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ID 14429
file
creator
Nihous, Gérard
Saito, Kimio
subject
game theory
environmental problems
Kyoto Protocol
CO2 Ocean Sequestration Field Experiment
NDC
Pollution. Environmental engineering
abstract
This paper uses elementary arguments from game theory to consider the interaction between protago-nists involved in environmental problems. It is argued that 'generic' global problems often result in aPrisoner's dilemma, with the status quoas equilibrium. Also, a brief consideration of the KyotoProtocol confirms that if developing countries were asked to join, their dominant strategy would be torefuse, and that the recent withdrawal of the United States leaves other signatories in a precarious posi-tion. Finally, the paper focuses on a specific recent project, the CO2 Ocean Sequestration FieldExperiment, to demonstrate that many of the difficulties hampering the resolution of global-scale envi-ronmental problems have to be dealt with at local levels as well.
journal title
Journal of International Development and Cooperation
volume
Volume 11
issue
Issue 1
start page
25
end page
41
date of issued
2005-01
publisher
広島大学国際協力研究科
issn
1341-0903
ncid
SelfDOI
language
eng
nii type
Departmental Bulletin Paper
HU type
Departmental Bulletin Papers
DCMI type
text
format
application/pdf
text version
publisher
department
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation
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