

A Meta-Applied Ethical Study on ‘Influence’

from ‘Causal Explanation’ to ‘Subjective Explanation’

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Summary: The word of “influence” is defined as “bringing the change to something by acting on it.” It can be used both in a good sense and in a bad one. There seems to be a causal relationship between A and B when one says that A has influence on B. The influenced relationship, as is often compared to the causal relationship, exhibits ascendant causality to be deduced from effects. This is called “the causal explanation of influence.” We consider the point at issue giving a sample of train accidents. This explanation presupposes that something occurs that ought to do. However it is insufficient to understand the concept of influence in a broad sense. If we take up what occurs in the correlation with what doesn’t occur, “influence” can be grasped as “change” from the latter to the former. Paying attention to the change will lead to the discovery of “the subject free from influence.” Therefore the influenced relationship can be explained as follows: “the object can give influence because there is the subject to be influenced.” This is called “the subjective explanation of influence.”

Leibniz once advocated monadism, opposing to Locke’s “tabula rasa,” and declared that a monad has no windows through which something goes in or out.¹⁾ A monad is an inseparable simple substance and can neither influence the external world nor be influenced from it. Hence a monad seems to have no transformation. However any change can be seen in the representations of a monad based on “entelechia” i.e. an inner principle. The highest developed stage is called “spirit.” Human beings can have this clearest representation unlike plants and other animals. But such a view of spontaneous development is inappropriate for the human, for the human is a social animal. Mutual influence is indispensable for the development of human beings. The image of late Socrates was deeply imprinted on the minds of young Plato. Jesus couldn’t help being acquainted with St. John the Baptist as well. In addition, Kepler was affected absolutely by Tycho Brahe, Shinran by Hohnen, and Norinaga Motoori by Mabuchi Kamono. Goethe and Schiller, Heidegger and Jaspers, and Saneatsu Mushanokoji and Naoya Shiga as well affected each other to have a closer existential relationship. All human culture is, so to speak, influenced consequences in greater or less degree.

1. The concept of ‘influence’

The word of “influence” is variously used, such as, for example, “the influence of radiation, electric wave, smoking, drugs, alcohol, etc. upon the body and healthy,” “that of acid rain, agrichemicals, chemical substances etc. upon the natural environment,” “that of computerization, mass communications, game software etc. upon children.” The word of “influence” is in general used in two sorts of context: one in natural sciences, the other in social and spiritual sciences. While the former indicates mainly “internal” influence on the body and objects, the latter mainly “external” on the spirit and minds. There are indefinite elements in respect of the range and strength of influence. For example, global warming refers to the phenomena that the balance of absorption and emission of sunlight is lost with the rise of greenhouse effect, the earth surface temperature rises, and the unusual weather occurs, so that the influence is given upon ecosystem. If we are questioned about when, how and to what degree the influence appears, we will be unable to answer it with accuracy, for the relationship between cause and effect is so complicated that it goes beyond our expectation. Speaking conversely, environmental issues are so global. In addition, as for the influence of radiation on the human body, most of us go to the death if we are exposed to more

radiation than 1,000 rems.²⁾ Prominent symptoms almost appear if less than 100 rems. No abnormal symptoms can be discovered in normal examination if less than 25 rems. Radiation causes cancer, genetic disorders, late obstacles, etc. in the human body. If we are questioned about when and how radiation gives influence upon human body, it will be not easy for us to answer it, for we must also take account of individuals' difference. As for influence of game software upon children's mental growth, it doesn't matter to what degree each child is affected but whether the significant difference between "a group of children who have used game software" and "a group of children who have never used it" is recognized. There being any significant difference, we might judge that there is "soft" causality between game software and children's mental growth. But the statistical difference shows only the fact of a causal tendency.

