Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations
IDEC-DP2_10-8.pdf 1.94 MB
I study a self-enforcing mechanism for an international organization that interacts repeatedly over time. A random shock determines which countries would be in favor of or against taking a collective action. Thus, if the organization wants to take the action, incentives must be provided. I show that the optimal stationary equilibrium is equivalent to a mechanism characterized by voting weights. I study how this optimal mechanism depends on the discount factor. In particular, I show that within a class of parameter cases, the optimal mechanism mimics the way voting power is distributed among UN members via Security Council seats.
This study is based on the first chapter of my doctoral dissertation at Yale University.
IDEC DP2 Series
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Departmental Bulletin Paper
Departmental Bulletin Papers
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation