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ID 35705
file
creator
subject
R&D coordination
Environmental R&D
End-of-pipe technology
Precommitment ability
Emission tax
JEL Classification Numbers: O32
JEL Classification Numbers: L13
JEL Classification Numbers: Q55
JEL Classification Numbers: Q58
NDC
Pollution. Environmental engineering
abstract
This paper presents examination of environmental R&D of Cournot duopolists with end-of-pipe technology under a regulator's precommitment to an emissions tax. Results show that, in the presence of technological spillover effect, the government invariably prefers environmental R&D cartelization to environmental R&D competition. In addition, this paper, in stark contrast to those presenting earlier studies, reveals that consumer surplus is not necessarily maximized by environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization, although there invariably exist private incentives to firms for ERJV cartelization as well as social incentives for it.
journal title
IDEC DP2 Series
volume
Volume 4
issue
Issue 3
start page
1
end page
11
date of issued
2014-06
publisher
広島大学大学院国際協力研究科
SelfDOI
language
eng
nii type
Departmental Bulletin Paper
HU type
Departmental Bulletin Papers
DCMI type
text
format
application/pdf
text version
publisher
department
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation
Graduate School of Social Sciences
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