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ID 32090
file
creator
subject
Environmental research joint venture
Environmental R&D
Time-consistent emission tax
Competition policy
Cournot duopoly
NDC
Economics
description
This paper presents an examination of the socially desirable formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emissions tax. The results reveal that if environmental damage is sufficiently small, alternatively if there is severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially desirable. However, if environmental damage is sufficiently extensive, and if a firm's environmental R&D costs are sufficiently limited, then, in contrast to previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more desirable than environmental R&D cartelization and ERJV cartelization, although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing" and “NO R&D coordination."
journal title
IDEC DP2 Series
volume
Volume 2
issue
Issue 6
start page
[1]
end page
18
date of issued
2012-02
publisher
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
SelfDOI
language
eng
nii type
Departmental Bulletin Paper
HU type
Departmental Bulletin Papers
DCMI type
text
format
application/pdf
text version
publisher
department
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation
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