

**Securing Security Governance in Post-conflict Situation:
A Framework of Conflict Prevention through ECOWARN in
West African Region**

Tatsuo YAMANE

**Associate Professor, Graduate School for International Development and
Cooperation, Hiroshima University**

Affiliated Researcher, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University

SUMMARY

This article focuses on an analytical approach of “security governance” in light of post-conflict situation and aims to examine a system of conflict prevention in the West African region from a viewpoint of the approach. The security governance initially developed security studies of International Relations especially for the regional governance in the field of European security. On that basis of making and developing the new perspective for the region, it currently goes to expand the subject to other regional security including Africa related to the post-conflict situation where multiple security providers are involved. In spite of needs for the further analysis, it seems that the research of security governance still deviates from the concrete study based on

African cases related to the issues of reconstruction for “failed state,” due to the complexity of security governance among the public and private providers through the formal and informal interactions. In that context, after demonstrating the characteristics of security governance in post-conflict situation, this article argues distinction of security governance in Africa, especially through a practice of the security governance through “conflict prevention and early-warning system” formulated by a regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and an organization of local civil society, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), with the financial support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

1. Introduction: From European Security Governance to African Security Governance

This article aims to examine a practice of conflict prevention in West Africa, from an analytical perspective of “security governance” in post-conflict situation.¹ At the thought of security concerns in West Africa as a whole, a problem of “state failure,” where the state cannot provide minimum public goods for the national under the low level of capacity of democratic governance, has been a critical cause to bring severe violent conflicts by unrestrained political, economic and social rivalries among the parties to the conflicts.² Indeed, the region of West Africa has been plagued by recurring intrastate conflicts for more than two decades since the 1990s. Especially, cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia were raised and examined as the typical examples of state failure.³

Although those two countries have been in much progress on post-conflict peacebuilding since the early 2000s with international supports and the local leadership, there still remains transnational threats on security into the region including these two countries. Among the myriad works of lessons learned from issues of the state failure, it is one of major challenges how to create security governance among multiple stakeholders into global or regional levels on the milieu over failed states as well as the national level. In that sense, this article focuses on the case of conflict prevention excised by interactions among the multiple stakeholders not only in the process of post-conflict reconstructions in the domestic level, but also in the parallel time for consolidation of regional security in West Africa.

At the outset of this analysis, the background in the approach of security governance is to be designated. On the approach of security governance, in 2004, the article entitled “the Governance of European Security” in *Review of International Studies*, which is one of the arguments in the embryonic stage, sets up the quotable

¹ Mark Webber, Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terrif, and Elke Krahnemann, “The Governance of European Security,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol.30, 2004, pp.3-26.

² For example, Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail*, Princeton University Press, 2004.

³ Martin Lowenkopf, “Liberia: Putting State Back Together,” I. William Zartman (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, pp.91-108, William Leno, “Sierra Leone: Warfare in a Post-State Society,” Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, Brookings Institution Press, 2003, pp.71-100.

definition of security governance.⁴ The author, Mark Webber, offered to analyze European security architecture in the post-Cold War era with a view to multiple interactions between state and non-state actors based on formal or informal arrangements. Webber defines “the concept of security governance as involving the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms.”⁵

Arguments on the security governance approach have a tendency to accede to the genealogy of liberal institutionalism in the field of International Relations, especially on global governance approach⁶ and security community approach.⁷ Both approaches stress effectiveness of cooperative problem-solving by institutional arrangement among stakeholders, even under the condition of international society where unified power structure among sovereign states has not yet been prepared. Surely, Webber carefully noted the earlier literatures on the two approaches, as introducing the special concept of security governance according to the definition. Not only Webber, but also other scholars which purport to conceptualize security governance also mention the two approaches for the consolidation of their ideas.⁸

According to the genealogy, Webber stressed on that the interactions among multiple stakeholders become an essential measure for formulating the current European security governance. For Webber, the transformation of security architecture under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), engaged the related action, i.e., Europeanization of security by the European Union (EU)-led conflict resolution after the end of the Cold War. The Webber’s work and the relevant arguments which focus on the change of European security architecture, tend to grasp the characteristics on

⁴ Webber et al., *op.cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁶ For example, James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1992, Oran R. Young, *International Governance*, Cornell University Press, 1994, and Jon Pierre (ed.), *Debating Governance*, Oxford University Press, 2000.

