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ID 37379
file
creator
Komura, Mizuki
NDC
Society
abstract
This paper develops a model combining marriage and the job search, including marital bargaining and wage posting. It considers two types of jobs, full-time and part-time, and workers, male and female. After job-worker matching, male and female individuals find one another in the marriage market. This model has multiple equilibria in terms of gender divisions of labor, and the equilibrium market tightness is socially inefficient because of externalities arising from the expected gains from marriage.
journal title
IDEC DP2 Series
volume
Volume 5
issue
Issue 1
start page
1
end page
44
date of issued
2015-06
publisher
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
language
eng
nii type
Departmental Bulletin Paper
HU type
Departmental Bulletin Papers
DCMI type
text
format
application/pdf
text version
publisher
department
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation
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