Referring to the etymology of "influence," it means "flow into," "pour into," "run into" and so on. "Influence" is expressed as "Einfluß" in German, the meaning of which is in common with English. In addition, it is expressed as "eikyo" in Japanese, which means the effect according to the cause.³⁾ The verb of "affect" also is often used instead of "influence." This originates from "afficio" in Latin, which has the meaning of "act," "stimulate," "weaken" and so on. As far as "influence" can be defined as "bringing the change to something by acting on it," we can think two sorts of influence according to the context. John Stuart Mill says, "As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it.... But there is no room for interfering with it, becomes open to discussion."⁴⁾ He regards behaviors to hurt others' interests as the evil and admits society to interfere an individual's freedom for the purpose of preventing them. Needless to say, he is much interested in bad influence, i.e. social risks. This kind of influence has recently become more and more serious in environmental ethics and technical ethics. But the word of "influence" is not restricted to such negative use but can be also used when it is not quite evident whether the consequences will be good or bad, such as the influence on political situations and stock trends and when plus influence is specially emphasized, such as international interchanges give good influence upon children's education. "Influence" can be thus related with both plus aspect and minus aspect, the latter of which is more popular than the former. So is Mill's use. Utilitarianism in general deliberates on possible consequences in the total situation where positive influence and negative influence are summed up.⁵⁾ Of course, we cannot deliberate on possible consequences for a long term, e.g. after decades or centuries. In human history, First Qin Emperor was indeed much more atrocious tyrant than Nero and Hitler in terms of extinction of a race but is also the greatest contributor of modern China in terms of tourist resources. History often plays mischief to change minus influence into plus influence. Therefore in order to deliberate on long-term influence, we must postulate "ripples in the pond" which presuppose that influence in too distant future fades gradually and becomes nothing like a ripple at last.⁶⁾ The energy of influence doesn't last infinitely unlike the law of inertia but spreads gradually and disappears at last. When should the influence be estimated as zero? Exaggeratedly estimated, the present generation would have to sacrifice for the coming generation. Furthermore, if we must take account of influence upon the mind as well as the body, it will be more difficult to estimate it. The assumption of high-strung society will lead to reappearance of the Maintenance of the Public Order Act. In this sense, we can fully understand Mill's idea that the restriction of individual's liberty is approved only in the public territory and the liberty should be guaranteed to the maximum in the private territory. Too safe society, i.e. "depending society" seems to be useful for avoidance of responsibility for oneself rather than fulfillment of this aim. Therefore it is significant for us to consider the concept of "influence."

2. Causal explanation

I would like to take up a philosophical fiction the content of which is as follows⁷⁾: suppose that one day you discover by accident that your friend's brain has been controlled by a team of scientists at a research institute in California since he was young, then you cannot get angry even if your friend broke the promise to pick you up at the airport and vice versa, you cannot recommend your friend's charity even if he was devoting his time to collecting money for the United Way. It is not your friend but a scientific group that can be blamed or be praised.

The previous estimate of your friend will change dramatically after the "discovery." The author gains a foothold in responsible theory through this fiction. Here I want to consider the fiction independently of his intention and in addition substitute "A" for "your friend" and "B" for "the scientist" in order to simplify it. It should be questioned

what relation there is between A and B. Referring to the conclusion in the first place, it isn't right to state that "A was influenced from B" but "A was controlled by B." What is the difference between "being influenced" and "being controlled"? In the latter, there exists a certain relationship between the ruler and the ruled by the means of command, compulsion, coercion, menace, pressure and so on. In the former, the situation similar to the "controlled" can be given birth to without these means but bodily change and movement never fail to be produced, whether directly or indirectly, as a kind of "visualization" as a vocal sound, expression, a gesture, an attitude, a conduct and so on.

