Defoe in his fiction in order to enhance the effect of psychological realism. Fludernik’s great contribution to the study of consciousness representation is her attention to the historical origin of the consciousness novel based on the above-mentioned Bakhtian idea that a new narrative technique gradually becomes familiar over centuries. What she seems to have overlooked, however, is the importance of consciousness representation in first-person narratives in early novels. Her view on the emergence of the consciousness novel is, as she says, concerned with “an increased interest in consciousness, usually third-person consciousness, on the part of writers, resulting in an extended portrayal of the mind” (1996b: 48, italics added). Consequently, she seems to regard the first-person narrative as rather peripheral, though she does mention Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1747-48), William
Godwin’s *Caleb Williams* (1794) and the classic American novel, Charles Brockden Brown’s *Edgar Huntly* (1799) as examples of the first-person consciousness novel. Bray questions this peripheral treatment of the first-person narrative, especially that of the epistolary novel, arguing that the latter is “fundamental to the novel’s development of increasingly sophisticated ways of representing individual psychology” (2003: 2). Although his attention to the first-person narrative is welcome, there is another type of first-person narrative which was popular in the early eighteenth century and which cannot be ignored, namely the autobiographical narrative. The sub-sections that follow explore the formal, functional and semantic features of free indirect style (FIS and FIT in 3.4.2 and NP in 3.4.3), comparing examples from first-person autobiographical narratives with those from third-person narratives, and also exploring their effects, especially focusing on the first-person context.

### 3.4.2 Free indirect speech and thought

This sub-section first discusses the formal and functional features of FIS and FIT together. They are very similar in terms of linguistic constructs, though they are significantly different in their semantics, as will be explained in the latter part of this sub-section.

It is widely acknowledged that Jane Austen was the first English novelist to use FIST extensively, although, as mentioned above, representing characters’ consciousness has actually been a central concern for writers since the Middle English period and the techniques for representing consciousness have gradually developed over the centuries. The following is a prototypical example of FIST from Austen’s *Mansfield Park*:

(19) To be acting! After all his objections — objections so just and so public!

After all that she had heard him say, and seen him look, and known him
to be feeling. Could it be possible? Edmund so inconsistent. Was he not deceiving himself? Was he not wrong? (Mansfield Park: 123)

This passage has many of the typical linguistic markers of FIST. It expresses Fanny’s subjective consciousness with the syntactic properties of DST, such as exclamatory sentences (“To be acting!”, “After all his objections — objections so just and so public!”), interrogative sentences (“Could it be possible?”, “Was he not deceiving himself?”, “Was he not wrong?”), and incomplete sentences (“Edmund so inconsistent”). Other expressive elements, such as the progressive aspect (“be feeling”, “was … deceiving”) and intensifying adverbs (“so just”, “so public”, “so inconsistent”) also help to express Fanny’s subjectivity. On the other hand, her subjective language is combined with that of the narrator: the third-person pronoun she to designate Fanny and the past tenses (including the pluperfect) corresponding to the surrounding narration (“had heard”, “could”, “was”) are used as in IST. As such, the sentences in (19) show many prototypical features of FIST.

FIST becomes more complex in first-person narratives. Whether it can occur in this narrative style has often been the subject of discussion. Does it exist in first-person narratives? The most explicit objection is Käte Hamburger’s (1973: 316) claim that FIST cannot occur in first-person narratives at all. She argues:

it is not a coincidental, but a structurally determined factor that those conclusively fictional presentational forms, the verbs of inner action applied to third-persons, and in turn the narrated monologue [FIST] and even straight monologue — in short, the formation of third-person subjectivity — cannot occur in the first-person novel. (Hamburger 1973: 316)

As Bray observes, other critics implicitly “limit both free indirect speech and free indirect thought to the third person” (2003: 23). He lists three critics who
implicitly deny the occurrence of FIST in first-person narratives: Seymour Chatman (1978), Charles Fillmore (1981) and Susan Ehrlich (1990). Chatman, for example, states that “a narrator is presupposed by the third person pronouns and the anterior tense” in FIST (1978: 201, qtd. in Bray 2004: 23), while Fillmore similarly points out that “the person whose speech or thought is being represented is always presented in the third person” (1981: 157, qtd. in Bray 2004: 23). According to Ehrlich, “the subjective points of view of third-person subjects often emerge within texts characterized by [FIST]” (1990: 5, qtd. in Bray 2004: 23-24). The views on FIST in Page (1988) and Brinton (1980; 1995) are also limited in that they only observe its prototypical features in third-person narratives, although they do not explicitly deny the existence of first-person FIST.30

In the first-person narrative, the narrator and one of the characters share the same pronoun “I”, which makes it difficult to discern whether this “I” refers to the present self (narrator-I) or the past self (character-I). Yet it is not true at all that the shifted pronoun is the only characteristic indicator of FIST readings. Many other critics have found considerable evidence that FIST does occur in first-person narratives. For example, it occurs frequently in Robinson Crusoe. It is true that Defoe’s use of FIST is not as extensive and elaborate as Austen’s, but his use of it has the same stylistic power to represent the experiencing self’s subjective consciousness. In (20), Crusoe thinks of confronting the savages in order to stop their cruel ritual, but he realizes that he can do nothing alone:

(20)… and what could one Man do among them, when perhaps there might be twenty or thirty of them together, with their Darts, or their Bows and Arrows, with which they could shoot as true to a Mark as I could with my Gun? (RC: 142)

The younger Crusoe’s thought is represented in (20). The personal pronoun does not shift as it would in a third-person narrative. However, the tense corresponding
to the surrounding narration (the past tense “could”), and the sentence mood (the interrogative “what could one Man do …?” within the narrative sentence, which is indicated by the conjunction and) signify that this is his thought represented through FIT. When thought is rendered in an affirmative sentence, it is more difficult to identify it as FIT in a first-person narrative. In such cases, we can rely not on the formal appearances of the sentence, but only on “the content and the context of a passage” (Fludernik 1993: 198, italics original). Although the pronoun does not shift in (20), the content, together with other linguistic markers, makes it clear that it is the younger Crusoe who is continuing to think of the savages’ cruel actions, and not the older Crusoe.

As is clear from the above examples, it is difficult to define the formal features of FIST in terms of one standpoint because there are a number of linguistic parameters. Although it is possible to enumerate some of the formal features of FIST, we can neither list all its features nor avoid having exceptions. It is also extremely difficult to fix the boundary between FIST and the adjoining categories of speech and thought representation. As I have shown above in this chapter, speech and thought representation is a linguistic system which has a clinal nature, and thus each category is characterized in terms of “family resemblance”, where “no one particular feature has to be present” (Leech and Short 2007: 264). This makes it difficult to define each category without exception. I will, however, explain the prototypical formal features of what I call FIST in this thesis for the sake of clarity, because I will frequently have to mention the categories of speech and thought representation in my analysis of extracts from texts.

Some scholars adopt a broader definition of FIST, while others adopt a narrower one. Leech and Short (2007) and Anne Neumann (1992), for example, take the former approach. They regard the following sentences as variations of FIST:
(i) He told her to leave him alone! (Leech and Short 2007\textsuperscript{2}: 266)

(ii) Poor Lord G. is gone to seek his fortune, I believe.


Leech and Short (2007\textsuperscript{2}: 266) explain that the exclamation mark in (i) “evoke[s] the character’s manner or expression”, and so they categorize it as FIS. According to them, “it is possible to construct examples where the only thing which suggests that an utterance is in FIS is a single lexical or graphological feature” (2007\textsuperscript{2}: 266). Neumann (1992: 119-120) insists that (ii) includes FIT in DT because the word “Poor” implicitly reflects Charlotte’s ironic attitude to the original speaker who used this word. I do not disagree with them in that the represented speech and thought with these lexical or graphological features reflect the characters’ points of view, and representations with such features become more character-centred than other indirect modes without any of these features. However, FIST should be formally distinguished from other categories based on its grammatical and syntactical features. In this respect, Lieven Vandelanotte (2009) gives practical demarcations between categories based on syntactic, deictic and expressive features. He argues that “topicalization” or “right dislocation”, “exclamative interjections”, “hesitation phenomena” and “the use of a different dialect”\textsuperscript{32} could syntagmatically occur in a reported clause of IST, and thus have some expressivity (Vandelanotte 2009: 111-112). Page (1988\textsuperscript{2}: 36), for instance, calls IST with lexical faithfulness “parallel indirect speech”, and IST with phonological features “coloured indirect speech”.\textsuperscript{33} He deals with these as distinctive categories of speech and thought representation, but it would be more appropriate to regard them as variations of IST in order to avoid complicated categorization. Variations in the indirect mode of consciousness representations like Page’s “coloured indirect speech” will be investigated further in 3.5. For the time being, let me clarify the prototypically crucial differences between DST, FIST and IST.
Their differences are identified according to the syntagmatic structure, expressive lexis and sentence mood in the reported clause, and the shift of deictic centres between the reporting and reported clause. The characteristics of these categories are illustrated in Table 3.3:

Table 3.3  Syntactic, deictic and expressive features of DST, FIST and IST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between Reporting and Reported Clause</th>
<th>Deictic Centres in the Represented Consciousness</th>
<th>Operativity of Represented Subject’s Deictic Centre</th>
<th>Expressivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>Juxtaposition 2</td>
<td>1 (rep) 3</td>
<td>Full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIST</td>
<td>Juxtaposition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IST</td>
<td>Incorporation 4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 expressivity at a syntactical level. DST and FIST can contain various sentence moods (e.g. interrogative, imperative etc.) in the reported clause.

2 i.e. the reported clause has an equal status with the reporting clause.

3 represented subject.

4 i.e. the reported clause is syntactically subordinated to the reporting clause.

Broadly speaking, FIST is a category in which speech and thought are “referentially aligned and tenses shifted in accordance with the surrounding narrative discourse” (Fludernik 2009: 67), yet the reported clause is juxtaposed as in DST. There are two deictic centres in the reported clause, which allows this type to include freely the points of view of both narrator and character (i.e. the narrating self and the experiencing self in the first-person narrative). It also has high operativity of the represented subject’s (i.e. the character’s or the experiencing self’s) deictic centre, which permits freer expressivity in the reported clause than is the case with IST. More specifically, it can thus allow inversions, topicalisations, exclamations, repetitions, incomplete sentences, parentheticals with verbs of consciousness and so on, and may contain figural
deictics (proximal deictics which are co-temporal with a character’s here and now), expressive language (evaluative or epistemic adjectives and adverbs) and, lastly, definite articles and pronouns with no antecedent.

In his functional approach to language reports, Geoff Thompson (1996) suggests that the ways in which a message is represented can be divided into five functions: “quote”, “echo”, “paraphrase”, “summary” and “omission”. These roughly correspond to the categories of speech and thought representation. “Quote” is equivalent to (F)DST, “echo” to FIST, “paraphrase” to IST, “summary” to NRSA/TA, and “omission” to NV. Although Sotirova, based on her empirical study of readers’ responses to narrative point of view, concludes that FIST is “a difficult form to evaluate and describe functionally” (2005: 110), the core function of FIST can be suggested following Thompson (1996) and others, at least on the theoretical level. When FIST is used in a text, the narrator “echoes” a character’s (mental) language, or reflects the character’s subjective point of view in the represented speech or thought. As some critics observe (Fludernik 2009; Pallarés-García 2012; Rundquist 2016), this is the most distinctive functional feature of FIST. It represents “the contents” of speech and thought “in a narrative context” like IST, yet “the expressive power” of DST is present at the same time (Fludernik 2009: 67).

The semantics of FIST is a common concern in the study of consciousness representation. In most cases, FIS and FIT have a different semantic effect due to the different qualities of speech and thought. The passages (21) and (22) below, which feature FIS and FIT, show the semantic differences between them.

(21) (a) This amaz’d him, and he told me, I was pleas’d to be mysterious; but, that he was sure it was no-body’s Power to hinder him going, if he resolv’d upon it, except me; who had Influence enough upon him to make him do any-thing.

(b) Yes, I told him, I cou’d hinder him, because I knew he cou’d no
more do an unkind thing by me, than he cou’d do an unjust one; and to put him out of his Pain, I told him I was with-Child.

(c) He came to me, and taking me in his Arms, and kissing me a Thousand times almost, said, Why wou’d I be so unkind, not to tell him before? (Rox: 155)

(22) (a) As for me, my Business was his Money, and what I could make of him, (b) and after that if I could have found out any way to have done it, I would have sent him safe home to his House, and to his Family, for ’twas ten to one but he had an honest virtuous Wife, and innocent Children, that were anxious for his Safety, and would have been glad to have gotten him Home, and have taken care of him, till he was restor’d to himself; (c) and then with what Shame and Regret would he look back upon himself? (d) how would he reproach himself with associating himself with a Whore? (e) pick’d up in the worst of all Holes, the Cloister, among the Dirt and Filth of all the Town? (f) how would he be trembling for fear he had got the Pox, for fear a Dart had struck through his Liver, and hate himself every time he look’d back upon the Madness and Brutality of his Debauch? (g) how would he, if he had any Principles of Honour, as I verily believe he had, I say how would he abhor the Thought of giving any ill Distemper, if he had it, as for ought he knew he might, to his Modest and Virtuous Wife, and thereby sowing the Contagion in the Life-blood of his Posterity? (MF: 189-190)

In (21), Roxana and a Dutch merchant are talking about his leaving her after she refused to marry him. The utterances of Roxana as character and the Dutch merchant are rendered in FIS in the first half of (21b) (“Yes, I told him, I cou’d hinder him, because I knew he cou’d no more do an unkind thing by me, than he cou’d do an unjust one”) and the latter half of (21c) (“He … said, Why wou’d I be
so unkind, not to tell him before?”). As FIS is a rendering of speech, it is always articulated by the character.

On the other hand, the semantics of FIT varies. The FIT sentences (the interrogative sentences from (22c) to (22g) and possibly the sentence (22b)) represent Moll’s agitated imagination about the man she has robbed. The sentences from (22c) to (22g) are questions, so they are most likely to be expressing articulated thoughts of the experiencing self. In contrast, the sentence (22b) represents what could have gone on in the mind of the experiencing self non-verbally. This is likely to be the case in this context, because (22b) is the continuation of N in (22a), which means it could be either FIT or NI. Traditionally, FIT is regarded as a semantic structure which can convey verbal and/or potentially non-verbal thoughts (Cohn 1978; Brinton 1980; Banfield 1982). Cohn considers such potential semantic variations to be an important characteristic of FIT, which takes a middle position between the mimetic and the diegetic modes of consciousness representation (1978: 99-105). Though she first explains that “[a] transformation of figural thought-language into the narrative language … is precisely what characterizes the technique for rendering consciousness” (1978: 100), Cohn remarks that “[b]y leaving the relationship between words and thoughts latent, the narrated monologue [FIT] casts a peculiarly penumbral light on the figural consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation” (1978: 103). She also observes that the semantics of FIT fluctuates depending on the surrounding context in which other consciousness representation categories are used. She argues that:

when it borders on psycho-narration, it takes on a more monologic quality and creates the impression of rendering thoughts explicitly formulated in the figural mind; when it borders on spoken or silent discourse, it takes on a more narratorial quality and creates the impression that the narrator is formulating [his/her] character’s inarticulate feelings. (Cohn 1978: 106)
Therefore, it is “a more complex and a more flexible technique for rendering consciousness than the rival techniques [psycho-narration and quoted monologue]” (Cohn 1978: 107).

Another semantic ambiguity of FIT is its ability to represent a character’s reflective and/or non-reflective consciousness (Kuroda 1976; Brinton 1980; Banfield 1981; 1982). As discussed in 3.1, Banfield (1981; 1982) follows Kuroda (1976) in distinguishing two levels of consciousness, that is, reflective and non-reflective consciousness. For Banfield, the demarcation between these two levels of consciousness is clear: the distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness corresponds to that between thought and perception. Therefore, “represented thought” (her terminology for FIT) means reflective consciousness, whereas “represented perception” (her terminology for NP) means non-reflective consciousness. As these techniques represent different levels of consciousness, they have some grammatical and syntactical differences. Brinton (1980), however, does not see the distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness as corresponding to the distinction between thought and perception. According to her, FIT can be either reflective or non-reflective, and so can NP. I agree with her position, and will explain why in the following sub-section.

Recently, these ambiguous semantic statuses of FIT have received increasing attention, especially from stylisticians. Bray points out the importance of FIT in terms of the development of the novel, claiming that “the access it allows to consciousness” can reveal the depths of characters’ psychology. (2003: 21). For Rundquist, free indirect style, in which he includes NP and consonant psycho-narration as well as FIT as mentioned earlier, is “one of the means by which narrative discourse can convey different degrees of verbalization, as well as reflexivity, within a character’s mental activity” (2014: 161). Although he uses the term FIT for cases in which “the expressivity and content of the discourse represent a character’s highly conscious, reflective thought, not lower level and
less reflective mental activities” (2014: 163), Rundquist thinks that FIT does not necessarily represent verbal thoughts, because it is impossible to tell clearly “which elements in FIT might be quoted and which are not” (2014: 164). According to Sotirova, free indirect style, “in its classic form”, “depicts only fully verbalised thought” (2013: 40). However, Defoe’s use of FIT, including the sentence (22b), shows that FIT can represent non-verbal or non-reflective thoughts. FIT is a semantically ambiguous linguistic representation, as it can represent either verbal or non-verbal, reflective or non-reflective consciousness depending on the context in which it is used. This makes it possible for the narrative technique to delve into characters’ consciousness.

3.4.3 Narrated perception
This sub-section turns to NP, a narrative technique which “render[s] the sensory perceptions of a fictional character – visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile and so on – without explicitly reporting an act of perception” (Pallarés-García 2012: 171). This technique has also been called “substitutionary perception” (Fehr 1938; Hernadi 1972; McHale 1978), “represented perception” (Brinton 1980; Banfield 1982; Rundquist 2014) and “free indirect perception” (Chatman 1978; Palmer 2004; Schmid 2010). The term narrated perception is preferred to other terms in this thesis, because, as Elena Pallarés-García (2012: 184; 2014: 21) suggests, it implies a close relationship between narration and perception, which will become clearer in the course of the discussion below.

NP has been examined under a broader mode of free indirect style (Harnadi 1972; Chatman 1978; McHale 1978; Soirova 2011; Rundquist 2014), or as an aspect of FIT (Ikeo 2007), because it represents figural consciousness seemingly without mediacy like FIT, and consequently it is similar to FIT in formal terms. NP and FIT often occur alternately in texts, which makes it difficult to discern these different modes. Let us look at the prototypical use of NP in the following passage from Katherine Mansfield’s “The Garden Party” (1922), and I will point out the similarities and ambiguities between them:
Laura perceives that things are different from usual in the house, and also in her mind, when everyone is preparing for the garden party. In this passage, (23a) is a report of her perception, (23b) to (23f) are NP, (23h) is FIT, and (23g) could be either NP or FIT. The sentence (23a) (“She was still, listening”) functions as a perception indicator, and implies that the following sentences may represent her immediate auditory perceptions. Indeed, the sentences (23b-23f) are not pure narration but a representation of her immediate perceptions filtered through her consciousness, which is linguistically indicated by the use of the verb *seem* (“All the doors in the house seemed to be open” in (23b)), and the evaluative adjectives (“soft”, “quick” and “running” in (23c), “muffled” in (23d), “chuckling” and “absurd” in (23e)), and the proximal deictic *now* with the narrative past tense (“now there came” in (23e)). The sentence (23e) also begins with a coordinating conjunction (“And now there came …”). All these linguistic indices are markers of subjective consciousness, and thus can be found in the sentences which are FIT as well.

This passage also shows the seamless transition from perception (NP) to conception (FIT). The sentence (23h) is a typical example of FIT. The interrogative mood and the pronoun *you* as well as the content clearly tell us that this is Laura’s reflective thought. What makes us pause here is the exclamatory sentence (23g) (“But the air!”). The exclamatory mood can be found in both NP and FIT, but (25g) is located between NP sentences (23b-23f) and a FIT sentence.
(23h), so it could be either NP or FIT, that is, it could be either Laura’s reflective perception or her reflective thought. The ambiguity implied by this exclamatory sentence skillfully shows not only the linguistic seamlessness between NP and FIT, but also the seamlessness of flow of consciousness from perception to conception.

As Brinton (1980) and Pallarés-García (2012) argue, however, NP has some formal, functional, and semantic significance which distinguishes it from FIT. Formally, it prototypically shares with FIT such features as the subjective use of the past progressive, proximal deictic adverbs, incomplete sentences, inversions, evaluative and epistemic expressions and exclamations (several of which are shown in (23)), but unlike FIT it does not contain parentheticals, and questions are rare in it (Brinton 1980: 374-375). In the case of reflective perception especially, the verb seem and similes using like, as, and as if often become markers of NP, because they essentially link the event described with the subject of consciousness.36

In terms of narrative function, FIT’s major function is to represent a character’s consciousness in an echoed way in a narratorial context, but NP has two major functions, namely representation of a character’s consciousness and description of events in the external world (Pallarés-García 2012: 175). This is well demonstrated in example (23) above. The sentences of NP mimaetically represent Laura’s perceptual consciousness as if there were no mediator (i.e. the narrator), and simultaneously describe what is happening around her and give surrounding information to the reader. The greatest significance of NP is that a sentence which may at first seem like narration actually turns out to be a representation of a character’s subjective consciousness, and consequently it opens up more possible interpretations for the reader. However, the credibility of the narrated events in the form of NP is in most cases diminished, as they turn out to be represented from a subjective, limited point of view (Fludernik 1993: 305; Pallarés-García 2012: 175-176). Some critics (Cohn 1978; Brinton 1980;
Fludernik 1993; Pallarés-García 2012) thus place NP between narration and FIT, or in Cohn’s words, in the “hazy region where inner and outer fictional realities are intertwined in the figural mind” (1978: 133).

Semantically, as Pallarés-García points out, NP “essentially portrays what is happening in the immediate environment of a character, as well as his/her awareness of ongoing bodily sensations and mental states” (2012: 175). She goes on to explain that NP only captures what Chafe (1994: 195-211) calls “extroverted consciousness”, whereas FIT can also portray “introverted consciousness”. As discussed in 1.4, extroverted consciousness means consciousness which is “immediately affected by the environment” (Chafe 1994: 197). It renders perceptual experiences “a single holistic interpretation of immediate reality” (Chafe 1994: 32), regardless of whether they are verbal or non-verbal. Perception is by nature non-verbal, and thus some critics equate perception with non-reflective consciousness (e.g. Fehr 1938; Banfield 1982). However, perception is not always passive. In NP, a character’s reflective perceptions may be represented mimetically, which is sometimes indicated by linguistic features such as exclamations as in (23g) or the use of similes. NP, therefore, may render a character’s immediate consciousness which may be consciously articulated or naturally non-articulated, reflective or non-reflective. What differentiates NP from FIT is that the former technique expresses a character’s external conscious experiences, whereas the latter expresses his/her inner ones.

Although many literary critics have studied NP, they have not yet explored the way this technique was used in early eighteenth-century novels, or in the first-person narrative. In her analysis of consciousness representation in Modernist fiction, Sotirova (2013: 133) regards the predominance of NP as the narrative technique that distinguishes the techniques of Lawrence, one of the pioneers of Modernist fiction, from those of his predecessors. Indeed, NP is used much less in the novels of the early eighteenth century, but it should not be entirely overlooked when we discuss fictional consciousness in these early novels.
This thesis illustrates that Defoe uses this style effectively, though not as elaborately or extensively as some writers in later periods, such as Austen. In particular, NP is used very effectively in the robbery scenes in *Moll Flanders*. The following passage describes Moll’s first adventure as a thief. The narrating self blames her wrongdoing on the Devil, because she was not conscious of what she was doing at that time (24a-24b). However, the ways in which the experiencing self reacts to the bait which the Devil laid, that is, her conscious perceptions, are represented in the passage in detail:

(24) (a) I am very sure I had no manner of Design in my Head, when I went out, I neither knew or considered where to go, or on what Business; (b) but as the Devil carried me out and laid his Bait for me, so he brought me to be sure to the place, for I knew not whither I was going or what I did. (c) Wandering thus about I knew not whither, (d) I pass’d by an Apothecary’s Shop in Leadenhall-street, (e) where I saw lye on a Stool just before the Counter a little Bundle wrapt in a white Cloth; (f) beyond it, stood a Maid Servant with her Back to it, looking up towards the top of the Shop, where the Apothecary’s Apprentice, as I suppose, was standing up on the Counter, with his Back also to the Door, and a Candle in his Hand, looking and reaching up to the upper Shelf for something he wanted, so that both were engag’d mighty earnestly, and no Body else was in the Shop. (*MF*: 160)

The participle construction in (24c) includes the word “thus”, which implies that the narrating self still emphasises that she was induced to steal. The present participle “wandering” implies that the younger Moll is walking without any purpose, without knowing where she is going. However, in the following main clause (24d), the experiencing self’s apparent perceptions of her whereabouts are indicated. Her action “I passed by” means that the experiencing self sees the shop
and recognizes that she is passing by it. She notices what kind of shop it is and which street it is located in (“an Apothecary’s Shop in Leadenhall-street”). In the next relative clause (24e), her visual perception is explicitly reported with the perception verb “saw”. This clause functions as a perception indicator, so the following clauses are NP rather than pure narration.

The preposition “beyond” in (24f) clearly represents the visual perception of the experiencing self. It indicates that she moves her eyes from the bundle to the maid. The word order is inverted in the clause beginning with “beyond”. According to Fludernik, “the order of perception may be mirrored iconically by the word order” (1993: 305). Here, the younger Moll moves her eyes from the bundle, sees someone standing, recognizes that it is a maidservant, that the bundle is behind her, and that she is looking up, and so forth. The word “something” signifies the experiencing self’s inability to name what she is seeing (Fludernik 1993: 306). The use of the past progressive in “was standing” and epistemic words, such as “mighty earnestly”, also indicates the ongoing or evaluative perceptions of the experiencing self, and they all convey a sense of the past self’s subjective consciousness.38

Such a passage that represents extroverted perceptions in a mimetic way has the effect of undermining the narrating self’s claim that the past self was not aware of the circumstances of the theft. The representations of figural perceptions evoke the experiencing self’s point of view, and imply that the narrating self is entering the past consciousness and reliving her sensory experiences as they were experienced before. Thus the reader also feels as if he/she were looking at the bundle as perceived by Moll in the fictional world.39 Visual perception is important in the robbery scenes in Moll Flanders because the younger Moll’s perceptions of the outer world are the stimuli which lead her to take the intended action (see also 5.5). The passages which use NP show the reader directly from the experiencing self’s point of view why Moll is so skillful at stealing things. The NP clauses in (24) are not as well-formed as Mansfield’s NP sentences in (23),
but they explicitly show that they convey what is happening in the external world as well as the character’s consciousness.

3.4.4 The effects of free indirect style
One last topic to conclude this section is the effects of free indirect style, a topic that has been keenly discussed in stylistics and narratology. These effects cannot be accounted for in terms of only one approach: they vary depending at least on 1) some structurally intrinsic factors, 2) the nature of different levels of consciousness, 3) the context in which the style is used, and 4) the relationship between the representing and the represented subject. In this sub-section, I will mainly explore the different effects traditionally attributed to FIS and FIT, regarding the effects of FIT as almost including those of NP.

Although the degree of mediacy in FIS and FIT is linguistically almost the same, their effects may be either similar or different. Most critics agree that free indirect style is “routinely naturalized both as a mode of ironic distancing from characters and as a mode of empathetic identification with characters” (McHale 1978: 275), and they typically attribute an ironic effect to FIS and an empathetic effect to FIT. On the one hand, this typical attribution comes from the fact, as Fludernik observes, that empathetic FIT may be “quantitatively more prominent” than ironic FIT, and the opposite is true for FIS (1993: 6). On the other hand, they have explained it either in terms of the factors which are structurally intrinsic to consciousness representation categories, or in terms of the nature of different levels of consciousness, or in terms of the context in which the style is used. I will here re-examine the literary effects of free indirect style from qualitative perspectives.

Leech and Short (2007) have famously explained the reason for these typically attributed effects, based on the assumption that DS is the norm for speech whereas IT is the norm for thought:
Given that the norms for speech and thought presentation are at different points on the continuum, the different values of FIS and FIT can be naturally explained. FIS is a movement leftwards from the norm … and is therefore interpreted as a movement towards authorial intervention, whereas FIT is seen as a move to the right and hence away from the author’s most directly interpretative control and into the active mind of the character. Because the direct perception of someone else’s thought is not possible, DT is perceived as more artificial than more indirect forms.

(Leech and Short 20072: 276-277)

However, I find this explanation unconvincing, firstly because Leech and Short consider FIST only in the third-person context, and secondly because although it is true that “the direct perception of someone else’s thought is not possible”, it does not necessarily mean that IT is the criterial form for thought representation.

Stefan Oltean (1993) explains why these different effects (irony and empathy) are naturally generated, while he preliminarily admits that the nature of free indirect style “can hardly be captured” from only one standpoint as “the actualizations of FID⁴⁰ can be extremely diverse” (1993: 704). In terms of what he calls “the evaluative function”,⁴¹ he observes that “[t]he natural conjunction of irony with FID arises from the fact that FID articulates a double significance produced by the contrast of values associated with the two positions” (1993: 706), whereas “[e]mpathy is closely associated with the rendering of a character’s personal perspective through FID, which presupposes the narrator’s identification with his/her subjectivity” (1993: 708). In other words, according to Oltean, the narrator’s distancing from a character leads to irony while his/her identification with a character causes empathy. These two different types of “the evaluative function” seem to be associated with “the integrative function”, which, he says, “is postulated as a higher-order function” (1993: 704), of FID. In “integrative” terms, there is bivocal or polyvocal FIST at one pole, and univocal FIST at the
other: the bivocality or polyvocality of FIST means “the interference of multiple voices or perspectives in the FID structure”, and thus leads to “the significance of major semantic and pragmatic factors, such as irony” (1993: 704). On the other hand, when FIST becomes univocal, “the narrator manifests total identification with the character” (1993: 705), which results in creating empathy. The narrating subject’s dissociation from or identification with the narrated other is a result of the different degrees of harmony between their voices: bivocality or polyvocality (i.e. the separation of the narrating subject’s voice from that of the narrated other) means the former’s dissociation from the latter, whereas univocality (i.e. the close association of the narrating subject’s voice with that of the narrated other) leads to the former’s identification with the latter. The effect of empathy becomes present when “polyvocality has been abolished” (1993: 709), that is, when a character’s own reflections or revelations or a character’s non-reflective or non-verbal/preverbal consciousness are represented (1993: 705, 709). This inversely means that the effect of irony becomes present when polyvocality is predominant, that is, when a character’s reflective or verbal consciousness is represented. This almost explains the traditional tendency to associate FIS with irony and FIT with empathy because FIS always represents a character’s verbal consciousness while FIT in many cases conveys a character’s own reflections or non-verbal consciousness.

Silvia Adamson (1994) associates these different effects of FIST with the style’s historical origin. She examines the style in terms of two opposing but related subjectivities, namely empathy and echolalia. For her, FIST “derives from linguistic practices which can be found, indeed are extremely common, in speech and non-literary writing”, and “such practices encode two subjectivities” (1994: 197). On the one hand, she describes narrative empathy in terms of deixis: the narrating subject’s deictic projection “into the spatiotemporal position of a real or fictional other” quite regularly occurs in ordinary language (1994:197), as in “By this time he was screaming with pain” (1994: 198, italicized boldface original).
The word “this” in the sentence above is the narrating subject’s spatiotemporal identification with the narrated other, or in other words, empathetic deictic projection; whereas the past tense “was” is the normal, that is egocentric, use of deixis. The use of a deictic expression such as “this” in the sentence above is called “empathetic deixis” (1994: 197). On the other hand, Adamson argues that another linguistic phenomenon called *echolalia* produces narrative detachment. The term *echolalia* originally refers to “a normal phase of child development, in which the child repeats the words or sentences it heard, and to a pathological condition in adults, in which a patient repeats back the speech of others and instead of answering questions, simply echoes them” (1994: 202). Adamson uses the word “to describe a particular form of echoing in normal adult language-use in which the speaker is characteristically aware of the status of the echoed utterance and while repeating a form of words simultaneously indicates its origin in another speaker” (1994: 202) as in “Chuck you this book? Certainly not.” as an answer to the request “Chuck me that book!” (1994: 203). In echolalia, empathetic deixis is usually suppressed and the dual modality is exploited. Consequently, it results in “detachment and satiric edge” (1994: 205). In theory, she argues, narrative sentences in which “empathetic deixis is the main marker” (1994: 207) of FIST create empathetic effects, whereas those in which “echolalia provides the leading features” (1994: 207) convey ironic meanings, but in practice, FIST sentences “[blend] in varying proportions empathetic and echolalic components, spatiotemporal involvement and epistemic detachment” (1994: 206-207) and “relatively few examples will exhibit so marked a predominance of a single pole” (1994: 207). She also points out that in cases where *thought* is represented rather than *speech*, ironic effect may be diminished even if echolalic elements are dominant in quantity (1994: 207). What she suggests here indicates that the effect of free indirect style cannot be determined by means of only linguistically or stylistically intrinsic factors, but needs to be evaluated in terms of what sorts of consciousness are being represented.
As mentioned earlier, Cohn observes that the semantics of free indirect style “fluctuates when it is found in the immediate vicinity of the other techniques” (1978: 106) because it is an intermediate category between the direct and the indirect modes of consciousness representation. This view can be extended to the effect of the style: when it borders on the direct modes, it tends to create ironic effect because of the increased mediacy in the representation (“a movement towards authorial intervention” in Leech and Short’s words (2007: 277), or “a more narratorial quality” in Cohn’s words (1978: 106)), whereas when it borders on the indirect modes, it results in empathy due to the increased im mediacy (“a move … into the active mind of the character” (Leech and Short 2007: 277), or “a more monologic quality” (Cohn 1978: 106)). The narrative situation is also important in the interpretation of the style. According to Cohn, “[t]here is clearly affinity between authorial narration and psycho-narration [IT, NRTA, NI], between figural narration and the narrated monologue [FIT]” (1978: 138). Therefore, “[i]n an authorial milieu both monologic forms [(F)DT and FIT] take on an ironic tonality. In a figural milieu psycho-narration [IT, NRTA, NI] and quoted monologue [(F)DT] move toward each other” (1978: 138).

Bray warns that “[c]are needs to be taken … when considering how exactly these ‘empathetic’ or ‘ironic’ representations are created” (2007b: 58), observing that “the view that empathy and irony are automatically present in the text as a result of the interaction of character and narrator in the so-called ‘dual-voice’ of free indirect discourse neglects the role of the reader, a crucial figure vital to any discussion of the style’s effects” (2007b: 58). Indeed, Oltean’s evaluative function is based on “the expressive strategies through which narrators communicate their attitudes toward events, agents, or settings” (1993: 704, italics added), and is not related to the reader’s interpretation of the represented “events, agents, or settings”. Agreeing with Fludernik’s (1993) view that irony is “an effect of reading” (2007b: 58), Bray also insists that “empathy also needs to be considered as, at least in part, a construction of the reader, rather than as an
intrinsic feature of the text” (2007b: 59). According to him, when empathy is examined in this way, it entails “a range of meanings; from ‘identification’ at one end of the continuum to ‘sympathy’ at the other” (2007b: 60). I agree with Bray (2007b) since neither an ironic nor an empathetic effect is automatically generated as a result of the linguistic construct. Rather, irony and empathy are the effects of reading created by the act of narrating. The narrator, character and reader are deeply involved in creating these effects: the narrator’s distancing from or identification with the character expresses the emotional or psychological attitudes (empathetic or non-empathetic) he/she has as a representing subject, and this in turn becomes one of the triggers that creates either irony or empathy, in the sense of sympathy rather than identification, \(^{44}\) in the reader’s mind.\(^ {45}\)

We must also take especial care when we discuss the effects of free indirect style especially in the first-person narrative. These effects become more varied in the first-person narrative depending on the relationship between the narrating self and the narrated subject, who can be either its past self or other characters. Let me first examine the effects of FIT which seem to be less diverse than those of FIS. According to Cohn, FIT occurs in the first-person narrative “only when the emphasis is entirely on the experiencing self, when the narrating self is thus unstressed, indeed not presented … This empathy with the past stage of the self is in my opinion one of the prerequisites for free indirect style in the first-person novel” (Cohn 1969, qtd. in Stanzel 1984: 220, italics added). For Cohn, FIT is the form in which “the narrator momentarily identifies with [his/her] past self, giving up [his/her] temporally distanced vantage point and cognitive privilege for [his/her] past time-bound bewilderments and vacillations” (1978: 167), and thus it is “the ideal device for displaying empathy with [his/her] younger [self]” (1978: 168). In first-person narratives, especially retrospective ones, FIT occurs less frequently than in third-person narratives, because “[t]he narrating self often forces itself so strongly into the foreground” (Stanzel 1984: 220) or in other words “[first-person narrators] like to keep their distance from the past they
recount” (Cohn 1978: 167). However, as Cohn also admits, the narrating self in autobiographical narratives sometimes uses FIT in representing its past consciousness, as is the case in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. FIT is used in his narratives to represent past consciousness when the narrating self identifies with its past self. For example, the transition from N, NI to FIT in (22) above shows that Moll as narrator is gradually identifying with her past self and representing her great perplexity in the past in an empathetic way.

In my view, the varying effects of free indirect style are primarily due to the different communicative aspects which speech, thought and perception have: speech is accessible to the third person as it is a communicative action whereas thought and perception are only known to the experiencer unless communicated by language. If the narrating self is expressing its inner speech out loud in FIS, it gives a similar effect to FIT, that is, it can be interpreted as the reliving of its past experiences. Sentence (1f) quoted in 3.3.1 (“Well then, said I, if God does not forsake me, of what ill Consequence can it be, or what matters it, though the World should all forsake me, seeing on the other Hand, if I had all the World, and should lose the Favour and Blessing of God, there wou’d be no Comparison in the Loss.”) represents the climax of the younger Crusoe’s cognitive process, and gives a sense of strong in-mediacy in this context. If, however, the narrating self is recounting conversational speech, the use of FIS does not necessarily enhance the illusion of immediacy in the reader’s mind.

The narrating self’s representation of conversational, especially third-person, speech implies an interpretation of or a mental attitude towards that represented speech on the part of the narrating self (i.e. polyvocality), so an ironic distance is created in most cases. In (21), for example, the FIS rendering of the Dutch merchant’s speech by Roxana as narrator (“He … said, Why wou’d I be so unkind, not to tell him before?”) implies both her past and present mental attitude that she was not and is not as enthusiastic as him about having a baby. Roxana as narrator thus distances herself from what he said. The fact that she was not as enthusiastic
as him was also supported by the use of FIS for her own utterance in (21b) (“Yes, I told him, I cou’d hinder him, because I knew he cou’d no more do an unkind thing by me, than he cou’d do an unjust one”). These FIS sentences show that the narrating self here displaces herself from her past experiences by reflecting her present psychological attitude towards what happened, and hence they give an ironic effect in this context.

The following passage is another interesting example that shows the ironic effect created by the use of FIS. In (25), a mysterious voice wakes Crusoe up when he is asleep in his old bower. The mode used to describe the way in which he figures out who is talking to him changes from DS to FIS:

(25) (a) I got over my Fence, and laid me down in the Shade to rest my Limbs; for I was very weary, and fell asleep: (b) But judge you, if you can, that read my Story, what a Surprize I must be in, when I was wak’d out of my Sleep by a Voice calling me by my Name several times, Robin, Robin, Robin Crusoe, poor Robin Crusoe, where are you Robin Crusoe? Where are you? Where have you been?

(c) I was so dead asleep at first, … that I did not wake thoroughly, but dozing between sleeping and waking, thought I dream’d that some Body spoke to me: But as the Voice continu’d to repeat Robin Crusoe, Robin Crusoe, at last I began to wake more perfectly, and was dreadfully frightened, and started up in the utmost Consternation: (d) But no sooner were my Eyes open, but I saw my Poll sitting on the Top of the Hedge; and immediately I knew that it was he that spoke to me …

(e) However, even though I knew it was the Parrot, and that it was no Body else, it was a good while before I could compose my self: …(f) But as I was well satisfied it could be no Body but honest Poll, I got it over; (g) and holding out my Hand, and calling him by his Name Poll, the sociable Creature came to me, and sat upon my Thumb, as he used to do,
and continu’d talking to me, Poor Robin Crusoe, and how did I come here? and where had I been? just as if he had been overjoy’d to see me again; (RC: 121)

The utterances by Crusoe’s pet parrot, Poll, are represented through DS in the latter part of (25b) and FIS in the middle part of (25g). He first hears the bird’s words, which are represented in DS (“Robin, Robin, Robin Crusoe, poor Robin Crusoe, where are you Robin Crusoe? Where are you? Where have you been?”). He then hears similar lines repeated by the bird, but this time they are represented through FIS (“Poor Robin Crusoe, and how did I come here? And where had I been?”). What is realized here is not limited to Crusoe’s experience of hearing Poll say something like “Poor Robin Crusoe, how did you come here? Where have you been?” Now that the younger Crusoe is sure that “it could be no body but honest Poll” (25f), the narrating self ironically sees as foolish the fact that he was at first “dreadfully frighted” (25c) and it takes him “a good while before [he] could compose [himself]” (25e).

When the narrating self represents its own past utterance through FIS, however, it may give either a similar effect to FIT or a different effect from FIT depending on the content and context in which it is used. In other words, FIS that renders one’s own speech can be either empathetic or ironic according to the narrative distance between the two selves in that context. The narrative distance between the two selves is great in the context of (21), hence the FIS sentence (21b) gives an ironic effect as explained above. In contrast, the use of FIS in (26) below expresses empathy on the part of the narrating self:

(26) I sent her back to enquire in the Neighbourhood, what was become of the Family that liv’d in that House? and if they were remov’d, where they liv’d? and what Circumstances they were in? and withal, if she cou’d, what became of the poor Children, and how they liv’d, and where? how they had been treated? and the like. (Rox: 189)
This passage describes Roxana sending her maid Amy to her old neighbourhood to ask what has become of her children. It conveys the experiencing self’s utterances, but it does not describe an actual conversation between Roxana and Amy. NRSA (“I sent her back to enquire in the Neighbourhood”), in which IS with subjectivity is embedded (“to enquire … what was become of the Family that liv’d in that House? …”), finally slips into FIS (“how they had been treated?”), which is a movement towards the end of character subjectivity in the consciousness representation scale. The passage thus signifies the narrating self’s identification with the past self, which creates an empathetic effect rather than an ironic one in this context.

These examples illustrate that the effect of free indirect style varies depending on the linguistic factors (the balance of subjectivities), the linguistic context in which it is used (whether it borders on more indirect modes or on more direct modes), what is represented (speech, thought or perception), and last but not least, the relationship between the representing subject and the represented subject (whose consciousness the former is representing). Basically, as Oltean observes, the style’s “dialogism can sustain irony”, but “when the dialogism is subtle”, it can create empathy (1993: 704). In the case of the first-person autobiographical narrative, where the narrating self represents its past consciousness, dialogism often becomes subtle in the sense that the bivocal features are neutralized because “the narrating self ultimately retains an existential link with [its] earlier, experiencing self” (Stanzel 1984: 221), or the two selves “still remain yoked by the first-person pronoun” (Cohn 1978: 144). Consequently, not only FIT but also FIS can be used in the first-person narrative for an empathetic effect, or in other words, for creating the illusion of immediacy.

This section has examined the formal, functional semantic features and the effects of free indirect style. This style is important as regards psychological realism in Defoe’s fiction, because it expresses mimetic qualities in the narratorial context. It
is an important narrative technique for capturing psychological reality as it embodies the internal tension between the two selves in narrative discourse, even when it produces an ironic rather than an empathetic effect – that is, when the illusion of immediacy does not seem to be created. The next section investigates how similar effects are created in more indirect modes of consciousness representation. The mimetic elements, or directness, found in more indirect modes are related to Adamson’s empathetic deixis hypothesis, which states that the sporadic use of empathetic deixis in first-person narratives in the eighteenth century became more stylized in third-person narratives around the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Defoe’s novels, which were written in the early eighteenth century when free indirect style was still a pioneering technique, the use of direct elements in the more indirect modes of consciousness representation became a stylistically important narrative technique which enabled him to represent his characters’ psyches in great depth.

3.5 Mimetic diegesis II:

Directness of indirect representations of consciousness

Free indirect style in the novels of the early eighteenth century, when Defoe was writing, was still pioneering compared to later periods when it became more sophisticated and more common. This does not mean, however, that the earlier novels looked into their characters’ consciousness less deeply than later ones. As Palmer (2004) points out, eighteenth-century novels depict the density of fictional consciousness very richly within what he calls “thought report”, which is a less privileged category in stylistics and narratology. This section describes the ways in which the early novels delve into characters’ consciousness, or more specifically, the ways in which the points of view of the two selves are blended in more indirect modes of consciousness representation. It focuses on syntactic, deictic and expressive elements that signify directness within more indirect
representations of consciousness (i.e. speech, thought and perception report), and also within narration.

Palmer laments that thought report, or in Cohn’s terminology, psycho-narration, which includes IT, NRTA and NI, is given low priority compared with “[a] good deal of brilliant, imaginative, and subtle work” “done on free indirect thought and direct thought” (2004: 57). As he argues, Cohn’s investigation into psycho-narration is the only study that “gives equal weight to thought report despite the fact that it is the most significant mode in terms of amount of use” before his own study (2004: 57). He attributes this neglect to the negative expressions which stylisticians and narratologists use to refer to the narrator’s role in thought report, namely narratorial “interruption”, “intrusion”, “interference”, and “distortion” (2004: 57). However, such a negative slant on narratorial presence is less elaborately justified “[w]hen narration does descend to the subliminal level” (Cohn 1978: 48). One important and powerful advantage of thought report, as Cohn argues, is “its verbal independence from self-articulation” (1978: 46):

> Not only can it order and explain a character’s conscious thoughts better than the character [him-/herself], it can also effectively articulate a psychic life that remains unverbalized, penumbral, or obscure. Accordingly psycho-narration often renders, in a narrator’s knowing words, what character ‘knows’, without knowing how to put it into words.

(Cohn 1978: 46)

For Cohn, therefore, the narrator can represent non-consciousness as well as consciousness through psycho-narration “as long as [he/she] uses [his/her] own language rather than [his/her] character’s” (1978: 56). Non-consciousness cannot be expressed as it is unless it is inferred from the mental and physical events described in the text.
The reason why Palmer (2004) regards thought report as highly important seems to lie in this ability which it has. As it can render subconscious states, it is suitable for conveying to the reader “the contents of fictional minds in their social and physical context” (Palmer 2004: 76, see also Palmer 2002; 2010). For him, therefore, it is an important narrative technique “in linking individual mental functioning to its social context” (2004: 76). He argues that “[t]he mode of thought report is ideally suited to informative presentations of the purposive and directive nature of thought as well as its social nature” (2004: 76). Ultimately, his theory of fictional minds is a theory about “characters’ minds, not just in terms of passive, private inner speech in the modes of direct or free indirect thought, but in terms of the narrator’s positive linking role in presenting characters’ social engaged mental functioning, particularly in the mode of thought report” (2004: 16). The following is a list of the nine key semantics of thought report according to Palmer (2004: 81-85), together with an example of each attribute from Defoe’s narratives:

1) Presentation of variety of mental events: “What to do I knew not, nor to whom to have recourse; to keep in the House where I was, I could not, the Rent being too great; and to leave it without his Order, if my Husband should return, I could not think of that neither; so that I continued extremely perplex’d, melancholy, and discourage’d, to the last Degree.” (Rox: 13)

2) Presentation of latent states of mind: “… and as I knew that the first Storm that blew must necessarily break her all in Pieces, …” (RC: 47)

3) Presentation of mental action: “This baulk’d me a little, and I resolv’d to push at something or other, for I was not us’d to come back so often without Purchase;” (MF: 214)
4) Presentation of character and personality: “I was … sharp as a Hawk in Matters of common Knowledge; quick and smart in Discourse; apt to be Satyrical; full of Repartee, and a little too forward in Conversation; or, as we call it in English, BOLD, tho’ perfectly Modest in my Behaviour.”

(Rox: 6)

5) Summary: “However, I preserv’d the Youth of my Temper; was always bright, pleasant in Company, and agreeable to every-body, or else every-body flatter’d me;” (Rox: 182)

6) Presentation of background information: “I had alas! no divine Knowledge;” (RC: 76)

7) Presentation of intermental thinking: “While we were thus preparing our Designs, …” (RC: 218)

8) Expression of consensus: “… it began to be publick, that Roxana was, in short, a meer Roxana, neither better nor worse; and not that Woman of Honour and Virtue that was at first supos’d.” (Rox: 182)

9) Interpretation, analysis, and judgment: “… yet the young Cats were the same Kind of House breed like the old one; and both my Cats being Females, I thought it very strange;” (RC: 88)

While Palmer’s main concern is the linking function of thought report, mine is the effects of the mimetic qualities expressed in more indirect modes of consciousness representation. The directness of indirect representations of consciousness is important, especially in the early novels in which free indirect style is still a developing and pioneering narrative technique.
As I discussed in detail in 3.4, free indirect style is generally regarded as a form which has both diegetic/indirect and mimetic/direct elements: the pronominal reference and sequence of tense aligning with the surrounding narration signify indirectness (the narrating self’s displaced observer point of view), while syntactical and deictic elements evoke directness (the experiencing self’s original field point of view). Consequently, they are used in the transitional phases from the RECOUNTING mode to the RELIVING mode of the story-telling schema of REMEMBERING. The evocation of the experiencing self’s point of view is so powerful that it creates the illusion of immediacy in the reader’s mind. However, free indirect style is not the only mode of consciousness representation that can incorporate the points of view of the two selves. Some directness can be found in more indirect representations of consciousness. For example, although the reported clause of IST is incorporated, some direct elements can be used in it because it has two deictic centres (see Table 3.3). Some character-centred deictic and expressive features are also frequently found in other indirect modes and narration. The reason why some direct elements can be allowed in indirect modes other than IST and in narration is difficult to explain in terms of grammatical or syntactical structures, but can be explained in terms of empathetic deixis (Adamson 1994), which is a natural linguistic phenomenon found in ordinary language use, as discussed in 3.4.4.

The most evident marker for directness in more indirect modes of consciousness representation is the use of empathetic deixis, or the co-occurrence of the past tense with proximal deictics, which I call the PAST (the narrative past tense) + NOW (the proximal time – and also spatial – deictics) construction. Deictic expressions are selected according to a deictic centre “consisting of the speaker at the time and place of speaking” (Levinson 2004: 111). For example, when the time deictic now is used, it means “some span of time including the moment of utterance” (Levinson 2004: 114). Similarly, the present tense “predicates a property that holds at the time of speaking” (Levinson 2004: 114).
In both literary and non-literary language, however, deictic expressions are often used inconsistently in a sentence (e.g. *I was happy now*). This paradoxical linguistic phenomenon is regarded as a “normally ungrammatical combination” (Nikiforidou 2010: 266), in which the narrative past tense is typically aligned with the deictic centre of the narrating self, whereas the proximal temporal and spatial deictics are aligned with that of the experiencing self. The conflicting deictic expressions chosen from different deictic centres indicate a shift of subjectivity away from the narrating self, which in turn tends to represent consciousness from the point of view of the experiencing self. Therefore, contrary to the typical relationship between the modes of conscious representation and the narrative point of view discussed in 3.3.3, the indirect representations which evoke the observer perspective in autobiographical memory can also reflect the field perspective, and thus express the subjectivity “transferred to [the] past self” (Nikiforidou 2012: 183). Adamson points out that this sporadic change in point of view (i.e. empathetic deixis) “occur[s] quite unobtrusively in ordinary spoken language” (1994: 198).

This linguistic phenomenon, in which the narrating self’s temporal domain is blended with the experiencing self’s “temporal deictic viewpoint” (Vandelanotte 2012: 201), has been regarded as one of the formal features of free indirect style. As demonstrated in Wilhelmus Bronzwaer (1970), it marks a shift in the narrative point of view from the narrating self to the experiencing self. Kiki Nikiforidou similarly regards the construction as one of the formal features of free indirect style, arguing that in free indirect style “the *Past + now* serves to present events from the point of view of a ‘self’ or a consciousness (other than the narrator) that is contextually available and prominent, as that character’s thoughts, speech, or perceptions” (2012: 177). However, the construction frequently occurs not only in free indirect style but also in more indirect representations of consciousness, and foregrounds the field perspective taken by the narrating self to show its psychological closeness to the experiencing self. In fact, Adamson suggests that
the use of empathetic deixis can be found even in narration “where no speech or thought is represented at all and where a sentence such as war clouds were now gathering over Europe is not even associated with any protagonist within the narrative” (1994: 200, italicized boldface original). The following examples show the use of proximal deictics in the past tense context in IST or in perception report in Defoe’s narratives:

(27) I was exceedingly pleas’d with my new Circumstances, and now I us’d to say to my self, that I was come to what I was Born to, and that I had never till now liv’d the Life of a Gentleman. (CJ: 207)

(28) … it seem’d to me that I was hurried on by an inevitable and unseen Fate to this Day of Misery, and that now I was to Expiate all my Offences at the Gallows, that I was now to give satisfaction to Justice with my Blood, and that I was come to the last Hour of my Life, and of my Wickedness together: These things pour’d themselves in upon my Thoughts in a confus’d manner, and left me overwhelm’d with Melancholly and Despair. (MF: 228-229)

(29) … and now I thought I had found what I had so often wish’d for, to make me happy, and had twice miscarry’d in, and resolv’d not to miss her, if it was possible to obtain her. (CJ: 239)

(30) I began now to perceive my Powder abated considerably, and this was a Want which it was impossible for me to supply, and I began seriously to consider what I must do when I should have no more Powder; (RC: 123)

In the reported clauses in (27) and (28), the proximal deictic now is co-temporal with the past tense (“I had never till now liv’d”, “now I was to Expiate”, “I was
now to give”): it refers to the now of the experiencing self, and functions as a marker for the blended point of view. More specifically, the proximal deictic now is generally “anchored to a present” (Nikiforidou 2012: 185). When it co-occurs with the past tense, however, it does not mean “the present of the speaker”, but refers to “the ‘present’ of the narration”, or “the present of a character” in the fictional world (Nikiforidou 2012: 185). Consequently, the PAST + NOW construction evokes the reliving of the experience by the narrating self, as well as the illusion of immediacy which the reader experiences. It has “an effect of zooming in” (Nikiforidou 2012: 180) on conscious experiences: the consciousness represented is beginning to be remembered from the field perspective. The proximal deictic now also co-occurs with verbs of thought or perception in the reporting clause as in (27), (29) and (30) (“now I us’d to say to my self”, “now I thought”, “I began now to perceive”), in which case the act of thought or perception itself is zoomed in on. Another proximal deictic this as in (28) also functions in a similar way. The zooming-in effect is even more stressed when the construction is used with multiple proximal deictics, as in (28) and the following example (31):

(31) … for I observ’d, that these Wretches never came to this Island in search of what they could get; perhaps not seeking, not wanting, or not expecting any Thing here; and having often, no doubt, been up in the cover’d woody Part of it, without finding any Thing to their Purpose.

(RC: 140)

This is a part of the scene in which the narrating self expresses the experiencing self’s gratitude towards God for having cast him on the safer side of the island. In this report of perceptual thought, different proximal deictics, namely these, this and here, are repeatedly used with the past tense, which enhance the effect of blended point of view. The field perspective originally experienced by the
experiencing self remains dominant because of these multiple proximal deictics, and indeed, the deictic verb “came” shows that the narrated event is perceived from the location in which the experiencing self stands. The blended point of view implies that the narrating self recollects the scene more from the field perspective.

Similar linguistic markers for the shifted point of view can be found in other types of speech, thought or perception report. The proximal deictic now found in (32) to (36) in NRTA and in (37) in perception report refers to the now of the experiencing self:

(32) … and therefore I acquiesced in the Dispositions of Providence, which I began now to own and to believe, order’d every Thing for the best; (RC: 93)

(33) But now I began to exercise my self with new Thoughts; (RC: 97)

(34) Upon serious Consideration, for indeed now I began to Consider things very seriously, and never till now: (MF: 27)

(35) I was exceedingly surpriz’d at the News, and began now seriously to reflect on my present Circumstances, … (MF: 144)

(36) I began to understand him now, and to see plainly, that he resolv’d to make Love to me; (Rox: 138)

(37) He look’d now scar’d and wild, and began, I believ’d, to suspect what follow’d; (MF: 123)

The proximal deictic now is simultaneous with the thought or perception acts. The narrating self summarizes what his/her past self thought or perceived, using
his/her own language, but at the same time the inner states described reflect the psychological point of view of his/her past self at that time. Although these scenes do not describe emotionally heightened experiences by using free indirect style, the proximal deictic now linguistically shows the natural attributes of the REMEMBERING schema, that is, the point of view in autobiographical memory is changing as the remembered experience unfolds.

Similarly, in (38) to (42) below, which are sentences of NI, the proximal deictics represent the now of the experiencing self, not that of the narrating self:

(38) I was now uneasy, indeed, for Fear of the Pyrates, for I was a rich Ship, having besides Goods, near 40000 Pieces of Eight in Silver. (*CJ*: 290)

(39) I was now the most unhappy of all Woman in the World: (*MF*: 74)

(40) And now I was greatly perplex’d about my little Boy; (*MF*: 105)

(41) … and all those wicked things have been known too, which I now began to be very much asham’d of. (*Rox*: 249)

(42) I was now under a new Perplexity; for this young Slut gave so compleat an Account of every-thing in the Dress, that my Friend QUAKER colour’d at it, and look’d two or three times at me, … (*Rox*: 288)

As already mentioned in 3.3.1, NI is a category newly proposed in Semino and Short (2004). By their definition, it refers to “all those cases where the narrator reports a character’s cognitive and emotional experiences without presenting any specific thoughts”, but not to “reports of characters’ perceptions, whether those stimuli are internal (‘She felt a pain in her stomach’) or external (‘She felt the softness of his hair’)” (2004: 46). While they basically agree on the extent which
the term NI covers, critics disagree about the status of NI on the thought representation scale (see 3.3.1). Semino and Short (2004) point out that what is captured in NI is quite different from that in other modes of thought representation. They suspend the final decision about whether NI is either “an extra category, to be found only on the thought presentation scale” or “not part of the thought presentation scale at all, but simply part of narration (as is indeed suggested by the name we have chosen for this category)” (2004: 229). Sotirova (2013), however, includes NI in what she calls “free indirect style” as it captures more subjective consciousness (see 3.4.1).

As discussed earlier, I do not entirely agree either with Semino and Short’s position or with Sotirova’s regarding the status of NI. On the one hand, I partly agree with Semino and Short (2004) in that NI can be included in narration as it shares many syntactic features with the latter. On the other hand, I agree with Sotirova (2013) that NI can be more evocative of characters’ point of view. However, as discussed in 3.3.1, NI has different degrees of subjectivity and it becomes more subjective only when it is used in a figural context. The degree of subjectivity in NI changes depending not only on the narrative situation (teller mode or reflector mode (Stenzel 1984); dissonant or consonant (Cohn 1978)), but also on the presence or absence of directness such as the proximal deictics shown in the examples (38) to (42). For example, NI with proximal deictic now in (42) (“I was now under a new Perplexity”) is more evocative of the point of view of the experiencing self, compared with the cases in which no deictics are used at all (e.g. “I was under a new Perplexity”) or when distal deictics are used instead of proximal ones (e.g. “I was then under a new Perplexity”).

The PAST + NOW construction often occurs in narration other than NI, as in the examples below. They indicate that not only conscious experiences but also all kinds of past events can be remembered from the field perspective. Some critics tend to consider that any sentences containing this construction are categorized as free indirect style (Leech and Short 2007; Nikiforidou 2010; 2012), but the
example sentences from (43) to (49) do not convey the consciousness of the character, but describe happenings or situations in the fictional world. Their role is to provide background information for the story the narrator is telling, or to describe the new settings the characters are in. In this sense, it seems problematic to regard this linguistic construction as the unique characteristic of free indirect style, unless the style is defined broadly as in Adamson (1994; 1995a; 1995b; 2001) (see 3.4.1, n. 28).

(43) The rainy Season of the *Autumnal Equinox* was *now* come, and I kept the 30th of *Sept.* in the same solemn Manner as before, being the Anniversary of my Landing on the Island, having *now* been *there* two Years, and no more Prospect of being deliver’d, than the first Day I *came there*. *(RC: 96)*

(44) I was *now* in my twenty third Year of Residence in *this* Island, …

*(RC: 152)*

(45) While I was *here*, and before I was brought to Bed, I receiv’d a Letter from my Trustee at the Bank full of kind obliging things, and earnestly pressing me to return to *London*: *(MF: 142)*

(46) I had had two Children by him and no more, for to tell the Truth, it began to be time for me to leave bearing Children, for I was *now* Eight and Forty, and I suppose if he had liv’d I should have had no more.

*(MF: 158)*

(47) Also I was willing he should draw out while he had something left, lest I should come to be stript at Home, and be turn’d out of Doors with my Children; for I had *now* five Children by him; the only Work (perhaps)
that Fools are good for. (Rox: 10)

(48) *Amy* was dressing me one Morning, for *now* I had two Maids, and *Amy* was my Chamber-Maid; (Rox: 45)

(49) It *now* began to be Day-light, for the Storm held all Night-long, and it was some Comfort to see the Light of another Day, which indeed, none of us expected; (Rox: 127)

As noted above, point of view in autobiographical memory is not stable but oscillates within the same memory as the remembered experiences unfold. In particular, (43), (46) and (47) illustrate that the point of view oscillates between the observer and field perspective within the same memory. In these sentences, the original view of the experiencing self is reflected in the use of proximal deictics (“The rainy Season of the *Autumnal Equinox* was now come”; “… having now been there two Years” in (43), “I was now Eight and Forty” in (46), “I had now five Children by him” in (47)). On the other hand, the detached point of view of the narrating self is also apparent since the presence of the narrating self is indicated by the distal deictics in (43) (“… having now been there two Years”, “the first Day I came there”), the idiomatic phrase in (46) (“to tell the Truth”), the deictic present tense in (46) and (47) (“I suppose”, “Fools are good for”), and the epistemic adverb in parenthesis in (47) (“(perhaps)”). The collocation of the proximal deictic *now* and “I us’d to say” in (27) quoted above also shows the fluctuation of point of view in autobiographical memory.

Another linguistic marker for the blended point of view within more indirect modes is the use of expressive language by the experiencing self. The expressive elements belonging to the experiencing self can be embedded in the language of the narrating self, which evokes the field point of view even in narration and indirect representations of consciousness. Many evaluative adjectives in (50) to
(52) show that the narrative sentences are affected by the experiencing self’s language:

(50) I found … that I had so long Fancy’d was her meer natural Disposition, and now having no more occasion for Disguises, she resolv’d to seem nothing but what really she was, a wild untam’d Clot, perfectly loose, and careless to conceal any part, no, not the worst of her Conduct.  

(CJ: 193)

(51) This was all acted to the Life by this good, kind, poor Creature; for tho’ her Design was perfectly good and charitable, yet there was not one Word of it true in Fact; (Rox: 22)

(52) I seem’d in a little Hurry which Amy came and went, so every-Day, at first; but when that was over, I liv’d here perfectly retir’d, and with a most pleasant and agreeable Lady; I must call her so, for tho’ a QUAKER, she had a full Share of good Breeding, sufficient to her, if she had been a Dutchess; in a word, she was the most agreeable Creature in her Conversation, as I said before, that ever I met with.  

(Rox: 211)

The evaluative expressions “wild untam’d Clot, perfectly loose, and careless” in (50) depict Jack’s extravagant wife. However, she later reforms herself, remarries Jack and becomes a good wife. The evaluations are then based on the younger Jack’s evaluation of her. Similarly, the expressions like “this good, kind, poor” and “perfectly good and charitable” in (51), and “perfectly retir’d”, “most pleasant and agreeable” “the most agreeable” in (52) are obviously evaluations by the experiencing self. In (51), the experiencing self’s gratitude to her relatives who have saved her from distress are expressed in these evaluative adjectives, but
their scheme seem to be “perfectly good” only to the experiencing self, which is explicitly expressed in the following comment by the narrating self: “yet there was not one Word of it true in Fact”. Likewise in (52), the evaluation of her situation is evidently based on the limited knowledge of the experiencing self as she could not actually live “perfectly retir’d” at all. Her persistent daughter finds where she is not long after this scene. On the other hand, the Quaker continues to be a “pleasant” and “agreeable” woman for both the older and younger Roxana, and thus these evaluative adjectives imply dual subjectivity. The fact that Roxana’s judgement on the Quaker has not changed is clearly indicated by the narrator’s comments such as “I must call her” and “in a word”.48

Such a linguistic phenomenon is called “coloured narrative” (Hough 1978: 50-51), “contamination” (Pascal 1977: 55-60; McHale 1978: 260-261; Stanzel 1984: 192-193) or “stylistic contagion” (Cohn 1978: 32-33). The words contamination and contagion give a negative impression to this phenomenon, as words such as intervention and interference do in referring to the narratorial presence, so I will use the word coloured rather than contamination or contagion. Although Hough’s “coloured narrative”, when it was first defined, referred to the “narrative or reflection or observation more or less deeply colored by a particular character’s point of view” (1978: 50, italics added), the phenomenon has been generally associated, even by Hough himself, with the borrowing of characters’ speech, idiom or tone in narration (Cohn 1978; Hough 1978; McHale 1978; Stanzel 1984). More recently, Pallarés-García states that “[c]oloured narrative is defined as the incorporation of a character’s speech or mental language into N” (2012: 181). “Coloured narrative”, therefore, has been particularly regarded as the application of the character’s idiomatic language to narration. In my view, however, this linguistic phenomenon, as Hough originally defined it, should include the cases in which any linguistic indices reflecting the character’s point of view, and not only his/her idioms, are incorporated in narration. Also, it can be applied more broadly to narrative techniques for representing intermingling points
of view within more indirect modes of consciousness representation.

In this respect, Cohn (1978) was right in mentioning “stylistic contagion” in her chapter on psycho-narration. She argues that psycho-narration ranges between the dissonant type and the consonant type. The dissonant type of psycho-narration “is dominated by a prominent narrator who, even as [he/she] focuses intently on an individual psyche, remains emphatically distanced from the consciousness [he/she] narrates” (Cohn 1978: 26). On the other hand, the consonant type “is mediated by a narrator who remains effaced and who readily fuses with the consciousness [he/she] narrates” (Cohn 1978: 26). Whereas dissonant psycho-narration is characterized by “the narrator’s superior knowledge of the character’s inner life and [his/her] superior ability to present it and asses it” (Cohn 1978: 29), consonant psycho-narration does not show “cognitive privilege on the narrator’s part” (Cohn 1978: 31-32). Instead of “gnomic present statements” or “speculative or explanatory commentary” (Cohn 1978: 31), the “vocabulary and rhythm is so vividly colored” by the character’s idiom in consonant psycho-narration, which narrative phenomenon Cohn calls “stylistic contagion” (1978: 32-33). Consonant psycho-narration is more likely to occur in the figural narrative situation in which the reflector mode is dominant. Consonant psycho-narration, especially when “involving stylistic contagion”, does not continue for long and tends to turn into FIT (Cohn 1978: 33). Cohn concludes that “[t]he proximity of this consonant type of psycho-narration to the more direct monologic techniques for rendering figural thought accounts in part for its abundant occurrence in the stream-of-consciousness novel, where its presence has been so reluctantly acknowledged by theorists of the genre” (1978: 33). More recently, critics have acknowledged the importance of consonant psycho-narration in relation to FIT (cf. Sotirova 2013; Rundquist 2014). Rundquist (2014) thus includes it in what he calls “free indirect style”.

In point of fact, a similar phenomenon to coloured narrative is found in indirect representations of consciousness. A character’s point of view is
sometimes incorporated into indirect modes by means of certain expressive elements:

(53) … I thought I liv’d **really very happily** in all things, except that of Society. (*RC*: 122)

(54) … and **now** it came into my Head with a double force, that **this** was the High Road to the Devil, and that **certainly this** was not **the** Life of a Gentleman! (*CJ*: 67)

(55) … I began to think, that if he **should** be taken and **should** Confess, and send the Officers to Search there for the Goods, and they **should** find them, I **should** be undone, and **should** be taken up for a Confederate; whereas, I knew nothing of the matter, and had no Hand in it. (*CJ*: 72)

(56) Besides, I fancied my self able to manage One, **nay**, Two or Three Savages, … (*RC*: 169)

The above examples depict consciousness in IT (53-55) and NRTA (56). IT is basically the representation of consciousness from the point of view of the narrating self. The experiencing self’s psychological attitudes, however, are reflected in the use of the evaluative adverbs “**really very happily**” in (53), the proximal deictics “**now**” and “**this**”, the evaluative adverb “**certainly**”, the definite article and the exclamation mark in (54), and the repetition of the modal auxiliary **should** in (55). Some of the earlier examples above also contain such linguistic indicators. For example, in (31) above, the epistemic adverb “perhaps” and the evaluative phrase “no doubt” express the mental attitudes of the experiencing self. Such colouring in IST has been pointed out and given different names such as “coloured indirect speech” (Page 1988\(^2\)) and “Indirect discourse, mimetic to some
degree” (McHale 1978), but the colouring is also seen in other types of thought report as shown in (56). In other words, it is a linguistic phenomenon which occurs in any indirect representations of consciousness as well as in narration. I shall therefore use the umbrella term coloured representation, by which I mean any kind of diegetic representation by the narrator incorporating deictic or expressive elements that indicate the character’s point of view. When I refer to a specific category coloured by such linguistic features, I call it coloured IS/IT, coloured NRSA/NRTA, coloured perception report, coloured NI, or coloured N.

Free indirect style, in which not only lexical and graphological elements but also syntactical elements are deeply affected by the character’s point of view, is generally regarded as “more deeply coloured” than that in coloured representation (Hough 1978: 51). When a sentence is coloured, the degree of mediacy changes irrespective of the standard arrangement of indirect categories (i.e. N–NRSA/TA–IST–FIST; N–perception report–NP). The degree of mediacy is also affected by the degree of colouring in more indirect modes, both in quality and quantity. In particular, the status of NI changes significantly according to the degree of colouring, because it is by definition more evocative of characters’ point of view than N. When it is coloured, especially in the reflector mode, NI becomes much more immediate than NRTA and IT to the extent that it gives an equally immediate effect with FIT. The dotted line in Figure 3.3 shows this status of NI, positioning it in the transitional phase towards the more immediate end. The degree of mediacy in coloured representation fluctuates between mediate and immediate depending on the degree of colouring, the narrative mode, and last but not least the narrative context.

More detailed and context-based analysis of a passage will illustrate the effects of directness on indirect representations of consciousness. The following is a short passage from Robinson Crusoe, in which Crusoe describes how he is beginning to go through a mental transition after living on the island for two years:
It was *now* that I began to sensibly feel how much *more happy this* Life I now led was, with all its *miserable* Circumstances, than the *wicked, cursed, abominable* Life I led all *the past Part of my Days*; and *now* I chang’d both my Sorrows and my Joys; my very Desires alter’d, my Afflictions chang’d their Gusts, and my Delights were *perfectly* new, from what they were at my first Coming, or *indeed* for *the two Years past*. (*RC*: 96)

In this passage, the proximal deictics *now* and *this* are used frequently with the past tense. The demonstrative pronoun *this* in (57) is not anaphoric, which means that it is used deictically: it refers to the life the younger Crusoe is living now on the story level. The phrases “*the past Part of my Days*” and “*the two Years past*” are references to the past from the now of the experiencing self. In terms of expressivity, the phrases “*more happy*”, “*miserable*”, “*wicked, cursed, abominable*”, “*perfectly*”, and “*indeed*” are used to designate evaluations by the experiencing self. Since their markedness is foregrounded by the unmarkedness of the past tense and neutral language in narration (Nikiforidou 2012: 185), the use of such elements gives the narrative “new colour as a marker of experiential immediacy” (Adamson 1995b: 216), as if it were represented from the past self’s point of view. As a result, these direct elements show the narrating self’s closeness to the past self. In teller-mode narratives such as *Robinson Crusoe*, the narrating self displaces itself from the past experiences and its point of view is usually foregrounded in narration and diegetic consciousness representation categories: the narrating self keeps a distance from its past self. However, the point of view of the experiencing self becomes more and more foregrounded by the markedness of the direct elements, which shows the narrating self’s identification with or closeness to the past self and results in the empathetic effect or the illusion of immediacy on the part of the reader. Cohn (1969; 1978) claimed that free indirect style occurs in the first-person narrative when the narrating self
temporarily identifies with the past self and the emphasis is on the past self. The mechanics of directness in more indirect modes of consciousness representation is similar, or in other words, it is a narrative technique for signifying the narrating self’s identification with the past self in the first-person narrative. The shift in point of view in (57) thus implies that the narrating self recollects the mental transition of his past self more and more from the field perspective in the RELIVING mode. In this passage, the narrating self describes the fact that he has lived happily on the island with gratitude for God’s providence, standing psychologically close to or right behind the experiencing self.

This section has examined important linguistic markers for blended point of view in more indirect modes of consciousness representation in order to confirm that Defoe presents his characters’ psychological realities through the narrative techniques of psychological realism. The colouring of indirect representations of consciousness with proximal deictics and expressive elements is an important narrative technique for psychological realism, because it indicates the oscillation in point of view between the narrating self and the experiencing self. The oscillation in point of view in more indirect modes of consciousness representation than free indirect style shows the subtle fluctuation in the minds of the two selves. This section has demonstrated how the internal tension between the two selves is represented with subtlety and complexity in Defoe’s fiction, with linguistic analysis in terms of deixis and expressivity. The directness of more indirect modes invites the reader to recognize what is represented as the now of the experiencing self, that is, the now in the fictional world. It consequently involves the reader in the fictional world, and the illusion of immediacy is created in his/her mind.
3.6 Changes in consciousness representation categories

What makes retrospective narratives so varied is the complex and fluctuating point of view woven into the narrative. For example, the point of view frequently shifts from the narrating self to the experiencing self, as this makes it possible for the reader not only “to see what a character sees but also to perceive with the character, to have [his/her] mind filled with the character’s sights, ideas, and responses” (Konigsberg 1985: 7). As Berntsen and Rubin (2006: 1194) point out, the transition or oscillation in point of view between the two selves is a natural phenomenon in autobiographical memory. The effect of authenticity is, therefore, naturally evoked by the imitation of this natural transition or oscillation, and this is linguistically shown through the manipulation of narrative point of view by means of changes in consciousness representation categories. The shift in point of view indicated by changes in consciousness representation categories in the first-person narrative, as this narrative style imitates real-life schemas, can signify the internal tension between the two selves. This section reveals how closely the representation of consciousness in fictional autobiographies imitates the natural shift of point of view in autobiographical memory (observer/field), and illustrates the importance of the oscillating internal tension between the two selves indicated by changes in consciousness representation categories in Defoe’s retrospective narratives.

In his analysis of consciousness representation categories, Rundquist illustrates how a change in categories gives “the semantic effect” of indicating a change in the way of thinking on the part of the subject of consciousness (2014: 165). He argues that “[t]he verbality of a character’s thought is not entirely determined by style, though style can ... be highly influential on a reader’s impressions” (2014: 164). In the case of the first-person narrative, a change in categories affects not only the ways in which the experiencing self thinks (e.g. verbal, semi-verbal or non-verbal) but also the mental attitudes of the narrating self towards the younger, past self. It can signify the degree of the narrating self’s
identification with the experiencing self, or in other words, the internal tension between the two selves in the narrative text. The following passage, for example, shows a change in mental attitude on the part of the narrating self when it remembers the past, as well as a change in how the experiencing Moll thinks:

(58) (a) I was now in good Circumstances indeed, if I could have known my time for leaving off, and my Governess often said I was the richest of the Trade in England, and so I believe I was; for I had 700 l. by me in Money, besides Cloaths, Rings, some Plate, and two gold Watches, and all of them stol’n, for I had innumerable Jobbs, besides these I have mention’d; (b) O! had I even now had the Grace of Repentance, I had still leisure to have look’d back upon my Follies, and have made some Reparation; but the Satisfaction I was to make for the publick Mischiefs I had done, was yet left behind; and I could not forbear going Abroad again, as I call’d it now, any more than I could when my Extremity really drove me out for Bread. (MF: 211)

The passage shows the fluctuation of the internal tension between the two selves. It renders the thoughts of the younger Moll in the indirect mode and in narration with some directness in (58a). The proximal deictic now in “I was now” would be the distal deictic then if the passage were expressed purely through the consciousness of the narrating self. It also contains the evaluative words “indeed” and “good”, which show the experiencing self’s subjectivity. The narrating self, after being treated severely in Newgate, cannot think that her circumstances were “indeed” “good”. Although these expressions signify the subjectivity of the experiencing self, the modes of representation do not stress the verbal nature of the original thoughts. Then exclamatory FIT, beginning with “O!”, is used in (58b), which gives the impression that the thought is likely to have a verbal quality. Moreover, the transition from an indirect mode to a more direct one
shows that the narrating self is gradually identifying and empathizing with the experiencing self during the recollection.

What makes the passage complicated is that it also continues to exhibit the narrating self’s detached point of view. While the narrating self is gradually empathizing with her past self, she is also expressing her present consciousness. For example, the clause “if I could have known my time for leaving off” implies the narrating self’s superior knowledge that she was eventually caught because she continued stealing. The narrating self’s consciousness is more clearly indicated by the present tense, as in “I believe” and “I have mention’d”. In particular, the present tense “believe” makes the narrative point of view more complex as it is a verb which expresses a cognitive experience. It can be understood that the narrating self still believes she was “the richest of the Trade” back then, in which case it indicates that the narrating self’s consciousness is interpolated in the experiencing self’s consciousness as it naturally occurs in retrospection. On the other hand, it could also be the experiencing self who believes that she is the richest of all thieves. In this case, the shift from the past tense (“said”) to the present tense (“believe”) indicates that the present tense is “not a ‘true’ present that refers to the speaker’s present moment, but a narrative present that refers to the same past moment as the past tense does” and that “[t]he ease with which this narrative present alternates with the customary narrative past indicates the degree of consonance” (Cohn 1978: 157). The present tense “believe” in this sense shows the higher degree of consonance – that is, it is used as one of the temporal deictics which shows the narrating self’s complete empathy with the experiencing self in terms of tense. Either temporal movement or complete identification can signify the embodiment of the existential continuity between the two selves in the narrative text, which makes the representation of Moll’s psychology seem more real. This passage shows that her inner life, especially how she regrets being a thief, remains ambiguous to the reader. Due to the complex blending of the points of view between the two selves, the reader cannot make out
whether or not she is really and sincerely penitent for her past wickedness. Her story ends when she returns to England even though she decided to make up for her past follies by staying in Virginia. This creates an ambiguity about her real state of mind, and shows the complicated reality of her mind.

The following pages discuss more examples of the internal tension between the two selves, which is shown by changes in consciousness representation categories in Defoe’s narratives. In the following passage, the narrating self’s gradual empathy with the experiencing self during recollection is indicated by a change in consciousness representation categories from a more diegetic to a more mimetic mode. The passage describes Crusoe’s thoughts when he became sick:

(59) (a) In this Interval, the good Advice of my Father came to my Mind, and presently his Prediction which I mention’d at the Beginning of this Story, viz. (b) That if I did take this foolish Step, God would not bless me, and I would have Leisure hereafter to reflect upon having neglected his Counsel, when there might be none to assist in my Recovery. (c) Now, said I aloud, My dear Father’s Words are come to pass: God’s Justice has overtaken me, and I have none to help or hear me: I rejected the Voice of Providence, which had mercifully put me in a Posture or Station of Life, wherein I might have been happy and easy; but I would neither see it my self, or learn to know the Blessing of it from my Parents; I left them to mourn over my Folly, and now I am left to mourn under the Consequences of it: I refus’d their Help and Assistance who wou’d have lifted me into the World, and wou’d have made every Thing easy to me, and now I have Difficulties to struggle with, too great for even Nature itself to support, and no Assistance, no Help, no Comfort, no Advice; then I cry’d out, Lord be my Help, for I am in great Distress. (RC: 78)

The passage begins with NRTA, which is represented from the narrating self’s
detached, observer point of view in the RECOUNTING mode. In this phase of the story, the younger experiencing Crusoe is just beginning to realize how right his father’s advice was. In this sense, it is more likely that the older Crusoe with the observer perspective evaluates the advice (“the good Advice of my Father”, italics added). The narrating self’s representing consciousness is clearly indicated by the relative clause “which I mention’d at the Beginning of this Story” and the adverbial “viz.”. His father’s prediction is reproduced diegetically in (59b) and is still described in the RECOUNTING mode: the tense and person aligning with the deictic centre of the narrating self indicate that his father’s prediction is represented in IS, from the older Crusoe’s point of view. The representation of inner struggle then becomes more mimetic and im-mEDIATE in (59c): Crusoe expresses his agony aloud, which is directly represented through DT from the field perspective, and it continues till the end of the passage. The change in consciousness representation categories stylistically shows the narrating self’s gradual empathy with the past self. At the same time, this greatly affects the reader’s impressions of what is represented: the mimetic rendering of mental processes makes the reader feel exactly as the experiencing self might do. The narrating self’s empathizing with the past self seems natural in this context, because this is the turning point at which the younger Crusoe begins to be more grateful for God’s providence. What he thinks during his sickness changes the way he thinks about his religious faith. The fact that his sincere repentance begins when he is sick is shown by the gradual transition from the RECOUNTING mode, in which it is implied that the older Crusoe thinks his father’s advice is still good, to the RELIVING mode, in which his repentance is represented im-mediately. His sincere repentance about his former life and his gradual spiritual conversion while he is sick gives his life a new direction, which I will discuss further in Chapter IV. The gradual transition from the diegetic to mimetic mode occurs often in Defoe’s narratives at such crucial points in the narrative.

The following passage also shows a change in consciousness representation
categories from a more diegetic mode to a more mimetic one in a crucial scene in *Moll Flanders*, which expresses very well the relationship between changes in consciousness representation categories and the effect of authenticity. The passage represents Moll’s agony in Newgate:

(60) *(a)* I was now fix’d indeed; ’tis impossible to describe the terror of my mind, when I was first brought in, and when I look’d round upon all the horrors of that dismal Place: I look’d on myself as lost, and that I had nothing to think of, but of going out of the World, and that with the utmost Infamy; the hellish Noise, the Roaring, Swearing and Clamour, the Stench and Nastiness, and all the dreadful crowd of Afflicting things that I saw there; joyn’d together to make the Place seem an Emblem of Hell itself, and a kind of an Entrance into it.

*(b)* Now I reproach’d myself with the many hints I had had, as I have mentioned above, from my own Reason, form the Sense of my good Circumstances, and of the many Dangers I had escap’d to leave off while I was well, and how I had withstood them all, and hardened my Thoughts against all Fear; it seem’d to me that I was hurried on by an inevitable and unseen Fate to this Day of Misery, and that now I was to Expiate all my Offences at the Gallows, that I was now to give satisfaction to Justice with my Blood, and that I was come to the last Hour of my Life, and of my Wickedness together: These things pour’d themselves in upon my Thoughts in a confus’d manner, and left me overwhelm’d with Melancholly and Despair.

*(c)* Then I repented heartily of all my Life past, but that Repentance yielded me no Satisfaction, no Peace, no not in the least, because, as I said to myself, it was repenting after the Power of farther Sinning was taken away: I seem’d not to Mourn that I had committed such Crimes, and for the Fact, as it was an Offence against God and my Neighbour;
but I mourn’d that I was to be punish’d for it, I was a Penitent as I thought, not that I had sinn’d, but that I was to suffer, and this took away all the Comfort, and even the hope of my Repentance in my own Thoughts.

(d) I got no sleep for several Nights or Days after I came into that wretch’d Place, and glad I wou’d have been for some time to have died there, tho’ I did not consider dying as it ought to be consider’d neither, indeed nothing could be fill’d with more horror to my Imagination than the very Place, nothing was more odious to me than the Company that was there: O! if I had but been sent to any Place in the World, and not to Newgate, I should have thought myself happy. (MF: 228-229)

At the beginning of this passage, the narrating self says “’tis impossible to describe the terror of [her] mind”. Such explicit inexpressibility, according to Hardy (1985: 12, 22-23), articulates the intensity of emotional experience. The following analysis shows how the narrating self articulates her strong and indescribable terror in the past.

In the first paragraph (60a), the psychology of the past self is represented through indirect representations of consciousness, such as NRTA and NI. What is interesting in (60a) is that the proximal deictic now co-occurs with the past tense at the beginning of this paragraph (“I was now fix’d indeed”), while the distal deictics that and there are used to signify Newgate (“that dismal place”, “there”). This inconsistent use of deictic expressions implies that the two selves are temporally close, but spatially distant. In other words, while she gradually enters into the consciousness of the past self, the narrating self still cannot help but have a strong aversion to Newgate.

In the next paragraph (60b), Moll’s affliction continues to be represented indirectly through IT, NRTA and NI. However, the proximal deictics now and this are again used in indirect representations of consciousness (“Now I reproach’d
myself”, “I was hurried by an inevitable and unseen Fate to this Day of Misery”, “now I was to Expiate all my Offences at the Gallows”, “I was now to give satisfaction to Justice with my Blood”), which implies that the narrating self continues to stay psycho-temporally close to the experiencing self. The narrating self approaches the experiencing self more psychologically in the subsequent paragraph (60c): the thoughts of the experiencing self are parenthetically introduced by the clauses, “as I said to myself” and “as I thought”, which means that they are represented free-indirectly. The epistemic verb seem (“I seem’d not to Mourn that …”) and the word such (“I had committed such Crimes”) also reflect the point of view of the past self, signifying the fact that the narrating self is gradually and hazily remembering her traumatic psychological experiences in Newgate.

In the last paragraph (60d), Newgate is again referred to with distal deictics (“that wrech’d Place”, “to have died there”, “the Company that was there”). What is different from the earlier part is that this time the deictic verb come is used as in “I came into that wrech’d Place”. This means that the point of reference is in Newgate, and so the narrating self is psycho-spatially there, but at the same time, she is distant from it, as the use of distal deictics indicates. This contradictory use of spatial deictic expressions shows the even stronger aversion to Newgate that Moll still has. The repetitive use of negation (“nothing could be fill’d with”, “nothing was more odious”) indicates the inexpressibility of her terror, and finally, her agony is represented through FIT in the last sentence: “O! if I had but been sent to any Place in the World, and not to Newgate, I should have thought myself happy”. This expresses her thought which might have been on “the threshold of verbalization” (Cohn 1978: 103) at that time, or in other words, the terror which the narrating self referred to as “impossible to describe” in words in the sentence at the beginning of the passage.

As such, the realistic psychological tension between the two selves is represented through various categories of thought representation. This illustrates
the natural shift in point of view in autobiographical memory which also occurs in real life. In this passage, the narrating self’s empathy with the experiencing self is expressed by the change in consciousness representation categories, while complete empathy with the experiencing self on the part of the narrating self is still not easy as the present self still has a strong aversion to Newgate, which is indicated by the contradictory use of deictic expressions. The imitation of “the temporal continuity of real beings” (Cohn 1978: 144) through various categories, and the imitation of mental conflict regarding her traumatic experiences by using contradictory deictic expressions in the first-person narrative help to make the representation of her consciousness seem real, natural and authentic.

The categories also fluctuate dynamically between the diegetic and mimetic modes within a short passage, which imitates our way of changing perspectives quite regularly and naturally in recollection. Therefore, the realistic quality of the narrative is stressed when the fluctuation in internal tension is linguistically shown by changes in consciousness representation categories in the narrative text. The following passage describes Roxana’s thoughts about her wicked behaviour:

(61) … (a) it immediately occur’d to me, Poor Amy! what art thou, that I am not? what hast thou been, that I have not been? Nay, I am guilty of my own Sin, and thine too: (b) Then it came to my Remembrance, that I had not only been the same with Amy, but that I had been the Devil’s Instrument, to make her wicked; that I had stripp’d her, and prostituted her to the very Man that I had been Naught with myself; that she had but follow’d me; I had been her wicked Example; and I had led her into all; and that as we had sinn’d together, now we were likely to sink together.

(c) All this repeated itself to my Thoughts at that very Moment; (d) and every one of Amy’s Cries sounded thus in my Ears: (e) I am the wicked Cause of it all; I have been thy Ruin, Amy; I have brought thee to
this, and now thou art to suffer for the Sin I have entic’d thee to; and if thou art lost for ever, what must I be? what must be my Portion?

(Rox: 125-126)

The younger Roxana’s reflections about her immoral behaviour are represented through DT from the field perspective in (61a), in which the reader is given a direct replica of her thoughts as they occurred to her. This shows the narrating self’s alignment with the experiencing self in terms of mental perspective. The narrating self goes on to describe her inner happenings in the past through IT in (61b), which implies that she now remembers her past conscious memory, distancing herself from the memory, in order to try to be less empathized with her past self and show that she was thinking as reasonably as possible in this phase. Note, however, that she does not succeed in displacing herself fully from the experience, since towards the end of (61b), the conjunction that required in the second subordinate clauses of IST onwards is omitted, which means that the reported clauses (“I had been her wicked Example; and I had led her into all”) come to be more or less interpreted free indirectly. In the second paragraph of (61), Roxana’s thoughts in the past are first summarized in the form of NRTA (61c), and then they are again directly represented in (61e), which is introduced by a report of perception as in (61d). Such frequent changes in consciousness representation categories effectively indicate that the narrating self’s empathy with the past self is fluctuating as she remembers her past psychological experiences. The fluctuation in point of view in the scenes of repentance in Roxana implies that Roxana’s repentance or rationalization is by and large seeming, tentative and self-satisfactory. She often questions herself about her bad behaviour as in (61), but she neither tries to find a real answer nor repents her misdeeds sincerely. The reader eventually notices this fact by the repetitive representations of seeming repentance, through which the reader figures out what kind of person Roxana is (see also 4.4 regarding her seeming repentance).
Perceptual experiences can similarly be remembered in different ways as the remembered events unfold, which is indicated by changes in consciousness representation categories:

(62) (a) As soon as the Jew saw the Jewels, he falls a jabbering in Dutch, or Portuguese, to the Merchant, and I cou’d presently perceive that they were in some great Surprize, both of them; (b) the Jew held up his Hands, look’d at me with some Horrour, then talk’d Dutch again, and put himself into a thousand Shapes, twisting his Body, and wringing up his Face this Way, and that Way, in his Discourse; stamping with his Feet, and throwing abroad his Hands, as if he was not in a Rage only, but in a meer Fury; then he wou’d turn, and give a Look at me, like the Devil; (c) I thought I never saw any thing so frightful in my Life. (Rox: 112-113)

In the first sentence (62a), the perceptions of the experiencing self are reported (“As soon as the Jew saw the Jewels” and “I cou’d presently perceive that …”). Though they are represented through perception report, the point of view of the past self is partially evoked in (62a). For example, the use of the present tense “falls”, rather than the past tense “fell”, implies that the Jew’s actions are recollected im-mediately with a reliving quality (see 2.5). The expression “Dutch, or Portuguese” conveys the experiencing self’s unclear recognition of the language spoken at this moment. The use of the epistemic “some” and the extraposed “both of them” also signify the subjectivity of the past self. The reports of perception in (62a) function as perception indicators, and thus the subsequent (62b) renders the perceptual consciousness of the experiencing self more im-mediately than (62a). She can clearly recognize what language the Jew is speaking at this stage (“then talk’d Dutch again”). The repetition of the -ing form (“twisting”, “wringing”, “stamping”, and “throwing”) has a similar effect of representing ongoing perceptions in the past progressive. The similes with “as if”
and “like”, as Brinton (1980: 377) points out, are also markers of reflective perceptions. These linguistic markers embody the auditory and visual fright of the experiencing self.

In the last sentence (62c), the experiencing self’s perceptions lead to her thought, which is introduced by the reporting clause, “I thought”. It may look like IT, but the past tense “saw” is not back-shifted, so the reported clause is more likely to be represented from the deictic centre of the experiencing self. In other words, this can be read as the im-mediately rendered thought of the experiencing self. The reporting clause ("I thought") not only indicates that the representation shifts to the conceptual level, but also that the presence of the narrating self becomes less backgrounded, compared to the previous sentence (62b), which shows that the narrating self is existentially related to the experiencing self. Some critics, as suggested earlier, might regard the use of a reporting clause as “interference” with the reliving of experiences, but it actually helps to signify the internal tension between the two selves, because such a switching between the RECOUNTING and RELIVING modes is natural in autobiographical writings. This is exactly what makes a first-person narrative different from a third-person one. The existential continuity between the two selves is one of the important conditions for making reliving qualities in the first-person narrative.

It is important to note that without changing categories, the consciousness of both the narrating self and the experiencing self may sometimes be foregrounded through the free direct mode. In this mode, deictic expressions such as person, tense, and so on are aligned with the deictic centre of the represented subject, and expressive elements evoke the subjectivity of that subject. In most cases, the narrating self as the representing subject represents the consciousness of the experiencing self as the represented subject in the free direct mode, as the narrating self recounts its past experiences in its autobiography. The narrating self empathizes with, or positions itself close to, the past self, and represents its past conscious experiences mimaetically through the consciousness of the experiencing
self. However, it is also possible for the narrating self to represent its present consciousness through the free direct mode. What is represented through the free direct mode can sometimes be interpreted as reflecting the narrating self’s present consciousness, depending on content and context. Consider the following passage:

(63) So little do we see before us in the World, and so much reason have we to depend cheerfully upon the great Maker of the World, that he does not leave his Creatures so absolutely destitute, but that in the worst Circumstances they have always something to be thankful for, and sometimes are nearer their Deliverance than they imagine; nay, are even brought to their Deliverance by the Means by which they seem to be brought to their Destruction. (RC: 212)

In (63), many linguistic markers lead us to a FDT reading: the present tense verbs “see,” “have”, “does not leave”, “have”, “are”, “imagine” and “seem”, the evaluative expressions “So little”, “so much”, “cheerfully”, “so absolutely”, the colloquial expression “nay”, the inversion “So little do we see”, and the absence of a reporting clause. However, it is difficult to tell from the formal structure whether the passage represents the thoughts of the experiencing self or those of the narrating self. Is the omitted reporting clause “I thought” or “I think”? Are the present tense verbs in (63) aligned with the deictic centre of the experiencing self, or with that of the narrating self? The absence of a reporting clause makes it difficult to identify the represented subject in this passage.

In the preceding passage of (63), the younger Crusoe observes that the captain of an English ship and a few members of his crew are about to be left on the island. As he does so, he remembers the miserable situation of his early days on the island, which is described as follows:
(64) This put me in Mind of the first Time when I came on Shore, and began to look about me; How I gave my self over for lost: How wildly I look’d round me: What dreadful Apprehensions I had: And how I lodg’d in the Tree all Night for fear of being devour’d by wild Beasts.

As I knew nothing that Night of the Supply I was to receive by the providential Driving of the Ship nearer the Land, by the Storms and Tide, by which I have since been so long nourish’d and supported; so these three poor desolate Men knew nothing how certain of Deliverance and Supply they were, how near it was to them, and how effectually and really they were in a Condition of Safety, at the same Time that they thought themselves lost, and their Case desperate. (RC: 212)

Although the declarative mood makes it difficult to regard the sentences as FIT in terms of the syntactical structure, the deictic and expressive elements (“dreadful Apprehensions”, “these three poor desolate Men”) can become markers for a FIT reading. The use of the present perfect (“I have since been so long nourish’d and supported”) in the inserted relative clause is the most obvious indication that the passage is represented from the point of view of the experiencing self. It is clear from the context that the younger Crusoe has “been so long nourish’d and supported” from the time he arrived on the island until the present time of the past self. The FDT sentence in (63) comes right after this passage, in which sense it might be more likely to represent continuously the consciousness of the experiencing self. It can be understood that the experiencing self’s gratitude towards God is expressed in (63). However, it is also possible to interpret the FDT in (63) as the narrating self’s view on providence: what the younger Crusoe felt and learned from his experiences still influences the present self’s way of seeing things, so the narrating self still feels in the same way as his past self did. The effect of the present tense verbs in (63) is therefore ambiguous: they can be construed as deictic expressions from both the deictic centre of the narrating and
that of the experiencing self. There is no clear distinction, and more importantly it is not necessary to make a clear distinction about whether the passage renders the consciousness of the present self or the past self. In some cases, depending on the content and context, FDT without any reporting clause indicates the ambiguity of the represented subject, which in turn clearly shows the psychological connection between the narrating self and the experiencing self. In other words, this ambiguity linguistically indicates the psychological closeness between the two selves in the narrative. This tends to occur toward the end of the story in Robinson Crusoe, when the psychological distance between the two selves becomes shortened as the younger Crusoe grows spiritually as a result of his various experiences on the island (see also Chapter IV below).

The following passage, on the other hand, looks at first glance like a representation of the narrating self’s representing consciousness, but later we find that the experiencing self’s consciousness seems to be reflected as well:

(65) I cannot but observe also, and leave it for the Direction of my Sex in such Cases of Pleasure, that when ever sincere Repentance succeeds such a Crime as this, there never fails to attend a Hatred of the Object; and the more the Affection might seem to be before, the Hatred will be the more in Proportion: It will always be so, indeed it can be no otherwise; for there cannot be a true and sincere Abhorrence of the Offence, and the Love to the Cause of it remain, there will with an Abhorrence of the Sin be found a detestation of the fellow Sinner; you can expect no other.

I found it so here, … (MF: 103)

Here the narrating self is obviously giving some instruction: Moll observes what she learned from her experiences and gives “the Direction of [her] Sex” based on her experiences. The present tenses in the passage are therefore used for making gnomic statements, reflecting the narrating Moll’s present consciousness. In the
second paragraph, however, Moll as the narrating self tells us that “[she] found it so here”. This implies that the experiencing self also had such thoughts and feelings back then, though not exactly verbatim as expressed in (65).

This chapter has explored Defoe’s narrative techniques for representing consciousness in order to illustrate how he achieves psychological realism and creates the effect of authenticity in his narratives by using these techniques. Like the use of different narrative modes discussed in the previous chapter, the representations of consciousness through various categories imply that there is a narrating figure who manipulates the forms of representation and aims to create psychological realism in his/her narratives. More importantly, however, the representations of consciousness through various categories stylistically indicate the internal tension between the narrating self and the experiencing self. The gradience which these categories construct together is an important way to analyse the internal tension between the two selves, which is always changing in the course of the narrative. This fluctuation and duality in point of view is so natural in real life that it gives the reader the impression that what is represented through various consciousness representation categories in the first-person narrative is real, natural and authentic. The representations of consciousness, especially through mimetic modes or diegetic modes with mimetic elements, emphasise the immediateness of the conscious experiences which are described, and this additionally contributes to the creation of psychological realism in Defoe’s narratives.

Chapters IV and V will turn to the represented ideas about the self in each of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, which are very much related to the effective use of narrative schemas and techniques discussed in Chapters II and III. These chapters will therefore examine how the remembering modes and consciousness representation categories are actually used for the creation of selves in his fictional autobiographies.
CHAPTER IV  COLLECTIVE QUALITIES IN THE CREATION OF A SELF

The creation of a self by means of autobiography is the central issue in each of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. These works are remarkable “because they experiment with the image of a private and autonomous individual at the time when such a concept was not yet settled into a normative truth” (Borsing 2017: 173). They give us the impression that the protagonist’s self is improving or changing as we read and it is constantly being created. Defoe creates a self by presenting in his fictional autobiographies “a nearly organic existence, just as he asks us to believe in the actuality (not the potential actuality) of his narrator” (Butler 1983: 77, italics added). As Patricia Spacks argues, the kind of self represented in fiction “depends on the novelist’s purpose and function in manipulating [his/her] imitation of the real” (1976: 6, italics added). In other words, creating a self and the effect of authenticity in fiction are inseparable from each other, as the creation of a self is derived more or less from the illusion of an authentic narrator. This chapter and the next (Chapters IV and V) illustrate various ideas regarding the self in Defoe’s fiction – that is, the representation of a collective self (Chapter IV) and a subjective self (Chapter V) – and they discuss the effect of the representation of these selves in relation to his narrative development.

One of the keywords in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies is reflection, and his characters frequently tell us about their own experiences of reflection and its importance in human life:

In a Word, The Nature and Experience of Things dictated to me upon just Reflection, That all the good Things of this World, are no farther good to us,
than they are for our Use; and that whatever we may heap up indeed to give others, we enjoy just as much as we can use, and no more. (*RC*: 110)

Here I enjoy’d the Moments which I had never before known how to employ. I mean, that here I learn’d to look back upon a long ill-spent Life, bless’d with infinite Advantage, which I had no Heart given me till now to make use of, and here I found just Reflections were the utmost Felicity of human Life.

(*CJ*: 307)

Reflection has both a collective and a subjective aspect. According to Robert Merrett, it is “mental, social, and discursive conduct that entails the reflexive expression that is instrumental to autobiography and the self-examination that fortifies ethical norms” (2013: 51). Reflection plays a very important role in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. In *Robinson Crusoe*, for example, the word *reflection* “highlights Crusoe’s stance on the physical and spiritual realms, revealing the process by which he grows in experience and conscience to be unsteady yet reciprocal” (Merrett 2013: 52). If one desires to reflect upon something, one inevitably needs different phases of oneself, or in the narratological terms discussed in previous chapters, a narrative distance or internal tension between the narrating self and experiencing self. The relationship between these different phases of the self in an individual character creates the sense of another kind of self, that is, a more abstract idea of the self, at the holistic level of the narrative. This chapter and the next will examine this more abstract idea of the self in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. I agree with those critics who say that he was more interested in expressing his characters’ thoughts and feelings than in depicting the physical settings around them (e.g. Novak 2000: 248; Merrett 2013: 9). I will therefore focus on the scenes of internal reflection in his fiction in order to discuss the relationship between the creation of a self and internal tension.
The selves in Defoe’s fiction have both collective and subjective qualities. For instance, in one recent critical work about him, Christopher Borsing refers to the distinction between “an external public self” and “an interior private self” (2017: 1). This chapter discusses the role of “an external public self”, or what I call a collective self, that is, a self which embodies collective ideas and principles in the social world. As Monika Fludernik (2014) argues, collectivity and intersubjectivity formed the foundation of contemporary beliefs and ideologies in the early modern period. According to Fludernik, New Historicism “originally concentrated on attitudes and beliefs current in the early modern period and on how these views are reflected in literary and nonliterary discourses” and is later applied to eighteenth-century studies (2014: 689-690). Despite its privileged “focus on the rise of subjectivity and on individual self-fashioning”, however, “an analysis of early modern ideologies ... crucially, and somewhat paradoxically depends on a community of agents and on the consent between individuals belonging to particular social groups and parties” (Fludernik 2014: 691, italics original). In this sense, it becomes important to observe “how individuals emerge within this collectivity as typical representatives, rampant proselytizers, or dissenting voices or in fact as oscillating among these roles” (Fludernik 2014: 691) in early modern literature.

As mentioned above, the creation of a self in fiction depends on the author’s purpose in his/her narratives. In the eighteenth century, according to Spacks, this purpose is usually the author’s “announced moral intent” (1976: 6), under which the characters’ identities exist. A book’s intention of imparting moral or spiritual teachings to the reader is then naturally carried out by the representation of a collective self in the narrative. Indeed, as Borsing observes, “Defoe’s characters work personal identity as an instrumental fabrication woven in with others’ beliefs and expectations” (2017: 174). Unless it is presented as having collective qualities, the represented self cannot express morality or spirituality in a narrative.

Section 4.1 gives an overview of the narrative distance between the narrating
self and the experiencing self in each of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. As discussed in Chapter III, it changes quite frequently during the narrative at the local level, which is linguistically shown by the use of different consciousness representation categories. This section focuses on the narrative distance at the global level of narrative, that is, the holistic relationship between the two selves, arguing how important it is in terms of the creation of different ideas of the self in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies.

Section 4.2 illustrates how his first fictional autobiography, *Robinson Crusoe*, was affected by the conventional narrative framework of spiritual autobiography, which was a popular literary form in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The great advantage of spiritual autobiography is that it can introduce collective ideas of the self, as it is based on the belief that every event in one’s life has spiritual significance which applies to everyone, even though it may seem purely individual. This section investigates Defoe’s use of this literary framework within his fiction, showing some narratological and stylistic evidence for making it possible and effective.

Section 4.3 focuses on the spiritual scenes in *Robinson Crusoe* and *Captain Singleton* to demonstrate the effect which spiritual conversion – the most important phase in spiritual autobiography – gives to the narrative. Genuine conversion is required to promote the sense of collectivity in the narrative. This section illustrates how collectivity is effectively conveyed through various narrative techniques for representing consciousness in these works.

Finally, Section 4.4 examines the failure or absence of spiritual conversion in the narrative and its effect on collectivity in *Moll Flanders*, *Colonel Jack* and *Roxana*. These fictional autobiographies lack the thematic control which is important for the organization of spiritual autobiography, even though they have some spiritual elements. As a result, they cannot convey the important collective ideas represented in the narratives very effectively, and they increase the subjective or individual sense of the protagonist’s self. In Chapter V, I will
examine in greater detail how such selves are represented and how they hold subjective qualities in the narrative.

4.1 Narrative distance and the qualities of a self

The narrative distance (especially psychological) or internal tension between the narrating self and the experiencing self is very important for the interpretation of the first-person narrative (see 2.1). The narrative distance between the two selves changes constantly in the course of the narrative at the local level, which is linguistically shown by the different forms of consciousness representation, as was discussed in Chapter III. In this section, I aim to look at the distance between the two selves at the global level of the narrative, that is, the holistic relation between the narrating self and the experiencing self in the narrative. The narrative distance at the global level, or the overall temporal, spatial and psychological relationship between the present self and the past self is created differently in each of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, and it affects the interpretation of the represented ideas of the self.

In *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), for example, the narrating self is traditionally considered to be separate from the experiencing self and is regarded as a source of stability who narrates the story (cf. Boardman 1983; Bell 1985b). One interesting textual fact is that while the spatiotemporal distance between the two selves in *Robinson Crusoe* is shorter than that in Defoe’s other fictional autobiographies (Crusoe begins his story when he is an adolescent, whereas Bob, Moll, Jack and Roxana start when they are children), the psychological distance between the two in this work seems greater than in any of his other fictional autobiographies, because Crusoe as narrator is morally and spiritually more mature than his past self. In this work, according to Ian Bell, the distinction between the narrating self and the experiencing self is evident: Crusoe as character is “the book’s source of instability” as he is a wanderer who does not know what will happen next, while
Crusoe as narrator is a “source of stability” as he is the chronicler who can reflect upon his past experiences (1985b: 160). As Bell argues, “Crusoe could look back over his adventures with the complacent satisfaction of eventual success” (1985b: 167-168). This is in part derived from the tacit understanding that “[t]o read the travel tale, we need to believe in the authority of the narrator, while at the same time relishing the impotence of the protagonist” (Bell 1985b: 157). Since these different roles are rarely exploited in Robinson Crusoe, “Crusoe as narrator is simply an agency from which the narrative may proceed” (Bell 1985b: 157). Bell thus regards the narrative of Robinson Crusoe as “a simple chronicle, breezily running along on the ‘and then’ principle, with little use of hindsight, and a purely conventional use of the first person” (1985b: 172).1 We are given impression that the narrating self in Robinson Crusoe is spiritually mature when we read the preface as well as the whole narrative. In the preface, Defoe has the editor provide us with the narrator’s stance in presenting the story:

The Story is told with Modesty, with Seriousness, and with a religious Application of Events to the Uses to which wise Men always apply them (viz.) to the Instruction of others by this Example, and to justify and honour the Wisdom of Providence in all the Variety of our Circumstances, let them happen how they will. (RC: 3)

This emphasis in the preface on the narrating self’s “Modesty”, “Seriousness”, and “religious Application”, and on “the Wisdom of Providence” makes the role of the narrating self transparent: what is told in his narrative, as Bell argues, is for “the ends of narration, rather than to Crusoe’s ‘character’” (1985b: 156). The purpose of narration in Robinson Crusoe is for the older, mature Crusoe to give the reader religious instructions about honouring God, which is unlikely to be achieved without detached psychological distance from one’s past, immature self. The narrating self has the typical function of the narrator of a conventional
spiritual autobiography, that is, he is someone who has undergone spiritual conversion and has consequently gained detached perspective about his past.

In his recent book, Merrett gives a completely different view on the distance between the present narrating self and the past experiencing self: “Lacking full awareness of the semantic reciprocity of synonyms and antonyms, he [Crusoe] never achieves an assured narrative viewpoint” (2013: 8). He goes on to say that:

Since the syntactic and cognitive distance between characters and narrators constantly shifts, the protagonists never attain a fixed perspective. Sometimes identifying with their former selves, they dissolve narrative distance and time, while, at other moments, by condemning themselves out of hand and denying integrity to those selves, they render their narratives judgmental and abstract. (Merrett 2013: 17)

These shifts certainly exist everywhere in all of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. In the case of *Robinson Crusoe*, the narrative distance between the two selves “constantly shifts”, but the identification with or dissociation from the past self which Merrett describes is more likely to apply to the distance at the local level of narrative. Since the psychological distance between the two selves at the global level is essentially dissonant, the shifting distance between them signifies the manipulation of the local internal tension by the narrating self in order to make its instruction most effective, rather than the narrating self’s lack of fixed perspective.

In *Captain Singleton* (1720), the fictional autobiography which follows the *Robinson Crusoe* trilogy, Defoe still makes a relatively clear distinction at the global level between the narrating self and the experiencing self. The travelogue framework gives the narrative of *Captain Singleton* the conventional separation between the two selves. Bob’s explicit statement, “I kept no Journal” (*CS*: 3, 9), at
the beginning of the story, for example, “defines the distance between the mature writer and the boy: it alludes to the pious duty of recording one’s experience to discern its pattern” (Zimmerman 1975: 57) on the part of the narrating self. Bob’s narrative is to a great extent “a summary of what one might expect to hear from a competent, if unimaginative, travel writer who also happens to have been a pirate” (Boardman 1983: 103). At the same time, in some parts of *Captain Singleton* Defoe seems to see the possibility that “the dual vision [i.e. the narrating self’s and the experiencing self’s] ... can coexist with the liveliest sense of events experienced and not just described” (Boardman 1983: 105), which is more completely realized in his next work, the famous fictional autobiography *Moll Flanders* (1722).

The relationship between the narrating self and the experiencing self is problematic in *Moll Flanders*. As in *Robinson Crusoe* and *Captain Singleton*, some parts of *Moll Flanders* seem to exhibit the mature perspective of the narrating self. When she begins to talk about her childhood, for example, the older, mature Moll’s ironic stance is evident. Defoe critics frequently discuss the irony in *Moll Flanders* (Van Ghent 1953; Koonce 1963; Novak 1964), but the distance between the mature and the immature Moll collapses very easily in her narrative. Maximillian Novak explains the reason for this collapse as follows:

Sometimes she [Moll] achieves an ironic distance about herself, as in her account of herself as a young girl desiring to become a gentlewoman, or in her narrative about how she was seduced by the elder son of the Colchester family where she served as the chambermaid. Yet such distancing is likely to collapse, as in her account of her suffering when she finds her lover is unwilling to marry her, or later in the novel when she tells of her urge to murder a girl she has robbed. At such moments the past comes rushing into the present and narrative distance is almost entirely lost in the violence of the recreated emotions. (Novak 2015: 29)
At other times, when Moll wants to give moral significance to her narrative, as Ian Watt argues, “she had to function both as a character and as an editorial mouthpiece and she therefore had to recount the story from the perspective of her later penitence” (1957: 116). In other words, the distance between the narrating self and the experiencing self is indispensable in giving moral instruction. This poses some problems,

partly because Moll’s loves and larcenies would obviously lose most of their attraction for the reader if they were too heavily sprinkled with the ashes of repentance; and partly because such a perspective called for a very rigorous separation in time between the consciousness that had performed the evil deeds and the reformed consciousness that was responsible for their redaction. (Watt 1957: 116)

However, the narrative of Moll Flanders gives priority to lively experience rather than moral instruction. Marie-Paule Laden, for example, argues that Moll tends to “deviously destroy rather than construct any consistent point of view toward herself” (1987: 57), and thus it is almost impossible to dissociate her two selves (1987: 58). Similarly, Bell shows that the two selves are separated only occasionally in this work (1985b: 172). The reasons for the closeness of the two selves can be explained not only in terms of Moll’s dishonest and unreliable character (Bell 1985b: 162-163; Laden 1987: 58), but also her failure to have a wiser point of view when looking back at her life, which one expects of a mature self (Laden 1987: 58). The editor mentions her dishonesty and unreliability explicitly in the preface (“the Copy which came first to Hand, having been written in Language, more like one still in Newgate, than one grown Penitent and Humble, as she afterwards pretends to be” (MF: 3)), and so the instructiveness of her narrative from the point of view of a morally mature self is doubtful. In fact, the editor tells us at the end of the preface that her husband’s life story, written by a
third person, reveals that Moll was “not so extraordinary a Penitent, as she was first” (*MF*: 6) after she returned to England. When the narrative’s aim becomes the expression of character rather than instruction, the ideas regarding the self presented in the narrative are likely to be of a more individual nature. This tendency is crystallized and expressed further in *Colonel Jack* and *Roxana*.

In *Colonel Jack* and *Roxana*, the narrating self and the experiencing self are intentionally separated, but this separation is different from that in *Robinson Crusoe* and *Captain Singleton*. In the earlier works, the separation is conventional, and it signifies the detached perspective of the morally and spiritually mature self. However, in the later works, especially *Roxana*, “the separation is purposeful and informative”, in the sense that “the whole narrative seeks to explore the availability and significance of its own history” (Bell 1985b: 171). The narrative becomes more and more causally structured, which implies the self-consciousness of the narrating self in organizing his/her life story.

The narrative of *Colonel Jack* implies Jack’s self-possession regarding his past. At the beginning of his narrative, the narrating self says of his life that he can “look back upon it from a safer Distance” (*CJ*: 3). His attempt to keep “a safer Distance” shows his self-consciousness and his intension “to outline cause and effect, to dwell in orderly fashion upon the meaning of a moment, to construct authentic parallelisms and to avoid those informative but digressive tendencies that characterize narrators like Moll and Singleton” (Richetti 1975: 147). As Everett Zimmerman observes, Jack as narrator thus “conveys his sense of the discrepancy between his past and his present” (1975: 143). He further argues that “[t]he ‘safer Distance’ that he [Jack as narrator] writes of is not only in time but *in consciousness*” (1975: 144, italics added). In my view, however, the “safer Distance” only applies to temporal distance, and not to psychological distance. However much he seems to keep “a safer Distance” from the past and so is able to reflect upon his past, his repentance turns out to be shallow and not genuine, so the “safer Distance” in consciousness is unconvincing and illusory. It is true that
Jack as narrator is conscious of his past, but it does not necessarily mean that there is a psychological distance between his present self and his past self. On the contrary, his strong sense of self-consciousness reveals that he is not morally mature in a true sense: his moral arguments drawn from his experiences lead to the representation of a collective self on his own terms, which means that they only represent his subjective self.

Defoe’s last fictional autobiography, *Roxana*, also features a character who is self-conscious regarding her past. However, as in *Colonel Jack*, the deliberate separation between the present self and the past self does not necessarily mean that the narrating self is distancing herself psychologically from her past self. Though she is self-conscious, Roxana as narrator seems to “stand in judgment of her past, while still being trapped by its implications” (Bell 1985b: 167). The initial interest of the narrating self in *Roxana* is to answer the question “what went wrong?” (Bell 1985b: 169), which arises because of the gap between Roxana’s helplessness as a narrator who can only lament that the past cannot be changed, and her vitality as a character who does not realize that her current vigour will eventually lead to her feeling helpless in the future. This vital question, however, is never fully answered in her narrative, which shows that there is a deliberate gap between the narrating self and the experiencing self, but there is not a substantial gap in terms of psychological distance. The narrating self is trapped by her past and cannot escape from it, so she cannot grow psychologically. This lack of growth is evident in her self-conscious sinning. As early as her first crime, which was to marry her landlord while still being married to her first husband, Roxana is aware of her sin, but she commits it anyway: “I sinn’d with open Eyes, and thereby had a double Guilt upon me” (*Rox*: 43). The narrative reveals that she cannot stop sinning “with open Eyes”, which consequently leads to her misery, as is suggested at the end of her narrative: “I was brought so low again, that my Repentance seem’d to be only the Consequences of my Misery, as my Misery was of my Crime” (*Rox*: 330). Her self-conscious sinning from the beginning implies
that her attitude towards sinning and committing crimes does not change throughout her life. Contrary to what we might expect, the narrating self is never psychologically or spiritually mature in *Roxana*.

Roxana’s narrative is based on the problem of conscience. However, the moral instruction in her narrative is not persuasive because when she begins it, she is still living a sinful life, and she is not spiritually mature. There is always a gap between the past and the present in *Roxana*, as only events connected to the central moral purpose are included in the narrative and many other parts remain untold. In this sense, the gap in time between the narrating self and the experiencing self is always “unbridgeable” (Bell 1985b: 171). Psychologically, however, her failure to grow spiritually eliminates the substantial gap between the two selves, and therefore her self-examination ends up seeming unreal and not genuine, or in Bell’s words, “never fully successful” (Bell 1985b: 171).

The psychological distance at the global level of the narrative is important as it affects the ideas of the self presented in the narrative. The selves represented in all of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies exhibit both collective and subjective qualities, but their collective qualities tend to increase when the psychological distance is large, and to decrease when it is small. The holistic narrative distance influences the effect of collectivity or subjectivity in the narrative, which will be discussed in detail in sections 4.2 to 4.4.

**4.2 *Robinson Crusoe* and spiritual autobiography**

One important fact in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies is that both secular and religious elements are woven into the narrative. The reason why his fictional autobiographies contain both elements seems to be related to his class and religious background (see 1.2). For one thing, he aimed to attract middle-class readers. He was after all a writer of popular fiction, in which events and happenings in secular life are presented as entertainment for readers. For another,
he was a Puritan, and according to Puritan ethics, worldly affairs were seen in relation to religious duties. Puritans did not disregard “the calls of business” as unspiritual or secular, but combined them with “the duties of religion”, as they believed that “the genuine faith is that which produces works” (Häusermann 1935: 307). Put more simply in Borsing’s words, “Defoe should conflate sermons and popular print” (2017: 16). Even though “the alliance of the spiritual and the secular is an uneasy one” (Zimmerman 1975: 51) in a narrative, Defoe succeeded in combining the religious and the secular in an effective way in each of his fictional autobiographies by using the conventional pattern of spiritual autobiography, in which an individual’s spiritual development is based on his/her everyday experiences. One critic claims that Defoe “use[s] the form of spiritual autobiography to contain but also to justify imaginative self-investigation” (Spacks 1976: 29). This section focuses on his first fictional autobiography, *Robinson Crusoe*, in which the conventional pattern of spiritual autobiography is used with greatest effect. The section examines the collective ideas suggested by Crusoe’s typical spiritual development within the framework of a spiritual autobiography, and illustrates how typically his self is integrated, or in other words, how the idea of a collective self is embodied in the narrative of this work. It especially analyses the representations of Crusoe’s psychological states, as they show us his spiritual development.

According to Zimmerman, *Robinson Crusoe* is about “a fall, repentance, and redemption – both spiritual and secular” (1975: 34). Later in the same book, however, he insists on the importance of the secular aspect of the story: although he suggests its “emblematic significance”, Defoe “emphasize[s] secular experience” and thus “the spiritual become[s] only an adjunct to secular success” (1975: 52). For G. A. Starr (1965) as well as myself, on the contrary, Crusoe’s secular experiences are secondary to his spiritual development, because the former are organized in the narrative as the process of the latter. In *Robinson Crusoe*, Defoe created an individual’s life which is private yet also public, and
ideas of the self which are subjective yet also collective. For him, a man of the early eighteenth century, “[t]he sense of being an individual as distinct from definitions of and loyalties towards nation, religion or family is one such unthinkable thought” (Borsing 2017: 58). As John Richetti observes, Crusoe “lives in an uncommon common fashion. His life is public, that is, attractive and meaningful to the typical private person, because he introduces private and common order into thrilling and uncommon events” (1975: 25). Robinson Crusoe, he argues, “is most about self-assertion and the accommodation of nature to man and of social ideology to personal reality” (1975: 63). Therefore, Crusoe’s everyday activities and experiences cannot be seen “in a wholly secular light”, or presented in a narrative “without placing them in a religious framework” (Watt 1957: 74). Merrett similarly argues that Defoe’s fictional autobiographies (and especially Robinson Crusoe, in my opinion) “uncover in psychological states, seemingly remote from faith and theology, latent spiritual ideas” (2013: 37). He goes on to say that:

Defoe constantly repeats the phrase to bind secular conduct to religious knowledge and to subordinate epistemology to theology. This occupation signals his wish to unsettle pretensions about what the mind may learn and how it learns. He spurned claims that ideas are solely empirical – that they arise only from bodily sensations and self-contained cerebrations. On behalf of innate ideas, he details connections between psychological and spiritual experiences and depicts highly emotional and surprisingly numinous states because of what they reveal about how mental awareness of religious truth both falters and flourishes. (Merrett 2013: 45)

Crusoe as narrator suggests either implicitly or explicitly the spiritual significance of his secular psychological states. This signifies “the complementarity of secular and theological values” and the “implications for practical living” yielded by
“spiritual insight” (Merrett 2013: 98).

Spiritual autobiography is the most effective narrative framework for expressing collective qualities through an individual character. This framework is important in Robinson Crusoe, because when we read it, we can easily see that Crusoe, like Defoe himself, “attached a great importance to the part played by Divine Providence in man’s life” (Häusermann 1935: 305). However, unlike the genuine spiritual autobiographies of the seventeenth century, Robinson Crusoe is a fiction in which subjective qualities remain important. As Starr argues, genuine spiritual autobiographers put exclusive emphasis on spiritual significance, and so the instruction in their autobiographies “gets detached from narration” (1965: 72). In Robinson Crusoe, however, Defoe, “by leading his hero through a series of conventionally meaningful actions, fuses a great deal of interpretation and comment into the narrative itself” (Starr 1965: 72). Crusoe as narrator is concerned with the significance of spiritual edification – that is, “the regenerate man’s normal impulse to edify the natural man” (Starr 1965: 71). However, the edifying parts are incorporated into the narrative in which subjective daily experiences are described. Even so, among all Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, Robinson Crusoe is the one which is most “strongly influenced by a long tradition of spiritual autobiography” (Starr 1965: viii), and it seems to retain the conventional significance of spiritual autobiography.

Spiritual autobiography was a popular literary genre in the seventeenth century. It is the only kind of autobiography that does not need any justification for writing it, since it is generally assumed that self-regeneration “tend[s] to stress the importance of the spiritual welfare of the individual”, so “one’s ‘soul-experiences’ are fit to write about” (Starr 1965: 4). Spiritual autobiography is “a summing-up and review of a whole series of self-dissections” (Starr 1965: 6). It consists of a series of episodes which happened in a person’s life, but mere self-dissection is not enough. Organizing individual episodes is important in order for spiritual autobiographers “to serve an overall purpose or to form a unified
whole” (Starr 1965: viii) and finally to edify and instruct other Christians. As Starr argues, several assumptions “gave impetus and direction to the writing of [spiritual] autobiography” (1965: 13). The most important one is:

the principal that there are universal and recurrent elements in human affairs, particularly in vicissitudes of the soul. History repeats itself not only in man’s outward, group existence, but in the spiritual life of individuals. Circumstances vary, but only accidentally or superficially; however much they may obscure basic similarities from the casual observer, on closer view they actually confirm and heighten the constant, general features of religious experiences. (Starr 1965: 13)

Spiritual autobiography is thus based on the “belief in the essential uniformity and sameness of Christian experience” (Starr 1965: 14), or in my terminology the collectivity in spiritual development in Christianity (especially Puritanism). Although they are not clear-cut, there are differences between genuine spiritual autobiographies and fictional ones like Defoe’s. Nevertheless, Robinson Crusoe retains the conventional pattern of spiritual autobiography, as I will show in detail in the following pages.

Spiritual autobiography is episodic, that is, it consists of a series of episodes in which the narration of experienced facts functions as the basis for reflection and eventually leads to instruction for oneself and/or others. According to Starr, since edifying oneself or others is the main purpose of writing spiritual autobiography,

little stress was laid on the actual recording of experience, although this obviously had to precede any interpretations instructive to oneself or others. The consistent ability to get beyond the merely documentary, however, was one distinctive feature of spiritual autobiographies, and indeed of the diaries
on which they were so often founded. Undertaken as a religious exercise, such compositions were not to dwell on the narration of fact: fact was to serve purely as ground for reflection, and allowing it to become an end in itself would be vain self-indulgence. (Starr 1965: 27)

Zimmerman similarly observes that “[t]he traditional use of a journal among the religious was to find and memorialize the spiritual significance of daily existence” (1975: 40). Religious instructions, therefore, are central to spiritual autobiography. However, the focus on religious edification can generate difficulties when it is included in a narrative:

On one hand was the will to condense and curtail the factual record and to expatiate only on its spiritual significance; on the other, the propensity to expand a deserving narrative. One finds these conflicting tendencies in a considerable number of the diaries and autobiographies. The tension between them may explain in part the abruptness with which interpretation sometimes follows fact: the author, launching out in [his/her] account of something seen or done, will presently recall that only its spiritual implications really matter, and forthwith inserts them. (Starr 1965: 28)

Defoe solved this conflict by writing fictional spiritual autobiographies. He basically conforms to the traditional pattern of spiritual autobiography, with Crusoe’s experiences forming the basis for his reflection and instruction. The difference between real spiritual autobiographies and Defoe’s fictional ones is that he narrativized the edifying parts, incorporating them into the narration of experiences. Spiritually instructive passages can be found everywhere in *Robinson Crusoe*. The following passage illustrates Defoe’s techniques for narrativizing instruction while conforming to the traditional pattern. In his third or fourth year on the island, Crusoe recklessly starts to make a canoe, urged by his
strong desire to get off the island, even though his common sense could have told him that it would be impossible to drag it to the shore by himself. His attempt to make the canoe becomes a warning about our tendency to be easily blinded or deceived when we want something very badly:

(1) (a) This [making a canoe] I not only thought possible, but easy, and pleas’d my self extremely with the Thoughts of making it, and with my having much more Convenience for it than any of the Negros or Indians; (b) but not at all considering the particular Inconveniences which I lay under, more than the Indians did, viz. Want of Hands to move it, when it was made, into the Water, a Difficulty much harder for me to surmount, than all the Consequences of Want of Tools could be to them; (c) for what was it to me, That when I had chosen a vast Tree in the Woods, I might with much Trouble cut it down, if after I might be able with my Tools to hew and dub the Out-side into the proper Shape of a Boat, and burn or cut out the In-side to make it hollow, so to make a Boat of it: If after all this, I must leave it just there where I found it, and was not able to launch it into the Water.

(d) One would have thought, I could not have had the least Reflection upon my Mind of my Circumstance, while I was making this Boat; but I should have immediately thought how I should get it into the Sea; (e) but my Thoughts were so intent upon my Voyage over the Sea in it, that I never once consider’d how I should get it off of the Land; (f) and it was really in its own Nature more easy for me to guide it over forty five Miles of Sea, than about forty five Fathom of Land, where it lay, to set it a float in the Water.

(g) I went to work upon this Boat, the most like a Fool, that ever Man did, who had any of his Senses awake. (b) I pleas’d my self with the Design, without determining whether I was ever able to undertake it;
The typical pattern of spiritual autobiography, in which experience leads to reflection and then instruction, can be seen in the passage. It basically exhibits the reflective part, but one can see what the younger Crusoe experienced through this reflection: he made a canoe out of a tree in order to get off the island, but could not move it to the water, because he was so engrossed in making it that he did not think rationally about how he would move it after he had finished making it, and so it ended up being useless. Though it is only the sentence “I went to work upon this Boat” in the first part of (1g) that directly records a part of his past actions through narration, the whole picture of this experience is easily reconstructed from the representations of his past thoughts and psychological states through the categories of psycho-narration, such as NRTA (e.g. “This I not only thought possible, but easy” in (1a)) and NI (e.g. “I pleas’d my self with the Design” in (1h)).

The reflective quality is most evident in (1b) and the latter part of (1e) and (1h), which tells us what the experiencing self failed to consider (“not at all considering ...” in (1b), “I never once consider’d ...” in (1e), “without determining ...” in (1h)). It is only the narrating self reflecting on the past who can talk about it. The latter part of (1g), “the most like a Fool, that ever Man did, who had any of his Senses awake” also describes the present self’s reflections.

Other sentences or clauses, that is, (1c), (1d) and (1f), tell the reader implicitly about his past actions, as well as his reflections. For example, when the reader reads (1c), he/she understands that Crusoe did actually “[choose] a vast Tree in the Woods”, “cut it down”, “hew and dub the Out-side into the proper Shape of a Boat, and burn or cut out the In-side to make it hollow”. At the same
time, these sentences and clauses represent his present thoughts (“what was it to me ...” in (1c), “One would have thought, ...” in (1d)), and convey the edifying message which he learned from his experiences. This message, that you should not think or behave recklessly or stupidly, however much you are carried away by emotion or enthusiasm, is made implicit in the narrative when it is conveyed through Crusoe’s present thoughts, and it is clearly understood by the reader.

Finally, in (1i), the narrating self gives the reason why his younger self just “pleas’d [himself] with the Design, without determining whether [he] was ever able to undertake it”. His foolishness was made explicit in the last sentence, which contains the “foolish Answer” which he gave himself repeatedly, namely “Let’s first make it, I’ll warrant I’ll find some Way or other to get it along, when ’tis done”. This FDT sentence is not used for empathy as it usually is (see 3.4.4), because it is placed abruptly in the instructive part where the point of view of the narrating self dominates. It is used in order to make it explicit that the psychological gap between the present self and the past self has become so great that the present self has a mature view of his past foolishness. By representing exactly how he thought at that time entirely from the younger self’s point of view using the free direct form, Crusoe as narrator stresses the difference in his mind between the present and the past, indicating that he has spiritually matured so he can reflect upon his past and give instruction to others.

What the textual evidence in (1) suggests is that the RECOUNTING mode dominates throughout the passage. The representation of the ideas of a collective self requires narrative distance because the narrator intends that the reader should be instructed and edified. As a result, the RECOUNTING mode becomes the preferred narrative mode, and the consciousness of the past self tends to be represented through diegetic modes from the narrating self’s point of view. On the other hand, the narrating self’s present consciousness is generally represented through mimetic modes, and is used for the presentation of instruction and edification, and the construction of a collective self.
As the analysis of the passage (1) shows, the instructive parts imply the collective qualities of the self, because they apply to other selves, not just to one particular self. Some other narrative elements promote the collective qualities in *Robinson Crusoe* in a similar way. One is that the young Crusoe is portrayed as a typical young man who goes against the “joint authority of family, society, and Providence” (Starr 1965: 79), rather than as one who has “individual traits” (Starr 1965: 76). Since “[i]mplicit in Defoe’s treatment of the episode is a conventional identification of family, social and divine order” (Starr 1965: 77), Crusoe’s “ORIGINAL SIN” (*RC*: 164) of defying his father at home implies that he will continue to move towards damnation unless he experiences spiritual conversion. The beginning part of the story describes a young man’s typical tendency to be rebellious and headstrong:

(2) Being the third Son of the Family, and not bred to any Trade, my Head began to be fill’d very early with rambling Thoughts: My Father, who was very ancient, had given me a competent Share of Learning, as far as House-Education, and a Country Free-School generally goes, and design’d me for the Law; but I would be satisfied with nothing but going to Sea, and my Inclination to this led me so strongly against the Will, nay the Commands of my Father, and against all the Entreaties and Perswasions of my Mother and other Friends, that there seem’d to be something fatal in that Propension of Nature tending directly to the Life of Misery which was to befal me. (*RC*: 5)

Crusoe has “rambling Thoughts” of “going to Sea”, in opposition to his father’s desire that his son be settled in “the middle State” (*RC*: 6). As the end of the passage suggests, this sin is a sign of “the Life of Misery” he is destined to have, which is the typical fate of a young man like him who disobeys the “joint authority of family, society, and Providence” (Starr 1965: 79). The typical traits of
such a man continue to be expressed in the narrative. Even though he is deeply moved by his father’s earnest and tearful attempt to persuade him, the young Crusoe could not change his mind about going to sea:

(3) I was sincerely affected with this Discourse, as indeed who could be otherwise? and I resolv’d not to think of going abroad any more, but to settle at home according to my Father’s Desire. But alas! a few days wore it all off; and in short, to prevent any of my Father’s farther Importunities, in a few Weeks after, I resolv’d to run quite away from him. (RC: 7-8)

Despite his father’s “farther Importunities“, Crusoe “broke loose” (RC: 8) one year after he “resolv’d to run quite away from [his father]”, not according to a plan, but because of an opportunity that he encountered by chance:

(4) But being one Day at Hull, where I went casually, and without any Purpose of making an Elopment that time; but I say, being there, and one of my Companions being going by Sea to London, in his Father’s Ship, and prompting me to go with them, with the common Allurement of Seafaring Men, viz That it should cost me nothing for my Passage, I consulted neither Father or Mother any more, nor so much as sent them Word of it; but leaving them to hear of it as they might, without asking God’s Blessing, or my Father’s, without any Consideration of Circumstances or Consequences, and in an ill Hour, God knows. On the first of September 1651 I went on Board a Ship bound for London; never any young Adventurer’s Misfortunes, I believe, began sooner, or continued longer than mine. (RC: 8-9)
The series of passages from (2) to (4) imply the eventual outcomes of the sin which is typical of a reckless young man like Crusoe. At first this sin becomes the cause of his unfortunate life, but eventually it leads to his spiritual conversion. These outcomes are told by the mature Crusoe, for only he with his reflective view of his life can see what happened to the young man. Some elements in these passages indicate that Crusoe as narrator has a different and more mature view than his younger self, that is, the tone of lamentation rendered through the narrating self’s reflective point of view, such as “who could be otherwise?” and “But alas!” in (3), his references to God as in “without asking God’s Blessing”, and “God knows” in (4), and the use of evaluative words which only the narrating self can use in recollection, such as “an ill Hour” in (4). In (1), the RECOUNTING mode and the representation of the narrating self’s present consciousness are conducive to one of the typical features of spiritual autobiography, that is, giving instruction to the reader. In (2), (3) and (4), they are also used as a way to capture another typical feature of spiritual autobiography, that is, the life of an ordinary young man who goes through spiritual conversion in the end. Robinson Crusoe is an individual, but he has the common traits of a wayward young man, which implies that his character is more or less based on collective ideas of the self in Defoe’s time.

Collective qualities are also expressed by Crusoe’s conventional “strange surprising adventures” which “help to chart the stages of his inward condition” (Starr 1965: 97). This is “indicated not only by the spiritual significance traditionally attached to such happenings, but more explicitly by Crusoe’s own comments” (Starr 1965: 97). Before his spiritual conversion, the narrating self’s tone of lamentation expressed by the conditional structure often indicates his younger self’s inability to understand his father’s goodness or the providence of God, which implies that he has not yet been regenerated:
(5) Had I now had the Sense to have gone back to Hull, and have gone home, I had been happy, and my Father, an Emblem of our Blessed Saviour’s Parable, had even kill’d the fatted Calf for me; for hearing the Ship I went away in was cast away in Yarmouth Road, it was a great while before he had any Assurance that I was not drown’d.

But my ill Fate push’d me on now with an Obstinacy that nothing could resist; and tho’ I had several times loud Calls from my Reason and my more composed Judgment to go home, yet I had no Power to do it. I know not what to call this, nor will I urge, that it is a secret over-ruling Decree that hurries us on to be the Instruments of our own Destruction, even tho’ it be before us, and that we rush upon it with our Eyes open. (RC: 14)

The second paragraph of (5) further indicates how a young man tends to “rush upon” his own destruction “with [his] Eyes open” when he is not yet regenerated. At the same time, this comment by the narrating self in the present tense suggests that he eventually went through spiritual conversion and is now regenerated. His comments are usually less abrupt than those in genuine spiritual autobiographies. In (5), for example, even though we can understand that only the narrating self can make such comments in retrospect, we are invited to feel as if we were in the very same situation the young Crusoe was in. The use of the proximal deictic now in this context (“Had I now had the Sense”, “my ill Fate push’d me on now”) is subtly conducive to this kind of effect (see 3.5).

Once the past, younger self has gone through spiritual conversion, the present, narrating self’s comments seem more and more assimilated with the consciousness of his former self. As the discussion of the passages (63) and (64) in 3.6 has shown, the psychological gap between the two selves is resolved after Crusoe’s spiritual conversion. It then becomes difficult to decide whether the consciousness represented through FDT in the present tense belongs to the
narrating self or the experiencing self. The following passage (6), like (63) in 3.6, seems like the representation of the narrating self’s consciousness as it is evidently an instructive part, but if we consider the fact that the younger Crusoe has already undergone spiritual conversion, it is also possible to read it as his immediate consciousness when he unexpectedly sees an English ship coming to the shore:

(6) Let no Man despise the secret Hints and Notices of Danger, which sometimes are given him, when he may think there is no Possibility of its being real. That such Hints and Notices are given us, I believe few that have made any Observations of things, can deny; that they are certain Discoveries of an invisible World, and a Converse of Spirits, we cannot doubt; and if the Tendency of them seems to be to warn us of Danger, why should we not suppose they are from some friendly Agent, whether supreme, or inferior, and subordinate, is not the Question; and that they are given for our Good? (RC: 210-211)

In Robinson Crusoe, therefore, the duality of the present tense in FDT signifies that the instructive parts are incorporated into the narrative as reflecting the consciousness of both the present self and the past self.

The convention of spiritual autobiography is important for shaping Crusoe’s life story. The representations of his inner life are for the most part used to indicate his spiritual development. His perceptions, feelings and thoughts are of course peculiar only to the protagonist himself, but at the same time they are communal in that they can lead to the same spiritual experiences in others. Robinson Crusoe thus creates a collective self through the individual character, Robinson Crusoe.
4.3 The effect of spiritual conversion on collective qualities in *Robinson Crusoe* and *Captain Singleton*

In *Robinson Crusoe*, the protagonist’s “religious conversion to a faith in Providence is an important subject and structural principle” (Hardy 1977: 3). Spiritual conversion, according to Starr (1965: 99), is a gradual process, and Crusoe undergoes “gradual alienation from God, gradual loss of control over events, [and] gradual hardening” (Starr 1965: 99) before his conversion. However gradual and slow it may seem, “the religious experience is part of his survival” (Richetti 1975: 41), and his spiritual conversion “enables Crusoe to leave his paranoid seclusion and to covert his island from a prison into a garden” (Richetti 1975: 46). Spiritual conversion also occurs in *Captain Singleton*, although it is less evident than in *Robinson Crusoe*, as the book is “a soggy amalgam of the picaresque and Puritan” (Zimmerman 1975: 48). The picaresque qualities tend to promote a sense of individuality and thus impede or prevent the process of spiritual conversion, as I will show in detail in 5.2.

These two books may seem to be a kind of travel literature, which was popular in the early eighteenth century, but as Zimmerman observes, “Defoe was not primarily concerned with the realism of the travel book” (1975: 71):

> He was attempting to extend the dimensions of the account to what we now call the archetypal and what the Puritan called the typical. Defoe’s narrative suggests the journey of the Israelites from Egypt to the Promised Land, a pattern used symbolically in many Puritan narratives to imply man’s passage from his sinful origins to his final redemption. (Zimmerman 1975: 71)

Conversion “brings no immunity to further spiritual vicissitudes, but it does supply a new orientation from which to face them, and a new strength with which to endure or overcome them” (Starr 1965: 46). In other words, it brings the ability to resolve spiritual anxieties on one’s own. In order to reach this spiritual state,
one needs to repent one’s past misdeeds. There is a pattern of repentance in traditional spiritual autobiography, even though “the process by which one actually came to repent might be quite complex” (Starr 1965: 106):

First there was the provocation to repentance – the event or impression which set the whole process in motion; next there was reflection or consideration, a ‘coming to oneself’; this was followed by ‘conviction’ or ‘godly sorrow’, a phase of remorseful self-accusation; then there came the stage, to which most writers reserved the term ‘conversion’, when God actually relieved and reclaimed the sufferer. (Starr 1965: 106)

Robinson Crusoe conforms to this pattern, but this section does not aim to explicate the pattern in it, as Starr has already done so in detail (see Starr 1965). Rather, it explores how spiritual conversion is reflected in the characters’ consciousness within the typical process of repentance. It also reveals how this consequently evokes collective qualities in the narrative, that is, how it creates a collective self in Robinson Crusoe and Captain Singleton.

Within the typical pattern of spiritual autobiography, “[c]onversion is clearly the pivotal phase in the sequence” (Starr 1965: 40). It is important in spiritual autobiography because writing about it gives credibility and significance to the fact that every Christian has or should have the same spiritual experience. Roughly speaking, the process of repentance has three phases: before, during and after conversion. These phases are well balanced in Robinson Crusoe. The consciousness of the experiencing self before his conversion is related to the process whereby he eventually repents of his sins. The young Crusoe has many chances to realize his sins and repent sincerely, but his sense of repentance quickly subsides many times. His first sense of repentance comes after his father “press’d [him] earnestly, and in the most affectionate manner, not to play the young Man” (RC: 7), that is, not to go to sea. His father’s earnest and tearful
entreaties move him, but his sense of repentance soon disappears as in (3), which was quoted in the previous section:

(3) I was sincerely affected with this Discourse, as indeed who could be otherwise? and I resolv’d not to think of going abroad any more, but to settle at home according to my Father’s Desire. But alas! a few Days wore it all off; and in short, to prevent any of my Father’s farther Importunities, in a few Weeks after, I resolv’d to run quite away from him. (RC: 7-8)

This pattern of short-lived repentance is repeated until Crusoe goes through real spiritual conversion. For example, we can see it in (7), in which he experiences a storm for the first time and feels repentant for a short time:

(7) All this while the Storm encreas’d and the Sea, which I had never been upon before, went very high, tho’ nothing like what I have seen many times since; no, nor like what I saw a few Days after: But it was enough to affect me then, who was but a young Sailor, and had never known any thing of the matter. I expected every Wave would have swallowed us up, and that every time the Ship fell down, as I thought, in the Though or Hollow of the Sea, we should never rise more; and in this Agony of Mind, I made many Vows and Resolutions, that if it would please God here to spare my Life this one Voyage, if ever I got once my Foot upon dry Land again, I would go directly home to my Father, and never set it into a Ship again while I liv’d; that I would take his Advice, and never run my self into such Miseries as these any more. Now I saw plainly the Goodness of his Observations about the middle Station of Life, how easy, how comfortably he had liv’d all his Days, and never had been expos’d to Tempests at Sea, or Troubles on Shore; and I
resolv’d that I would, like a true repenting Prodigal, go home to my Father. (RC: 9)

The sight which was “the most delightful” (RC: 10) after the storm the next morning and the punch which made him drunk that night, however, make him “[drown] all [his] Repentance, all [his] Reflections upon [his] past Conduct, and all [his] Resolutions for [his] future” (RC: 10). His sense of repentance soon wears off, because it is only temporary repentance that comes not from “remorseful self-accusation” (Starr 1965: 106) but from mere “Agony of Mind”.

In the passages (3) and (7), the seemingly remorseful thoughts of the experiencing self are rendered in psycho-narration (“I was sincerely affected with this Discourse” in (3); “I made many Vows and Resolutions” in (7)). They imply that the experiencing self is not serious at these stages, since his earnest desire to repent is not rendered mimetically from his own point of view so that the reader can feel his remorse is really genuine. Crusoe is still too young to be truly repentant in these passages, but his eventual spiritual development is implied by the narrating self’s lament, “But alas!” in (3), and his use of a simile, “like a true repenting Prodigal” in (7). These representations of the narrating self’s consciousness suggest that the young Crusoe eventually goes through the process of repentance and experiences spiritual conversion.

At the same time, his gratitude towards God for his safety and survival on the island is often expressed before his conversion. For example, when he sees some ears of English barley growing out of the ground, he is “surpriz’d and perfectly astonish’d” (RC: 67) and feels grateful for God’s providence:

(8) It is impossible to express the Astonishment and Confusion of my Thoughts on this Occasion; I had hitherto acted upon no religions Foundation at all, indeed I had very few notions of Religion in my Head, or had entertain’d any Sense of any Thing that had befallen me,
otherwise than as a Chance, or, as we lightly say, what pleases God; without so much as enquiring into the End of Providence in these Things, or his Order in governing Events in the World: But after I saw Barley grow there, in a Climate which I know was not proper for Corn, and especially that I knew not how it came there, it startl’d me strangely, and I began to suggest, that God had miraculously caus’d this Grain to grow without Help of Seed sown, and that it was so directed purely for my Sustenance, on that wild miserable Place. (RC: 67)

The springing up of the barley indicates “Providence’s concern for him [the young Crusoe] and power over him” and it invites him “gently” to repent (Starr 1965: 102). However, his sense of gratitude soon wears off because of his failure to repent and believe in God’s providence, for he realizes that he “had shook a Bag of Chickens Meat out” (RC: 68) in the place where the barley had sprung up, and naturally “[his] religious Thankfulness to God’s Providence began to abate too upon the Discovering that all this was nothing but what was common” (RC: 68).

Crusoe thus deepens his sin by not being repentant for his sins or grateful to God. This leads to his “lowest spiritual ebb” (Starr 1965: 99), which comes right before his conversion. He reaches this “lowest spiritual ebb” in a dream he had while suffering from malaria:

(9) I thought, that I was sitting on the Ground on the Out-side of my Wall, where I sat when the Storm blew after the Earthquake, and that I saw a Man descend from a great black Cloud, … his Countenance was most inexpressively dreadful, impossible for Words to describe; when he stepp’d upon the Ground with his Feet, I thought the Earth trembl’d, just as it had done before in the Earthquake, and all the Air look’d, to my Apprehension, as if it had been fill’d with Flashes of Fire.

He was no sooner landed upon the Earth, … he spoke to me, or I
heard a Voice so terrible, that it is impossible to express the Terror of it; all that I can say, I understood, was this, *Seeing all these Things have not brought thee to Repentance, now thou shalt die: … (RC: 75)*

This is a crucial scene in the story in terms of spiritual conversion, because after this dream the young Crusoe begins to thank God and repent his lack of piety. As the passage shows, the ways in which the experiencing self’s consciousness is rendered become more and more complicated so that the narrating self can represent his complex mental process during his spiritual conversion. For example, in (9), the consciousness of the experiencing self in his dream is represented through IT and DS. The narrating self portrays what his past self perceived in his dream in IT (“I thought, that I was sitting on the Ground …”), but he uses DS to represent vividly what was uttered by “a Man” whose face was “most inexpressively dreadful” (“Seeing all these Things have not brought thee to Repentance, now thou shalt die”). The effect of using a particular form of consciousness representation changes according to the content and the context in which it is used (see 3.4.4). According to Elena Semino and Mick Short, diegetic forms such as IST and NRSA/TA have “a backgrounding effect” (2004: 75, 80) when used alongside more mimetic forms, while mimetic forms have “a foregrounding effect when used alongside other, less direct, forms” (2004: 90). The different forms used in (9) thus signify that the experiencing self’s perceptions in his dream at that time are backgrounded, while his feelings of fear are foregrounded. This tells us that in the dream the young Crusoe was more afraid of the spiritual presence of the frightening man than of the physical happenings, such as the trembling of the earth. The fact that something non-physical is more terrifying for him than something physical is a sign that his realization of the power of God is very near. Indeed, the young Crusoe begins to lament having “no divine Knowledge” (*RC: 76*), exclaiming, “Lord! what a miserable Creature am I? If I should be sick, I shall certainly die for Want of Help,
and what will become of me!” (RC: 78). This mimetic representation of his intense feelings makes them seem more authentic, so the consciousness of the experiencing self during his conversion is often rendered mimetically.

During his conversion, his mind is unsettled, and he accuses God of not giving him real deliverance, that is, deliverance from the island (RC: 79, 82). When he finally becomes grateful for a different kind of deliverance, the young Crusoe “kneel’d down and gave God Thanks aloud, for [his] Recovery from [his] Sickness” (RC: 82), and “cry’d out aloud, Jesus, thou Son of David, Jesus, thou exalted Prince and Saviour, give me Repentance!” (RC: 83). After this, his spiritual conversion affects his way of living on the island. He begins to “daily read the Word of God, and apply’d all the Comforts of it to [his] present State” (RC: 97). Thanks to his conversion, he is finally able to have reflections which can be instructive to others:

(10) (a) But all I could make use of, was, All that was valuable. (b) I had enough to eat, and to supply my Wants, and, what was all the rest to me? (c) If I kill’d more Flesh than I could eat, the Dog must eat it, or the Vermin. (d) If I sow’d more Corn than I could eat, it must be spoil’d. (e) The Trees that I cut down, were lying to rot on the Ground. (f) I could make no more use of them than for Fewel; and that I had no Occasion for, but to dress my Food.

(a) In a Word, The Nature and Experience of Things dictated to me upon just Reflection, That all the good Things of this World, are no farther good to us, than they are for our Use; and that whatever we may heap up indeed to give others, we enjoy just as much as we can use, and no more. (b) The most covetous griping Mise in the World would have been cur’d of the Vice of Covetousness, if he had been in my Case; for I possess’d infinitely more than I knew what to do with. (i) I had no room for Desire, except it was of Things which I had not, and they were but
Trifles, though indeed of great Use to me. I had, as I hinted before, a Parcel of Money, as well Gold as Silver, about thirty six Pounds Sterling: Alas! There the nasty sorry useless Stuff lay; I had no manner of Business for it; and I often thought with my self, That I would have given a handful of it for a Gross of Tobacco-Pipes, or for a Hand-Mill to grind my Corn; nay, I would have given it all for Sixpenny-worth Turnip and Carrot Seed out of England, or for a Handful of Pease and Beans, and a Bottle of Ink. As it was, I had not the least Advantage by it, or Benefit from it; but there it lay in a Drawer, and grew mouldy with the Damp of the Cave, in the wet Season; and if I had had the Drawer full of Diamonds, it had been the same Case; and they had been of no manner of Value to me, because of no Use. (RC: 110)

The narrating self tries to describe the “just Reflection” which his past self had and its importance, using various consciousness representation categories. This makes his “just Reflection” seem authentic because the reader can see that it really happened to him, which in turn makes it more instructive.

The passage above begins with the connective “But”. Sentence initial connectives have been recognized as one of the linguistic indicators of FIST (e.g. Brinton 1980; Fludernik 1993; Sotirova 2004; 2011). “Connectives (conjunctions and conjunctive adverbials), particularly when used sentence-initially”, argues Violeta Sotirova, “have been correlated with the presentation of character viewpoint”, because “[t]he strong oral overtones that they bring to a narrative passage [make] readers interpret it as stemming from the character’s perspective rather than the narrator’s” (2011: 95). Sentence-initial connectives occur far more often in spoken language than in written language (Fludernik 1993: 241; Sotirova 2011: 96-97). Sotirova (2011: 96-97) quotes the study of Elisabeth Rudolph (1989) and Ann Lazaraton (1992), in which they prove both the frequency of
sentence-initial connectives and their subjective quality. For example, in Rudolph’s view, “the use of conjunction would, to a certain extent, correlate with a subjective dimension added to a text: pure descriptions of facts do not require conjunction, but psychological and argumentative discourse do” (Sotirova 2011: 97). Susan Ehrlich sees sentence-initial conjunctions as linking devices which often become markers of FIST because they provide textual links indicating the continuity of a character’s viewpoint beyond one sentence. Therefore, the sentence-initial “But” in (10a) is more likely to be interpreted as evoking the experiencing self’s point of view than the narrating self’s. Even though it is vague, the experiencing self’s point of view is established in the previous passages: they do not include any parenthesis that directly indicates that it is a rendering of the experiencing self’s consciousness through FIT, but the PAST + NOW construction (e.g. “I was remov’d from all the Wickedness of the World here”, “I was now capable of enjoying” (RC: 109)) and the modal expressions (e.g. “I might call my self King” (RC: 109)), as well as the content and context of the passages, all evoke the experiencing self’s point of view. Therefore, the sentence-initial “But” in the following paragraph, that is, the first paragraph of (10), is naturally interpreted as coming from the past self’s point of view. This interpretation is supported by the linguistic indices for FIT in the next sentence (10b): at its beginning, it is not certain whether the sentence is narration or FIT, but the interrogative mood used in the latter half, “what was all the rest to me?”, syntactically signals that it is the representation of the past self’s thoughts through FIT. The subsequent sentences (10c) to (10f) are then interpreted as a sort of answer to this rhetorical question, and thus are more likely to be the continuation of FIT. In addition to the content and context, the past progressive in (10e) (“were lying”) is a linguistic marker for FIT: it is used with a stative verb, which suggests that the experiencing self is seeing the trees he cut down at the very moment he is having this thought. This paragraph represents the consciousness of the experiencing self mimetically to tell us exactly what occurred in his mind.
The next paragraph begins with the phrase “In a Word” and its content becomes more abstract compared to the more concrete thoughts in the previous paragraph. This signifies that now the narrating self’s point of view is predominant in (10g). In fact, (10g) is the representation of the experiencing self’s reflection through IT: the that clause explains the contents of his “just Reflection”. This is obviously the reflection the experiencing self had, as it is indicated by the past tense “dictated”. However, the contents of his reflection are rendered in the present tense, which suggests the instructiveness of this reflection: the narrating self tells us what his past self reflected, using the gnomic present and the plural we, in order to show that the narrating self has the same reflection, and it can be edifying for others. From (10h) to (10j), the narrating self expresses his own thoughts on his past to reinforce the effectiveness of the collective idea expressed in (10g). Crusoe’s reaction to “a Parcel of Money” is then represented from the point of view of the past self in (10k), with the exclamatory “Alas!” and the evaluative “nasty” and “sorry”. This FIT sentence is then followed by an IT sentence (10l), which clearly shows that these are the thoughts of the past self. The sentences (10m), (10n) and (10o) are punctuated with semi-colons and colons, but the connectives at the beginning of each sentence, that is, “nay” in (10m), “As it was” in (10n), and “but” in (10o), suggest they are the continuation of the past self’s thoughts in FIT. Again, these concrete thoughts about what he needs and does not need give the effect of realness and authenticity, which enhances the effectiveness of the instructive part at the beginning of this paragraph. In this way, Crusoe’s reflections are effectively represented within consciousness representation categories, and because they occur in the process of spiritual conversion, they can be edifying to others.

As Starr argues, “the actual work of regeneration is achieved only through a settled change in attitude and behavior, and clearly requires time” (1965: 113, italics added). Consequently, even after his conversion, the young Crusoe is easily affected by frightening things and surprises because his repentance is still new.
His internal life is made more plausible and credible because his confusion is represented in a way that makes it feel real and authentic. The representation of his thoughts in (11), for example, shows his inner struggle after he finds a human footprint on the shore:

(11) (a) I slept none that Night; (b) the farther I was from the Occasion of my Fright, the greater my Apprehensions were, which is something contrary to the Nature of such Things, and especially to the usual Practice of all Creatures in Fear: (c) But I was so embarrass’d with my own frightful Ideas of the Thing, that I form’d nothing but dismal Imaginations to my self, even tho’ I was now a great way off of it. (d) Sometimes I fancy’d it must be the Devil; and Reason joyn’d in with me in this Supposition: (e) For how should any other Thing in human Shape come into the Place? (f) Where was the Vessel that brought them? (g) What Marks were there of any other Footsteps? (h) And how was it possible a Man should come there? (i) But then, to think that Satan should take human shape upon him in such a Place where there could be no manner of Occasion for it, but to leave the Print of his Foot behind him, and that even for no Purpose too, for he could not be sure I should see it; (j) this was an Amusement the other Way; (k) I consider’d that the Devil might have found out abundance of other Ways to have terrify’d me than this of the single Print of a Foot. (l) That as I liv’d quite on the other Side of the Island, he would never have been so simple as to leave a Mark in a Place where ’twas Ten Thousand to one whether I should ever see it or not, and in the Sand too, which the first Surge of the Sea upon a high Wind would have defac’d entirely; (m) All this seem’d inconsistent with the Thing it self, and with all the Notions we usually entertain of the Subtilty of the Devil. (RC: 131)
My aim in quoting this long passage is to explicate the effect of authenticity given by consciousness representation categories, as in (10). This passage, like (10), conveys the younger Crusoe’s complicated mental process in a way that makes his past consciousness seem real. The action of the past self is depicted through narration in (11a). The fact that he could not sleep on the night after he saw the footprint is represented from the point of view of the narrating self. This is indicated by the use of a distal deictic expression, namely “that Night”. The first part of (11b) is categorized as NI: the narrating self narrates the psychological states of the experiencing self, but does not describe any specifically verbalized contents of his fear and anxiety. This is followed by a non-restrictive relative clause, in which the narrating self comments on his past experiences in the gnomic present tense (“which is something contrary to the Nature of such Things, …”). The narrating self continues to represent his past experiences through NI in (11c). All the sentences from (11a) to (11c) are thus primarily rendered from the point of view of the narrating self, though the PAST + NOW construction in (11c) (“I was now”) implies that the younger Crusoe’s point of view begins to be incorporated at the end of this sentence. The subsequent IT in (11d) seems to be represented more and more from the point of view of the past self: the modal auxiliary verb must invokes “the presence of the represented speaker as ‘utterer’ in the surrogate ground” (Davidse and Vandelanotte 2011: 243). It reflects the point of view of the experiencing self, not that of the narrating self. The use of the PAST + NOW construction in (11c) and the modal auxiliary must in (11d) indicate that the narrating self gradually empathizes with the past self.

The narrating self empathizes more with the past self, representing his agitation through FIT from (11e) to (11i). The younger Crusoe’s thoughts are given in the interrogative mood from (11e) to (11h) and the exclamatory mood in (11i). In terms of syntax, they do not have a reporting clause and the tense is aligned with the surrounding narrative. In the first four sentences (11e-11h), the younger Crusoe tries to rationalize the idea that the footprint was actually left by
the Devil. Since he cannot answer his questions satisfactorily, it seems to him that his supposition is reasonable and he temporarily succeeds in overcoming his fear. This rationalizing process represented through FIT echoes the younger Crusoe’s verbalization of thoughts, contrary to the less echoed or paraphrased thoughts in the preceding IT (see 3.4.2). In the subsequent exclamatory FIT in (11i), however, his supposition is immediately questioned. The interjectional expression “to think that” is typically used to express “a fact thought of as remarkable or surprising” (*OED*, s.v. *think*, v.² 5. a). It expresses a critical view of his supposition with surprise, which is indicated by the use of the evaluative modal auxiliary *should* in the *that*-clause. The frequent use of modal auxiliaries (“there could be”, “he could not be”, “I should see”) suggests that the younger Crusoe’s point of view is strongly reflected in (11i).

The following sentence (11j) can be regarded as either narration or FIT because of “the fuzziness of the boundaries” (*Semino and Short* 2004: 183) between them when there is no clear linguistic marker in the sentence concerned. Since (11j) is represented in the past tense like the surrounding narrative (“was”) and in the affirmative (“this was an Amusement …”), it can be read as both narration and FIT. However, an FIT reading seems preferable in this sentence because of the context. It lies between the FIT in the preceding sequences from (11e) to (11i) and the IT in the sentences which follow it, that is, (11k) and (11l). It is thus more natural to read (11j) as a part of the past self’s thoughts represented from the point of view of the past self, rather than as narration given from the point of view of the narrating self. In these representations of consciousness through FIT, the narrating self strongly empathizes with the past self in order to represent the younger Crusoe’s great bewilderment on seeing the footprint.

In (11k), the narrating self continues to use IT to express doubt about the past self’s supposition. It is followed by (11l), in which the reporting clause (“I consider’d”) is omitted, and which begins with the conjunction *that*. The conjunction *that* indicates that the reported clause is subordinated, though the
reporting clause has been omitted, so this sentence can be categorized as IT according to my way of categorizing of consciousness representation as discussed in Chapter III. Mick Short points out that one of the effects of IT is that it foregrounds “calmness”, whereas FIT foregrounds “vividness” (2007: 230-231). This distinction corresponds with “the showing/telling distinction” (Short 2007: 230). The modal auxiliary with the perfect infinitive (e.g. “might have found” in (11k), “would never have been” in (11l)) and the epistemic adverb (“quite” in (11l)) suggest that the point of view is still that of the experiencing self. Nevertheless, compared with the highly agitated mind represented through FIT in the preceding sentences, the IT in sentences (11k) and (11l) depicts the younger Crusoe as beginning to think more calmly.

Lastly, in (11m), the narrating self uses NRTA, the most distanced form of thought representation in this extract. The specific wording of the thought is not given, but the content of the thought is summarized. In (11m), the reason why the younger Crusoe felt “inconsistent” is explained by the general belief about the Devil, which is expressed from the point of view of the narrating self in the present tense (“we usually entertain”). The narrating self positions himself further away from the experiencing self in (11m) than in the IT in the preceding sentences (11k) and (11l). In (11), therefore, the narrating self first psychologically approaches, then empathizes with, and finally detaches himself from the experiencing self, which makes the represented mind seem authentic. His fear is so strong as such that it “banish’d all [his] religious Hope” (RC: 132). Even after his conversion, Crusoe is still a young penitent, and so his regenerated mind is easily affected by what he experiences. However, he gradually and surely undergoes regeneration. After rescuing Friday from some cannibals, Crusoe, as an active agent of God’s providence, teaches him about Christianity, which shows that he is beginning to have “a settled change in attitude and behavior” (Starr 1965: 113). As he has undergone spiritual conversion, Crusoe realizes his regeneration can and should lead to the edification of others. After all, as Starr
argues, the primary motive in writing a spiritual autobiography “is the urge to impart to others the benefits of one’s own conversion” (1965: 120).

By representing a character’s consciousness before, during and after his/her conversion through various narrative techniques as discussed above, the narrating self makes it possible to promote the authentic qualities of represented minds in the process of spiritual conversion. In doing so, the narrating self makes the collective ideas extracted from spiritual experiences seem credible.

In Captain Singleton, less weight is put on the protagonist’s spiritual development. As mentioned above, this book has the quintessential aspects of both a spiritual autobiography and a picaresque novel. Picaresque elements tend to hinder the hero or heroine in his/her spiritualization and foster individual rather than collective qualities (see 5.2). Captain Singleton, however, leaves the door open for the portrayal of collective qualities in the narrative. This work is full of picaresque elements, since most of it is about Bob’s adventures as a pirate. However, the individual psychology usually generated by picaresque techniques is less evident than in Defoe’s other picaresque narratives because it often features rather collective psychology, using the plural pronoun we. The story is about not only Bob but also his comrades on his journey. This makes it possible for the spiritual experience which every Christian undergoes, or should undergo, to be described in the narrative, as spiritual autobiography usually does. Bob goes through a very abrupt spiritual conversion towards the end of the novel, which is hinted from the very beginning of the story when the narrating self says “the Devil” was “[his] Aversion” (CS: 7), though he “had no Sense of Virtue or Religion upon [him]” (CS: 6) at this early stage.

Kidnapped by a wicked trader woman and raised by a gypsy mother and then among seamen, Bob has no notion of sin. However, his natural aversion to barbarism evokes his first religious thought when he sees the horrific behaviour of some black Africans:
(12) I think it was the first time in my Life that ever any religious Thought affected me; but I could not refrain some Reflections, and almost Tears, in considering how happy it was, that I was not born among such Creatures as these, and was not so stupidly ignorant and barbarous: But this soon went off again, and I was not troubled again with any Qualms of that Sort for a long time after. (CS: 61)

As the passage shows, Bob’s first religious thought soon abates, as is normal before conversion, and indeed, he did not have “any Qualms of that Sort for a long time after”. However, when a “Blast of Lightning” (CS: 194) hit his ship long after he had this first religious thought, another religious thought came into his mind. He “was all Amazement and Confusion” and “began to feel the Effects of that Horrour” (CS: 195), though he was not yet “a sincere Penitent” (CS: 195):

(13) I thought my self just sinking into Eternity, owning the divine Justice of my Punishment, but not at all feeling any of the moving, softning Tokens of a sincere Penitent, afflicted at the Punishment, but not at the Crime, alarmed at the Vengeance, but not terrify’d at the Guilt, having the same Gust to the Crime, tho’ terrifide to the last Degree at the Thought of the Punishment, which I concluded I was just now going to receive. (CS: 195)

Before conversion, as in (12) and (13), the younger Bob’s consciousness is rendered almost entirely from the point of view of the older self, whose reflective position implies the younger self’s eventual conversion. Although there are a few exceptions such as the PAST + NOW construction (“I was just now going” in (13)), which indicate the experiencing self’s point of view, the predominant representation of immature spirituality in psycho-narration in these passages indicates the non-seriousness and non-religiousness of the younger, experiencing
self at that time. This is very similar to Crusoe’s non-religiousness, which I discussed above.

Captain Bob’s spiritual conversion owes a great deal to a man called William, who is a Quaker taken from a ship Bob attacked and plundered. William’s teachings deeply affect Bob’s way of perceiving and thinking:

(14) *William* had struck so deep into my unthinking Temper, with hinting to me, that there was something beyond all this, that the present Time was the Time of Enjoyment, but that the Time of Account approached; that the Work that remain’d was gentler than the Labour past, *viz.* Repentance, and that it was high Time to think of it; I say these, and such Thoughts as these, engross’d my Hours, and in a Word, I grew very sad. (*CS*: 265)

Bob’s conversion is described in far less detail than Crusoe’s. The younger Bob who experienced “‘conviction’ or ‘godly sorrow’” (Starr 1965: 106) converses with William “seriously and gravely, and upon the Subject of [their] Repentance continually” (*CS*: 272). He finally repents being “a Dog, a Wretch that had been a Thief, and a Murtherer” (*CS*: 267). His conversion and regeneration result in “a settled change in [his] attitude and behavior” (Starr 1965: 113), and he uses his ill-gotten wealth in a charitable way, namely by giving money to William’s sister, in atonement for his past misdeeds.

Bob’s spiritual conversion is represented in a way which is strikingly different from Crusoe’s. As the passage (14) shows, Bob’s thoughts are not rendered mimetically to give the impression that this is exactly what came into his mind at that time. As the narrating self does not represent his past consciousness mimetically even when he went through spiritual conversion, the significance of his spiritual experiences seems to be weaker than Crusoe’s. This is one of the serious shortcomings of *Captain Singleton*: since it is an incomplete amalgam of
spiritual autobiography and the picaresque, it cannot take full advantage of either
the narrative framework of spiritual autobiography or that of the picaresque novel.
Defoe’s later works which have both spiritual and picaresque qualities resolved
this problem by putting more weight on the individual, subjective aspect of a self.
The significance of spirituality in the process of repentance thus becomes more
and more fleeting and perfunctory in *Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack* and *Roxana*, as
I will discuss in the next section.

### 4.4 Seeming repentance in *Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack* and *Roxana*

Spiritual autobiography has “thematic coherence” in spite of “narrative
incoherence”, as individual episodes are unified under a common theme, that is,
“the protagonist’s inward vicissitudes obeyed the traditional pattern” of spiritual
autobiography (Starr 1965: 126). In other words, the protagonist’s religious
psychology can direct a narrative, even though there seems to be no plot in it. As
long as the vicissitudes of the protagonist’s religious psychology conform to the
traditional pattern, any autobiographical narrative can be regarded structurally as
spiritual autobiography. According to Starr, this pattern “illustrates some basic
features of the action and characterization of *Moll Flanders*”, because “[t]he
chronological sequence of events is halting and abrupt, and their causal
connection is arbitrary at best” (1965: 126-127). He further argues that “the
book’s real coherence seems to lie in the gradual unfolding of these inward states,
not in the overt action by which they are revealed” (1965: 132-133). The “point of
departure” for Moll’s spiritual vicissitudes is her “vanity” (Starr 1965: 133), and
then she undergoes spiritual hardening and eventual conversion.

*Roxana*, on the other hand, has structural difficulties (Starr 1965: 163-164). Moll
can narrate her past mistakes from the point of view of a penitent in the first
person because she undergoes conversion, but “Roxana’s point of view is not, as it
turns out, that of a convert” (Starr 1965: 182). However much it seems that “[i]n
spirit, *Roxana* follows autobiographical conversion by presenting a regenerate narrator who chronicles and ‘improves’ the course of her soul’s development” (Starr: 1965: 182), this spirit is violated because she is not truly repentant. In *Roxana*, therefore, “[s]piritual autobiography continues to furnish a narrative technique and a degree of thematic coherence, but narrative itself has become paramount, and largely eludes thematic control” (Starr 1965: 183). The same is true of the narrative of *Colonel Jack*, because it “preserves distinct vestiges of the spiritual autobiography, but virtually abandons both its characteristic spirit and shape” (Starr 1965: 183). To summarize Starr’s (1965) view, *Moll Flanders* is a spiritual autobiography written from the point of view of a true penitent, whereas *Colonel Jack* and *Roxana* contain some elements of spiritual autobiography, but lack thematic control.

In my view, however, not only *Colonel Jack* and *Roxana* but also *Moll Flanders* lack thematic control, because the coherence generated by spiritual development ends up seeming illusory. As Borsing observes, there has been a view that not only *Roxana* but also *Moll Flanders* can be regarded either “as spiritual confessions or as secular and psychological works of self-absolution” (2017: 119). In fact they have both elements, but their “spiritual confession” results in failure due to their shallow and fleeting repentance and reflection. Seeming repentance and reflection can of course be found in genuine spiritual autobiographies, because they are an important process of spiritual hardening before conversion (Starr 1965: 42, 133). In these three books, however, the protagonists do not seem to undergo any genuine conversion, which is the crucial ingredient of spiritual autobiography. Even though Moll, Jack and Roxana display their reflective point of view, their true regeneration is not shown in their narratives and thus their repentance is incomplete. In the following, I will illustrate how their seeming repentance and regeneration fail to convey any spiritual significance, and how the failure or absence of genuine conversion consequently debases the collective qualities usually generated by the traditional
pattern of spiritual autobiography.

The process of Moll’s repentance, as Zimmerman observes, is “the most detailed one in Defoe’s novels” (1975: 89). In particular, her spiritual decay, which usually takes place before conversion in the traditional pattern, is especially prolonged and detailed. She has many chances to repent with the help of her conscience, but every time she fails to repent sincerely and goes on committing crimes. In the first half of the book, she deepens her sin mainly by being a whore. Her first lover, the elder brother of the Colchester family, was the first snare she fell into: she could have “very little solid Reflection” when he first seduced her, as she could only have “a most unbounded Stock of Vanity and Pride, and but a very little Stock of Vertue” (MF: 22). The cause of her first crime was her innocence and ignorance, and she was much troubled by a love triangle between herself and the two Colchester brothers. She had no choice but to marry the younger brother whom she did not love in order to protect herself. When her first husband died and she was “left loose to the World” (MF: 50), therefore, she blamed “that Cheat call’d, LOVE”, and continued her misdeeds, resolving “to be Married, or Nothing, and to be well Married, or not at all” (MF: 51). This resolution led her to further sinning. She married a linen draper for his money, but he eventually went bankrupt and deserted her. She was still legally married to him, but she pretended to be a widow, and tricked a fine man into marrying her. They moved to Virginia in order to have a better life and lived happily there for a while, but it turned out that he was her half-brother. Moll could not stand this, and so returned to England. Her sins up until this point were not self-conscious: she was not fully aware that she was still “limitted from Marriage” (MF: 54), nor did she commit incest consciously. When she came back to England, however, she realized that she had behaved like a whore in the past, as well as in the present. Her first self-conscious crime was committed in Bath, soon after she came back from Virginia. In Bath, where she moved from London to live cheaply, she met a married gentleman who was kind enough to support her financially. She eventually had a physical
relationship with him to get his financial support, but it did not last very long. When she finally received a letter from him telling her that he was no longer willing to take care of her, she admitted that she “was not blind to [her] own Crime” and “reproach’d [herself] with the Liberties [she] had taken, and how [she] had been a Snare to this Gentleman, and that indeed [she] was principal in the Crime” (MF: 104). This would have been a good time for her to repent her wickedness, yet she did not do so but continued “[her] wickedness” (MF: 105) in order to get money to live. She then married a gentleman whom she met in Lancashire, which turned out to be “an elaborate double-bluff” (Hammond 2015: 142): both of them married the other because they thought he or she was rich, but in reality neither of them was. As she laments, they were “married here upon the foot of a double Fraud” (MF: 124), and they could not bear the lack of money to support themselves, so they separated, though they seemed to love each other very much. After disposing of the child of this husband, she then married a bank clerk in London, and finally seemed to be penitent for her past wickedness, as she herself declared:

(15) (a) O had this particular Scene of Life lasted, or had I learnt from that time I enjoy’d it, to have tasted the true sweetness of it, and had I not fallen into that Poverty which is the sure Bane of Virtue, how happy had I been, not only here, but perhaps for ever? for while I liv’d thus, I was really a Penitent for all my Life pass’d, I look’d back on it with Abhorrence, and might truly be said to hate my self for it; …

(b) Now I seem’d landed in a safe Harbour, after the Stormy Voyage of Life past was at an end; and I began to be thankful for my Deliverance; I sat many an Hour by my self, and wept over the Remembrance of past Follies, and the dreadful Extravagances of a wicked Life, and sometimes I flatter’d my self that I had sincerely repented.
But there are Temptations which it is not in the Power of Human Nature to resist, and few know what would be their Case, if driven to the same Exigences: As Covetousness is the Root of all Evil, so Poverty is, I believe, the worst of all Snares: But I wave that Discourse till I come to the Experiment. (MF: 157-158)

However, her repentance is only temporary, and it vanishes when her husband dies and her financial security comes to an end. It is represented as shallow and fleeting from the point of view of the narrating self, in the RECOUNTING mode in (15): the deictic past is used in (15a) and (15b), and the present tense in (15c), which indicates the narrating self’s reflecting point of view. The rhetorical question in the subjunctive mood in (15a) clearly implies that “this particular Scene of Life” did not last and she “[fell] into that Poverty which is the sure Bane of Virtue”, which only the narrating self who knows what happens next can describe. Although the narrating self says that she “was really a Penitent for all [her] Life pass’d” in (15a), she admits that she only “flatter’d [herself] that [she] had sincerely repented” (italics added) in (15b), which implies that her past self’s penitence was not real when she looks back on her past. In (15c), the narrating self talks of “Temptations which it is not in the Power of Human Nature to resist”, and spouts universal truths in the present tense (“are”, “is”, “know”), but what she says sounds like only an excuse for her further sinning, and the sense of instructiveness in this part is much reduced, as her repentance is not sincere.

In the second half of the book, Moll becomes even more sinful when she begins stealing. After her first theft, the experiencing self realizes that her belief that “[she] had been reform’d, and had … repented of all [her] pass’d wickednesses” is only an illusion, and that “[her] Prayers had no hope in them” (MF: 161-162). She continues thieving, knowing it is sinful, until she is finally arrested and imprisoned in Newgate. Her lowest spiritual ebb is the loss of her “power of reflection” (Starr 1965: 136), that is, the loss of her ability to think,
when she is taken to prison. Even when she is there, however, her repentance is shallow, because “[she] seem’d not to Mourn that [she] had committed such Crimes” but “[she] mourn’d that [she] was to be punish’d for it” (MF: 229). In such partial repentance, as Zimmerman argues, “[t]he focus is on Moll’s emotions, not on religious abstractions” (1975: 90):

(16) As soon as I began, I say to Think, the first thing that occur’d to me broke out thus; Lord! what will become of me, I shall certainly die! I shall be cast to be sure, and there is nothing beyond that but Death! I have no Friends, what shall I do? I shall certainly cast; Lord, have Mercy upon me, what will become of me? This was a sad Thought, you will say, to be the first after so long time that had started into my Soul of that kid, and yet even this was nothing but fright, at what was to come; there was not a Word of sincere Repentance in it all: (MF: 235)

In this passage, Moll’s repentance is fleeting even when her ability to think is restored. The expression of her thoughts in DT (“Lord! what will become of me, I shall certainly die! …”) is only emotional, and, as the narrating self admits, “there was not a Word of sincere Repentance in it all”. Unlike the mimetic rendering of Crusoe’s thoughts, the mimetic representations of Moll’s thoughts do not make her spiritual message seem more authentic, but they do make her psychological state seem more authentic.

After she “was found Guilty of Felony” (MF: 238), a clergyman visited her in order to lead her to genuine repentance. Affected by his teaching, she began to feel another kind of repentance:

(17) It was now, that for the first time I felt any real signs of Repentance; I now began to look back upon my past Life with abhorrence, and having a kind of view into the other Side of time, the things of Life, as I believe
they do with every Body at such a time, began to look with a different
Aspect, and quite another Shape, than they did before; the greatest and
best things, the views of felicity, the joy, the griefs of Life were quite
other things; and I had nothing in my Thoughts, but what was so
infinitely Superior to what I had known in Life, that it appear’d to me to
be the greatest stupidity in Nature to lay any weight upon any thing tho’
the most valuable in this World.

The Word Eternity represented itself with all its incomprehensible
Additions, and I had such extended Notions of it, that I know not how to
express them: Among the rest, how vile, how gross, how absurd did
every pleasant thing look? I mean, that we had counted pleasant before;
especially when I reflected that these sordid Trifles were the things for
which we forfeited eternal Felicity.

With these Reflections came in, of meer Course, severe
Reproaches of my own Mind for my wretched Behaviour in my past
Life; that I had forfeited all hope of any Happiness in the Eternity that I
was just going to enter into, and on the contrary was entitul’d to all that
was miserable, or had been conceiv’d of Misery; and all this with the
frightful Addition of its being also Eternal. (MF: 239-240)

Some critics regard this final repentance in Newgate as real and sincere. Novak,
for example, argues that “Defoe was not being ironic about Moll’s repentance and
conversion in Newgate” and that “the conversion and repentance in Newgate
follows the pattern of a true repentance which appears in Defoe’s other writings”
(1964: 200-201, see also Richetti 1975: 133, 138; Novak 2015: 70-71). Her
repentance does seem to be genuine. The passage, as a whole, describes her
repentant mind in the RECOUNTING mode, implying that it is represented from
the point of view of the narrating self who has repented. The narrating self
explicitly says that this was the very first time when “[she] felt any real signs of
Repentance”. Her spiritual conversion is expressed by, for example, the representation of her present consciousness in DT in the second paragraph (“how vile, how gross, how absurd did every pleasant thing look?”), which describes the “extended Notions” of eternity she says “[she] know[s] not how to express”. In Starr’s (1965: 138-139) view, the repeated spiritual hardening by Moll’s seeming repentance is the inevitable process of real repentance, leading to conversion. When one reads this passage, therefore, one might believe that she has been brought to true repentance and spiritual conversion at this point. However, she never goes through real spiritual conversion, which is “a new strength with which to resolve [spiritual turmoils]” (Starr 1965: 115). Even after this so-called “real” repentance, she seeks money and a husband so she can live in a happy life, rather than trying to resolve her spiritual turmoil caused by her desire for them. She does not hesitate to use the money and valuables she has stolen, nor to marry one of her ex-husbands, even though she is still married to her second husband, the linen draper. She is a person who “is only remorseful when all is lost” (Ardila 2015b: 128). Thus she repeats her sins even after what some critics regard as her “real” repentance, and she cannot resolve her spiritual turmoil because her repentance is only shallow. As Richetti observes, we usually “expect fictional characters to ‘grow’ and mature” (1975: 118) in autobiographies, but Moll does not grow and mature in a spiritual sense, and she repeats the same sins. Without true spiritual conversion in the narrative, the instructive parts in it inevitably lose their significance.

Similarly in Colonel Jack, we see the main character seeming to repent a number of times. One characteristic of this novel, as Zimmerman argues, is that “Jack’s repentance is perfunctory, but he achieves the equanimity that Crusoe, Singleton and Moll lack” (1975: 153). His self-possessed tone is especially evident at the end of the book, where he says that he has “leisure to reflect” (CJ: 308) and “Leisure to Repent” (CJ: 309). However, although he says he has such “leisure”, his story is not that of a penitent, but of a man who eagerly seeks what
he considers a “gentle” life. Zimmerman observes that “[i]ncident after incident in
Colonel Jack shows the central character’s behavior being guided by his notions
of gentility” (1975: 127). His behaviour is not organized according to the process
of spiritual development as in traditional autobiographies, but according to the
“dimly apprehended but disembodied conception” (Zimmerman 1975: 127) of
gentility. In point of fact, Jack reflects on his wrong behaviour and tries to make
amends for it, for example, by giving the money that he stole to a poor woman,
but he does this not because he repents what he did, but because he wants to
behave like a gentleman. He has some serious religious thoughts for the first time
on his plantation in Virginia when he meets a man called William who was
transported from England, and who has experienced conversion. After talking
with this man, Jack admits that:

(18) I was sincerely Touch’d with his Discourse on this Subject, I had known
so much of the real difference of the Case, that I could not but affected
with it, tho’ till now I confess I knew little of the religious Part: I had
been an Offender as well as he, tho’ not altogether in the same Degree,
but I knew nothing of the Penitence; neither had I look’d back upon any
thing, as a Crime: but as a Life dishonourable, and not like a Gentleman,
which run much in my Thoughts, as I have several times mention’ed.

(CJ: 162)

Jack asks this man to teach him about religion, and learns that “Virginia, and a
State of Transportation, may be the happiest Place and Condition they [any
unhappy Wretch] were ever in, for this Life, as by a sincere Repentance” (CJ:
173). However, Jack’s story does not contain any scenes of sincere repentance and
spiritual conversion, and thus his subsequent behaviour is not that of a penitent.
At the end of the story, he tells that “the History of Men’s Lives may be many
ways Useful, and instructing to those who read them, if moral and religious
Improvement, and Reflections are made those that write them” (CJ: 307). But Jack himself admits that “had [he] with him [William] sincerely repented of what was pass’d, I had not for 24 Year together liv’d a life of levity, and profligate Wickedness after it” (CJ: 308), which implies that he does not sincerely repent his past life for very long after meeting William. He may have converted in the end, but the book does not tell us about this, and the reader can never know if he is really repentant as he claims to be. The instructiveness or collective qualities of the book are greatly reduced because he fails to show that he has undergone real conversion, which is the most crucial part of a spiritual autobiography.

*Roxana* is similar to *Colonel Jack* in that Roxana does not go through spiritual conversion in the book. To some extent, it follows “a pattern of spiritual decay” (Starr 1965: 182): Roxana hardens herself by committing sins caused by her vanity and greed, which is very similar to Moll’s spiritual hardening. As Starr argues, “[i]n spirit, *Roxana* follows autobiographical convention by presenting a regenerate narrator who chronicles and ‘improves’ the course of her soul’s development. But this spirit … is violated in two ways” (1965: 182):

First, Roxana’s point of view is not, as it turns out, that of a convert: she eventually provokes God ‘to give [her] up to the way of [her] own heart, and seal [her] condemnation’. Second, there is a great deal of narrative that she simply fails to ‘improve’, narrative that that is included on other grounds than its spiritual significance. (Starr 1965: 182)

Starr’s view here can also be applied to *Colonel Jack* as I discussed above, and to *Moll Flanders*. The only difference between *Moll Flanders* and the other two works is that Moll’s so-called “real” conversion is described explicitly, even though it later turns out to be shallow and short-lived, but this is not the case in the other two works.

The most obvious seeming repentance in *Roxana* occurs during a storm
when she is on board a ship. Like Crusoe, she feels repentant in the terrible storm, and has serious reflections as follows:

(19) Upon these serious Considerations, I was very Penitent too, for my former Sins, and cry’d out, tho’ softly, two or three times, Lord have Mercy upon me; to this, I added abundance of Resolutions, of what a Life I wou’d live, if it should please God but spare my Life this one time; how I would live a single and a virtuous Life, and spend a great deal of what had thus wickedly got, in Acts of Charity, and doing Good.

Under these dreadful Apprehensions, I look’d back on the Life I had led, with the utmost Contempt and Abhorrence; I blush’d, and wonder’d at myself, how I cou’d act thus; how I cou’d divest myself of Modesty and Honour, and prostitute myself for Gain; and I thought, if ever it shou’d please God to spare me this one time from Death, it wou’d not be possible that I should be the same Creature again.

(Rox: 126-127)

In this passage, it seems that Roxana’s penitence is represented in a credible way from the point of view of a regenerate narrator in the RECOUNTING mode, and occasionally mimetically in DS ("I … cry’d out, tho’ softly, two or three times, Lord have Mercy upon me"), which seems to tell us how earnestly the experiencing self wished for her salvation. As the storm abates, however, her repentance fades away. The narrating self admits that “[she] had no Sence of Repentance, from the true Motive of Repentance”, and more specifically, “[she] had only such a Repentance as a Criminal has at the Place of Execution, who is sorry, not that he has committed the Crime, as it is a Crime, but sorry that he is to be Hang’d for it” (Rox: 129). Like Moll, Roxana’s repentance comes from her fear of punishment, and not from her sin. It is fleeting, and therefore, as Starr argues, “her character remains static; grow worse she cannot, repent she will not”
(1965: 178). When she finally married a Dutch merchant, “[she] began to look back upon it [her gay and wicked Course] with that Horror, and that Detestation, which is the certain Companion, if not the Forerunner, of Repentance” (Rox: 261). She felt this repentance, however, only because she was “marry’d and settl’d in so glorious a Manner” (Rox: 261). In other words, her repentance was still shallow, as the narrating self recounts:

(20) Sometimes the Wonders of my present Circumstances wou’d work upon me, and I shou’d have some Raptures upon my Soul, upon the Subject of my coming so smoothly out of the Arms of Hell, that I was not ingulph’d in Ruin, as most who lead such Lives are, first or last; but this was a Flight too high for me; I was not come to that Repentance that is rais’d from a Sence of Heaven’s Goodness; I repented of the Crime, but it was of another and lower kind of Repentance, and rather mov’d by my Fears of Vengeance, than from a Sense of being spar’d from being punish’d, and landed safe after a Storm. (Rox: 261)

The book ends thus with “Roxana’s inability to repent” (Zimmerman 1975: 180). This brings her a further calamity, namely the murder of her own child, Susan, and as the final part of the book says, “[she] was brought so low again, that [her] Repentance seem’d to be only the Consequence of [her] Misery, as [her] Misery was of [her] Crime” (Rox: 330). She never experiences conversion, which is the most important turning point in spiritual development. The times when she repents are often represented from the point of view of the narrating self in the RECOUNTING mode, but, as she never undergoes conversion, the narrating self’s point of view seems unreliable, and any collective ideas which may be drawn from her experiences lose their value.
This chapter has demonstrated the collective qualities of the selves in Defoe’s narratives. These qualities are found in abundance in his earlier fictional works, especially in *Robinson Crusoe*, in which the protagonist’s spiritual conversion is of primary importance, but less so in his later works, such as *Moll Flanders* and *Roxana*. In these later works, the protagonists undergo spiritual hardening. According to Starr, the hardening process, or “hardness of heart”, is “essentially a spiritual phenomenon”, and thus the representations of it “may have spiritual assessment rather than psychological realism as their purpose” (1965: 142). However, its spiritual quality is greatly diminished if the narrator has not undergone real spiritual conversion himself/herself, and so we find that the psychological quality of the hardening process has a greater effect on the narrative than the spiritual quality. The next chapter turns, therefore, to this psychological quality, and discusses its effects on the representation of ideas of the self in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies.
Writing about one’s everyday experiences is not always intended to convey their spiritual significance. As Christopher Borsing (2017: 139) observes, it may be an expression of dissected personal identities. Chapter IV discussed what Borsing calls “an external public self” (2017: 1), or in my terminology, a collective self. Spiritual autobiographies are conducive to the creation of a collective self, as the individual experiences in these works are regarded as having the same significance for all Christians. This quality of spiritual autobiography can be found in *Robinson Crusoe*, which portrays a collective self through Crusoe’s spiritual conversion. *Captain Singleton* also exhibits the collective qualities of the self, since Bob undergoes a conversion, even though it is abrupt, but its significance is less obvious due to the picaresque qualities in the narrative. The more a particular picaresque characteristic, such as the representation of individual psychology, becomes foregrounded, the more the collective qualities of the self go into the background, as it becomes difficult to find the thematic coherence of spiritual autobiography expressed by the process of spiritual conversion in the narrative. *Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack*, and *Roxana* do have some spiritual qualities, but their protagonists fail to experience true conversion, which makes their experiences more psychological than spiritual. At first glance, *Moll Flanders* seems to contain a scene of true repentance in Newgate and to convey the process of spiritual conversion. However, Moll’s behaviour and attitude after this repentance do not improve at all, which implies that she has failed to gain the power to resolve her spiritual difficulties on her own. Consequently, what is represented by the narrating self loses its collective qualities, so the ideas of the self expressed in this book become more and more subjective. Similarly, *Colonel Jack* and *Roxana* contain spiritual experiences in the form of spiritual hardening processes, but spiritual conversion, which is the most important
phase in spiritual autobiography, does not occur in these works. As a result, what is represented by the narrating self does not have any collective qualities, but instead focuses on the subjective qualities of the protagonists’ experiences.

The present chapter, therefore, examines what Borsing calls “an interior private self” (2017: 1), or, in my terminology, a subjective self in Defoe’s narratives, focusing on various scenes dealing with psychological experiences. What I call a subjective self means a self with a subjective mind which is particular to one individual, rather than a self which embodies collective qualities in a social world. According to Maximillian Novak, Defoe was “rediscovered in a period that admired his willingness to display emotions and to create characters who display emotions” (2015: 221). As I said in Chapters II and III, he represents his characters’ psychology, including their emotions and feelings, in a skillful way which makes them seem authentic and real. As the direct, authentic representations of his protagonists’ psychology increase, his narratives are organized according to their subjective consciousness. The more the focus is on individual psychology, the less significant are the collective qualities drawn from everyday experiences, which are usually expressed in spiritual autobiographies. This chapter aims to show how Defoe created subjective selves, rather than collective ones, by representing his protagonists’ individual psychology in his fictional autobiographies, and to illustrate how his narratives develop.

Section 5.1 examines the relationship between the subjective self and other people, illustrating how the subjective self is represented differently in relation to others in Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders. Crusoe’s subjective self, which we encounter in scenes portraying his secular psychology when he is relating to others, is more likely to be conducive to the creation of a collective self as part of the process of spiritual conversion, whereas Moll’s subjective self is more a product of realistic representations of her consciousness, which present her as an individual entity who coexists with others in society.

Section 5.2 turns to the picaresque qualities of Defoe’s narratives, and explores,
in particular, one of the most important characteristics of the picaresque – the representation of a picaro’s individual psychology. We find picaresque elements in Captain Singleton, Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack and Roxana, though the representation of individual psychology in Captain Singleton is less accomplished than in the other three works. This section illustrates how Defoe’s use of the picaresque developed, comparing some psychological scenes in Captain Singleton with similar scenes in Moll Flanders and Colonel Jack.

Section 5.3 analyses the effect of the present tense in what seem like instructive parts in Moll Flanders and Roxana. As the heroines of these works are not truly regenerate penitents, there is a disparity between their inner beliefs and their outward behaviour. This affects the reader’s interpretation of the instructive parts of the narratives, as what is explained through generalizations in the present tense loses its collective quality, and becomes more like a representation of the characters’ psychology. The section demonstrates how this is technically realized in the narratives, focusing on some instructive scenes written in the RECOUNTING mode in Moll Flanders and Roxana.

Section 5.4 investigates how the creation of a subjective self is related to authenticity in the narrative. It focuses especially on the scenes in Roxana describing the heroine’s self-conscious sinning, and gives examples which show that the more the subjective qualities of a self are foregrounded in the narrative, the more the sense of reality and authenticity is promoted. Roxana’s self-conscious sinning effectively creates a duality in consciousness between the narrating self and the experiencing self. This close psychological and existential relationship between the two selves is technically expressed in the representations of consciousness through various categories. This section illustrates how the duality in consciousness in self-conscious sinning in Roxana promotes the authenticity of the subjective self, and consequently of the narrative as a whole.

Finally, Section 5.5 looks into the relationship between subjective selves and individual perception in Defoe’s narratives. Though the representation of
perception has been little discussed in studies of fictional consciousness, perception is an important part of consciousness which is connected with the description of personal experiences in fictional narratives. This section argues how the various perception representation categories are conducive to creating subjective selves in Defoe’s narratives, illustrating their use especially in the scenes of stealing in *Moll Flanders* and *Colonel Jack*, in which the representation of perception is more conspicuous than in his other works.

5.1 The functions of the self in relation to others in *Robinson Crusoe* and *Moll Flanders*

As I have already pointed out, the selves in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies have both collective and subjective qualities. As illustrated in Chapter IV, the sense of collectivity implied in his ideas of the self is deeply related to the religious ideas of the early eighteenth century. According to Borsing, such a religious self “may be open to God and to self-introspection” (2017: 77). There was a traditional view in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century that a person’s everyday experiences and the instruction gained from those experiences were common to every Christian. This way of thinking naturally led to Defoe’s creation of selves with collective qualities in his fictional autobiographies. In contrast, “the empiricist and everyday self”, as Borsing observes, exists alongside the concept of otherness (2017: 77). This individual, subjective self, unlike a religious self, is described in terms of its relationship with others, as its existence is either “crucial in the paradox of an otherness constitutive of the self” (Ricoeur 1994: 327, qtd. in Borsing 2017: 15), or asserted “at the expense of other” (Richetti 1975: 96). This section examines the representation of subjective selves in relation to others.

The previous chapter demonstrated that the collective qualities of the self are evident in *Robinson Crusoe*. This does not mean, however, that there is no representation of Crusoe’s individual secular psychology in the narrative. As
Michael Boardman argues, “Defoe created a narrator who functions in several ways”, and so, “one may begin to see how Crusoe [as narrator] can elicit so many responses, how each of his roles exerts its power on one’s memory” (1983: 29). One of the narrating self’s roles is to represent Crusoe’s real psychology in the past, as some critics have pointed out. Novak, for example, observes that Defoe was able “to use prose fiction in a manner that allows us enter [sic] the mind of Crusoe to gauge his feelings of terror over a period of time while giving a vivid picture of men struggling against the sea” (2015: 54). In Robinson Crusoe, the representations of subjective and non-spiritual emotions and feelings are rich and abundant when the experiencing self realizes or longs for the existence of other people on the island. For example, the footprint scene discussed in 4.3 depicts the experiencing self’s fear of other people on the island. While this scene represents the experiencing self’s unsettled attitude after conversion, as mentioned in 4.3, the significance of the scene can also be seen in terms of subjective psychology. The experiencing self is living alone on the island, where he can define his existence in relation to the power of God, but the possibility that there are other people on the same island distorts his relationship with the Almighty. He must now define his existence in relation to others, which creates intense fear in his mind. As Novak argues, “he longs for companionship, but finding other human beings on the island, he discovers in them a terrifying otherness as they turn out to be cannibals” (2015: 143). The footprint scene thus shows Crusoe’s emotions generated by the relationship between his subjective self and others.

In another scene, the experiencing self discloses his feelings about longing for the company of others:

(1)  (a)I cannot explain by any possible Energy of Words, what a strange longing or hankering of Desires I felt in my Soul upon this Sight;
(b)breaking out sometimes this; O that there had been but one or two; nay, or but one Soul sav’d out of this Ship, to have escap’d to me, that I might
but have had one Companion, one Fellow-Creature to have spoken to me, and to have convers’d with! (c) In all the Time of my solitary Life, I never felt so earnest, so strong a Desire after the Society of my Fellow-Creatures, or so deep a Regret at the want of it.

(d) There are some secret moving Springs in the Affections, which when they are set a going by some Object in view, or be it some Object, though not in view, yet rendered present to the Mind by the Power of Imagination, that Motion carries out the Soul by its Impetuosity to such violent eager embracings of the Object, that the Absence of it is insupportable.

(c) Such were these earnest Wishings, That but one Man had been sav’d! O that it had been but One! (f) I believe I repeated the Words, O that it had been but One! A thousand Times; (g) and the Desires were so mov’d by it, that when I spoke the Words, my Hands would clinch together, and my Fingers press the Palms of my Hands, that if I had had any soft Thing in my Hand, it wou’d have crusht in involuntarily; and my Teeth in my Head wou’d strike together, and set against one another so strong, that for some time I cou’d not part them again.

(h) Let the Naturalists explain these Things, and the Reason and Manner of them; all I can say to them, is, to describe the Fact, which was even surprising to me when I found it; though I knew not from what it should proceed; it was doubtless the effect of ardent Wishes, and of strong Ideas form’d in my Mind, realizing the Comfort, which the Conversation of one of my Fellow-Christians would have been to me. (RC: 158-159)

The passage depicts how the experiencing self felt when he saw the ship washed ashore. The narrating self seeks to represent his past feelings, but he says “[he] cannot explain by any possible Energy of Words” his strong feelings at that time, which are represented through psycho-narration from the point of view of the
narrating self in (1a). Though he says it is impossible to convey them, however, the narrating self begins to represent how his past self felt mimetically, shifting the deictic centre to the past, younger self in (1b). He tells us about his wishes at that time in the following words, “O that there had been but one or two; nay, or but one Soul sav’d out of this Ship, to have escap’d to me, that I might but have had one Companion, one Fellow-Creature to have spoken to me, and to have convers’d with!” The point of view then shifts back to the narrating self in (1c) when he explains how earnestly his past self longed to meet “Fellow-Creatures” once he actually saw there was a possibility of doing so. This psycho-narration conveys the past self’s mental condition with strong expressions such as “*never* felt *so* earnest, *so* strong a Desire … or *so* deep a Regret …” (italics added), and thus it heightens the immediateness and eagerness of his desires, which are represented through DT in (1b). The first paragraph renders the subjective psychology of the experiencing self, and then Crusoe’s ardent secular wishes are expressed as collective human nature in the second paragraph. This human nature which is common to everyone who experiences such strong feelings is expressed in the gnomic present tense (“are”, “carries”, “is”) in (1d).

The third paragraph renders the subjective psychology of the experiencing self, like the first paragraph. The past self’s “earnest Wishings” are repeated again and again mimetically (“but one Man had been sav’d! O that it had been but One!” in (1e), “*O that it had been but One!*” in (1f)). These strong desires represented through FDT are reinforced by the following psycho-narration and narration in (1g), which describes his physical reactions to these desires, showing how strong they were (e.g. “my Hands would clinch together”, “my Teeth in my Head wou’d strike together”). Again, in the last paragraph, the narrating self’s comment on this psychological experience is expressed in the present tense (“Let the Naturalists explain these Things, and the Reason and Manner of them; all I can say to them, is, to describe the Fact”), which implies collective ideas derived from the experience.

Note also that in (1h), the narrating self explains that his past self was well
aware of “the Comfort, which the Conversation of one of [his] Fellow-Christians would have been to [him]”. His longing to converse with “Fellow-Christians” implies that his desires are not solely the expressions of secular psychology, but also are related to the process of spiritual development. In this way, the experiencing self’s subjective psychology is turned into a representation of the collective mindset common to all devout Christians. As in the footprint passage, the creation of a subjective self through the representation of individual, secular psychology helps to develop Crusoe’s attitudes and behaviour after his conversion, and consequently to clarify the significance of the collective self.

These scenes suggest that there may be other people on the island, who may be either dangerous or friendly. When Crusoe discovers that there are other people on the island, his peculiar subjective self seems to become fused with others and to become more ordinary. Boardman makes an interesting observation about how Crusoe’s relationship with the men who came ashore affects his role as narrator:

The use of Crusoe as impersonal chronicler of unsystematized experience is actually as rare in his story as it is common in earlier narrative and in Defoe’s own Journal [of a Plague Year] and Memoirs of a Cavalier. ... Certainly, Crusoe becomes more vitally human, and therefore more interesting, when he washes up on the island and the clichés of reportorial adventure can be left behind. Even so, once he leaves the island, he reverts back to the personal cipher he was before, and the interplay McKillop notes as characteristic of Defoe fades away. (Boardman 1983: 40)

Crusoe’s subjective self is created in relation to the collective ideas of the self drawn from spiritual experiences, especially when he is alone on the island and conversing with God. However, once his solitude comes to an end and he meets other people on the island, his self becomes more ordinary and mundane. In Robinson Crusoe, therefore, the subjective self is represented primarily for enhancing the significance
of the collective self. Indeed, as Donald Crawly observes, Defoe was selective in displaying “those aspects of phenomena that, according to Defoe’s Puritan beliefs, were necessary to Crusoe’s abstracted spiritual reflections” (1972: xv).²

In Defoe’s other fictional autobiographies, the protagonists find their subjective self in relation to other people, and their aloneness in society brings this self into relief. In Moll Flanders, for example, Moll’s subjective self is foregrounded by her solitude in society. She feels alone throughout her life, being “[u]nable to confide fully in anyone”, and she “has not moved on from the physical cell or metaphysical Hell of Newgate” (Borsing 2017: 132). This aloneness is “a social necessity and personal reality” (Richetti 1975: 112) for her. Her self is not seen as “deriv[ing] from the other” but as being asserted “at the expense of other” (Richetti 1975: 96). Her self in the narrative is “a means of enacting for us independence of the ‘other’, that is, of society, history, and circumstance in general” (Richetti 1975: 96), which leads to the creation of a subjective self rather than a collective one in this work. Moll Flanders is very effective in representing this self in a realistic way by “keeping us very close to the consciousness of Moll Flanders as she struggles to make her recollection clear” (Watt 1957: 101). In Watt’s view, “the effect of spontaneous authenticity” is heightened by some narrative features that might seem to interfere with it, such as “the lack of marked pauses within the sentences, and the frequent recapitulations” (1957: 101). The following examples (2) and (3) illustrate how the use of various consciousness representation categories is also conducive to creating Moll’s subjective self in an authentic way. The passage (2) describes her emotions when her fourth husband, whom she married in Lancashire, leaves her:

(2) (a) Nothing that ever befell me in my Life, sunk so deep into my Heart as this Farewel; (b) I reproach’d him a Thousand times in my Thoughts for leaving me, for I would have gone with him thro’ the World, if I had beg’d my Bread. (c) I felt in my Pocket, and there I found ten Guineas, his Gold
Watch, and two little Rings, one a small Diamond Ring, worth only about six Pound, and the other a plain Gold Ring.

(d) I sat me down and look’d upon these Things two Hours together, and scarce spoke a Word, till my Maid interrupted me, by telling me my Dinner was ready: (e) I eat but little, and after Dinner I fell into a vehement Fit of crying, every now and then, calling him by his Name, which was James, (f) O Jemy! said I, come back, come back, I’ll give you all I have; I’ll beg, I’ll starve with you, (g) and thus I run Raving about the Room several times, and then sat down between whiles, and then walking about again, call’d upon him to come back, and then cry’d again; and thus I pass’d the Afternoon; till about seven a-Clock when it was near Dusk in the Evening, being August, when to my unspeakable Surprize he comes back into the Inn, but without a Servant, and comes directly up into my Chamber. (MF: 128-129)

The passage begins with a sentence consisting of psycho-narration, that is, (2a), in which the narrating self says that her separation from this husband is the most depressing experience in her life. This is a representation of past consciousness from the point of view of the narrating self in the RECOUNTING mode. Although her past psychology is represented by the self-possessed, detached narrating self, the negative expression, “Nothing … sunk so deep into my Heart” (italics added), tells us how strongly and deeply she was affected by his departure. She goes so far as to say in (2b) that “[she] would have gone with him thro’ the World, if [she] had beg’d [her] Bread”, which clearly contradicts her principle that gold is more important than love. This mental attitude, which is unusual for Moll as she loves gold, continues to be expressed in (2c): her tactile perceptions of the valuables left in her pocket are listed in a blunt way as if they were of much less value than her husband’s staying. This is also clearly expressed in (2d) at the beginning of the second paragraph: the experiencing self continues to “[look] upon these Things two
Hours together” without saying a word. The fact that she spends two hours without doing anything tells us that her mind is occupied with her longing for her husband rather than with the valuables, which are of little value to her. Her depressed feelings are shown by her attitude and actions, such as “eat but little” and “fell into a vehement Fit of crying”, in (2e) in the form of narration. Up to this point, the past self’s thoughts and feelings are rendered basically from the point of view of the narrating self in the RECOUNTING mode, using diegetic consciousness representation categories. Though the strength of her emotions was implied from (2a) to (2e), as explained above, her depressed feelings are not rendered mimetically in these sentences.

The mimetic rendering of her feelings in (2f), therefore, captures the most intense moment of her emotion at that time. What is implied in the sentences from (2a) to (2e) breaks out into the words, “O Jemy! … come back, come back, I’ll give you all I have; I’ll beg, I’ll starve with you” in (2f). This is the emotionally crucial moment in this scene, and her husband does actually come back, as stated in the latter part of (2g), because he hears her saying “O Jemy! O Jemy! come back, come back” (MF: 129). The sentences of narration with occasional NRSA (“call’d upon him to come back”) and NV (“cry’d again”) in (2g), like the psycho-narration from (2a) to (2e), emphasise Moll’s heightened emotions in (2f). Her desire that he should come back and the fact that he actually does come back are crucial, which is indicated by the use of the historical present tense “comes” in the last part of (2g). The historical present tense, as discussed in 2.5, “has a relieving function in relation to the surrounding past-tense context” (Fludernik 2003: 124), and here it represents her “unspeakable Surprize” mimetically. The mimetic rendering of her emotion in (2f) is thus the most important moment in the scene. The sequence of her emotions in (2) seems real and authentic to the reader, because “[s]he simulates proper responses so devotedly that they acquire a reality of their own” (Zimmerman1975: 88), due to the effective use of various consciousness representation categories.
In other psychological scenes, Moll’s emotions continue to be represented mimetically through (F)DT. The passage (3) portrays the past self’s psychology when she married a London bank clerk, while keeping many secrets from him:

(3) (a) I turn’d from him, for it fill’d my Eyes with Tears too; and I ask’d him leave to retire a little to my Chamber: If ever I had a Grain of true Repentance for a vitious and abominable Life for 24 Years past, it was then. (b) O! what a felicity is it to Mankind, said I, to myself, that they cannot see into the Hearts of one another! (c) How happy had it been for me, if I had been Wife to a Man of so much honesty, and so much Affection from the Beginning?

(d) Then it occur’d to me what an abominable Creature am I! and how is this innocent Gentleman going to be abus’d by me! (e) How little does he think, that having Divorc’d a Whore, he is throwing himself into the Arms of another! that he is going to Marry one that has lain with two Brothers, and has had three Children by her own Brother! one that was born in Newgate, whose Mother was a Whore, and is now a transported Thief; one that has lain with thirteen Men, and has had a Child since he saw me! (f) poor Gentleman! said I, What is he going to do? (g) After this reproaching my self was over, it followed thus: Well, if I must be his Wife, if it please God to give me Grace, I’ll be a true Wife to him, and love him suitably to the strange Excess of his Passion for me; I will make him amends, if possible, by what he shall see, for the Cheats and Abuses I put upon him, which he does not see. (MF: 152-153)

When Moll agreed to marry the bank clerk, he was so delighted that “Tears [stood] in his eyes” (MF: 152). The sentence (3a) says she was moved by his tears, and she “had a Grain of true Repentance” for the first time in her sinful life. From the sentence (3b) onwards, the past self’s heightened emotions are rendered in (F)DT,
with ardent, spontaneous words. In (3b), the past self secretly thinks how fortunate it is for us that we cannot know what other people think. This implies that she cannot disclose her secrets to this honest husband, which drives her to psychological solitude even though he is someone she can trust. This ironic feeling induces strong regrets over her unfortunate marriages as in (3c). Her self-accusation is then expressed in (3d) and (3e). The past self confesses her long history of crimes and sins to herself in (3e), but this can never be revealed to her husband, because then their marriage would end. In (3f), she further expresses her feelings, putting herself in her husband’s place. The sentences (3b) to (3f) are all represented in the exclamatory mood, which structurally indicates her highly emotional situation. Finally, (3g) describes mimetically how she intends to make amends for deceiving her husband. Her determination to be “a true Wife” without disclosing her secrets to her husband is not what a truly repentant person would do. Her inner thoughts and feelings represented as real and authentic reveal her real self here. Novak argues that she so often “lies, conceals, [and] distorts the truth” that the reader is forced “to search behind the explanations for the real Moll Flanders” (2015: 30). His claim certainly holds true, as the narrating self avoids revealing her real character (see, for example, (58) in 3.6). On the other hand, the experiencing self’s real, spontaneous thoughts and feelings are frequently revealed to the reader as in (3), though they are not confided to her husband. This confessional narrative of her secret criminal mind heightens the sense of an authentic individual self and reveals the real Moll. John Richetti claims that “the more the characters have to ‘reveal’ (one can only reveal what was at some point unknown to others), the more they may be said to exist” (1975: 128, italics added). Moll reveals a great deal about herself, so she “may be said to exist”, and what she says seems authentic.

As briefly mentioned in Chapter IV, the ideologies of subjectivity and individualism in the early eighteenth century “depend[ed] on a community of agents and on the consent between individuals belonging to particular social groups and parties” (Fludernik 2014: 691, italics original). According to Richetti, “Defoe’s
great achievement in [Moll Flanders] was to communicate something important in the structure of eighteenth-century feeling” (1975: 139), that is, “the delightful autonomy of the self” (1975: 144), in a way that did not “violate the equally autonomous facts of nature and society” (1975: 144). In Moll Flanders, “the private self … preserves itself without falsifying the destructive truth of public experience” (Richetti 1975: 140). Moll’s subjective self is created and displayed in society, which is full of other people. Unlike Robinson Crusoe, Moll Flanders shows how an individual, subjective self functions within a society governed by collective ideas.

5.2 Picaresque and individual psychology in Captain Singleton and other picaresque works

Most of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, namely, Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack, Roxana, and to a lesser extent Captain Singleton, were influenced by the picaresque novel. Brean Hammond observes that Defoe “selected from [the picaresque], he so to speak ‘tamed’ it: pruned its luxuriance and took from it the strands that spoke to his concerns” (2015: 149). He intentionally used picaresque elements to express his interests and concerns in his fiction. This section examines the characteristics of the picaresque as a literary genre, suggesting that its relationship with individual psychology is the most important quality in Defoe’s fiction, and illustrates how he developed the use of this quality in his fictional autobiographies.

As briefly mentioned in Chapter I, the Spanish work La vida de Lazarillo de Tormes (1554) is considered to be the first picaresque novel. Although there has been some disagreement about the definition of “picaresque”, it is generally said that the essential characteristics of a picaresque novel are “(1) the narration of a life expounding the circumstances leading to a final situation; (2) the implicit satire of the novel that reflects the social bias of the author; (3) the picaro as protagonist” (Ardila 2015a: 15-16). Another important characteristic is verisimilitude. According to J. A. Garrido Ardila, the picaresque novel is “a verisimilar fictional
autobiography” (2015a: 4). It portrays realistically the life of an individual who suffers from “individual alienation from and loneliness within a coercive and chaotic social order” (Blackburn 1979: 9), and it represents his/her “psychological sophistication” (Ardila 2015a: 5). Ardila observes that a picaro, that is, the protagonist of a picaresque novel, is depicted as a person who “undergoes a progressive psychological change” (2015a: 14). The representation of a picaro’s psychology as part of a believable fictional life is necessary so that the writer can present what he/she considers to be social problems. For example, according to Ardila, Bunyan’s *Life and Death of Mr Badman* is “an inquisitive exploration of the picaro’s psychology with the purpose to undermine and question the established social order. His psychological development required a coherent narrative structure and a verisimilar plot” (2015b: 127, italics added). Ardila goes on to say the following about *Moll Flanders*:

By providing a complete account of her [Moll’s] circumstances – namely her conviction, repentance, life as a convict in Virginia and subsequent economic success – Defoe uses a legal requirement to tell a story with a profound religious moral, demonstrating that economic prosperity, which under Calvinist theology is the sign of salvation, must always be pursued. In so doing, Defoe recalls the picaresque in order to posit his religious and social ideology in an attempt to counter the adversity that faced Puritans during that era.

(Ardila 2015b: 129)

The representation of the heroine’s psychology – her loneliness, dilemmas, repentance, reflection and beliefs – is, therefore, a necessary part of *Moll Flanders* as it enables the author to present his message to the reader.

Defoe’s fictional autobiographies cannot, however, be regarded as purely picaresque novels. Alexander Blackburn says that “eighteenth-century novelists produced a greatly modified version of the picaresque”, because the eighteenth-
century mind was different from that of both earlier and later periods due to “[a] sense of the real, a sense that objective experience of the world has validity” (Blackburn 1979: 14). Consequently, Defoe’s fictional autobiographies are different from “the reality-destroying style of the Spanish picaresque” (Blackburn 1979: 23). Defoe’s *Moll Flanders*, *Colonel Jack* and *Roxana* are regarded as examples of the eighteenth-century English picaresque novel. *Captain Singleton*, which was published before these works, is somewhat different from them as regards its use of picaresque qualities.

Defoe’s use of the picaresque becomes evident in *Captain Singleton*, which was published after the *Robinson Crusoe* trilogy, but his use of it is less developed in this work, as it does not fully take advantage of what is one of the most salient characteristics of the genre, namely the representation of a picaro’s subjective psychology. As Blackburn argues, a picaro exists in loneliness generated by “the outgrowth of the sense of failed identity, of the instability of an inferior social standing, and of the failure to find human solidarity” (1979: 20). This picaresque aspect is not fully expressed in *Captain Singleton*, as Bob is almost always “accompanied, the ‘I’ becoming ‘we’” (Blackburn 1979: 20). At an early stage of his life, when his gypsy mother was hanged and he was left alone, he was taken by the captain of a ship, who he thought was like his own father. Misfortunes soon befell him, however. Their ship was taken by a Turkish pirates, and then by a Portuguese man-of-war, so Bob grew up among Portuguese sailors. The narrating self says that “[he] was exactly fitted for their Society indeed; for [he] had no Sense of Virtue or Religion upon [him]” (*CS*: 6). As he has no sense of morality or religion, the young Bob can neither have the sense of a collective self nor express his individual, subjective self in their society, and his subjective self becomes a part of the sailors’ rough world. His situation changes as his life proceeds, but this basic fact that he is one of a group of pirates does not change in the course of the narrative. After a while, some of the crew of the Portuguese ship, including Bob, are left on an African shore because of their plan to murder the captain, so they decide to make
decisions as a group. Bob is very self-conscious about being the youngest member of this group so he suppresses his opinions and tries to fit in with the others. In the following passage, he speaks out for the first time and gives his opinion for the group’s sake:

(4) I never proposed to speak in their General Consultation before; but finding they were at some Loss about what kind of Vessel they should make, and how to make it; and what would be fit for our Use, and what not; I told them I found they were at a full Stop in their Counsels of every kind; that it was true we could never pretend to go over to Goa, or the Coast of Malabar in a Canoe, which tho’ we could all get into it, and that it would bear the Sea well enough, yet would not hold our Provisions, and especially we could not put fresh Water enough into it for the Voyage; and to make such an Adventure would be nothing but meer running into certain Destruction, and yet that nevertheless I was for making a Canoe.

(CS: 24)

In this passage, it seems that the narrating self expresses his younger self’s opinions in order to imply that his past self’s consciousness belongs to that of the group, rather than to show his individuality by representing his feelings and emotions. His opinions are rendered in IS, which is the representation of consciousness from the point of view of the narrating self. This formally implies that the experiencing self is calm and unemotional when he gives his opinions for the group’s benefit, and he wants to be a member of the group.

The narrating self in Captain Singleton tends to describe group actions, behaviour and consciousness. There are many sentences representing group consciousness beginning with the subject we, such as “We were now at a great Loss” (CS: 27). There are, of course, sentences whose subject is I, but as discussed in 4.3, they tend to express collective qualities rather than subjective ones in this work.
This, I suggest, is a consequence of Defoe’s endeavour to incorporate spiritual qualities into the picaresque. As briefly mentioned in 4.3, Captain Singleton is a mixture of spiritual and picaresque elements. Critics have different opinions of this combination of collective and subjective qualities. Richetti, for example, contends that Bob “establishes a free society of pirate comrades in which the power of the group and the autonomy of the individual coexist perfectly” (1975: 65). Other critics, however, regard the amalgam as a failure, arguing that although Defoe’s narratives “are not damaged by the religious attitudes that he expresses in them, even if we feel that these attitudes are in themselves hypocritical”, his use of the picaresque “exacerbates his difficulties in convincing his reader of the psychological validity of his characters” (Zimmerman 1975: 52). In other words, Defoe’s use of the picaresque in this narrative, which expresses collective qualities means that his main protagonist’s subjective qualities lack validity. In this fictional autobiography, neither a subjective self nor a collective self is emphasised, as Bob’s conversion is abrupt, and his subjective consciousness is only partially represented.

Defoe’s more successful picaresque works portray picaros’ subjective psychology in a realistic way. Everett Zimmerman says that the use of the picaresque in Captain Singleton “does not convince us of the psychological validity of its central character” (1975: 53). However, in Defoe’s other picaresque works – that is, Moll Flanders, Colonel Jack and Roxana – the representation of the protagonists’ subjective psychology encourages the reader to be involved in the fictional world, and the characters’ psychology represented in these works seem authentic and real. The subjective psychology of the picaros in these works wavers “between a belief in free will and a belief in fate or necessity” (Hammond 2015: 149), which distinguishes them from typical traditional picaros:

In particular, the solitariness and marginalisation from society of the picaro as against the desire for reintegration manifested by all Defoe’s criminals, the commitment to a philosophical realism present in Defoe but not in the
picaresque – which enables Defoe’s protagonists to assemble an identity and to become known by readers in a way that picaros cannot – and Defoe’s providential understanding of ‘necessity’, distinguish him.

(Hammond 2015: 153)

According to Hammond, the two aspects of the picaresque which gripped Defoe the most were (a) “the question of moral agency and the ethical dilemmas deriving from that”, and (b) “what the vicissitudes of the protagonists’ lives had to say about the nature of society, and of rank – gentility – in particular” (2015: 145). In Defoe’s more successful picaresque works, namely *Moll Flanders*, *Colonel Jack* and *Roxana*, the concepts of necessity and gentility make us acknowledge the characters’ psychological validity and encourage us to feel empathy with them. The rest of this section shows how necessity and gentility contribute to creating picaresque subjective selves in *Moll Flanders* and *Colonel Jack*.

Defoe’s picaros are different from traditional ones because he portrays their psychological aspects, which are usually not dealt with in traditional picaresque novels. In *Moll Flanders*, Moll’s behaviour and attitudes based on her beliefs – especially regarding natural behaviour – are deeply related to the representations of her psychology. Natural behaviour is a key concept in this work, because it is always her “stated guide to human existence” (Columbus 1963: 428). As Novak observes, “Defoe drew upon [natural law] for his moral judgments concerning natural behavior” (1964: 200). *Moll Flanders* displays “the disparity between the judgments of the repentant Moll concerning her life passed under the laws of nature” (Novak 1964: 200), or in other words, the different judgments made by the narrating self about what her past self did under natural law. Her natural behaviour and attitudes in particular situations are generally influenced by her feelings of necessity, and so her thoughts and feelings which accompany this natural behaviour and attitudes are often represented, especially when she is seized by feelings of necessity regarding money:
(5) On the other hand, tho’ I was not without secret Reproaches of my own Conscience for the Life I led, and that even in the greatest height of the Satisfaction I ever took, yet I had the terrible prospect of Poverty and Starving which lay on me as a frightful Spectre, so that there was no looking behind me: But as Poverty brought me into it [whoredom], so fear of Poverty kept me in it, and I frequently resolv’d to leave it quite off, if I could but come to lay up Money enough to maintain me: But these were Thoughts of no weight, and whenever he came to me they vanish’d; for his Company was so delightful, that there was no being melancholly when he was there, the Reflections were all the Subject of those Hours when I was alone. (MF: 101)

(6) I often reflected how my Lover at the Bath, strook by the Hand of God, repented and abandon’d me, and refus’d to see me any more, tho’ he lov’d me to an extreme; but I, promoted by that worst of Devils, Poverty, return’d to the vile Practice, and made the Advantage of what they call a handsome Face, be the Relief to my Necessities, and Beauty be a Pimp to Vice. (MF: 157)

(7) This was doubtless the happy Minute, when if I had hearken’d to the blessed hint from whatsoever hand it came, I had still a cast for an easie Life; but my Fate was otherwise determin’d, the busie Devil that so industriously drew me in, had too fast hold of me to let me go back; but as Poverty brought me into the Mire, so Avarice kept me in, till there was no going back; as to the Arguments which my Reason dictated for perswading me to lay down, Avarice stept in and said, go on, go on; you have had very good luck, go on till you have gotten Four or Five Hundred Pound, and then you shall leave off, and then you may live easie without working at all. (MF: 170)
As is clear in these passages, “Poverty” is the keyword which affects Moll’s internal states. The narrating self frequently tells us how her younger self thought and felt when driven by the fear of poverty, and explains why she could not resist the devil of poverty with the power of her conscience, for example, “so fear of Poverty kept me in it” in (5), “but I, promoted by that worst of Devils, Poverty, return’d to the vile Practice” in (6), “as Poverty brought me into the Mire” in (7). The diegetic modes of consciousness representation predominate throughout (5) and (6). For example, there are many sentences of IT (e.g. “I often reflected how my Lover at the Bath, strook by the Hand of God, repented and abandon’d me, and refus’d to see me any more” in (6)), NRTA (e.g. “tho’ I was not without secret Reproaches of my own Conscience for the Life I led” in (5)) and NI (e.g. “even in the greatest height of the Satisfaction I ever took” in (5)). They also occupy most of (7), but towards the end of the passage, the mimetic mode is used to represent the voice of avarice which rings in Moll’s head (“go on, go on; you have had very good luck, go on till you have gotten Four or Five Hundred Pound, and then you shall leave off, and then you may live easie without working at all”). Her thoughts are rendered mimetically here so the reader can feel the same as her when reading this part. In both the diegetic mode and the mimetic mode, her feelings about poverty and need are rendered realistically and openly in order to present her subjective self.

As a number of critics have pointed out, *Moll Flanders* is a narrative which powerfully portrays Moll’s individuality. Her story is organized according to her own consciousness. It is, as Richetti observes, “something which happens as much from Moll’s sense of freedom as from ignorance, and something which is the real beginning of her strength rather than merely the first surrender of circumstances” (1975: 101). Novak similarly argues that “Defoe’s sophisticated attitude toward human nature as governed by natural law allowed him to see mankind free from the claims of religion and social customs” (1964: 203). The passages quoted above illustrate how Moll’s subjective psychological states are based on her sense of need, which depends on natural laws, that is, what she needs to do to avoid starving, rather
than socially imposed ones. Though her sense of necessity generates a problem of moral ambivalence, the primary concern in this work is her individual psychology rather than the spiritual or social significance of her experiences, which consequently brings her subjective self into relief.

In Colonel Jack, according to Blackburn, “Defoe’s special attitude about ‘necessity’” (1979: 101) is even clearer. Jack’s sense of necessity is closely associated with his “aspiration towards gentility” (Hammond 2015: 150), which is prominent throughout the book. Traditional picaros do not normally yearn for their absent family, but, as Zimmerman contends, “it is precisely the concern for his absent family that makes Jack cling tenaciously to his airy notions of gentility” (1975: 150). Told by his nurse to remember that “[his] Mother was a Gentlewoman”, that “[his] Father was a Man of Quality”, and that “[he] was a Gentleman” (CJ: 3), Jack believes from childhood that he comes from genteel origins. His vague notions of gentility are repeatedly mentioned in order to imply that “[f]ar more so than in the picaresque, Jack’s quest [for gentility] is an interior one” (Hammond 2015: 150). In (8), the child Jack overhears a conversation between two gentlemen, and is struck by what one of them says:

(8) … but for a Man of Breeding, Sir, says he, a Gentleman! it ought to be look’d upon as below them; Gentlemen know better, I beseech you Sir, when you are tempted to swear, always ask your self, is this like a Gentleman? does this become me as a Gentleman! do but ask your self that Question, and your Reason will prevail, you will soon leave it off.

(CJ: 61)

When Jack hears this, “it made the Blood run Chill in [his] Veins, when [the gentleman] said Swearing was only fit for such as [those like Jack] were”, and “from that time forward [he] never had the least Inclination to Swearing, or ill Words, and abhored it when [he] heard the other Boys do it” (CJ: 61). The questions
which the man asks, “is this like a Gentleman? does this become me as a Gentleman!”, echo in Jack’s head throughout his life. Whether his behaviour is gentlemanly or not is his basis for the judgment of right or wrong. For instance, after robbing a poor woman in Kentish Town, he tries to return the money because robbing a poor woman is not like a gentleman:

(9) (a) But my Heart was full of the poor Woman’s Case at Kentish Town, (b) and I resolv’d, if possible to find her out, and give her her Money: (c) With the abhorrence that fill’d my Mind at the Cruelty of that Act, there necessarily follow’d a little Distaste of the thing it self, (d) and now it came into my Head with a double force, that this was the High Road to the Devil, and that certainly this was not the Life of a Gentleman! (CJ: 67)

Although his thoughts and feelings are expressed in the RECOUNTING mode with NI in (9c) and IT in (9b) and (9d), they are expressed in (9d) with the PAST + NOW construction in the reporting clause (“now it came into my Head”) and with an exclamation mark at the end of the passage (“certainly this was not the Life of a Gentleman!”), which are coloured representations that reflect the immediate psychology of the experiencing self. Similarly, in (10) to (13) below, Jack’s strong desire to be and behave like a gentleman is expressed in diegetic categories of consciousness representation with the PAST + NOW construction:

(10) … a thing which from the time, I saw it in Edinborough, was so terrible to me, … that I was now in a certain way of Living, which was honest, and which I could say, was not unbecoming a Gentleman. (CJ: 104)

(11) Now I found differing Sentiments of things taking Place in my Mind; and first, I had a solid Principle of Justice and Honesty, and a secret Horror at things pass’d, when I look’d back upon my former Life: That Original
something, I knew not what, that used formerly to Check me in the first meannesses of my Youth, and us’d to Dictate to me when I was but a Child, that I was to be a Gentleman, continued to Operate upon me NOW, in a manner I cannot Describe; (CJ: 155)

(12) Now, I look’d upon my self as one Buried alive, in a remote Part of the World, where I could see nothing at all, and hear but a little of what was seen, and that little, not till at least half a Year after it was done, and sometimes a Year or more; and in a Word, the old Reproach often came in my way; Namely that even this was not yet, the Life of a Gentleman. (CJ: 172)

(13) I was exceedingly pleas’d with my new Circumstances, and now I us’d to say to my self, I was come to what I was Born to, and that I had never till now liv’d the Life of a Gentleman. (CJ: 207)

As Hammond observes, Jack’s yearning for his absent family and for gentility “is certainly a search for identity in the sense of locating the bedrock of conscience and religious belief that renders the self accountable” (2015: 150). His aspiration for gentility is thus what forms his subjective self, and his judgments about conscience and religious belief are influenced by his notion of gentility.

Defoe is most indebted to the picaresque, in terms of the creation of fictional subjective selves, because of its interest in characters’ psychology. The realistic representation of the picaro’s psychology, which is an important aspect of picaresque novels, affects the way that the self is dissected. In spiritual autobiographies, spiritually significant experiences are dissected and narrated episodically in order to be eventually integrated into a theme, namely the autobiographer’s spiritual development, which follows a path similar to that of every devout Christian. In picaresque novels, however, the dissection of the self is
more concerned with the protagonist’s individual psychology. They are organized according to his/her subjective consciousness, and not according to the theme of spiritual development, so they are very conducive to the creation of subjective selves in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies.

Defoe’s characters, however, do not develop like traditional picaros. As Zimmerman observes, “[t]hey draw back from their sense of outer and inner chaos, and attempt to impose an order on their world. They persist in attaching themselves to ‘some idea or ideal of conduct’, however dubious it may be” (1975: 49). The next section thus turns to Defoe’s characters’ world views, and observes how they often utter what appear to be collective truths, using the present tense.

5.3 The heroines’ subjective psychology in Moll Flanders and Roxana

The experiences described in a narrative become more psychologically individual, rather than spiritually universal, when the narrative is organized according to a character’s subjective consciousness, rather than according to a theme which connects all the episodes. The experiences in non-fictional spiritual autobiographies are given some thematic coherence for the reader’s benefit, but the experiences in fictional autobiographies are often represented from the subjective point of view of the protagonist, since one of the aims of these works is to entertain the reader. Therefore, as Robert Donovan argues, the real subject matter in works such as Moll Flanders, which have few spiritual qualities, “is not the incidents in themselves, but the incidents as seen from a particular point of view” (1966: 22). The protagonist’s point of view is more or less limited and biased, which is reflected in his/her world view. This section examines how the protagonist’s world view is biased, focusing especially on the use of the present tense in the outwardly instructive scenes in Moll Flanders and Roxana.

As briefly mentioned in 4.4, Moll Flanders and Roxana are seen either as “spiritual confessions” or as “secular and psychological works of self-absolution”
(Borsing 2017: 119). However, as I said in 4.4, Moll and Roxana’s narratives cannot be regarded as true spiritual writing because their penitence is illusory and not real, which makes the reader doubt the validity of their instructions. It seems, therefore, that they give their perfunctory instructions based on their subjective generalizations in order to present their world view for the sake of their own absolution. Their ways of seeing the world are partial and biased, and not collective or universal as in genuine spiritual autobiographies, and their point of view is correspondingly limited. What makes their narratives coherent is not a spiritual theme, but rather their commitment to their own consciousness which forms their identity. As Boardman (1983) observes:

Her [Moll’s] point of view, however, never deviates, a consistency she shares only with Roxana. ... Moll never simply reports what she sees for its own intrinsic interest. She melts the world down and recasts it in the mold of her own personality. ... Indeed, Moll seems so much more vivid than earlier narrators not just because of the much-praised paraphernalia of realism – many earlier pseudomemoirs used similar strategies of internal confirmation – but because Defoe refuses to dilute the intensity of her focus.

(Boardman 1983: 124)

The present section analyses the creation of a subjective self in relation to the subjective generalizations made by the narrating selves in Moll Flanders and Roxana, and focuses on the effect of the present tense which they use.

Since Moll is not really penitent, the moral instructions she gives in the narrative do not seem genuine, which, according to Donovan, “is clearly demonstrated, not so much by the disparity between her professed beliefs and her behavior, as by the fact that the disparity does not seem to damage her complacency” (1966: 33). Due to her failure to repent sincerely and be regenerated, her wicked behaviour, which is inconsistent with her beliefs and conscience, makes her feel
self-satisfied. However much she insists that “every Branch of [her] Story, if duly
consider’d, may be useful to honest People” (MF: 224), her generalizations are
subjective and her instructions end up seeming fake and unconvincing. In (14), she
presents her views about women, drawn from the case of a woman whom she helped
to marry a certain man, after the woman had rejected his first attempt to woo and
marry her:

(14) I cannot but remind the Ladies here how much they place themselves
below the common Station of a Wife, which if I may be allow’d not to be
Partial is low enough already; I say they place themselves below their
common Station, and prepare their own Mortifications, by their
submitting so to be insulted by the Men before-hand, which I confess I
see no Necessity of.

This Relation may serve therefore to let the Ladies see, that the
Advantage is not so much on the other Side, as the Men think it is; …

Nothing is more certain, than that the Ladies always gain of the Men,
by keeping their Ground, and letting their pretended Lovers see they can
Resent being slighted, and that they are not afraid of saying No. …

No Man of common Sense will value a Woman the less, for not
giving up herself at the first Attack, or for not accepting his Proposal
without enquiring into his Person or Character; on the contrary he must
think her the weakest of all Creatures in the World, as the Rate of Men
now goes; …

I would fain have the Conduct of my Sex a little Regulated in this
particular, which is the Thing, in which of all the parts of Life, I think at
this Time we suffer most in: ’Tis nothing but lack of Courage, the fear of
not being Marry’d at all, … but would the Ladies once but get above that
Fear, and manage rightly, they would more certainly avoid it by standing
their Ground, … and if they did not Marry so soon as they may do
otherwise, they would make themselves amends by Marrying safer; she
is always Married too soon, who gets a bad Husband, and she is never
Married too late, who gets a good one: … (MF: 62-64)

The phrases, “I cannot but remind the Ladies here …” in the first paragraph and
“This Relation may serve therefore to let the Ladies see, …” in the second
paragraph, clearly indicate that (14) is an instructive part written in the
RECOUNTING mode from the point of view of the narrating self, so it is obvious
that the present tense is being used with a gnomic sense. Although the narrating self
declares that the story about her friend may be instructive to women, what she has
drawn from this experience turns out to be unreliable and perfunctory. For one thing,
what the narrating self presents as universally true and therefore instructive does
not seem to be really so, since she uses phrases which imply her subjectivity, such
as “as I may say”, “I observe” and “I think” (MF: 62-64). This suggests that her
generalizations are based on her own opinions, and that her instructions are
perfunctory. In other words, the present tenses in (14) do not express universal
qualities, but reflect the subjective consciousness of the narrating self. Also, the
instructive value of the sentences in the present tense in (14) is very doubtful,
because what the younger Moll does in order to get a good husband is to trick a rich
man into marrying her, which is narrated right after this passage. The use of the
gnomic present tense in the RECOUNTING mode is a kind of camouflage to make
her subjective ideas seem like objective truths. The present tenses in (14) look like
the gnomic present tense, but actually they are examples of the present tense being
used to present the narrating self’s immediate consciousness. The passage, therefore,
portrays the narrating self’s consciousness, rather than giving instructions based on
generally acknowledged ideas drawn from her experience.

What makes this seemingly instructive passage interesting in terms of the
representation of individual psychology is that it can also be seen as reflecting the
experiencing self’s consciousness. Though it is explicitly declared at the beginning
of (14) that the passage is coming from the point of view of the narrating self (“I cannot but remind the Ladies here …”), the context suggests that the younger Moll’s advice is based on this perfunctorily instructive view. In this sense, the narrating self is expressing her past as well as her present consciousness in (14). In other words, the present tenses in (14) give a sense of duality, as they allow us to see the minds of both the narrating self and the experiencing self simultaneously.

The following passages from (15) to (18) also contain the seeming gnomic present tense, which shows the duality between the narrating self and the experiencing self. The generalizations expressed in the present tense in these passages may seem like instructions, but they are actually monologic representations of the subjective consciousness of both the past self and the present self. In the following passage (15), the narrating self gives her subjective view “for the Direction of [her] Sex” (MF: 103), which comes from her experience of being deserted by a man for whom she was a whore (also quoted as (65) in 3.6):

(15) I cannot but observe also, and leave it for the Direction of my Sex in such Cases of Pleasure, that when ever sincere Repentance succeeds such a Crime as this, there never fails to attend a Hatred of the Object; and the more the Affection might seem to be before, the Hatred will be the more in Proportion: It will always be so, indeed it can be no otherwise; for there cannot be a true and sincere Abhorrence of the Offence, and the Love to the Cause of it remain, there will with an Abhorrence of the Sin be found a detestation of the fellow Sinner; you can expect no other.

