Speech Acts, Social Reality, and the Cooperative Principle in Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*

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This article forms a part of a project to examine the works of J. L. Austin in order to reassess his ideas and their influence on pragmatics. In relation to pragmatics, we wish to consider its value both in fictional narratives, including novels, short stories, drama and film, as well as considering the language used in professions such as medicine and law. In doing this, we also consider the theory that has been built up around speech acts, particularly in relation to two of Austin's contemporaries, Searle and Grice.

Here we focus on an analysis of a novel, Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*. The book has been selected due to its narrative complexity, involving a large amount of embedded direct speech, offering good opportunities to analyse spoken discourse within fiction.

We do not treat the research as a linear process, in which a theory is carefully worked out, and then applied to particular situations. Instead, it is a reciprocal interaction between the theory and the situation, with the theory illuminating certain facets of the situation, and the situation asking questions of the theory. In this case, the situation is the reading of a particular novel, and the theory relates to speech acts within pragmatics. The approach here is piecemeal, and we make no attempt to generalise the findings to all fiction; rather, we consider the interplay between theory and the reading of *Lord Jim*.

In relation to the theory, this paper may be considered a sketch rather than a finished work. The theory covers aspects of the work of three philosophers (Austin, Searle, and Grice) as well as an applied linguist (Widdowson), exploring areas such as speech acts, social reality, the cooperative principle, and discourse. This is a lot of ground to cover, and a critic might argue that it would be better to focus on only one of these. However, our argument is holistic: In analysing a text, there is considerable interplay between these areas, and the article is used to sketch this interaction. Subsequent articles will look at particular areas in more depth, but at this stage the aim is to consider the connections between speech acts, social reality, and the cooperative principle within discourse in examining the novel *Lord Jim*.

The Philosophy of Language and Pragmatics

Three analytic philosophers have had a powerful influence on the development of pragmatics: J. L. Austin, J. Searle, and P. Grice. Austin and Searle are both highly influential in the development of the theory of speech acts. Searle has also integrated speech acts into a theory of social reality, and Grice is famous for his 'cooperative principle'. We use ideas from all three philosophers in this article, as well as the considerable contribution of an applied linguist, H. G. Widdowson, who took the analysis of speech acts from the level of the sentence to the level of discourse. This sets the framework for an analysis of *Lord Jim*.

Speech Act Theory

Austin was not the first writer to consider speech acts. Smith (2003) observes that Aristotle made reference to uses of language that are not of the statement-making sort, but argues that he confined such study to "the peripheral realms of logic and poetry" (p. 3). Smith further notes that the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid referred to promisings, warnings, and forgivings as 'social operations' or 'social acts'. He also cites Adolf Reinach, who focused on 'social acts' such as promising, commanding, warning, entreating, flattering, and declaring. However, he notes that both Reid's and Reinach's work had little influence; it was Austin's ideas on speech acts that found a wider audience

J. L. Austin is most famous for his 1955 lecture series at Harvard University, *How to Do Things with Words*. A book of the same name was published posthumously (1962), using his lecture notes, and edited by Urmson and Sbisa. As Warnock (1989) observes, the structure of the book is slightly unusual. Austin starts by making a distinction between constatives and performatives. Constatives are statements of fact that are verifiable: either true or false. In contrast, performatives are defined as sentences that are actions. The examples of performatives that he gives are "I do" in a wedding ceremony, "I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*" in a ship launching ceremony, "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother" in a will, and "I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow." Austin (1962) explores the distinction between the constative and performative, and finding it inadequate, he declares, in chapter 7: "It is time to make a fresh start on the problem" (p. 99). He rejects the constative/performative distinction, and examines what he calls 'speech acts', coming up with two sets of three acts:

Set 1: a phonetic act, a phatic act, a rhetic act
Set 2: a locutionary act, an illocutionary act, a perlocutionary act

The acts can be illustrated best by examples. Austin uses "Shoot her!" and "You can't do that." We have created one related to teaching: "Talk to him."

Regarding set 1, if someone says "Talk to him," she produces a certain set of sounds (phonetic act). She also produces recognisable words (phatic act). If they are meaningful, then they have sense and reference (rhetic act).

Regarding set 2, if someone says "Talk to him," she says the words with sense and reference, so performing a locutionary act. She also performs an illocutionary act; in a classroom, we might report it as "She instructed the student to talk to another student." There is also a perlocutionary act: The student started talking to another student in the class.

