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ID 50131
file
creator
subject
Political Economy
Mechanism Design
Impatient Players
Security Council
abstract
I study a self-enforcing mechanism for an international organization that interacts repeatedly over time. A random shock determines which countries would be in favor of or against taking a collective action. Thus, if the organization wants to take the action, incentives must be provided. I show that the optimal stationary equilibrium is equivalent to a mechanism characterized by voting weights. I study how this optimal mechanism depends on the discount factor. In particular, I show that within a class of parameter cases, the optimal mechanism mimics the way voting power is distributed among UN members via Security Council seats.
description
This study is based on the first chapter of my doctoral dissertation at Yale University.
journal title
IDEC DP2 Series
volume
Volume 10
issue
Issue 8
start page
1
end page
53
date of issued
2020-12
publisher
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
language
eng
nii type
Departmental Bulletin Paper
HU type
Departmental Bulletin Papers
DCMI type
text
format
application/pdf
text version
publisher
department
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation
Ohters
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