I found it so here … (MF: 103)

The present tenses used in the first paragraph of (15) imply the duality in consciousness between the narrating self and the experiencing self, as we find the phrase “I found it so here” at the beginning of the second paragraph. Moll says that “the more the Affection might seem to be before, the Hatred will be the more in
Proportion”. This is another of her biased generalizations which reflect her personal emotions and wishes: she persuades herself that the man actually loved her so that she can convince herself she lost him and can continue being a whore without feeling any pricks of conscience. It is an excuse for complacency, rather than “for the Direction of my Sex” as she suggests. The instructive sense of the present tenses in (15) is lost, and this piece of pseudo-instruction shows us Moll’s past as well as present consciousness.

Moll’s generalizations in the present tense at other times are often her excuses for her bad behaviour. The passage (16) is an introduction to the second half of the book, in which her life as a thief is narrated. It begins with her excuse for stealing:

(16) O let none read this part without seriously reflecting on the Circumstances of a desolate State, and how they would grapple with meer want of Friends and want of Bread; it will certainly make them think not of sparing what they have only, but of looking up to Heaven for support, and of the wise Man’s Prayer, *Give me not Poverty lest I Steal*.

Let ’em remember that a time of Distress is a time of dreadful Temptation, and all the Strength to resist is taken away; Poverty presses, the Soul is made Desperate by Distress, and what can be done?

*(MF: 159-160)*

The narrating self pretends to lament the fact that she has to tell the worst part of her life as a thief at the beginning of the first paragraph of (16). However, her lamenting tone expressed by the exclamation “O” is fake, as all she does in this paragraph is make excuses for her stealing, speciously mentioning “the wise Man’s Prayer, *Give me not Poverty lest I Steal*”. Her excuse is that it was poverty that made her steal. This is also made explicit in the second paragraph, when she says, “Poverty presses, the Soul is made Desperate by Distress, and what can be done?”. However, she soon begins to steal more than she needs, so her excuse expressed in
the generalized present tense is not justified by her story, and consequently the instructive sense of her excuse is lost. In particular, the rhetorical question in the last sentence of (16), “Poverty presses, the Soul is made Desperate by Distress, and what can be done?”, implies the duality in consciousness between the narrating self and the experiencing self. When the gnomic sense of the present tense is lost, it becomes more like a direct representation of the narrating self’s consciousness written in the RECOUNTING mode as discussed above, that is, this is how the narrating self feels when writing her life story in recollection. At the same time, the passage tells us the experiencing self’s immediate thoughts before she became a thief, considering the fact that she has never become psychologically mature and the context that led to her beginning to steal.

The passage (17) is a warning to men who meddle with women like Moll. She robbed a fine gentleman whom she met at the Bartholomew Fair after he got drunk and fell asleep in a coach. After robbing him, she thought about sending him home safely, as “‘twas ten to one but he had an honest virtuous Wife, and innocent Children, that were anxious for his Safety” (MF: 190). She continued to think about how he would feel when he recovered: “with what Shame and Regret would he look back upon himself? … how would he abhor the Thought of giving any ill Distemper, if he had it, as for ought he knew he might, to his Modest and Virtuous Wife, and thereby sowing the Contagion in the Life-blood of his Posterity?” (MF: 190). All of this is represented through FIT. The warning in (17) comes right after the represented consciousness of the experiencing self in FIT above:

(17) Would such Gentlemen but consider the contemptible Thoughts which the very Women they are concern’d with, in such Cases as these, have of them, it wou’d be surfeit to them: As I said above, they value not the Pleasure, they are rais’d by no Inclination to the Man, the passive Jade thinks of no Pleasure but the Money; and when he is as it were drunk in the Extasies of his wicked Pleasure, her Hands are in his Pockets
searching for what she can find there; and of which he can no more be sensible in the Moment of his Folly, than he can fore-think of it when he goes about it. (*MF*: 190)

This appears to be a warning to such men, but really it is just an excuse for her own wicked behaviour. The narrating self generalizes the nature of men like him and women like herself, using the gnomic present tense, in order to blame him for what happened. The younger Moll was one of “the very Women” and “the passive Jade” who did exactly what is described here. By making a generalization about “the passive Jade”, the narrating self rationalizes and justifies her past behaviour. As explained above, (17) is the latter part of a series of FIT sentences which describe what the experiencing self thought at that time. This implies the possibility of reading this passage as reflecting more or less the consciousness of the past self, even though it is written in the RECOUNTING mode. The present tenses in (17) thus express the duality in consciousness between the past self and the present self, as in the other passages above.

When Moll was finally taken to Newgate, she was so desperate that she lost her power of thinking. The passage (18) describes her mental state when she escapes from the abyss and regains her ability to think:

(18) In short, I began to think, and to think is one real Advance from Hell to Heaven; all that Hellish harden’d state and temper of Soul, which I have said so much of before, is but a deprivation of Thought; he that is restor’d to his Power of thinking, is restor’d to himself. (*MF*: 235)

What brought her back from hell was the ability to think, for she says that when “[she] began to think”, she was restored to herself. The narrating self explains this not by representing her consciousness, but by making a generalization, that is, “all that Hellish harden’d state and temper of Soul … is but a deprivation of Thought;
he that is restor’d to his Power of thinking, is restor’d to himself”, using the generic *he* and the gnomic present tense. This is a very tricky generalization, however. Being restored to oneself sounds good in a general sense, but in Moll’s case, it implies that she may go back to her life of crime. In fact, she can neither be regenerated, even after saying she has sincerely repented, nor change her behaviour in a real sense in order to escape from Newgate, as demonstrated in 4.4. Consequently, her plausible generalization that “anyone that is restored to one’s power of thinking is restored to oneself” should not be taken favourably, and it cannot be an instruction to others, however much it may sound like it because of her use of the present tense. What it really is is an expression of her subjective consciousness for the purpose of rationalizing and justifying her behaviour, which continues to be wicked.

In *Roxana*, the heroine’s pretended penitence causes her morality and values to collapse easily. The disparity between her inner beliefs and outer appearances is obvious, so her moral judgments and instructions seem fleeting and unconvincing. As in *Moll Flanders*, Roxana’s complacency due to her inconsistent behaviour is not disturbed by this disparity. As a result, as Zimmerman observes, her behaviour is often subjectively “rationalized but not explained” (1975: 185). What seems to be rationalized in the narrative is never fully explained, and thus her generalizations become the representations of her subjective psychology. For example, the narrating self gives a subjectively rationalized instruction in (19) to explain the reason for her whoring and not remarrying:

(19) And here I must take the Liberty, whatever I have to reproach myself with in my after-Conduct, to turn to my Fellow-Creatures, the Young Ladies of this Country, and speak to them, by way of Precaution, If you have any Regard to your future Happiness; any View of living comfortably with a Husband; any Hope of preserving your Fortunes, or resorting them after any Disaster; Never, Ladies, marry a Fool; any Husband rather than a

316
Fool; with some other Husbands you may be unhappy, but with a Fool, you will be miserable; with another Husband you may, I say, be unhappy, but with a Fool you must; nay, if he wou’d, he cannot make you easie; every thing he does is so awkward, every thing he says is so empty, a Woman of any Sence cannot but be surfeited, and sick of him twenty times a-Day: What is more shocking, than for a Woman to bring a handsome, comely Fellow of a Husband, into Company, and then be oblig’d to Blush for him every time she hears him speak? To hear other Gentlemen talk Sence, and he able to say nothing? And so look like a Fool, or, which is worse, hear him talk Nonsense, and be laugh’d at for a Fool.

In the next Place, there are so many Sorts of Fools, such an infinite Variety of Fools, and so hard it is to know the Worst of the Kind, that I am oblig’d to say, No Fool, Ladies, at all, no kind of Fool; whether a mad Fool, or a sober Fool, a wise Fool, or a silly Fool; take any thing but a Fool; nay, be any thing, be even an Old Maid, the worst of Nature’s Curses, rather than take up with a Fool. (Rox: 7-8)

The narrating self gives this instruction to young ladies, based on her experience of the failure of her first marriage to a husband who turned out to be a complete fool. She says that a young woman should not marry a fool, which is convincing enough as she had bad experiences with a stupid husband. However, she does not explain why “any Husband rather than a Fool” will make a satisfactory husband, and she is not qualified to say this because she has never been married to a man who is not a fool. Similarly, since she never marries a foolish man again, she does not know that being “an Old Maid”, which is thought to be “the worst of Nature’s Curses”, is better than being married to another fool. Her logic that “with another Husband you may … be unhappy, but with a Fool you must” also collapses as we read the book, because her second marriage, to a Dutch merchant who seemed to be a fine man,
does not turn out to be really happy, and it eventually causes her to be miserable again, as the last few paragraphs of the book imply: “Here [In Holland], after some few Years of flourishing, and outwardly happy Circumstances, I fell into a dreadful Course of Calamities … I was brought so low again, that my Repentance seem’d to be only the Consequence of my Misery, as my Misery of my Crime” (Rox: 329-330).

Nevertheless, the narrating self continually expresses this view to the reader. When she accidentally sees her foolish husband in France, she reminds the reader of this claim, commenting that “as a Fool is the worst of Husbands to do a Woman Good, so a Fool is the worst Husband a Woman can do Good to” (Rox: 93), and that “I was a Warning for all the Ladies of Europe, against marrying of FOOLS; a man of Sence falls in the World, and gets-up again, and a Woman has some Chance for herself; but with a FOOL! once fall, and ever undone; once in the Ditch, and die in the Ditch; once poor, and sure to starve” (Rox: 96). Her success in whoring with her landlord and a German prince in France increases her aversion to marriage, particularly with a stupid man, which deprives a woman of everything she has. These subjective thoughts and feelings of hers are emphasised by the italicization and capitalization of the word fool in the passages above, and also by the use of the exclamatory mood.

The narrating self in Roxana conveys her views on marriage and women’s social status using the gnomic present tense, as does the narrating self in Moll Flanders, even though they are merely subjective opinions and not generalizations about universally accepted ideas. In Roxana, her generalizations are sometimes expressed explicitly through consciousness representation categories. This strengthens the sense that her generalizations about marriage and women’s status in the present tense are actually the representations of her subjective consciousness. In (20), for example, the narrating self gives her reasons for not marrying again as generalizations in reported clauses of IT which convey the past self’s thoughts:
(20) (a) I had no Inclination to be a Wife again, I had had such bad Luck with my first Husband, I hated the Thoughts of it; (b) I found, that a Wife is treated with Indifference, a Mistress with a strong Passion; a Wife is look’d upon, as but an Upper-Servant, a Mistress is a Sovereign; a Wife must give up all she has; have every Reserve she makes for herself, be thought hard of, and be upbraided with her very Pin-Money; whereas a Mistress makes the Saying true, that what the Man has, is hers, and what she has, is her own; the Wife bears a thousand Insults, and is forc’d to sit still and bear it, or part and be undone; a Mistress insulted, helps herself immediately, and takes another.

(c) These were my wicked Arguments for Whoring, for I never set against them the Difference another way, I may say, every other way; (d) how that, FIRST, A Wife appears boldly and honourably with her Husband; lives at Home, and possesses his House, his Servants, his Equipages, and has a Right to them all, and to call them her own; …

(e) The Whore sculks about in Lodgings; is visited by in the dark; disown’d upon all Occasions, before God and Man; is maintain’d indeed; for a time; but is certainly condemn’d to be abandon’d at last, and left to the Miseries of Fate, and her own just Disaster: … (Rox: 132)

The narrating self describes her past thoughts in NI in (20a), and explains the reasons for having such thoughts in IT in (20b). Since the reporting verb is in the past tense (“found”), it is obvious that the narrating self is representing the thoughts of the past self. However, these thoughts are all expressed in the present tense, which implies that they are generalizations and that the present self may still feel this way. As she admits in (20c), they are “wicked Arguments for Whoring” which her past self believed, so they are her subjective opinions. In (20d) and (20e), she compares the opposite circumstances of a wife and a whore in the gnomic present tense. She presents her views about wives and whores as if they were general truths,
using the present tense, even though completely opposite views are held in the real world. This diminishes the gnomic quality of the present tense, and increases the sense that her ideas are her subjective generalizations.

Similar views represented through other indirect representations of consciousness in the past tense, as in (21) and (22), confirm the fact that most of her generalizations about marriage and women’s status are merely her own subjective opinions rather than universally acknowledged truths:

(21) I told him [the Dutch merchant], I had, perhaps, differing Notions of Matrimony, from what the receiv’d Custom had given us of it; that I thought a Woman was a free Agent, as well as a Man, and was born free, and cou’d she manage herself suitably, might enjoy that Liberty to as much Purpose as the Men do; that the Laws of Matrimony were indeed, otherwise, and Mankind at this time, acted quite upon other Principles; and those such, that a Woman gave herself entirely away from herself, in Marriage, and capitulated only to be, at best, but an Upper-Servant, and from the time she took the Man, she was no better or worse than the Servant among the Israelites, who had his Ears bor’d, that is, nail’d to the Door-Post; who by that Act, gave himself up to be a Servant during Life.

That the very Nature of the Marriage-Contract was, in short, nothing but giving up Liberty, Estate, Authority, and every-thing, to the Man, and the Woman was indeed, a meer Woman ever after, that is to say, a Slave. (Rox: 147-148)

(22) I told him [Sir Robert], I knew no State of Matrimony, but what was, at best, a State of Inferiority, if not of Bondage; that I had no Notion of it; that I liv’d a Life of absolute Liberty now; was free as I was born, and having a plentiful Fortune, I did not understand what Coherence the
Words *Honour* and *Obey* had with the Liberty of a *Free Woman*; that I knew no Reason the Men had to engross the whole Liberty of the Race, and make the Women, notwithstanding any disparity of Fortune, be subject to the Laws of Marriage, or their own making; that it was my Misfortune to be a Woman, but I was resolv’d it shou’d not be made worse by the Sex; and seeing Liberty seem’d to be the Men’s Property, I wou’d be a *Man-Woman*; for as I was born free, I wou’d die so.

(Rox: 170-171)

The verbs used in the reported clauses of IS in (21) and (22) are affected by the sequence of tenses, that is, they are all in the back-shifted past tense, since they are simply opinions that Roxana had in the past. It is implied through such representations of consciousness that her generalizations about marriage and women’s status, which have a great effect on her behaviour throughout her story, are subjective and unreliable, and that her instructions based on these ideas are also shallow and unreliable.

Both Moll and Roxana seek “to achieve independence and assert autonomy through self-renewing identities” (Borsing 2017: 142), which they do to justify their actions and absolve themselves. However, their attempts to create new identities are unsuccessful, in particular because of their bodies which can only keep up their appearances and outward behaviour. This failure to create self-renewing identities implies that in each of their narratives there is one true subjective self, and through its consciousness, Moll and Roxana can convey “immediate, unmediated and rationally inexplicable messages” (Borsing 2017: 167-168) to the reader. These “immediate, unmediated and rationally inexplicable messages” are realized by the creation of subjective selves in the narratives, especially in the representations of their subjective consciousness. In his later fictional autobiographies, Defoe seems to let “[m]oral judgements become confused and confusing assessments of characters’ inner worlds” (Zimmerman 1975: 185), because the internal tension
between the narrating self and the experiencing self is created more and more through consciousness unaffected by collective ideas. As a result, the so-called gnomic present tense used in the instructive parts of *Moll Flanders* and *Roxana* loses its gnomic sense, and these seemingly instructive parts, such as those in (14) to (20), show duality in consciousness between the two selves. Since neither Moll nor Roxana is a regenerate narrator, there is little psychological distance between the two selves, and the present tenses discussed above tend to create duality between them. The description of the heroines’ obsessive behaviour through their subjective consciousness in the present tense thus becomes “immediate, unmediated and rationally inexplicable messages”. However rational they may seem on the surface, the messages which are given in the gnomic present tense are never fully explained, and they contribute to creating a subjective self in each of the narratives.

### 5.4 Roxana’s self-conscious sinning

Defoe’s heroes and heroines become wicked not only because of physical necessity but also because of their “inclination towards wickedness” (Ardila 2015b: 127). This tendency is particularly conspicuous in *Roxana*, which is his last fictional autobiography. It has been pointed out that this work is different from Defoe’s other works in that the heroine is almost always conscious of her misdeeds. Richetti, for example, explains that “she can be exact about her origins and motives, clear and unashamed where the others tend to be apologetic and exploratory, pretending to look for hints of their subsequent selves in their early lives” (1975: 198). Zimmerman argues similarly that “[w]ith some exceptions, Roxana remains generally conscious of her evil choices”, and “[s]he sins knowingly, although unrepentantly, at the end of her career as well as at the beginning” (1975: 158). She can be conscious of her conduct because “[w]here the other narrators tend to begin with nullity or marginal social and personal identity, [she] presents herself as a fully
formed self from the beginning”, a self that “locates quite exactly her initial disaster and her subsequent prosperity” (Richetti 1975: 198). Her self-conscious sinning from beginning to end, as mentioned in 4.1, implies that she is neither spiritually nor morally mature, and that the psychological distance between her past self and her present self remains short, however great it may seem because of the technical separation of the two selves in the narrative. Therefore, as Zimmerman argues, while it is true that “[m]uch of her moral commentary is written from the point of view of her final undefined debacle”, it is also true that she “makes many of her reflections on her conduct during the period of her sinning” (1975: 158-159). In other words, there is a duality in consciousness between the past self and the present self in her moral comments and reflections, even at the beginning of her story. Since she also possesses the reflecting faculty of consciousness when she is sinning, “[t]he more exact and analytic she is about her past the more authentic the narrative self becomes” (Richetti 1975: 198). This section examines the relationship between authenticity and the creation of a subjective self in terms of Roxana’s self-conscious sinning.

Roxana is conscious of her wickedness as early as her first sinful act with her landlord, as briefly discussed in 4.1. She admits that “[she] sinn’d with open Eyes, and thereby had a double Guilt upon [her]” (Rox: 43). However happily she lives with this man after experiencing extreme poverty, the younger Roxana cannot help thinking about her sinfulness, and her mind is often troubled by her contradictory behaviour:

(23) (a)… there was, and would be, Hours of Intervals, and of dark Reflections which came involuntarily in, and thrust in Sighs into the middle of all my Songs; and there would be, sometimes, a heaviness of Heart, which intermingl’d itself with all my Joy, and which would often fetch a Tear from my Eye; (b) and let others pretend what they will, I believe it impossible to be otherwise with anybody; there can be no substantial
Satisfaction in a Life of known Wickedness; Conscience will, and does, often break in upon them at particular times, let them do what they can to prevent it. (Rox: 48-49)

The first half of the passage (23a) is written in the RECOUNTING mode from the point of view of the narrating self, but it tells us at the same time that the experiencing self made her reflections and comments about her behaviour during the period of her sinning. The fact that the past self could not help having “dark Reflections” (italics added) and the fact that she was aware of these dark reflections indicate that she was conscious of her sins while she was committing them. The context thus makes it possible to read the second half (23b) as a representation of the past self’s consciousness in the RELIVING mode as well as the continuation of the RECOUNTING mode in which the present self’s consciousness is expressed by her commentary. This duality in consciousness implies the individual and subjective quality of this part, as discussed in the previous section. The subjective self represented here becomes real and authentic, as Roxana, both as narrator and as character, is self-conscious and can analyse her troubled mind which wavers between sin and conscience.

Physical necessity, that is, the need to escape from poverty, was the main reason why Roxana embarked on a life of sin, but this is eventually replaced by psychological reasons, namely her pride and vanity. She was psychologically elevated by her whoring with a German prince in France after her landlord was murdered. As a result of being greatly favoured by such a gallant man, her past self’s vanity and pride become extreme, and she asks herself, “what could be more inexpressibly pleasing, and especially, to a Woman of a vast deal of Pride, as I was?” (Rox: 68), which can be interpreted as representing both the consciousness of the past self through FIT and that of the present self through FDT. The duality expressed here in the past tense enhances the subjective quality of the self. As Roxana sins consciously for her own satisfaction, the collective quality of her
rationalization of her sinning is diminished, and its subjective quality increases. She becomes more particular and exact about her mental states, which enhances the authenticity of the subjective self. For example, in the passage below, the younger Roxana asks herself why she is continuing to be a whore even though she knows that she does not need to:

(24) (a) ... yet the Sense of things, and the Knowledge I had of the World, and the vast Variety of Scenes that I had acted my Part in, began to work upon my Sences, and it came so very strong upon my Mind one Morning, when I had been lying awake some time in my Bed, as if somebody had ask’d me the Question, *What was I a Whore for now?* It occur’d naturally upon this Enquiry, that at first I yielded to the Importunity of my Circumstances, the Misery of which, the Devil dismally aggravated, to draw me to comply; for I confess, I had strong Natural Aversions to the Crime at first, partly owing to a virtuous Education, and partly to a Sence of Religion; but the Devil, and that greater Devil of Poverty, prevail’d; ...

(b) But not to dwell upon that now; this was a Pretence, and here was something to be said, tho’ I acknowledge, it ought not to have been sufficient to me at all; but, I say, to leave that, all this was out of Doors; the Devil himself cou’d not form one Argument, or put one Reason into my Head now, that cou’d serve for an Answer, no, not so much as a pretended Answer to this Question, *Why I shou’d be a Whore now?*

(c) It had for a-while been a little kind of Excuse to me, that I was engag’d with this wicked old Lord, and that I cou’d not, in Honour, forsake him; but how foolish and absurd did it look, to repeat the Word Honour on so vile an Occasion? As if a Woman shou’d prostitute her Honour in Point of Honour; horrid Inconsistency; Honour call’d upon me to detest the Crime and the Man too, and to have resisted all the Attacks which from the beginning had been made upon my Virtue; and Honour,
had it been consulted, wou’d have preserv’d me honest from the
Beginning.

For HONESTY and HONOUR, are the same.

(d) This, however, shews us with what faint Excuses, and with what
Trifles we pretend to satisfie ourselves, and suppress the Attempts of
Conscience in the Pursuit of agreeable Crime, and in the possessing those
Pleasures which we are loth to part with.

(e) But this Objection wou’d now serve no longer; for my Lord had,
in some sort, broke his Engagements (I won’t call it Honour again) with
me, and had so far slighted me, as fairly to justifie my entire quitting of
him now; and so, as the Objection was fully answer’d, the Question
remain’d still unanswer’d, Why am I a Whore now? … but as Necessity
first debauch’d me, and Poverty made me a Whore at the Beginning; so
excess of Avarice for getting Money, and excess of Vanity, continued me
in the Crime, not being able to resist the Flatteries of Great Persons; being
call’d the finest Woman in France; being caress’d by a Prince; and
afterwards I had Pride enough to expect, and Folly enough to believe, tho’
indeed, without ground, by a Great Monarch. These were my Baits, these
the Chains by which the Devil held me bound; and by which I was indeed,
too fast held for any Reasoning that I was then Mistress of, to deliver me
from.

(f) But this was all over now; Avarice cou’d have no Pretence; I was
out of the reach of all that Fate could be suppos’d to do to reduce me;
now I was so far from Poor, or the Danger of it, that I had fifty Thousand
Pounds in my Pocket at least; nay, I had the Income of fifty Thousand
Pounds; for I had 2500 l. a Year coming in, upon very good Land-Security,
besides 3 or 4000 l. in Money, which I kept by me for ordinary Occasions,
and besides Jewels and Plate, and Goods, which were worth near 5000 l.
more; these put together, when I ruminated on it all in my Thoughts, as
you may be sure I did often, added Weight still to the Question, as above, and it sounded continually in my Head, what’s next? *What am I a Whore for now?* (Rox: 200-203)

Since Roxana is almost always aware of her wickedness during the period of her sinning, and it goes against her conscience, her mind tends to be occupied with the dilemma described above in (24). In (24a), the past self’s states of mind are basically represented in the RECOUNTING mode, by means of the diegetic consciousness representation categories, such as NI (“the Sence of things … began to work upon my Sences, and it came so very strong upon my Mind one Morning”) and IT (“It occur’d naturally upon this Enquiry, that …”). The past self’s point of view is found only in the crucial question about why she continues to be a whore, which is categorized as FIT: the past tense and the proximal deictic now occur together in the question, “*What was I a Whore for now?*”. She tries to justify being a whore in the latter part of (24a), saying that it was the “Devil of Poverty” that was responsible (“the Misery of which, the Devil dismally aggravated, to draw me to comply”, “but the Devil, and that greater Devil of Poverty, prevail’d”).

In (24b), however, her justification is undermined, because she is not poor any more. Here, the narrative mode is still the RECOUNTING mode, but the experiencing self’s point of view gradually becomes more and more dominant, and the past tense often occurs with the proximal deictic now (“But not to dwell upon that now”, “or put one Reason into my Head now”). Since she cannot justify herself, the experiencing self questions herself again with a confused mind, which is reflected in the use of the auxiliary verb *should* in the question, “*Why I shou’d be a Whore now?*”. This expresses her inability to find any reason for still being a whore. As the tense of the auxiliary verb *should* cannot be shifted further to the past here (it is not the back-shifted tense of *shall*), it could be either FIT or FDT, though it is more likely to be the former because the word order is that of an indirect question.

In the next paragraph (24c), the past self again tries to justify herself,
explaining that honour was the reason for her sinful behaviour, but again, her justification is refuted. The narrative mode becomes closer to the RELIVING mode in (24c). The experiencing self’s thoughts are represented through FIT with the past tense (“but how foolish and absurd did it look, to repeat the Word Honour on so vile an Occasion? …”). After the gnomic expression “For HONESTY and HONOUR, are the same”, however, the tense shifts to the present (“shews”, “pretend”, “suppress”, “are”), as in (24d). This indicates not only that these verbs are used gnomically, but also that the narrating self is entering more deeply into the consciousness of the past self, expressing the duality in consciousness between the two selves.

In the next paragraph (24e), the tense shifts back to the past, but the point of view continues to be aligned with the past self, which is indicated by the use of the proximal deictic now with the past tense (“But this Objection wou’d now serve no longer”, “my Lord … had so far slighted me, as fairly to justify my entire quitting of him now”). She cannot help but completely admit that she has no reason to be a whore any more. This is implied in the following question in FDT, “Why am I a Whore now?”. Not only the temporal deictic adverb (“now”), but also the tense becomes proximal (“am”). The narrating self psychologically identifies with the experiencing self, and the unanswerable question becomes realistic to her, as she can never give a satisfactory answer to it, even when reflecting on her past.

Even though she cannot justify herself any more, the younger self still strives to make an excuse in the latter part of (24e), saying that avarice and vanity were the causes of her sins. This is refuted again in (24f), because she is very rich when she asks the question. With the detailed information about her finances (“for I had 2500 l. a Year coming in, upon very good Land-Security, besides 3 or 4000 l. in Money, which I kept by me for ordinary Occasions, and besides Jewels and Plate, and Goods, which were worth near 5000 l. more”), it becomes even more difficult to justify her sins. This naturally leads to the question, “what’s next? What am I a Whore for now?”, which is represented through FDT, as with the previous question.
What is different from the previous one is that another question, which is about the future, that is, “what’s next?”, is added before the main question. This implies her secret willingness to continue sinning in the future as well as the impossibility of giving a convincing justification for it. Roxana never reflects on her past conduct seriously as a regenerate narrator. The narrating self says that the question was “seldom out of [her] Thoughts, but yet it made not Impression upon [her]” (Rox: 203). The FDT question, therefore, clearly signifies the same psychological attitude, or the duality in consciousness, between the past self and the present self.

The question is represented more mimetically towards the end of the passage. The change shows that she has recognized the problem realistically, as the narrating self cannot answer the question even in retrospect. This suggests that the psychological distance between the two selves is short and the existential relationship between them is strong. The psychological and existential relationship between the two selves shown by the change in consciousness representation categories in (24) increases the feeling of authenticity, and so Roxana’s subjective self seems more real and authentic in this passage.

Roxana’s self-conscious sinning suggests her reflecting faculty in the early stages of her sinful life. Her consistent, unchanging self-consciousness affects our interpretation of her comments and reflections about morality, as they can be read as representations of consciousness from the point of view of the past self as well as the present self. The two selves are very close to each other psychologically because of their mutual awareness of their wickedness. Such duality in consciousness between the past self and the present self implied in her self-conscious sinning helps Roxana to be very specific about her psychological conflict in the past, which makes her subjective self seem more real and authentic in her narrative.
5.5 The role of individual perception in *Moll Flanders* and *Colonel Jack*

This thesis has emphasised the importance of consciousness representation in terms of authenticity and the creation of selves in Defoe's fictional autobiographies. As discussed in Chapter I, the representation of consciousness has been of great interest to many literary critics, as novels are very much concerned with the rendering of their characters’ psychology. Consciousness underlies “intellectual attempts to deal with experience” (Fludernik 1996: 49), and is closely connected to the representation of characters’ psychological experiences. Hence, the representations of a character’s thoughts, feelings and emotions through his/her subjective consciousness are crucial when writing about his/her inner experiences. What is equally crucial is the representation of a character’s perceptions because they connect his/her inner and outer experiences. This last section examines the representation of fictional perception in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, which has been little discussed in previous studies of his work.

The perceptual level of consciousness, as discussed in Chapter III, constitutes an important part of consciousness representation. Some critics have explored the narrative techniques for representing perception (cf. Kuroda 1976; Brinton 1980; Banfield 1982; Fludernik 1993; Pallarés-García 2012; 2014; Rundquist 2014; 2017). However, studies of fictional perception have been limited to NP, and to novels after Austen, especially twentieth century Modernist novels, such as the works of Lawrence, Woolf and Joyce. In Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, which were written much earlier, the representation of perception is not as sophisticated as in Modernist fiction, but it is closely associated with his descriptions of his characters’ experiences, as shown in 3.3.2 and 3.4.3. This section delves more deeply into Defoe’s narrative techniques for representing perception, focusing particularly on *Moll Flanders* and *Colonel Jack*, and illustrates that perception representation categories are conducive to creating a subjective self in a narrative in conjunction with thought representation categories.

In both *Moll Flanders* and in *Colonel Jack*, the scenes in which the
protagonists steal things contain varieties of perception representation which often lead to the representation of the conceptual level of consciousness. For example, Moll’s first theft, as discussed in (24) in 3.4.3, is described with the use of various perception representation categories, and the foregrounded use of NP in the scene evokes the subjective consciousness of the experiencing self in the RELIVING mode. Similarly in *Colonel Jack*, the moment when Jack first steals something of his own free will are rendered through his perceptual level of consciousness:

(25) When seeing the Book pass, and repass, into the Pocket, and out of the Pocket, as above, it came immediately into my Head, certainly, I might get that Pocket book out, if I were Nimble, and I warrant Will would have it, if he saw it go and come, to and again, as I did: But I saw it Hang by the way, as I have said; Now, 'tis mine said I, to my self, … (*CJ: 45-46*)

The child Jack’s perceptions of his surroundings prompt him to have thoughts about stealing the pocket book. His visual perceptions are rendered through a diegetic category (perception report) in (25), with the use of verbs of perception (“When *seeing* the Book pass, and repass, into the Pocket, and out of the Pocket”, “But I *saw* it Hang by the way”, italics added). Though they are not represented through NP, the repetitive descriptions of his seeing the pocket book come and go emphasise the significance of his first theft. His perceptions then lead naturally to his thoughts. After each sentence of perception report, his conceptual level of consciousness is rendered initially through IT (“it came immediately into my Head, …”) with some expressivity (modal expressions such as “certainly”, “might” and “would” in the reported clause), and then through DT (“Now, ’tis mine said I, to my self”). The mimetic representation of his thoughts signals the crucial moment when he decides to steal.

In other scenes of stealing in *Moll Flanders*, the experiencing self’s perceptions of her outer world are rendered through various other categories of
(26) (a) I went out now by Day-light, and wandered about I knew not whither, and in search of I knew not what, when the Devil put a Snare in my way of a dreadful Nature indeed, and such a one as I have never had before or since; (b) going thro’ Aldersgate-street there was a pretty little Child had been at a Dancing-School, and was going home, all alone, and my Prompter, like a true Devil, set me upon this innocent Creature; (c) I talk’d to it, and it prattl’d to me again, and I took it by the Hand and led it a long till I came to a pav’d Alley that goes into Bartholomew Close, and I led it in there; (d) the Child said that was not its way home; (e) I said, yes, my Dear it is, I’ll show you the way home; (f) the Child had a little Necklace on of Gold Beads, and I had my Eye upon that, and in the dark of the Alley I stoop’d, pretending to mend the Child’s Clog that was loose, and took off her Necklace and the Child never felt it, and so led the Child on again; (g) Here, I say, the Devil put me upon killing the Child in the dark Alley, that it might not Cry; (h) but the very thought frighted me so that I was ready to drop down, but I turn’d the Child about and bad it go back again, for that was not its way home; (i) the Child said so she would, and I went thro’ into Bartholomew Close, and then turn’d round to another Passage that goes into Long-lane, so away into Charterhouse-Yard and out into St. John’s-street, then crossing into Smithfield, went down Chick-lane and into Field-lane to Holbourn-bridge, when mixing with the Crowd of People usually passing there, it was not possible to have been found out; and thus I enterpriz’d my second Sally into the World.

(MF: 162)

In her second theft, the experiencing self steals the gold necklace from the little child. As in the passage about her first theft, the narrating self makes a typical
excuse for her crime, blaming the Devil, as in (26a). Even though she insists on her innocence, saying that she “wandered about [she] knew not whither, and in search of [she] knew not what”, her whereabouts and her target described in (26b) and (26c) suggest that the experiencing self was reflectively perceiving her surroundings in order to steal something. As Donovan points out, the description of the child, which says that she was “pretty”, she “prattl’d” and she had “a little Necklace on of Gold Beads” and a pair of “Clog[s]”, suggests that she “is seen only as an object to be robbed” (1966: 24). The conversation between Moll and the child in (26d) and (26e) similarly suggests Moll’s inclination to steal something, by leading the child into “the dark of the Alley”, and possibly killing her after the theft. After the conversation with the child, Moll’s perceptions are more explicitly represented through NP and perception report in the first part of (26f): the sentence, “the Child had a little Necklace on of Gold Beads”, is the representation of perception in NP, which is confirmed by the subsequent report of perception, “I had my Eye upon that”. The actual theft is described very briefly in the latter part of (26f), which Donovan argues “is buried among actions of much less consequence” (1966: 24). However, the representation of the experiencing self’s perceptions through NP and perception report in the first half of (26f) does imply, however subtly, that the passage is organized based on her actual theft.

Moll’s stealing induced by her perceptions then leads to her inner struggles based on her shallow morality, which is described in (26g) and (26h). Her thought of killing the child (though she insists it was the Devil who put this thought into her head, even after making it clear that she intended to steal something) “is clearly to counterbalance the practised ease and sudden satisfaction she now brings to crime” (Richetti 1975: 125-126). In fact, she shifts “[t]he real moral burden of the crime” to “the child’s parents, vain, self-seeking, and careless in allowing such a situation to develop” (Richetti 1975: 126). The last part (26i) includes some unnecessary details of her getaway with many names of streets. This list of details makes the narrative seem more realistic, or in Donovan’s words, it “disarms our suspicion that
the whole business is simply invention and thereby helps to convince us that the story is true” (1966: 24). The narrating self in this passage seems “simply inadequate to the task of rendering that inner struggle” (Richetti 1975: 125) which accompanies her theft. Moll’s narrative, therefore, “picks up speed and momentum” (Richetti 1975: 125), but it also “suggest[s] the absence of artifice” and “serve[s] to define the qualities of the *perceiving* mind” (Donovan 1966: 24, italics added). These qualities indicated by the representation of perceptual and conceptual levels of consciousness are, as Donovan observes, “as integral to what Defoe has to deliver in the passage as the events themselves” (1966: 24). They make Moll’s narrative credible in that it is represented through the perceiving consciousness, and so they also make her subjective self seem real and authentic.

The following is another passage describing Moll stealing something, in which her perceptions are crucial to make her work successful. At first, she was thwarted, finding that she could do nothing in a house where people were dealing in smuggled goods:

(27) *(a)* This baulk’d me a little, and I resolv’d to push at something or other, for I was not us’d to come back so often without Purchase; *(b)* so the next Day I dress’d myself up fine, and took a Walk to the other End of the Town, I pass’d thro’ the *Exchange* in the *Strand*, but had no Notion of finding any thing to do there, *(c)* when on a sudden I saw a great Clutter in the Place, and all the People, Shop-keepers as well as others, standing up, and staring, and what should it be? but some great Dutchess come into the *Exchange*; and they said the Queen was coming; *(d)* I set myself close up to a Shop-side with my back to the Compter, as if to let the Crowd pass by, *(e)* when keeping my Eye upon a parcel of Lace, which the Shop-keeper was showing to some Ladies that stood by me; *(f)* the Shop-keeper and her Maid were so taken up with looking to see who was a coming, and what Shop they would go to, that I found means to slip a Paper of
Lace into my Pocket, and come clear off with it, so the Lady Millener paid dear enough for her gaping after the Queen. (MF: 214)

Even though she is already stealing consciously and deliberately, she still pretends to have found her booty by chance, as the narrating self claims in (27b) that she “had no Notion of finding any thing to do there”, and in (27a) and (27b) she admits that “[she] resolv’d to push at something or other, for [she] was not us’d to come back so often without Purchase” and she intentionally “dress’d [herself] up fine” in order to find something. Her self-consciousness when she goes out to steal something is reflected in the words “I pass’d thro’ the Exchange in the Strand” in (27b), which means that the experiencing self is aware of her exact whereabouts in order to find something to steal. In (27c), her visual perceptions are represented, in combination with her thoughts, by means of perception report (“I saw a great Clutter in the Place …”). Her perceptions of the place, people, shopkeepers, and so on then lead to her thought, which is represented through FIT (“what should it be?”). When she finds out that a duchess and the Queen are coming, she sets to work. In (27d), her exact physical position (“I set myself close up to a Shop-side with my back to the Compter”) and her relationship to her environment (“as if to let the Crowd pass by”) are described. Her visual perception is then represented through perception report (“keeping my Eye upon a parcel of Lace”) at the beginning of (27e), and her immediate perceptions that follow are rendered in NP in the relative clause of (27e). The past progressive (“was showing”) is the explicit marker of ongoing perception. In (27f), her relationship with her environment and the surrounding situation is described in detail. The descriptions of her exact physical position and relationship with her surroundings before and after the representations of perceptions are important in these stealing scenes, as they enhance the authenticity of the narrative which is represented through perceiving consciousness.

The narrating self in Moll Flanders also sometimes represents her past perceptions more mimetically by using the historical present, as in (28):
I was going thro’ Lombard-street in the dusk of the Evening, just by the end of Three King Court, when on a sudden comes a Fellow running by me as swift as Lightning, and throws a Bundle that was in his Hand just behind me, as I stood up against the corner of the House at the turning into the Alley; just as he threw it in he said, God bless you Mistress let it lie there a little, and away he runs swift as the Wind: After him comes two more, and immediately a young Fellow without his Hat, crying stop Thief, and after him two or three more, they pursued the two last Fellows so close, that they were forced to drop what they had got, and one of them was taken into the bargain, the other got off free. (MF: 163)

As discussed in 2.5, the historical present tense can be one of the linguistic markers for the RELIVING mode in a narrative, as it has a reliving quality in relation to the surrounding past tense. In terms of the representation of perception, therefore, it can be interpreted as the mimetic representation of a character’s perceptual experiences (perception replica), when used for the description of external happenings from that character’s point of view. In this lucky adventure of acquiring a thief’s booty without actually stealing, the experiencing self’s visual and sensory perceptions of what is happening around her are rendered mimetically in the historical present tense, that is, “comes” and “throws” in (28b), “runs” in (28c), and “comes” in (28d). The historical present, according to Christian Casparis, captures “perception before cognition” (1975: 10). It implies the narrator’s “lack of analytic perspective on, or cognitive understanding of, [his/her] experiences” (Brinton 1992: 223), and therefore, can express “an uninterpreted and undigested string of actions” (Brinton 1992: 224) on the part of a character. Here, the historical present tenses may be interpreted as expressing almost entirely from her original perspective the younger Moll’s inability to digest the unexpected experience of witnessing the thief running away at the very moment of that experience. At the same time, the use of the historical present tense together with similes, such as “comes … as swift as
Lightning” in (28b) and “runs swift as the Wind” in (28c), implies that this tense is used here to represent her immediate perceptions at the moment of her experience.