In summary, in *How to Do Things with Words*, there are six named acts:

1. phonetic act
2. phatic act
3. rhetic act
4. locutionary act
5. illocutionary act
6. perlocutionary act

Forguson (1973) has argued that within Austin's categories, the rhetic act and the locutionary act are essentially identical, making one or the other redundant. For the purposes of this article, we consider it necessary to have a term for what is said, and then to analyse it. To do this, we make use of the redundancy by altering the definition of the locutionary act. We therefore alter the categories slightly to suit our analysis:

TABLE 1. Definitions of Categories Making up the Speech Act

1. The locutionary act is what is said, and we will refer to it as the locution. This can be identified by a question: What did the speaker literally say? ("Talk to him").
2. The rhetic aspect relates to the sense and reference: Does the locution make sense and to what do the components of the locution refer?
3. The illocutionary act is the general speaker act, and we will refer to it as the illocution. This can be identified by a question: What general act did the speaker perform? (an instruction).
4. The perlocutionary effect is on the hearer, and we will refer to it as the perlocution. This can identified by "What did the hearer do in response to the locutionary act?"

It should be noted that Austin's unit of analysis in *How to Do Things with Words* is the sentence. As Warnock (1973) notes, when reading a philosophical text, Austin liked to settle the meaning of a sentence before moving to the next sentence; while this approach worked well for a text like Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, it was often less successful in relation to other philosophical texts. It is therefore necessary to consider speech acts in relation to longer stretches of language.

From Sentence to Discourse

An important contribution to speech act theory comes from applied linguistics, where Widdowson (1978) uses it to analyse discourse, making a distinction between coherence and cohesion. Davies (2011) has argued that there is a tension within Widdowson's analysis concerning Austin's distinction between the locutionary act and the illocutionary act, and Searle's adaptation of the theory with the distinction between the propositional act and the illocutionary act. Davies argues that within applied linguistics, it is easier to use the coherence/cohesion distinction on the basis of illocutions and locutions as described in Table 1. For example, Widdowson's (p. 29) famous example can be considered:

A: That's the telephone.
B: I'm in the bath.
A: O.K.

Widdowson uses this dialogue to illustrate coherence. There are no overt links between the utterances of the interlocutors, but by following the illocutions, we intuitively understand what is happening. It is then possible to expand the dialogue to create overt links between the utterances.

A: That's the telephone. (Can you answer it, please?)
B: (No, I can't answer it because) I'm in the bath.
A: O.K. (I'll answer it.) (p. 29)

This approach is much easier than an analysis using Searle's force indicating devices and propositions. The shift of analysis from sentence to discourse is important, particularly in relation to the analysis of *Lord Jim* which contains a considerable amount of dialogue.

From Speech Act to the Construction of Social Reality

An important aspect of speech act theory is its connection to social reality. Searle (1996) notes that certain types of speech act alter the nature of social reality. This can be illustrated by examining one of Austin's four performative examples above. If certain words are uttered in a wedding ceremony by the right people, then a marriage takes place. This alters the relationship between the two people, who now have a different status within the framework of the law. Being married is a certain kind of fact. Searle (1996) describes these kinds of facts as 'institutional facts'. This is in contrast to 'brute facts': The fact that the earth orbits the sun is a fact of a different kind, although Searle accepts that such facts require the institution of language. He notes:

> Institutional facts can be created with the performative utterance of such sentences as "The meeting is adjourned," "I give and bequeath my entire fortune to my nephew," "I appoint you chairman," "War is hereby declared," etc. These utterances create the very state of affairs that they represent; and in each case, the state of affairs is an institutional fact. (p. 34)

Searle (1996) argues that social reality is very complex, but it is almost invisible to us:

> The child is brought up in a culture where he or she simply takes social reality for granted. We learn to perceive and use cars, bathtubs, houses, money, restaurants, and schools without reflecting on the special features of their ontology and without being aware that they have a special ontology. (p. 4).

In this article, we consider the effect of social reality on speech acts, and speech acts on social reality. This is particularly important in *Lord Jim*; as Tanner (1963) notes: " 'Fact' is to be a key word in the novel." However, there is a risk with the institutional fact/brute fact distinction. Does it disappear if human beings themselves are considered brute facts? Are their products, such as houses, also brute facts in the same way we might consider a spider's product, a web, a brute fact or a bird's product, a nest, a brute fact? To explore this question, it is easier to consider a world in which humans are extinct but their products remain. What were once houses, money, and courts, become features of a non-human landscape devoid of human meaning. This difference between a human reality and an autonomous non-human world helps give some traction to the division between brute facts and institutional facts. Of particular relevance in this article are institutional features such as frameworks of law, but there are other parts of social reality relating to guilt and shame which feature very strongly in *Lord Jim*.

Another aspect of speech acts that is important for an analysis of the text is Grice's cooperative principle, which also helps us to understand Widdowson's telephone example, above.

