The organization of R&D and environmental policy : So does emission subsidy reduce emissions?
Use this link to cite this item : http://doi.org/10.15027/33354
ID | 33354 |
file | |
creator | |
subject | Emission subsidy
Emission tax
Emission reduction
Environmental R&D
Cournot duopoly
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NDC |
Economics
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description | This paper reexamines the Poyago-Theotoky model and provides additional investigation that was conducted under a corrected environmental damage parameter. As new findings, we obtain the following. First, social welfare under a time-consistent emission tax (emission subsidy) policy is always welfare-enhancing rather than the case of laissez-faire. Second, if the environmental damage parameter is sufficiently small, then the equilibrium emission tax rate is invariably negative. It is therefore an emission subsidy. Moreover, total emissions under the emission subsidy become smaller than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is low. However, total emissions under the emission subsidy become greater than those under laissez-faire if the damage parameter is sufficiently small, and if the R&D cost is high.
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journal title |
IDEC DP2 Series
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volume | Volume 2
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issue | Issue 13
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start page | 1
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end page | 10
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date of issued | 2012-09
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publisher | 広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
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SelfDOI | |
language |
eng
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nii type |
Departmental Bulletin Paper
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HU type |
Departmental Bulletin Papers
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DCMI type | text
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format | application/pdf
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text version | publisher
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department |
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation
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他の一覧 |