One more linguistic indicator for representing perception is the use of the interjection behold, which is often used in Moll Flanders and Colonel Jack, but is only used once in Robinson Crusoe, Captain Singleton and Roxana. Since it is used as an interjection, the word behold implies some emotion in the subject of consciousness. When used in a first-person narrative, it often has a double significance, that is, it can be interpreted as conveying the narrating self’s emotion, and/or that of the experiencing self. The interjection behold is the imperative of the verb behold in the sense “To hold or keep in view” (OED, s.v. behold, v. 7; see also A Dictionary of the English Language, s.v. to behold, interjct.). It is “used to call attention” (OED, s.v. behold, int.; see also A Dictionary of the English Language, s.v. behold, interjct.), like the similar use of the verb look as an interjection. In Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, the interjection behold is used with the original meaning of the verb, that is, to view or see. It signals the protagonist’s mental state which can be either conceptually surprised (29) or perceptually surprised (30), or both (31).

(29) And now as I was full of Wealth, behold! I was full of Care, for what to do to secure my Money I could not tell, and this held me so long, and was so Vexatious to me the next Day, that I truly sat down and cryed.

(CJ: 23)

(30) At the End of this time, behold my Husband came on Board; he look’d with a dejected angry Countenance, his great Hear was swell’d with Rage and Disdain; (MF: 260)

(31) … hold, says he, first look here, then he took up the Roll again, and read it, and behold! it was a License for us to be married: (MF: 152)
Since it conveys the experiencing self’s act of seeing as well as his/her emotion, the interjection *behold* may be regarded as functioning as a perception indicator (see 3.3.2). For example, in (30), it signifies the experiencing self’s act of seeing, so the subsequent sentence, “my Husband came on Board” indicates that his coming on board is perceived through the consciousness of Moll as character. In fact, this reading is supported by the following sentence, “he look’d with a dejected angry Countenance, his great Hear was swell’d with Rage and Disdain”. This is a representation of her husband’s psychological state which she infers by seeing his behaviour and facial expression. Such contextual evidence suggests that the sentence, “my Husband came on Board”, should be regarded as the representation of fictional perception through NP rather than pure narration, though there are no other linguistic indicators of NP in the sentence, such as the past progressive, the PAST + NOW construction, or subjective expressions.

Similarly in the following examples from (32) to (36), the interjection *behold* functions as a perception indicator which implies that the subsequent sentence(s) are more likely to be representations of the experiencing self’s immediate perceptions than pure narration:

(32) The last time I had gotten up the Tree, I happen’d to come down not on the same Side that I went up and came down before, but on the other side of the Tree, and on the other Side of the Bank also; and behold the Tree had a great open Place in the Side of it close to the Ground, as old hollow Trees often have; (*CJ*: 25)

(33) We came about the House at One a-Clock to make our Observations, intending to go and lye under *Beaufort-House* Wall till the Close struck Two, and then to come again; but behold! when we came to the House, there lay the Fellow at the Door fast a-sleep, and very Drunk: (*CJ*: 65)
(34) I have mention’d, that he [Captain Jack] left me, and that I saw him, no more for Eighteen Months: … behold! my Noble Capt. Jack came in there, on Board the Ferry-Boat, from Fife, being after all his Adventures, and Success advanc’d to the Dignity of a Foot-Soldier, in a Body of Recruits rais’d in the North, for the Regiment of Douglas. (CJ: 103-104)

(35) From the Canaries, we had tolerable Weather, and a smooth Sea, till we came into the Soundings, so they call the Mouth of the British Channel, and the Wind blowing hard at the N. and N. W. oblig’d us to keep a larger Offing, as the Seamen call it, at our Enterance into the Channel, when behold! in the gray of the Morning, a French Cruiser, or Privateer of 26 Guns apper’d, and crowded after us with all the Sail they could make:

(CJ: 176)

(36) Accordingly she [Jack’s wife] went back, and came safe with the Sloop and Cargo to our Plantation, from whence after above four Months more Expectation, behold! the Sloop came to me again but empty, and gutted of all her Cargo, except about 100 sacks of unground Malt, which the Pyrates (not knowing how to Brew) knew not what to do with, and so had left in her: (CJ: 276)

The reason why the interjection behold is used more frequently in Moll Flanders and Colonel Jack than in Defoe’s other narratives may be related to the fact that both Moll and Jack have experienced stealing in their lives. Both of them need to observe their environment carefully in order to succeed in their crimes, and they retain this habit throughout their lives. Although not as fully developed as what is regarded as prototypical NP discussed in 3.4.3, the use of the interjection behold in Defoe’s narratives tends to signal the perceptions of the experiencing self as shown in the above examples.
This section has explored the representation of perception in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies, particularly *Moll Flanders* and *Colonel Jack*. The protagonists’ perceptions are important constituents of these works as they are deeply connected with the representations of personal experiences. As illustrated in (25) to (36), authenticity in a narrative is technically achieved not only by representing the characters’ thoughts, emotions and feelings, which make up their inner world, but also by representing their perceptions of the outer world.

In Defoe’s narratives, characters’ perceptions rendered mimetically through NP and perception replica tend to be used for indicating psychologically crucial moments. However, perception representation categories are used not only for emotionally crucial moments, for sometimes insignificant details perceived by a character are represented in the diegetic modes (perception report). The balance between the use of these categories in representing fictional perception enhances the effect of authenticity in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. In this sense, the representation of the perceptual level of consciousness, though it seems less developed than that of the conceptual level of consciousness, is one of the narrative techniques that he used in order to represent his protagonists’ selves through their subjective consciousness.

The present chapter has examined the creation of subjective selves in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. As discussed in 4.1, the psychological distance between the narrating self and the experiencing self at the global level of the narrative affects the interpretation of the self who is being represented. In each of his later works, such as *Moll Flanders*, *Colonel Jack* and *Roxana*, in which the psychological distance between the two selves is small due to the protagonist’s lack of spiritual development, Defoe’s aim seems to be to create a subjective self rather than a collective one. The textual evidence discussed in Chapters IV and V suggests that in each of these works, the protagonist’s subjective self is created not by integrating dissected individual experiences according to a particular theme, as seen in typical
spiritual autobiographies, but by organizing the narrative through his/her subjective consciousness.
CONCLUSION

The reasons why Defoe used the autobiographical style in his fictional works cannot be understood unless we take into consideration the ideas and concepts that surrounded him in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. While critics have paid much attention to the political and economic situation of the time when discussing his writings, this thesis has focused on the concept of literary authenticity, which was considered extremely important at that time, and has discussed the narrative schemas and techniques he used in order to create a sense of authenticity in his fictional autobiographies. Defoe’s use of an autobiographical form is also closely related to one of the crucial themes of his fiction, that is, the creation of selves. His ideas regarding the self are reflected in his representations of his protagonists’ experiences from their point of view, through their consciousness. His narrative techniques for representing consciousness in the first-person autobiographical form are extremely effective in creating selves, though his ideas regarding the self in each of his fictional narratives are not always the same. This thesis has examined the different ideas regarding the self in his fictional autobiographies, and has investigated why the same narrative schemas and techniques have different effects in creating a self in each of these works.

Chapter I discussed the importance of the concept of authenticity in Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. This was a crucial literary concept in the early eighteenth century, when works dealing with the real world were esteemed more highly than those which were merely works of fiction. Eighteenth-century authors would often claim that their fictional narrative was true, and they represented their characters’ experiences realistically. In other words, a sense of authenticity was achieved by a conventional claim of authenticity and a reliable narrative style, in
combination with a verisimilar representation of the pseudo-autobiographer’s present and past consciousness. Defoe’s narrative techniques for creating the effect of authenticity have been discussed in some previous scholarship (e.g. Kawasaki 2009). However, it has not been pointed out that his creation of a sense of authenticity was embodied in his narrative discourse when he used the narrative techniques of verisimilitude in representing his characters’ consciousness within a first-person autobiographical style.

Chapter II focused on the first-person autobiographical narrative style. When this style is used in a fictional autobiography, the authorial “I” of the pseudo-autobiographer makes the fabricated story seem true. This is primarily because the first-person autobiographical form is a narrative style that imitates a natural kind of writing in the real world, so it evokes a natural storytelling schema in the reader’s mind. This chapter explained the relationship between authenticity and the natural storytelling schemas, namely the RECOUNTING mode and the RELIVING mode. The first-person narrative style contributes to creating a sense of authenticity as it provides credibility, probability and contemporaneity at the global level of the narrative. Paul Hunter (1990: 33) asserts that these qualities at the global level are more important than those at the local level, but the latter is as important as the former in novels, such as Defoe’s fictional narratives.

Chapter III examined various ways of representing consciousness, that is, narrative techniques that create the effect of authenticity in Defoe’s fiction, particularly at the local level. This chapter proposed a consciousness representation paradigm, making use of the so-called speech and thought representation discussed in stylistics and narratology. Narrative techniques for representing consciousness are closely connected with point of view in the first-person narrative, and with the natural storytelling schemas which were discussed in Chapter II. Therefore, this chapter analysed the forms, functions, semantics and effects of the categories of consciousness representation in relation to the natural storytelling schemas. Various consciousness representation
categories are conducive to creating authenticity in the sense of psychological realism at the local level in a narrative. Their effects were also investigated in relation to the effect of authenticity at the global, holistic level created by the use of different narrative schemas within the same story. Chapters II and III demonstrated that the sense of authenticity becomes stronger when psychological realism through consciousness representation is achieved by using natural first-person storytelling schemas. This phenomenon is found in all of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies. My investigation into his narrative schemas and techniques has made it possible to show how he was able to represent the experiences of various selves in an authentic way in his fictional autobiographies.

Defoe’s use of narrative schemas and techniques to create a sense of authenticity varied depending on what he intended to convey in each of his fictional autobiographies. Chapters IV and V explored the creation of various selves, analysing how the narrative schemas and techniques discussed in the previous chapters are used differently in each of his works. It is not difficult to find similarities between his fictional autobiographies and genuine spiritual autobiographies, and we also find that he skillfully manipulated the degree of similarity from novel to novel. His first fictional autobiography, *Robinson Crusoe*, can be seen as an offshoot of the genre of spiritual autobiography, for in this work Crusoe’s spiritual development is the main theme and every episode is organized and narrated by the narrating self, who has experienced spiritual conversion. In contrast, his later works, such as *Moll Flanders* and *Roxana*, are not narrated from the point of view of a regenerate self, though they do have some spiritual qualities. Consequently, the protagonists have less spiritual validity, and other qualities predominate over the spiritual and collective aspects in the narrative. Secular and subjective aspects, which are distinctive characteristics of the picaresque novel, have more significance in these works, and the stories are organized according to the protagonists’ subjective consciousness rather than their spiritual development.

Chapter IV focused on the creation of what I call a *collective self*. The
spiritual qualities displayed in a narrative have a collective quality, as they are regarded as the same for all Christians. The early eighteenth century saw the rise of individualism, but people believed that individualism should be based on consent between individuals and society. In *Robinson Crusoe*, Defoe creates a collective self by using the genre of spiritual autobiography.

Chapter V focused on the creation of what I call a *subjective self*. Subjective qualities predominate in a narrative when the narrator disregards his/her relation to his/her community and organizes his/her narrative so as to absolve himself/herself and/or to rationalize his/her actions. This chapter illustrated that Defoe’s autobiographical narratives exhibited these subjective qualities of the self towards the end of his career as a writer of fiction.

As this thesis has demonstrated, although Defoe used the same narrative schemas and techniques in all his fictional autobiographies, their functions and effects differ significantly depending on what he aimed to convey. The same is true of the role of authenticity realized through these techniques. This means that Defoe’s narrative development cannot be explicated simply by, for example, the invention or the more sophisticated use of new narrative techniques such as free indirect style, for he used various narrative techniques, including free indirect style, in all of his fictional autobiographies. His narrative development can only be understood in the discussion of his fictional narratives in relation to the social, philosophical and literary themes that surrounded him when he wrote them, as this thesis has tried to show. As Michael Boardman says, “no work of literature yields the same meaning when examined within different frameworks, a theory that seems to locate the problem not in the text but in the tools critics employ to understand it” (1983: 27). My approach to Defoe’s narratives is a way to suggest a different meaning in reading them, and to understand him better as a writer of fiction.

My focus on first-person narrative schemas and narrative techniques for representing consciousness may shed some light on studies of narrative point of
view and fictional consciousness in stylistics and narratology, since neither early English novels nor first-person narratives have received sufficient attention in these theoretical fields. In particular, focusing on the early novels is important because of the diachronic change in the ways of representing fictional consciousness. There is a need for a detailed discussion of consciousness representation in the first-person narrative, as in the third-person narrative, because there are not only similarities but also crucial differences in their forms, functions, semantics and effects, as discussed in this thesis. Though this thesis has given some diachronic aspect to the studies of consciousness representation, more investigation into other first-person fiction is necessary, and also more research into the early novels is needed in order to give a more accurate diachronic picture of narrative point of view and fictional consciousness.

In terms of the consciousness representation paradigm, this thesis has focused on the conceptual and perceptual levels of consciousness in order to give a more specific description of its linguistic system. However, as Alan Palmer (2004) has pointed out, not only characters’ thoughts and perceptions but also their actions and other aspects of their experiences are necessary to create fictional minds. Integrating actions with thoughts and perceptions on a scale of levels of consciousness would give a fuller picture of fictional consciousness, and could lead to the development of an alternative scale for consciousness representation. This would be useful in investigating fictional consciousness in the present-tense narrative, which is a commonly used narrative style in contemporary novels. In some recent studies, scholars have examined the relationship between actions and consciousness in present-tense narratives. Characters’ actions, and also perceptions, seem more important in present-tense narratives than in past-tense ones in terms of fictional consciousness, because in the former there is no distance between the time of narrating and the narrated experiences. Theo Damsteegt argues that present-tense internal focalization is clearly linked with “a character’s mind at the time the character perceives and
mentally digests the perception” (2005: 53, see also Damsteegt 2004). Therefore, a description of a character’s actions in the present tense in an internally focalized present-tense narrative “indicate[s] an awareness on the character’s part of his or her actions at the very moment they are being performed” (2005: 42). This technique is called “Internal Focalization of Awareness (IFA)”, and the following extract from Ali Smith’s How to Be Both (2014) is an example of it:

(a) George goes downstairs and makes a single slice of toast. (b) She knifes over it with quite thick butter then puts the butter knife straight into the jam without washing it because no one will even notice. (c) She does it precisely because no one will, because she can leave dregs of butter in whatever jam she likes for the rest of her life now. (How to Be Both: 45-46)

Since internal focalization predominates in this novel, it is likely that George’s actions in the present tense in (a) and the first part of (b) (“goes”, “makes”, “knifes”, “puts”) are mentally perceived by George herself, rather than being externally reported by the narrator. George’s vague awareness of her actions naturally leads to her thoughts about the reasons for them, which is represented in FIT in the latter part of (b) (“because no one will even notice”) and (c). The present tense conveys her awareness of her actions “at the very moment they are being performed” in a much more immediate way than the past tense would do. As mentioned above, the present tense indicates a lack of distance between the time of narrating and the narrated event. According to Suzanne Fleischman, this “signif[ies] that the data source for the experience is, or purports to be, direct perception” (1990: 37). The present tense representing the actions of a reflectoral character is, therefore, closely connected with the perceptual level of consciousness, and actions, like perceptions, tend to lead to the conceptual level of consciousness, as we saw in the passage above. However, there is a need for more thorough and systematic investigation into actions as a part of consciousness.
representation.

Even a single study of a writer’s literary works can yield new interpretations of their meaning, as well as new directions in related theoretical fields, as my approach to Defoe’s fictional autobiographies in terms of authenticity has demonstrated. This thesis has shown that his narratives display particular meanings when examined in relation to narrative schemas and techniques which create a sense of authenticity, an important literary concept which was greatly affected by political, economic, social and philosophical factors in the early eighteenth century. In particular, the creation of either a collective or a subjective self greatly affects our understanding of Defoe’s fictional autobiographies and his use of narrative schemas and techniques. This thesis has also shown that close investigation of his narrative techniques can fill in the blind spots that previous studies have ignored, giving us a better understanding of fictional consciousness and showing potential new directions to stylistic and narratological studies of this field. As I have attempted to show, his fictional narratives contain an abundance of narrative techniques for representing consciousness – techniques which he pioneered, and which were the forerunners of the more sophisticated techniques used by later writers. For these reasons, I believe that Defoe should be given greater attention in the study of fictional consciousness.
NOTES

Introduction


2 In this thesis, Roxana is abbreviated as Rox, and similarly, Robinson Crusoe as RC, Captain Singleton as CS, Moll Flanders as MF, and Colonel Jack as CJ. All examples refer to the Oxford World’s Classics editions.

3 The term realism in this thesis refers not to “the nineteenth-century movement of Realism”, but to “a realistic portrayal of the fictional world” (Fludernik 1996b: 37). See 1.3 for more detailed discussion of realism.

Chapter I Creating a Sense of Authenticity in Fiction

1 It has been pointed out that Roxana was based on romances such as Eliza Haywood’s Idalia: or, The Unfortunate Mistress (1723). See Kawasaki (2009: 292-320), in which he argues the relationship between Defoe and Haywood in detail.


3 Italics in Defoe’s texts quoted hereafter in this thesis are all original, unless otherwise stated.


5 I will turn to the relationship between the reader’s involvement and psychological realism in the next section (1.3), and discuss in greater detail the narrative techniques for making it possible in Chapter III.


7 For ease of reference, some extracted passages are alphabetically numbered in this thesis.

This meaning is now obsolete. The last record of the use dates to 1869 (OED, s.v. conscience, I). It seems that conscience as meaning “[i]nward knowledge, consciousness” gradually gave way to the new word consciousness by the end of the nineteenth century, and the meaning of the word conscience was narrowed down to the modern one (“[c]onsciousness of right and wrong; moral sense” (OED, s.v. conscience, II)). On the other hand, the word consciousness, once it was conceptualized as a word, developed more senses.

The first instance cited in OED is a sentence from the second edition of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: “If the same consciousness can be transferr’d from one thinking Substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking Substances may make but one Person” (Locke 1695 [1690]: II. XXVII, xiii, quoted in OED, s.v. consciousness, 5. a). Locke’s ideas about consciousness are discussed below in detail.

According to Damasio, consciousness can be divided into “simple and complex kinds” (1999: 16). He calls the simple kind “core consciousness”, and it “provides the organism with a sense of self about one moment – now – and about one place – here” (1999: 16). On the other hand, he names the complex kind “extended consciousness”. It “provides the organism with an elaborated sense of self – an identity and a person, you or me, no less – and places that person at a point in individual historical time, richly aware of the lived past and of the anticipated future, and keenly cognizant of the world beside it”, and it is “enhanced by language” (1999: 16).


This is similar to Searle’s “content”: “Conscious states always have a content.
One can never just be conscious, rather when one is conscious, there must be an answer to the question, ‘What is one conscious of?’” (Searle 1999: 84).

14 Locke’s criticism of innate principles appeared in the first edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690: I, I-IV), and his chapter on identity and self (II, XXVII) was added in the second edition (1694).


16 A French fictional autobiography which was popular in early eighteenth-century France.

17 See also Humphrey (1992: 97, 193-194).

18 For the cognitive narratologist Alan Palmer, mind, in which consciousness is included, is thus not only “isolated in individual”, but also “social and contextual” (2004: 53). He emphasised the importance of the latter feature of consciousness in the analysis of fictional minds. Though what Palmer points out is not wrong at all, I regard the subjective nature of consciousness as a primarily important feature in this thesis, because it is the subjective nature of consciousness that may have caused the significant impact on the rise of the novel in early eighteenth-century England.

19 I do not disagree with Kawasaki’s view that Defoe used displaced immediacy consciously, since his narratives give us linguistic evidence that he did use it consciously. See, for examples, the extracted passages (25) in Chapter III and (24) in Chapter V, in which the interrogative sentences that have the same content meaning are rendered differently to imply the change in the protagonists’ mental states by the use of different modes. However, I disagree with his view that Defoe was the first English writer to do so, because it seems difficult to judge that it was Defoe who consciously and extensively used displaced immediacy for the first time, based on his textual analysis.

21 The reflector mode refers to a narrative mode in which fictional consciousness is represented through the eyes (both physical and psychological) of a particular character (Stanzel 1984). See Chapter II, in which Stanzel’s narrative modes including the reflector mode are discussed in detail.

Chapter II  Natural Narrative Schema in the First-person Narrative Style

1 See also Cohn (1978: 143-145), Galbraith (1994: 125) and Fludernik (2009: 90).

2 For an overall view about the significance of the distinction, see McIsaac and Eich (2004: 248) and Eich et al. (2009: 2239).


4 Their claim here is based on Hansen, et al. (1993) *Litteraturhåndbogen* [Handbook of literature] (Copenhagen: Gyldendal).

5 The passage is Warner’s English translation of the original German text. The page number here thus refers to the German text, Verena Stefan (1977 [1975]) *Häutungen. Autobiographische aufzeichnungen, gedichte, träume, analysen* (Munich: Frauenoffensive). The following is the original German passage:

‘Kannst du heute?’ fragte er.


Feuchtigkeit und kühle zwischen den beinen. Ist das nass von ihm oder von mir? Wie er schläft, rutscht ich verstohlen zur seite, betrachte das laken. der mond, der einzige auf den noch verlass ist, leuchtet mir. ich
Textual deixis is one of the cognitive deictic categories suggested in Stockwell (2002: 43-46). It refers to “expression that foreground the textuality of the text, including explicit ‘signposting’ such as chapter titles and paragraphing; co-reference to other stretches of text; reference to the text itself or the act of production; evidently poetic features that draw attention to themselves; claims to plausibility, verisimilitude or authenticity” (Stockwell 2002: 46).

In this sense, Cohn’s (1981) distinction between the “dissonant” and “consonant” first-person narration corresponds closely to Warner’s distinction between the RECOUNTING and RELIVING mode. Cohn’s distinction is essentially a modal division, and is not discussed in terms of our natural schema of REMEMBERING as Warner’s distinction is.

See also Fludernik (2012: 82-83), in which she similarly summarizes the exchange of articles between Hamburger and Stanzel.

Italicized boldface and underlining in some of the extracts from Defoe’s texts hereafter in this thesis are mine unless otherwise stated.

Since such a present tense “highlight[s] its fiction-specificity” and functions as a marker of fictionality, Cohn calls this use of the present tense “fictional present” (1999: 106).

For the historical development of the narrative present, see Avanesian and Hennig (2012) and Huber (2016).

Interestingly, Wierzbicka (2006: 204-246) locates the origin of first-person epistemic parentheticals in the early eighteenth century. She associates their rise and some cultural factors (British Enlightenment, empiricism and individualism), especially the publication of Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. The frequent use of first-person parentheticals in
Defoe’s narratives might be related to Wierzbicka’s hypothesis, but according to Brinton (2008; 2017), textual evidence suggests that the use of first-person epistemic parentheticals was already established in the Middle English period. See Brinton (2008: 223-224; 2017: 137-138).

I will use the third-person pronouns rather than “it” to indicate the specific experiencing self in Defoe’s narratives.

See 3.5 for more detailed accounts of free indirect thought used to express inexpressible psychology in words in narrative texts.

Other frequently used expressions which also evoke the RECOUNTING schema are the words or phrases used for summary, such as *viz.* (as in (10)), *that is, in a word* (as in (28)) and *in short*. See Lee (1869 Volume I: vi) and Novak (1987: 404) for Defoe’s favourite expressions including these words and phrases.


The use of the proximal deictic *now* in the past-tense context also signals the creation of another fictive mental space, which will be discussed in relation to the modes of consciousness representation in Chapter III.

Johnstone (1987) theorizes the *says/said* alternation in terms of the status difference. She illustrates her status hypothesis based on conversational “authority stories” (1987: 47), which focuses on the interaction between the storyteller as a non-authority figure and third-person authorities. Storytellers usually need “to communicate what it is that is interesting or ‘pointful’ about the story” (Johnstone 1987: 44). In this sense, authority stories serve as good examples: storytellers tend to use the historical present to introduce the utterances of authority figures because what authorities say usually marks narrative turns. Her conclusions are thus all based on data from authority stories, but some of her claims can be well applied to ordinary stories other than authority ones and are therefore worth exploring in this thesis.
“Footing” refers to “the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance” (Johnstone 1987: 44), a definition Johnstone draws on from Erving Goffman (1981) *Forms of Talk* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press).

Chapter III Representing Consciousness in Narrative

1 Fludernik’s experientiality refers to “the quasi-mimetic evocation of ‘real-life experience’”’ (1996b: 12). It is one of the important concepts in her “natural” narratological framework, and “as everything else in narrative” it “reflects a cognitive schema of embodiedness that relates to human existence and human concerns” (1996b: 13).

2 Actant generally means “a fundamental role at the level of narrative deep structure” (Prince 1987: 1), or its “involvement in a plot” (Fludernik 1996b: 26) in narratology. Fludernik’s actants, however, are defined by “their fictional existence (their status as existents)” (1996b: 26, italics original). She explains that “[s]ince they are prototypically human, existents can perform acts of physical movement, speech acts, and thought acts, and their acting necessarily revolves around their consciousness, their mental centre of self-awareness, intellection, perception and emotionality” (1996b: 26).


4 Interestingly, the word *perception* is first used in the sense of “[t]he taking cognizance or being aware of objects in general; sometimes practically = consciousness” (*OED*, s.v. *perception*, 3. a) in the seventeenth century (*OED*’s first citation dates to 1611), the same period when the notion of consciousness was conceptualized as a distinct word (see 1.3).

5 See also Marnette (2005: 50) and Rundquist (2014: 170).

6 Brinton refers to Banfield’s paper read at a seminar on the “style indirect libre”
in Flaubert’s works in 1977. Section 3.4.3 will verify Brinton’s view on the relationship between the levels of consciousness and reflectivity with linguistic evidence. See also Pallarés-García (2012), in which she gives evidence for reflective perceptions.

7 As Fludernik (2010: 106-111) summarizes, the distinction between story and discourse originated in the fabula and syuzhet (sujet) dichotomy in Russian Formalism (Eichenbaum 1965; Erlich 1965; Shklovsky 1965). This is “complemented (and muddied) by the story/plot opposition according to E. M. Foster (1990 [1927]: 42; 86-87)” (Fludernik 2010: 106). The terms story and discourse were first used in Seymour Chatman’s Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (1978). Though they signify slightly different narratological concepts, the fabula/syuzhet dichotomy and the story/discourse dichotomy are used almost interchangeably.

8 This thesis follows the simple distinction suggested by Stanzel (1984) and Genette (1980), but the notion of point of view discussed in narrative theory is far more complex than the dichotomous distinction. Banfield explains that the term point of view originates from “a notion borrowed from the visual arts, with their preoccupation with vision and perspective” (1982: 68). She adds that it is a spatiotemporal or conceptual “viewing position” (Uspensky 1973: 2) of a “subject confronting the world” (1982: 68). Since it is “extended to language”, she argues, point of view “has been axiomatically taken as located in a speaker” (1982: 68). Therefore, point of view as defined by Banfield is chiefly “the term for subjectivity as a feature of narrative style” (1982: 10). For other discussion on point of view in stylistics and narratology, see Uspensky (1973), Chatman (1978; 1990), Genette (1980; 1988), Lanser (1981), Simpson (1993), McIntyre (2006) and Leech and Short (2007).

9 “Represented speech and thought” in this thesis is used as an umbrella term for any kind of speech and thought represented in narrative, and therefore should not be equated with Banfield’s (1982) “represented speech and
thought (RST)” which refers to is what is called free indirect speech and thought in her terminology.

10 Fludernik’s use of the term consciousness in the quotation seems to be synonymous with thought in my terminology: the frameworks which have been paralleled are speech representation and thought representation and not speech representation and consciousness representation. She seems to use the term consciousness inconsistently in her academic works. Despite the fact that she defines consciousness in a broader way (see 3.1), her use of the term in her discussions about discourse representation often implies thought (see Fludernik 1993; 1996b; 2011).

11 The linguistic features of this mode will be explored in detail in 3.4.2.

12 Though he insists on the importance of “degrees of indirectness”, Page does not actually arrange his suggested categories in a continuum. See the table in Page (1988: 37), in which the main features of each category are indicated but the categories are not ordered according to the degree of indirectness.

13 See also Cohn (1966).

14 See, for example, the introductory books on narratology by Fludernik (2009) and Keen (2015).

15 NRSA and NRTA originally stand for “Narrative Report of Speech/Thought Acts” in Leech and Short (1981). Following Short (1996) and Semino and Short (2004), however, they stand for “Narrator’s Representation of Speech/Thought Acts” in this thesis. Also, Leech and Short’s NRA (Narrator’s Report of Action) is replaced with N (narration) because it is the more commonly used term in stylistics and narratology. N is put in square brackets, as Semino and Short (2004) do, because although it is an important part of representation especially in terms of mediacy, it is not a speech and thought representation category in a strict sense.

16 According to Semino and Short (2004), FDS and FDT are better regarded as subcategories of DS and DT respectively because the distinction between the
direct and the free direct does not seem to involve significant differences in effects as the distinction between the indirect and the free indirect does (see Short 1989: 70-71; Semino and Short 2004: 49; Short 2007: 228-233). But as Sotirova (2011) points out, Leech and Short’s distinction between DT and FDT is important in formal, functional and semantic terms as well as in terms of its origin, and thus this thesis follows Sotirova’s view in the following analyses.

17 Note that (1c) contains what Semino and Short (2004) call “writing presentation” (“I open’d the Bible upon these Words, *I will never, never leave thee, nor forsake thee,*”).

18 However, I do not completely agree with Sotirova’s (2013) view on NI. See my argument in 3.5 below.

19 Note that Semino and Short (2004: 228-229) also find some difficulties in placing NI in the continuum, because it is quite unlike NV, the category which is placed at the most indirect end of the speech representation scale. They have doubts about including it as a thought representation category, and suggest labeling it as a sub-category of N. They also propose that it might be necessary to label a sentence like “I thought and thought” as *Narrator’s Representation of Thought* (NT) as a corresponding category of NV. In either way, their proposals do not answer Sotirova’s crucial question, because she sees NI not as a sentence of narratorial statement, but as one which strongly evokes a character’s point of view.

20 Toolan’s pure narrative (PN) include sentences about “various actions and events involving the character” which are “physically overt and observable” in the fictional world (e.g. “She sat at the window watching the evening *invade the avenue*”), as well as sentences about “a character’s inward feeling” of which he/she is not consciously aware (e.g. “*His mind went blank; he couldn’t get his thoughts straight*”) (20012: 119).
The dotted lines imply that the diegetic categories can sometimes give the sense of *im*-mediacy when they cooperate with mimetic elements in their representations (see 3.5).

The other characteristics of NP will be explored in detail in 3.4.3.

See Chapter II for an analysis of this kind of existential relationship between the two selves.

The term *speech report* is used as an umbrella terms for more indirect categories of speech representation than FIS, while *thought report* is used for more indirect categories of thought representation than FIT.

I have intentionally put FIS in brackets here, because it does not always evoke psychological attachment to the past self, although the degree of mediacy in FIS is linguistically almost the same as that of FIT or NP. See 3.4.4 below, in which I give the reason for this and the different effect of FIS.

See Pascal (1977: 2-32) for the full history of the style in the French, German and English disciplines.

See, for example, Pascal (1977), McHale (1978), Page (1988²), Fludernik (1993; 1996b), Bray (2001; 2003; 2007a; 2007b; 2014), Toolan (2001²), Semino and Short (2004), Leech and Short (2007²) and Vandelanotte (2009). Free indirect discourse has also attracted great attention in functional grammar (see, for example, Thompson 1996), cognitive linguistics (see Sanders and Redeker 1996 and Vandelanotte 2004; 2009) and semantics (see Maier 2014; 2015 and Eckardt 2015).

In this sense, Adamson’s empathetic narrative seems to be a better umbrella term if one wants to include NI and consonant-psycho narration, because her term *empathetic* captures the evaluative function rather than the syntactical characteristics of this style. Note however that Adamson’s empathetic narrative is parallel to Stanzel’s (1984) figural narration and Genette’s (1980) internal focalization (Adamson 1995a: 20). She explains that she “[has] not used Bally’s term, *style indirect libre*, because it is generally taken to refer
exclusively to the representation of speech, although Bally himself did extend its application to cover the narration of events” (1995a: 20). For Adamson, therefore, empathetic narrative extends not only to narration that represents characters’ internal states but also to narration that describes events in the story world. See also Adamson (1994; 1995b; 2001; 2006).

29 The rendering of characters’ minds by means of a “narrativized” form (i.e. FIT) was rare, but a “narrativized” form was used in the rendering of characters’ speech (i.e. FIS) as early as the Middle English period. See Fludernik (1996a: 96), in which she gives examples of the first uses of FIS in Middle English.


31 Leech and Short explain that: “the definition is like that of Wittgenstein for games in the *Tractatus*. He argues that there is no one feature that all games share, but that there are features in common between football and chess, chess and bridge, bridge and patience etc. Hence patience and football may possibly share no features with each other but belong to the same ‘family’” (20072: 281).

32 Vandelanotte (2009: 112) quotes example sentences of topicalization (a), right dislocation (b), exclamative interjections (c), hesitation phenomena (d) and the use of different dialect (e) as follows:

(a) Henry declared that never had he had such a wonderful holiday.  
(Fludernik 1993: 244)

(b) She replied that they might be parted for years, she and Peter.  
(Banfield 1982: 30)

(c) He […] told himself that, whew, Gilly had talked the leg off of everybody.  

(d) It was on the tip of Eveline’s tongue to ask her if Major Moore-house was her … her … but she couldn’t think of a way of putting it.  
(Dos Passos 1919: 222, qtd. McHale 1978: 255)
To which Mr. Bailey modestly replied that he hoped he knowed wot o’clock it wos in gineral.

(Charles Dickens *Martin Chuzzlewit*, qtd. Clark and Gerrif 1990: 791)

Other scholars indicate that we often encounter speech and thought representation which contains the character’s lexical expressions. Semino and Short (2004: 54-55, 153-159), for example, call this characteristic “quotation phenomena” and Thompson (1996: 512-513) “partial quotes”.

This table refers to Vandelanotte (2009: 188) with some modifications.

See Banfield (1981: 66-75; 1982: 196-214), in which she discusses these different features in detail.


See 1.4, in which I have discussed the difference between extroverted and introverted consciousness suggested by Chafe (1994).

See Shigematsu (2016: 28-29; 2017b: 40-42) for more detailed explanation of this passage regarding the function of NP.

Note, however, that the narrating self appears in the passage in the parenthetical clause “as I suppose” in (24f). The reliving of experiences or the illusion of immediacy seems to be temporarily suspended by the use of this parenthetical, but in terms of the REMEMBERING schema of first-person autobiographical narratives, this existential relationship, that is, the temporal continuity between the two selves shown by the use of the present tense, is important to make the narrating self’s reliving more plausible and natural (see 2.4).

His FID (free indirect discourse) refers to a vehicle of “representing acts of discourse (external and internal) and preverbal or nonverbal acts of mentation” (1993: 712, italics original), and thus includes NP as well as FIS and FIT.
According to Oltean, the evaluative function of FID refers to the function “which is identified on the basis of the expressive strategies through which narrators communicate their attitudes toward events, agents, or settings” (1993: 704).

The term was first coined by Lyons (1977). He explains that “[i]t frequently happens that ‘this’ is selected rather than ‘that’, ‘here’ rather than ‘there’, and ‘now’ rather than ‘then’, when the speaker is personally involved with the entity, situation or place to which he is referring or is identifying himself with the attitude or viewpoint of the addressee” (1977: 677, qtd. in Adamson 1994: 197). See also 3.5, in which I discuss in detail the use of empathetic deixis in other indirect modes of consciousness representation than free indirect style.

The following is an explanation of irony by Fludernik (1993) (also qtd. in Bray 2007b: 58):

Irony is always a pragmatic phenomenon of an implicational nature; textual contradictions and inconsistencies alongside semantic infelicities, or discrepancies between utterance and action (in the case of hypocrisy), merely signal the interpretational incompatibility, the break in the argument, the crack in the mirror which then requires a recuperatory move on the reader’s part – aligning the discrepancy with an intended higher-level significance: irony. (Fludernik 1993: 352, italics original).

Empathy in the sense of identification has indeed been associated with the relationship between narrator and character, in which the reader is not usually involved. Kuno, for example, explains that empathy is “the speaker’s identification, which may vary in degree, with a person/thing that participates in the event or state that he/she describes in a sentence” (2004: 316). Similarly, for Bronzwaer (1970: 48), empathy is a suitable term to refer to the situation in which the narrator adopts the point of view of the character in focus.

46 Note that while I agree with Palmer (2004) that thought report is an important narrative technique, I disagree with him in that he tends to give lower priority to direct thought and free indirect thought than to thought report since the former categories presuppose inner speech. In contrast, I regard direct thought and free indirect thought to be as important as thought report (see 3.3 and 3.4).

47 Adamson (1994; 1995b) calls such a linguistic construction “the was-now paradox”, while Nikiforidou (2010; 2012) names it similarly as “the Past + now pattern”.

48 See Fludernik (1993: 332-338). She lists more linguistic markers which indicate varied expressivity.

49 On the contrary, if the narrating self wants to detach itself more from its past self, it can de-subjectify the representations by referring to itself as “he” or “she” in the third person (cf. W. Thackeray’s Henry Esmond (1852)).

Chapter IV  Collective Qualities in the Creation of a Self

1 Bell (1985b: 157, 162) goes further to argue that Robinson Crusoe could be translated into a third-person narrative without affecting the story. Although I agree with him that the narrating self in Robinson Crusoe has authority over his past self because he is morally and spiritually mature and more knowing, I completely disagree with his view that it could be translated into a third-person narrative. The psychological separation between the two selves at the global level of narrative has a significant effect on the interpretation of the narrative, which could not be elicited if it were written in the third-person narrative style (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3).

2 See also Ermarth (1998 [1983]: 95-143), which argues that the narrative point of view is unstable in Robinson Crusoe.
3 While he argues the “safer Distance” in consciousness as above, Zimmerman admits that “Jack’s repentance is perfunctory” (1975: 153). These statements are surely paradoxical, because if Jack is only seemingly repentant, why is he able to reflect on the psychological aspects of his past from “a safer Distance”?


5 Devidse and Vandelanotte explain that the modal auxiliary must is one of the “speaker/hearer-oriented modals” (2011: 243). “The surrogate ground” means the represented speaker’s temporal zero-point (Devidse and Vandelanotte 2011: 240).

Chapter V  Towards the Creation of Subjective Selves


2 Crowley (1972: xv-xvi) is discussing Defoe’s circumstantial realism. Nevertheless, I quote his claim here because it can also be applied to Defoe’s psychological realism.
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