Simulation Analysis Using Multi-Agent Systems for Social Norms
Use this link to cite this item : https://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/00028869
ID | 28869 |
file | |
creator |
Nishizaki, Ichiro
Oyama, Toshihisa
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subject | Social norms
Reputation
Simulation
Adaptive agents
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NDC |
Mathematics
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abstract | With the existence of the social customs or norms, Naylor demonstrates a possibility of stable long-run equilibria of support for a strike in a labor market, and this implies that at least some individuals will behave cooperatively and hence the prisoners' dilemma could be escaped. In this paper, using an agent-based simulation model in which artificial adaptive agents have mechanisms of decision making and learning based on neural networks and genetic algorithms, we compare the results of our simulation analysis with that of the mathematical model by Naylor. In particular, while Naylor's model is based on rationality as it relates to individual utility maximization, agents behave adaptively in our agent-based simulation model; agents make decisions by trial and error, and they learn from experiences to make better decisions.
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journal title |
Computational Economics
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volume | Volume 34
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issue | Issue 1
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start page | 37
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end page | 65
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date of issued | 2009-03-12
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publisher | Springer
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issn | 0927-7099
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ncid | |
publisher doi | |
language |
eng
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nii type |
Journal Article
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HU type |
Journal Articles
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DCMI type | text
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format | application/pdf
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text version | author
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rights | Copyright (c) 2009 Springer
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relation | The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
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relation url | |
department |
Graduate School of Engineering
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