We can recognize "change" in A's conduct evidently, because A made a promise to pick up at the airport but broke it. A's exchanged conduct was intentionally given rise to by B. If A could have the power to produce this change, the responsibility should be attributed to A. The standard for the discrimination between "being influenced" and "being controlled" doesn't consist in the change itself but in the existence of "α," which is presupposed for the possibility of change and, especially in a human being, stands for "the freedom to choice." If we differ "being controlled" from "being influenced" according to this standard, we can explain the former as the "absence" of the freedom and the latter as the "loss" of it. It is certain that the situation of "being influenced" contains "change" from existence to non-existence, which is the difference between "being influenced" and "being controlled." But this is still insufficient. For example, it isn't evident whether children have possessed freedom to choice before they are affected, for there is any possibility of their having already been influenced. Then we should state that children were not "affected" but "controlled" by adults. This is true of borderless patients and older people as well. Even if "being influenced" can be formally differed from "being controlled" according to the standard of *existence* and *non-existence* of freedom to choice, it is doubtful to what degree this discrimination is useful. The concept of "influence" connotes the existence of the freedom, which is different from the freedom included in a controlled relation or an influenced one. Here lies still the possibility of being kept from influence. It will be contradiction in a certain sense that something to be unaffected belongs to the influenced relation at the same time. But, no matter how logically right it may be, we don't know in fact clearly whether something belongs to a *group to be affected* or a *group to be unaffected*. The influenced relation contains such an indefinite factor unlike the controlled relation.

It is B's intention that becomes the cause of A's behaviors, as stated before. Even if any change may be recognized in A's behaviors as consequences, it isn't change given rise to by A. A doesn't possess the freedom to get rid of a causal connection or to modify it. If the freedom should be defined by the word of "coercion," it stands for *the circumstances without coercion*. There is no freedom to choice in the controlled relation, for "being controlled" contains "coercion" necessarily. But "being influenced" doesn't necessarily entail it. *Considered from the consequence*, it is possible that A is affected as if A was controlled, i.e. there is any possibility of harmony of the controlled conditions with the influenced conditions. A statement that "A was controlled" indeed accords with one that "A was influenced" *in terms of effects* but aren't the same *structurally*.

A statement that "A was influenced by B" indicates the possibility that A cannot be controlled but as a result was influenced by B. Here lies any psychological territory of freedom between A's behavior and B's intention, that is to say, A has negative freedom (conditions free from *x*). Therefore a statement that "B gives influence upon A" means that B induces A---a bearer of this freedom---to conduct as B wishes. "Induction" contains the possibility of giving birth to unexpected consequences unlike "coercion". There is not *strict causality* where B's intention necessarily becomes the cause why A is controlled but *soft causality* at most, because it looks as if B's influence upon A couldn't have been avoided, *judging from the fact that B affected A*. But this kind of causal relation isn't characterized as *descendent causality* going from cause to effect but *ascendant causality* going from effect to cause. Substituting *p* for cause and *q* for effect, $p \rightarrow q$ (the sign of " \rightarrow " stands for "if") is derived from the presupposition of $q \rightarrow p$. Logically considered, $\neg p \rightarrow \neg q$ (the sign of " \neg " stands for "not") is necessarily true but only $p \rightarrow q$ is probably true. That is to say, *p* is not always the cause of *q*. In order to make up the causality in a strict sense, the cause as a *sufficient condition* must be sought for under which same consequences cannot fail to occur. The concept of "influence" implies the cause as a *necessary condition* at most. Therefore the causality in the influenced relationship is characterized as "soft."

3. A case study

Suppose that a motorman drove exceedingly over a regulated speed so as to recover time lag, so that there occurred a railroad accident. What is this cause? Is it because he didn't drive on time, because he tried to recover time lag, or because he drove too speedy? We can point out a too speedy drive as the cause if we seek to form the strict causality. There is *physical causality* between a speed-up and a railroad accident, the process of which nobody can interfere with by any means. That is to say, there can be descendent causality of $p \rightarrow q$. Now, how about the state of affairs where a motorman didn't drive on time and intended to recover time lag? It is because of recovery of time lag that he drove too speedy and it is because of time lag that he intended to recover it. Conversely speaking, we can form causality as follows: he didn't drive on time and speeded up to recover time lag. However this kind of causality must be characterized as teleological, hence it needs the "reason" instead of the "cause". While the word of "cause" stands for "what makes something happen," that of "reason" stands for "the explanation that people give for why something is done".⁸⁾ For example, let us suppose that x hit y and y was injured. The cause why y was injured is that x had hit on y . This situation can be therefore described, such as "y was injured *because* x had hit y ." It isn't nevertheless so clear why x had to hit y that a further reason is requested, e.g. such as x got angry with y . The state of affairs can be described, such as " x got angry with y and x hit y , so that y was injured." We should turn then our attention to the difference between "because" and "as." The description of "because x hit y " indicates physical cause but that of "as x got angry with y " indicates psychological cause. We discriminate between physical cause and psychological cause and make their proper use according to the sort of their applicable objects. For example, suppose that a wild raccoon dog was run over by a car at midnight, it is main cause that it shot out on the road at midnight. But, if it is not a raccoon dog but a person that was run over, we cannot be so satisfied with this reason that we would like to question further, e.g. such as "Why at midnight?" "What is the purpose?" What is this difference? Why will we discriminate the category of causes?

Now, the factual proposition must be a verifiable one the content of which we can ascertain both spatially and temporally. The state of affairs that a motorman didn't drive on time, he drove too speedy, there was a railroad accident and so on, is consisted of some factual propositions, so can be verified. But the state of affairs that he intended to recover time lag cannot be verified, for it is another proposition, i.e. a *volitional one*. We take it for granted that there is any psychological territory where the will or the desire necessarily precedes bodily gestures and behaviors. But the volition comes and goes with bodily moments and its own territory is not so evident. Volitional propositions in general are eliminated from strict causality, so there seems to be no room for them. In order to explain this, let us now substitute the sign of t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4 for some points in time and the sign of L_1, L_2 for two number lines. Consisting ascendant causality of consequences, it is t_1 when the train was delayed, it is t_2 when a motorman tried to recover time lag, it is t_3 when he started to speed up, and it is t_4 when a railroad accident occurred. The stream of time is shown as $t_1 \ t_2 \ t_3 \ t_4$ on a number line L_1 , which is a mere fable. Because t_1, t_3 and t_4 are shown on L_1 but t_2 is shown on L_2 , there cannot be a continual process. While a number line L_1 stands for physical time, a number line L_2 stands for psychological time. Therefore we should not regard the process of time going from t_1 to t_4 as continuous but as discontinuous, i.e. understand that the process of time starting at t_1 once stopped just before t_2 and then it restarted at t_3 . As for strict causality, all that we can describe is the fact that something occurred that ought to do. The speed-up is indispensable for the occurrence of railroad accident. Namely, if we drive too speedy drive, we cannot help causing a railroad accident. Logically explaining about this situation, it is expressed as follows: $(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p)$ (the sign of " \rightarrow " stands for "equivalence"). If we bring the intention of recovering time lag under strict causality, $q \rightarrow p$ isn't valid unlike $p \rightarrow q$ (for "converses are not always true"). Even if we account this intention as *cause* of railroad accident, it is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. That is to say, *the intention doesn't always give birth to the accident*, hence we should state that *the intention would have given influence upon the accident*.

Even though the intention could be brought under the process of psychological time, all issues aren't nevertheless settled, because it might be an immediate reaction of one's body toward preceding cause, i.e. time lag might have driven him uneasy and fearful. Then we cannot but think that *the train's delay aroused him to uneasiness and fear and his bodily reaction led to a speed-up*. According to Arthur Schopenhauer, we cannot will to will.⁹⁾ The will is the body itself. Uneasiness and fear belong to bodily symptoms as excitement, flush, beats and so on. There is the possibility that the motorman had speeded up *with uneasiness and fear* before he intended

to recover time lag. Otherwise, there is the possibility that the intention didn't exist at all. Then this situation will be able to be described as a necessary bodily reaction, hence there cannot be the "intelligible cause" in a Kantian sense that a new causality begins, that is to say, no volitional propositions can be presented. It is thus very difficult to connect the effect q with the cause p .

So far we have assumed that influential action contains intention. Now, how about the state of affairs where the causality between influential action and an influenced object is ambiguous, for example, such as game software effects children's mental growth? Motive such as "because I was eager to kill others" has recently been reported, as is unbelievable. In addition, it also has been pointed out that this motive is due to influence from murder game software. A sadist is not good for our society, for there is any possibility that he promotes the evil. Let us suppose according to J. J. C. Smart that there be a universe where no sentient beings exist on one hand and a universe where only one sadist exists on the other hand who amuses oneself by imagining that he kills others.¹⁰⁾ If we accept the presupposition of hedonic utilitarianism, it will be better to choose the latter than the former. Of course, if there are another persons but a sadist who can be sacrificed for him, we must deliberate a quantity of pain, uneasiness, fear, etc. which can be produced by his existence itself, hence the alternative is different. In this case, we should esteem secondary influence more highly than expected consequences. How about if there is none in this universe? As there is none to be affected by a sadist, even though his existence is absolute evil, a quantity of pleasure cannot help becoming the standard of moral judgments.

This sample appears to be ridiculous, but suggests nevertheless the essence of influence. Game software is made for the purpose of entertainment of users. Therefore, when the users are so absorbed in game software that they are affected badly, there is no causality between game software and the influence. Now, how is the influenced relationship formed? As stated before, it matters how the causality between a thing and a man, or a man and a man is formed. Natural phenomena as typhoons, earthquakes and so on give great influence upon human society both physically and psychologically. There are no causal "gaps" between influential action and an influenced object. Typhoons or earthquakes deprive people of their fortune and life, which furthermore gives influence upon their mind. This kind of psychological influence is given birth to from natural disasters and can never exist without them. Therefore there can be any causality between natural phenomena and psychological influence. But in respect of game software, it is doubtful whether we can explain the birth of sadists as necessary. Sadists will exist in any society and in reverse, humanists will exist, no matter how hysterical and horrible society may be. Game software is one thing, and the existence of sadists is another. Hence the possibility that sadists exist cannot be denied, whether there may be game software or not. At any rate, so far as we consider influence from a causal point of view, we fall into a puzzle to be able to solve it by no means, for we must ascend to the cause without limit. Whether a railroad accident or game software, they are the same cases in respects that it is not easy to make the causality clear.

4. Beyond subjective explanation

So far we have considered an influenced relationship mainly from a causal point of view. This consideration is indeed valid in thinking of risks but not sufficient to grasp the concept of influence in a broad sense. In fact, this concept contains not only negative but also positive affects. Therefore we need to seek for more comprehensive concept of influence including the latter. What serves to seek for it is the discrimination between the conditions where something occurs that should do and the ones where nothing occurs that should do. Though being influenced similarly, there can occur different consequences. When the object to be affected is not a thing but a man, one of important factors is acceptability, which we cannot point out too much in the influenced relationship. For example, suppose that a spotlight is directed on a person against the background of a screen in the room where the sun's ray is blocked completely. Such a central part as a person and a screen is bright, a peripheral part is dim, and a distant part is truly dark. A spotlight corresponds to influential action. Then, what corresponds to the object to be affected? Is it only a person and a screen in the spotlight? How about a peripheral part where a light doesn't completely reach? This part doesn't face a spotlight firmly as "an evening primrose against Mt. Fuji."¹¹⁾ From the viewpoint of a spotlight, it is nothing but a shadow, an incidental image and noise. Hence the object that doesn't have this part is to explain in the perspective of influential action. However it will be obvious how intentionally

this concept of influence is thought out.

Now, a principle of pragmatism says: "In what respects would the world be different if this alternative or that were true? If I can find nothing that would become different, then the alternative has no sense."¹²⁾ This sentence refers to an issue on the causal explanation, in which we aim mainly for ascendant causality and fall into a puzzle at last. Saying again, the concept of influence stands for "bringing the change to something by acting on it." A main factor of influenced relation is what causes influence, that is to say, "action." But it is not enough to grasp the concept of influence in a broad sense. We should turn attention to any "change" in consequences, which we can never grasp insofar as we observe only "what occurs." The change in "what occurs" is made clear by comparison with "what doesn't occur," just as recognition to something white is not easy on the same colored field but on the different colored. Explaining it with the sample above, "brightness" of a person and a screen can be exaggerated only by comparison with "darkness" of the periphery. A light would not function without darkness. This might be understood from the Old Testament where it is written that the Creation originated from deep darkness. The same goes for physical movement. For example, a person riding on a train can perceive the outside scene moving. But it goes without saying that the train doesn't move in fact. The train's movement makes a person perceive as if it were moving. This relative movement is to understand only by comparison with "stillness." Even though a child doesn't tell his mother the fact of having faced bullying, she can read his grief in the change of his gestures and looks unlike the usual. If she is always indifferent to him, she won't be able to grasp this change.

So is if we understand "what occurs." The change in the object also is to grasp as the transition from "what doesn't occur" to "what occurs." That is to say, "what occurs" is possible only on the assumption of "what doesn't occur." The case goes for "something to be affected." We must take account of "something to be unaffected" at the same time if we intend to understand "something to be affected." However, can "something to be unaffected" be included in the influenced relationship at all? Isn't it a contradiction? We need to pay attention to the object itself independently of influential action so as to this puzzle. What is the object itself? This can be both affected and unaffected, hence it should be called "subject" rather than "object," i.e. "*the influenced subject*."

5. The factors of subjective explanation: acceptability and value

Strong influence cannot be avoided easily, just as a tidal wave swallows things and men in a moment. But we think that *we might had got rid of this disaster if we expected it before*, no matter how difficult it might be to avoid it. To think so is reasonable in a sense but we should forget that we have not been controlled yet. Those who have been influenced cannot be well conscious of their situations. Nobody knows whether coming darkness brings a nightmare or a pleasant sleep. Cinderella would like to an eternal spell but Snow White to awakening. It is easy to reflect the event after its occurrence, as most philosophers often do, but very difficult to know whether this moment is a dream or a fact. A little pretense would be sufficient to advocate the proverb of "meeting only once in a lifetime." We can rarely have such experience as we are moved heartily.

According to the causal explanation, the subject loses its independence as if it were fascinated with the object and controlled by it, hence the influenced relationship is formed based on a causal model. But, according to the subjective explanation, such subjective factors as "a gesture" and "an attitude" are placed between the subject and the object, which indicates a so-called "gap" in the influenced relationship. Illustrating it with "Nijushi no hitomi,"¹³⁾ where twelve pupils were to be all affected by Miss Oishi, this gap shows the possibility of the thirteenth pupil who is not affected by her. In the influenced relationship it is possible that the subject is not affected from the object. Now, the reaction of the subject influenced from the object is twofold: one is "loving" and "liking," the other "hating" and "disliking." The same energy causes the reaction of loving and hating. A contrary pupil would have been affected completely in this sense, however the pupil might hate her. Therefore this title had better been changed into "Thirteen Pupils." Here I will not consider this minus influence but only plus influence in order to avoid the complexity of situations.

By the way, how are we capable of being affected from nothing? Let's suppose here were "a black box." This box is assumed to understand human behaviors from the viewpoint of an outer observer. A model that is useful for the causal explanation is that the subject's intentional behaviors can be brought to naught and are automated. It is only the matter with the correlation between stimulus and reaction, or an input and an output. This correlation can

be understood only in the “perspective of an observer.” However rather a psychological region than a black box is important for the subjective explanation, in which we are forced to move from “an outer viewpoint” to “an inner one” and live in a “philosophers’ room” as a black box, so that we can intercept ourselves from all stimuli. Now, we don’t need to prepare for such a special tool as a black box any more. We have only to image how we receive stimuli. The proverb that “he catches the wind with a net” means that reaction is necessary for action. Such properties of the body as hardness, size, color, smell, etc. cannot exist without acceptability of the subject as so-called reaction. All stimuli would exist without subjective reaction. If there is none who is loved or hated, the action of loving and hating will be insignificant. Stimuli have thus a close relation to the acceptable subject. Hence we have only to rob us of acceptability in order not to respond all stimuli. We should shut out our sensation and indulge ourselves in the state of “Bodhidharma.” Whether we may take refuge into a black box, or whether we may remove our sensation, we are free from all stimuli, just as we cannot watch television unless we get radio wave or have a receiver.

