このエントリーをはてなブックマークに追加
ID 28869
file
creator
Nishizaki, Ichiro
Oyama, Toshihisa
subject
Social norms
Reputation
Simulation
Adaptive agents
NDC
Mathematics
abstract
With the existence of the social customs or norms, Naylor demonstrates a possibility of stable long-run equilibria of support for a strike in a labor market, and this implies that at least some individuals will behave cooperatively and hence the prisoners' dilemma could be escaped. In this paper, using an agent-based simulation model in which artificial adaptive agents have mechanisms of decision making and learning based on neural networks and genetic algorithms, we compare the results of our simulation analysis with that of the mathematical model by Naylor. In particular, while Naylor's model is based on rationality as it relates to individual utility maximization, agents behave adaptively in our agent-based simulation model; agents make decisions by trial and error, and they learn from experiences to make better decisions.
journal title
Computational Economics
volume
Volume 34
issue
Issue 1
start page
37
end page
65
date of issued
2009-03-12
publisher
Springer
issn
0927-7099
ncid
publisher doi
language
eng
nii type
Journal Article
HU type
Journal Articles
DCMI type
text
format
application/pdf
text version
author
rights
Copyright (c) 2009 Springer
relation
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
relation url
department
Graduate School of Engineering



Last 12 months's access : ? times
Last 12 months's DL: ? times


This month's access: ? times
This month's DL: ? times