⁷ Karl W. Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the light of Historical Experience*, Princeton University Press, 1957.

⁸ Elke Krahnemann, “Conceptualizing Security Governance,” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.38, No.1, 2003, pp.5-26, Tania Felicio, “Multilevel Security Governance: Reinventing Multilateralism through Multiregionalism,” *Human Security Journal*, Vol.5, 2007, pp.51-61, and Emilian Kavalski, “The Complexity of Global Security Governance: An Analytical Overview,” *Global Society*, Vol.22, No.4, 2008, pp.423-442.

comprehensive security governance over the individual actions by the respective regional organizations with state-interactions, especially in the area of the Atlantic.⁹

In spite of its importance for searching new perspective on European security governance, it seems that applied studies to other geographical areas such as Africa or Asia have not been argued accumulatively as main target for the approach.¹⁰ One of the main reasons for the scarcity entails in the fragility of other regional institutions on security not only in Africa but also in Asia, out of the higher level of “European security governance.” Yet, interactions between state and non-state actors as security providers in managing the security threats in the post-conflict situation in Africa are not rare rather ordinary. When we consider security challenges by the state failure with armed conflicts, it might be stressed that the applied research is connected to shed light on the phases of practical governance among non-state security providers, such as armed groups, civil society, regional organization and others under the fragility of the regional institutions.

On the above-mentioned essence of this article, the following second section aims to classify arguments on security governance under post-conflict reconstruction, and introduces the similar arguments associated with security governance applied for the situations in Africa. Besides, the third section of this article examines the nature of security governance formulated by interaction between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and a group of civil society, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) supported by some external factors. Finally, this article points out an importance of successful conflict prevention by recognizing mobilization of security governance with multiple actors which transnationally cooperate each other in the absence or weakness of state governance associated with legacy of state failure during conflicts.

⁹ For example, see also, Emil Kirchner and James A. Sperling (eds.), *EU Security Governance*, Manchester University Press, 2007, Charlotte Wagnsson, James A. Sperling and Jan Hallenberg (eds.), *European Security Governance: European Union in a Westphalian World*, Routledge, 2012.

¹⁰ Shaun Breslin and Stuart Croft (eds.), *Comparative Regional Security Governance*, Routledge, 2012, Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Dominguez (eds.), *The Security Governance of Regional Organizations*, Routledge, 2011.

2. Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Governance Approach

This section of this article develops an argument on post-conflict reconstruction in the spectrum of security governance. The first sub-section introduces a joint research on security governance in post-conflict situation by “MultiPart.” The second sub-section overviews a way of “multi-level governance” which investigated characteristics of post-conflict reconstruction conducted by multi-faceted stakeholders especially in African region.

2-1. Joint Research by “MultiPart” on Security Governance

The joint research project entitled “Multi-stakeholder Partnerships in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the European Union (MultiPart),”¹¹ launched in April 2008. The project, commissioned by the EU, was implemented by a number of research institutions based on several countries mainly in Europe for analyzing how the EU can create proper partnerships with state and non-state actors under post-conflict situations, such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

After the research duration for the twenty-eight months, MultiPart’s project finally published more than one reports according to separated topics in July 2010. A sub-group (one of the eight sub-groups in total for the joint research) was assigned to a study for security governance and put forward the final report entitled “*Multi-stakeholder Security Partnerships in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Final Thematic and Case-Study Report of Work Package 4a: MSP-WP 4a)*.”¹² This report finally adopted the definition of security governance as “the collective provision of

¹¹ Multi-stakeholder Partnerships in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Role of the European Union (MultiPart), <http://www.multi-part.eu/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1> accessed on 28 February 2011.

