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ID 31733
file
creator
Ueda, Yoshifumi
subject
State
Bargaining Power
Sovereignty
Game Model
NDC
Economics
abstract
The early state came into existence as the necessary result of the innovation of metal tools under the condition that the selfish motives of preceding communities' chieftains for making the transaction of external trade more profitable by resorting to a military force, the net-benefit of whose use could be sure to be increased by innovating bronze weapons, later taken over by iron ones. Though the main propositions are based on the recent empirical studies of ancient history and evolution anthropology, they are subsumed under the categorical frameworks of the transcendental philosophy. To prove them, some expected hypotheses are inferred and deducted by the analysis of a two-stage game comprised of both the "network game with hierarchies" abstracting an irrigation economic community and the "two-stage bargaining game" modeling the process of bargaining in a foreign trade, both of which are modeled in accordance with the Kantian categorical frameworks
journal title
The Hiroshima Economic Review
volume
Volume 35
issue
Issue 2
start page
37
end page
71
date of issued
2011-11-30
publisher
広島大学経済学会
issn
0386-2704
ncid
language
eng
nii type
Departmental Bulletin Paper
HU type
Departmental Bulletin Papers
DCMI type
text
format
application/pdf
text version
publisher
rights
Copyright (c) 2011 広島大学
department
Graduate School of Social Sciences
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