As mentioned above, we can point out the “acceptability” as a not sufficient but necessary factor for the subjective explanation. We can neither love nor dislike everything but there is also something we like, dislike, or are indifferent in. That is to say, *we aren’t affected from all objects*. Does this mean that we can differ intentionally what we are affected from what we aren’t affected? Judging from that there are the affected part and the unaffected part before the same object, *such discrimination seems to be valid*. However *we are not affected to make this difference but I find myself to be affected unconsciously*. In terms of the subject’s independence from any influence, we must take a subjective factor into the explanation. Even though the degree of influence depends on the capacity of the influenced part, we should not think that the influenced part gives birth to the influential action, i.e. a subjective factor precedes influence, which is completely opposite. “Natura naturata” can never replace “natura naturans.”¹⁴⁾

Nevertheless the object itself doesn’t give influence upon the subject. No influence would occur without anything to produce influence. Such factor of influence is *not the existence of object but its value*. This indicates the second factor of the subjective explanation, which causes such intentional experience as joy and sorrow. The concept of value is not necessary for formation of the influenced relation from a causal point of view. Necessary process going from what gives influence to what is influenced is to consider here. But this process is quietly the reverse in the subjective explanation. The existence of object is nothing but a mere trigger for producing the process indirectly. It goes without saying that *the value of object* is important.

6. Encounter with value: response to value

When the subject is affected from the object, there can be an encounter with the value, whether may on purpose or by chance. So long as influence is defined as *bringing the change to something by acting on it*, any factor bringing change ought to be included in the influenced relation. This factor called “value” is based on the object and at the same time discovered by the subject. Even if the object has value, it remains unknown insofar as it cannot be discovered. The discovery of intrinsic value of Vincent van Gogh's pictures made the approval of his art possible. The value would remain as “possible value” without its discovery. Therefore subjective factors usually follow valued phenomena. From this, we find the idea of “response to value” (Wertantwort) to be useful for the subjective explanation, which was advocated by Dietrich von Hildebrand.¹⁵⁾ He insisted on the importance of “attitude to value,” in which the realization of value is demanded. The thesis of subjective influence is that *a subjective response is important in order for value to be realized*. The change influence brings is nothing less than a subject response to the value of object. Of course, the subject doesn’t intentionally make a response to it but can do so spontaneously. But it is certain that this response contains a basic form of “Yes” and “No.” Comparing it with the sample above, the response of “Yes” indicates twelve pupils but that of “No” does the thirteenth contrary pupil. They were influenced by Miss Oishi to respond to her. Taking advantage of the idea of “response to value,” we can make it clearer how the influenced relation is formed on the influenced side. But we must question also *the way of subjective response to the value*. According to Hildebrand, the *right* attitude stands for *a valid response* to value. In addition, as a response is requested on the side of value, *a desirable attitude* is already assumed as a model of answers. That is to say, *this* response corresponds to *this* value, *that* response to *that* value. The rightness

of attitudes to value depends on this *one on one correspondence*. If attitudes have no correspondence, we can conceive it as unrighteous. So, Hildebrand advocated ethical attitudes according to value. It is right for us to manifest “a stir” and “an impression” to great artistic productions and “a sorrow” and “an anger” to violence and murder. If we take “tedious” and “tiresome” attitudes toward the former and manifest “a delight” and “a joy” to the latter, we have never valid response. *The response to value must be characterized as right.*

However a response in the influenced relation doesn't need to be such a right one. Furthermore, there can exist any influence even if it were a wrong response. We should remember how people made response when Napoleon burst as a so-called child of French Revolution. Both Beethoven and Hegel once fell into raptures over him, though they regretted their careless conduct later. So, even if there were wrong value on the subjective side, there can be any influence. Of course, wrong value has considerable disadvantage for right value *in terms of durability*. But we can live nevertheless in a wrong valued system eternally, so are asked again what value is in the world. Even though value is wrong or unjust, it also will be qualified as value if our life needs it, for the life itself also is value undoubtedly. Nobody can criticize us for our having lived a wrong life.

Now, Paulos was struck by lightning suddenly when he was taking the Christians to Jerusalem to punish them.¹⁶⁾ He heard a voice falling down: “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting Me?” When he questioned, “Who are You, Lord?” there was an answer: “I am Jesus of Nazareth.” Paulos went blind because of this event but was healed later, so that he changed from the persecuting to the persecuted. This experience is in general called “conversion of Paulos” and shows immediately what “blind value” is. Hildebrand says that there is blind value among those who don't know why impurity is bad, for example, such as Raskolnikov who is blind to the sanctity of human life.¹⁷⁾ They are fond of rather lower value than higher value. Hence blind value causes the badness. But this kind of value isn't brought about by temperament and incompetence but by haughtiness and avarice. Those who are blind to value are not originally incapable of grasping it rightly. Paulos could not have changed his heart only because he was struck by lightning. Lightning and revelation are indeed indispensable for Paulos' conversion, but it would be superficial to understand that they led to the conversion necessarily, for they only struck a chord in his heart. Long before the conversion, he must have been disturbed and longed for the moment when he was struck by lightning. This case goes for “Takasebune.” Constable Shobei Hada was disturbed with Criminal Kisuke's look of happiness.¹⁸⁾ While we fear and dislike anything that we cannot understand easily, we long for it at the same time. Awe is a complicated feeling that mingles fear and longing. Lightning and revelation are nothing but a religious form to direct Paulos' conversion dramatically. The sense of sin must have bothered him again and again before the appearance of this form. Therefore the conversion indicates change of mental orientation and it is possible for even those who are blind to value to grasp it rightly. The blindness to value doesn't stand for the want of talents and capacities for grasping value but a mere mistake of mental orientation toward it. If the mind is oriented rightly, the blindness to value will be able to be removed at once.

Notes:

- 1) Cf. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Ohne Überschrift, enthaltend die sogenannte Monadologie. *Die philosophischen Schriften VI*, ed. by v. Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, Berlin, 1885, p.607.
- 2) Cf. the term of “Radiation” in *Super Nipponica CD-ROM*.
- 3) Cf. Akiyasu Todo (ed.), *Dictionary of classical Chinese explained in Japanese*, Gakushu-Kenkyusha, 1979, p.440.
- 4) John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, *Collected Works Vol.18*, ed. by J. M. Robinson, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, p.276.
- 5) Cf. J. J. Smart & Bernard Williams, *Utilitarianism for and against*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973, p.32
- 6) Cf. op. cit. p.34.
- 7) Cf. John Martin Fischer(ed.), *Moral Responsibility*, Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 1986, Introduction, pp.9-10.
- 8) A. P. Cowie (ed.), *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, 1989, Fourth Edition, p.1046.

- 9) Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Preisschrift über die Freiheit des Willens*, ed. by H. Ebeling, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978, p.42
- 10) Cf. Fischer, *Moral Responsibility*, p.32
- 11) Cf. Osamu Dazai, Fugakuhyakkei, in: *Hashire merosu*, Kadokawa-shoten, 1972, p.19.
- 12) William James, *Pragmatism & The Meaning of Truth*, Harvard Univ. Press, 1978, p.29.
- 13) This is a famous Japanese novel written by Sakae Tsuboi. The title of “Nijushi no hitomi” literally stands for “twenty- four eyes,” which shows that there are twelve pupils.
- 14) Cf. Spinoza, *Ethica*, transl. by Naoshi Hatakenaka, Iwanami-Shoten, 1982, p.73.
- 15) Cf. Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethik, *Gesammelte Werke II*, Stuttgart, 1952², pp.201-253.
- 16) Cf. *New Testament*, Acts of the Apostles 22.5-8.
- 17) Cf. Fedor M. Dostoevskii, *Crime and Punishment*, transl. by Masao Yonegawa, Shincho-sha, 1971.
- 18) Cf. Ougai Mori, Takasebune, Shincho-sha, 1976.