¹² MultiPart, *Multi-stakeholder Security Partnerships in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Final Thematic and Case-Study Report of Work Package 4a)*, Institute Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg (HFSH), Institute for Security and International Studies in Sofia (ISIS), Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels and University of Amsterdam, May 2010. <http://www.multi-part.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=77&Itemid=113> accessed on 4 March 2011. This part of the works was conducted by the following implementers; Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg (IFSH), Institute for Security and International Studies, Sofia (ISIS), Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, University of Amsterdam, University of Pristina (Kosovo), Pole Institute (Goma in Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]) and Center for Policy & Human Development (CPHD in Kabul).

security by a variety of state and non-state actors being a non-hierarchical relation to each other and using different means, instrument and methods to reach a common goal on the basis of common norms, values and/or interests.”¹³

Providing the similar definition by Webber, the document (MSP-WP 4a) pointed out the importance of constructing security governance between state and non-state actors with common goals, and especially applied the security governance approach to post-conflict reconstruction link to peacebuilding works, including security sector reforms (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), civil-military relations, and others with some case studies in post-conflict areas. In most situations of post-conflict reconstruction, even with a peace agreement among stakeholders, security providers are not limited by states. As mentioned, it includes non-state actors, such as the international peacekeepers, regional organizations, private military companies, armed groups, and organizations for civil societies. In the process of statebuilding, multiple corporations among stakeholders in wider range are crucial to circumvent breach of order with parallel effort of pursuing justice.¹⁴

In the meantime, the embedded challenges into security governance pointed out by the document (the MSP-WP 4a), seem to be useful for the further search from viewpoint of early warning and conflict prevention in Africa. In the document, the four challenges are designated, i.e., implementation problems, support problems, legitimacy problems, and unintended side effects.¹⁵

First of all, it seems that “the implementation problem” is derived from difficulties for adjustment among actions through implementation. That is, when multiple stakeholders collaborate for tackling a particular security concern, there remains a question that the collaboration would be merely regarded as “cooperation” or “coordination” away from a sort of vertical governance structure. Secondly, “the support problems” concerns that lack of willingness, political strategy and funding support cause security governance to hinder the sustainability. The third one, “legitimacy problems,” shows that a lack of legitimacy, which accentuates not fragility of the governance structure but the network-type structure, prevent the multiple

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.17.

¹⁴ Kai Ambos, Judith Large, and Marieke Wierda (eds.), *Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development*, Springer, 2010.

¹⁵ MultiPart, *op.cit.*, 2010, pp.24-29.

stakeholders from the practical decision-making formally or informally in a feature of the “governance.” The fourth one, “unintended side effect,” for the MSP-WP 4a, includes influencing agenda, increasing transaction costs, fragmentations of effort, damaging reputation, enhancing corruption, weakening local structures, and enhancing insecurity.

Provided we envisage a vertical structure such as state governance led by single authority under sovereignty, it is not strange that these points might be recognized into embedded challenges of security governance. Yet, it should be considered why horizontal structure into security governance would be exist in situations of post-conflict areas to seek remedies for post-conflict reconstruction. In that sense, in order to reflect a lack of smooth connection between theoretical approach and practice in new security agenda, the four problems might provide a helpful perspective.

2-2. Arguments on “Multi-Level Governance” on African Region

In this sub-section, the author of this article shows the relevant arguments of the approach of security governance associated with European region extended to the African region.

No less important is the fact that the similar approach of security governance was founded in the article entitled “Beyond Notion of Security Community: What Role for the African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security?” in *The Round Table*.¹⁶ In the article, the author, Liisa Laakso, designated a notion of “multi-level governance (MLG)” which has proximity of the approach of security governance, and reviewed security community approach as Webber did. On the basis of the analytical perspective by the MLG, Laakso developed the argument along with the specialty of the African region. In light of fragility of democratization with a number of African states under conflict or post-conflict setting, Laakso extended to explain that the MLG does not always need its legitimized structure under democratic ways. In addition, for Laakso, network-type governance involved various non-state actors, for example, the UN, regional organizations, civil society groups, armed groups, and private military firms, play a significant role in creating the MLG “in overall security/insecurity architecture in

¹⁶ Liisa Laakso, “Beyond the Notion of Security Community: What Role for the African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security?” *The Round Table*, Vol.94, No.381, 2005, pp.489-502.

Africa.”¹⁷ As the document (the MSP-WP 4a) of MultiPart noted, the Laakso’s article mentioned necessity for the involvement of non-state actors including armed stakeholders to be contributed in resolving armed conflicts link to failure of state, especially among African countries.

Relevant to the needs for involvement of armed non-state actors for the MLG, Laakso also noted that “undemocratic” ways and means would be accepted for securing the ordering MLG even during a process for democratization and liberalization for peacebuilding. Indeed, this does not mean to recommend the creation of undemocratic and authoritarian regime, but it is important for the purpose to find out one of traits into post-conflict situations under being state failure. Arbitrary decision-making and limited membership prone to be a crucial condition for more powerful armed groups that are recognized and even authorized by international society to set an effective peace agreement for triggering a first step of conflict resolution.

On the other hand, Laakso, in the article, also examined interaction among regional organizations and civil societies for creating peace and security in African region, especially on the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).¹⁸ In the phase of conflict resolution right before and after peace agreement, regional organizations in Africa have a capacity to send peacekeepers to the areas of intraregional conflicts authorized by the respective organizations institutionally. In the most of past cases in the African region like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Mali, the United Nations (UN) Security Council often called on the troop contributions to the regional organizations in the African region, or the member states of the regional organizations as its part of the UN, to participate the UN peacekeeping operations which are to be deployed to the conflict’s areas in Africa. The strategic security cooperation under the connectivity of peacekeeping between the UN and the regional organizations in Africa has become further trends for securing security governance in the regional level.¹⁹

Precisely referring security community approach, however, Laakso criticized

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.493.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.499-500.

¹⁹ John S. Moolakkattu, “The Role of the African Union in Continental Peace and Security Governance,” *India Quarterly*, Vol.66, No.2, 2010, pp.151-165, and James J. Hentz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security (Routledge Handbooks)*, Routledge, 2014.

the approach of security community is not suitable for African region which is prone to have unreliable efficacy of the regional organizations on severe security concerns. If we stand for the original definition of security community based on the existence of domestic stability in all the states inside the regional community, it is clear that the absence of domestic stability in the region with disputing failed states diverts the analytical idea of security community.²⁰

Thus, this section of this article referred to the relevant approaches to security governance especially on post-conflict reconstruction. For MultiPart and Laakso, security governance approach might be to grasp facet of co-existences among multiple stakeholders in the process of ordering internal or external security for post-conflict reconstruction right after having peace agreement among warring stakeholders. In that sense, the security governance is recognized as one of the approaches in order to designate clear understandings for the situation of state failure.

3. Pursuing Interaction between ECOWAS and WANEP for Security Governance

3-1. Security Governance and Setting of Conflict Prevention by ECOWAS

In Africa where deadly armed conflicts frequently happened in the 1990s, as much as the UN did, ECOWAS endeavored to resolve internal conflicts in the region including the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia by sending ad hoc-type ECOWAS peacekeeping forces. Yet, over these interventions, the process of the decision-making and the authorization was flawed because of a lack of legitimacy under the insufficient stipulation for the decision-making on peace and security in ECOWAS. These struggles on the lack of institutional decision-making system for regional security caused to evoke new agenda for making security institutionalization in the ECOWAS region, and brought to the agreement entitled “The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict

²⁰ Naison Ngoma, “SADC: Towards a Security Community?” *African Security Review*, Vol.12, No.3, 2003, pp.17-28, Benedikt Franke, “Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities,” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.43, No.3, 2008, pp.313-340, Morten Boas, “Security Communities: Whose Security?” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.35, No.3, 2000, pp.309-319, and Laurie Nathan, “Domestic Instability and Security Communities,” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.12, No.2, 2006, pp.275-299.

Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security” in 1999.

This protocol is organized by the fifty-eight clauses into the eight chapters, and stipulates comprehensive procedures for conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and other actions by ECOWAS. Through this legitimated procedures, ECOWAS became a security institution to be able to establish the ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring groups (ECOMOG) for peacekeeping operation formally. Interestingly, in relevance with security governance, the protocol also says that collaboration between ECOWAS and local civil societies is crucial for developing conflict prevention and early warning in the ECOWAS region and “the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN)” under the security collaboration should be created.

In addition, in 2008, with respect to the progress on the issues of conflict prevention in the region, the decision on “the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)” was adopted by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council.²¹ Interestingly, in a part of the decision, a provision of “security governance” was incorporated. The definition of the security governance by the decision is as following.

The objectives of security governance shall be: [i] to eliminate threats to individual and group rights, safety, life, livelihoods, and property, and the protection of the institutions and values of democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law under a human security umbrella; [ii] to orient the focus and capacities of individuals, groups and institutions engaged in the security system to make them responsive and responsible to democratic control and adhere to basic human rights and the rule of law; [iii] to ensure the emergence and consolidation of accountable, transparent and participatory security systems in Member States. The purpose of this component is to facilitate the implementation of the relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty; the relevant provisions of the Mechanism and Protocol on Free Movement; and particularly Articles 1 (C, E) and 19-24 of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.²²

²¹ ECOWAS Official Document, Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08, 2008, pp.1-61.

<http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPF_final.pdf> accessed on 20 April 2011.

²² *Ibid.*, pp.35-37.

In this definition, “security governance” is primarily regarded as security sector governance in order to formulate the level of domestic governance into sovereign state. However, this implies the importance of democratic governance by interaction between individual and groups, and then the following paragraphs 73 and 74 mentioned the involvement both of statutory and non-statutory bodies, not only public military organizations but also private ones. Here, we can see the similarity of the approach of security governance with the decision in the practice.

3-2. WANEP Involvement in ECOWARN

WANEP, a network-type civil society group that has cooperative status with more than 450 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (as of 2008) in West African countries, was established in 1998. It has the head office in Accra and the four regional offices and the twelve national offices in the region.²³ But it seems to be more of a single NGO than network-type one. From the start, WANEP independently operated the project entitled “Early Warning and Early Response Program (WARP)” as one of the major projects. In the process of progression, WANEP had a collaboration in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding with ECOWAS and the WARP was incorporated into ECOWARN as well.

In the interaction between WANEP and ECOWAS, WANEP has a responsibility to ECOWAS, in the following items, i.e., data collection of security informations in grass roots level in West Africa as a whole to provide it to ECOWAS, capacity development of ECOWAS regional officers, technical support for ECOWAS early warning, policy analysis on security issues in the region and others. To carry into the effect of these items, ECOWARN coordination meeting convenes regularly in Abuja, Nigeria. These institutional arrangements are subject to the legal agreement by “the Memorandum of Understandings on Conflict Prevention and Early Warning (the MOU)” which enacted in February 2004 between the two parties. Later, institutional collaboration has been excised for the purpose of conflict prevention and early warning

²³ WANEP 2009 Annual Report, <http://www.wanep.org/wanep/attachments/article/202/ar_2009_en.pdf> accessed on 22 April 2011.

in the region.²⁴

As the view of the figure one of this article, ECOWAS and WANEP have close relation on ECOWARN both in the head offices and the regional offices. In the level of the head offices, for personnel exchange, it was reported that WANEP sent a liaison officer, who employed by WANEP, to ECOWAS Observation & Monitoring Center in Abuja.²⁵ In the level of the regional offices, as a matter of form, the two organizations have a daily-basis contact in Gambia, Burkina Faso, Liberia, and Benin.²⁶

On the background of the collaboration, there might be strong financial support by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for creating the project on ECOWARN itself. The MOU between ECOWAS and WANEP was an output of the support activity by USAID which was the phase I project entitled “WANEP-Catholic Relief Service (CRS) Partnership” in 2000. CRS, an international NGO, implemented the project (the phase I: 2000-2004) for which WANEP itself could empower the capacity development in the field of conflict prevention and early warning in the West Africa. At the end of the phase I, USAID published the final report on the project, and then the validity of the outcome was authorized in the Agency, as a result, the second phase was launched in 2005 (continued to 2007).²⁷ Moreover, USAID provided the financial support to ECOWAS from 2009 to 2010 (4.5 million U.S. dollar in total) and the later, pledged the continuous support in 2011 and 2012 separately.²⁸

²⁴ John Mark Opoku, “West African Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System: The Role of Civil Society Organizations,” *the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Paper*, No.19, 2007, p.13.


²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.14.

²⁶ Staff, WANEP Website, <<http://www.wanep.org/wanep/about-us-our-story/staff.html>> accessed on 28 April 2011.

²⁷ USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), *Final Report: Evaluation of the WANEP Capacity Building Project*, December 2004.

²⁸ USAID West Africa Newsletter, December 2009, p.14, <http://www.usaid.gov/westafrica/newsletter/usaid_wa_december_2009_Newsletter.pdf> accessed on 29 August 2011; Department of State, United States of America, “Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations Annex: Regional Perspective FY2011,” p.246, <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2011/2011_CBJ_Annex.pdf> accessed on 29 August 2011; Department of State, United States of America, “Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations Annex: Regional Perspective FY2012,” p.274, <<http://www.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/158268.pdf>> accessed on 29 August 2011.

Figure 1. Structure of ECOWARN between ECOWAS and WANEP



(Source: Created by the author of this article)

3-3. Embedded “Problems” of Security Governance and ECOWARN

Finally, this part of the section aims to examine the fundamental four “problems” of security governance which were designated by MultiPart (showed in the section two of this article) against the structure of ECOWARN.

The approach of security governance, in the views of above, has characteristics of interaction between state and non-state actors, regardless private or public ones, with multiple headed governance formally or informally. It also seems to be mobilized by stakeholders which are interested in a common norms or policy related on security concerns. As ECOWARN does not retain a stipulated decision-making line among the

stakeholders especially between WANEP and ECOWAS, there might be considered as a set of non-hierarchical structure. Regarding the practical ways and means, ECOWARN has a system for supplementing insufficient capacity of ECOWAS on local-level conflict prevention through training, collection of security information, learning on early warning and others, under the legal foundation (the MOU) as the common norm.

In this structure of security governance in ECOWARN, here, it might be useful for further understanding to investigate the governance from the viewpoint of embedded four “problems” associated with the approach.

First, on the implementation problem, if it is regarded as simple “cooperation” or “coordination,” these difficulties may come on formation of consent among the stakeholders over their subsidiary interests. In that sense, efficacy of ECOWARN also may be fluctuated through the process of implementation of conflict prevention and early warning, as a result, may lead a collapse of the MOU.

Secondly, the support problem shows a lack of sustainability of political will among stakeholders, scarcely organized political strategy, emergence of bureaucracy through the narrow sight by shortage of funding support and others. ECOWARN depends USAID on most of financial funding, as a result, the sustainable efficiency of the activities rely on the outer support so far. Therefore, it is vital component for sharing solid political will for conflict prevention in the region under the sustainable structure for the implementation with strong commitment among stakeholders.

Thirdly, there remains the legitimacy problem designated by MultiPart, ECOWARN does not have the certain reporting route by compulsory legitimization because it aims for “sharing” security information in local areas of the region and advocacy for the citizens on conflict prevention such as reconciliation works. Yet, how can WANEP be sure to conduct “conflict resolution” through ECOWARN if there is rampant frictions or huge scales of violence in the local areas? WANEP as civil society may be able to report for building awareness on security concerns to ECOWAS or others such as international community, in that case, the legitimacy problem on ECOWARN might emerge through forcible action by ECOWAS which has political power and its legitimized forces.

Fourthly, for MultiPart, the “unintended side effects” were derived from the above three problems. According to MultiPart, increasing number of agenda on security

governance are prone to hold the derivative problems, such as political corruption among stakeholders and deviation from effective policy-setting, and weakening social structures in local areas away from cities by decentralization of resources. Although these side-effects tend to be occurred inevitably, however, ECOWARN was created to discover, manage and solve these sense of problems. The central aim of ECOWARN includes to address advocacy on conflict prevention for local community in earlier stage before leading friction between stakeholders. Indeed, it is without saying that donor community should check severely against the possibility of internal corruption.

4. Conclusion: For Further Analysis on Security Governance in Post-conflict Situation

This article has argued the approach of security governance in post-conflict setting through the case of ECOWARN associated with conflict prevention and early warning. In that process, the article attempted to visualize the structure of security governance constructed by the interaction between state and non-state actors through the system of ECOWARN as much as possible. Above mentioned, the approach of security governance especially associated with post-conflict reconstruction has involvement of non-state actors as well as state actors, even in the field of security issues, through the collaborative way to pursuing common objective among actors. In that context, this article recognized a practice of security governance in the case study of conflict prevention in West Africa through ECOWARN in the early phase of post-conflict setting.

On this way of the analysis, as mentioned in the section one of this article, this article reconsidered the mainstream arguments of European security governance adopt the genealogy of international institutionalism especially on security community and global governance. Not only the European security governance, but also applied arguments of security governance on post-conflict reconstruction have generated. In post-conflict setting right after uniting peace agreement, security situation is still fragile for creating new structure of power among various stakeholders even which are going on sharing common works for their own statebuilding. In that formless situation, UN,

regional organizations, international/local NGOs, private military companies seem to be sought in the involvement for securing security governance for not only the national-level statebuilding but also regional/international level creation of security framework. In that sense, it seems not to be strange that the mechanism of conflict resolution and conflict prevention by the collaboration between ECOWAS and WANEP in the West African region, where are troubled with numerous armed conflicts in succession, is created institutionally.

The “four problems” on security governance, for MultiPart, have main cause where derives from a lack of legitimacy or weakness of governance structure in post-conflict setting. Yet, regarding ECOWARN, as analyzed in the third section of this article, these defects embedded in the approach might not damage the structure of ECOWARN at an early stage because it was conducted for the activities such as advocacy of conflict prevention disregard with particular political decision. Rather, at this moment, it is understandable that a space of multi-level security governance by the interaction among ECOWAS, WANEP, USAID and others exists temporarily for supplementing the insufficiency of legitimacy in state failure. Even in the current progress of peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the process of post-conflict reconstruction, further needs for conflict prevention and early warning might be activated by stretching of growing transnational threats in the region as a whole. As it is plausible that ECOWAS and the member states have continuous interest to secure peace and stability in the region, other stakeholders also hold an interest in creating security governance against growing concerns on security threats like terrorism in a deferent level. In that sense, we should continue to examine the validity of the approach of security governance associated with post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention through watching practices of security governance which would converge with a common object from the conjunctures of crossing interests along with each stakeholder.

Acknowledgement: This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI (Grant Number 23530187).