The Cooperative Principle

A key aspect of Grice's (1989) ideas is that, when we talk we do not overtly state everything, but that in speaking we usually cooperate with each other:

> Our talk exchanges do not necessarily consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose, or common set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. (p. 26)

On the basis of this assumption, Grice formulates his cooperative principle: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (p. 26). In relation to the cooperative principle, Grice produces four categories: "Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner." Within these categories he produces maxims:

TABLE 2. Grice's (1989) Categories and Maxims (pp. 26-27)

Category 1: *Quantity*
Maxim 1: Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
Maxim 2: Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Category 2*: Quality*
Maxim 1: Do not say what you believe to be false.
Maxim 2: Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Category 3*: Relation*
Maxim 1: Be relevant.

Category 4: *Manner*
Maxim 1: Avoid obscurity of expression.
Maxim 2: Avoid ambiguity.
Maxim 3: Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
Maxim 4: Be orderly.

By considering the cooperative principle in conjunction with speech acts, we can understand the coherence in Widdowson's example. "That's the telephone" is not a pure statement of fact. Something is being implied: "Please answer it." If B is following the cooperative principle, then within Category 4, B is being relevant, and something is being implied ("I can't answer it"). Consequently, in examining dialogue it is important to use the cooperative principle to establish if there are any implicatures.

It is necessary at this stage to note that there is an important difference between speech acts and social reality in comparison to the cooperative principle. The cooperative principle does not appear to be morally neutral. Grice has taken his categories from Kant, and the maxims are expressed in the form of imperatives. "Do not say what you believe to be false" clearly has a moral dimension to it. In contrast, the speech act

framework is morally neutral. For example, a paramilitary commander may issue the order "Fire!" resulting in the murder of a group of unarmed civilians, but this is a successful speech act. In comparison, if someone flat out lies, they are not following the cooperative principle. Interestingly, this is not given high priority by Grice because it does not generate an implicature. However, it is an important consideration, especially in one of the situations from *Lord Jim*: Jim's negotiation with the devious Gentleman Brown, who has no intention of keeping his word.

Method

In this article, we test the pragmatic theory sketched above against the text of *Lord Jim.* To do this, it requires a careful analysis of the structure of the book as well as identification and analysis of the locations within the story, reflecting different social realities. In addition, we have chosen three extracts involving dialogue. These extracts have been represented as drama-style dialogue in order to physically link the turns in the conversations more closely than in the actual text (See appendices). The conversations are then used for analysis.

Lord Jim

Lord Jim is an interesting case for analysis due to its construction. As Sherry (1992) observes, it has a simple plot with a highly complex structure. It is particularly relevant to speech act theory due to the way it is narrated. Before examining the narration, we briefly summarise the plot.

The Plot

Lord Jim is the story of a sailor, Jim, the son of a pastor, who becomes a naval officer. On a voyage east, he is injured by a falling spar and has to recuperate in hospital. After recovering, he gets a position as first mate on a very rusty old ship, the *Patna*, which is transporting Muslim pilgrims to the Middle East for their visit to Mecca.

On the voyage, the ship hits something in the water. The captain and the rest of the crew decide to abandon ship and leave the pilgrims to drown. Jim jumps into the crew's lifeboat at the last minute. When the lifeboat arrives in port, the crew discover that the *Patna* has been rescued.

There is a Court of Inquiry. Jim is the only member of the crew to attend the inquiry, and his sailing certificate is concelled. He stays in the east, and takes on several low-level jobs, but leaves them whenever some connection to the *Patna* incident catches up with him. Finally, he goes to Patusan, a remote Malay town, where through acts of courage, he plays a crucial role in defeating a vicious warlord, and bringing peace to Patusan. He is given the name *Tuan Jim* (Lord Jim), and is regarded as a figure of authority in the town. He settles down with a woman called Jewel.

A group of desperate pirates led by Gentleman Brown come to Patusan to steal food and anything else they can. The town defends itself, and the pirates become cornered. Brown negotiates with Jim and asks to be allowed to leave with his weapons.

Jim negotiates on behalf of the pirates with the town elders, promising that his life is forfeit should anything bad happen. The town lets the pirates go, but as they leave, the pirates fire a volley at the defenders on the river bank, killing the headman's son. Jim goes to face the headman, Doramin, who kills him.

The Narrative Structure and Relevant Punctuation

The structure of Lord Jim is complex, and can be divided it into three key sections:

1. The first four chapters use a third-person narrative.
2. In chapter 5, there is a switch to a first-person narrative, this being the narration of the story by a sea captain, Marlow, to a small audience. This continues until the end of chapter 36.
3. From chapter 37 to the last chapter (45), the narration is from Marlow's written script, sent to a friend; the first-person narrative is continued through a letter and then through a packet of papers in which Marlow has written the final episode of Jim's life.

Lothe (1989) describes these three sections as: (1) an omniscient narrator, (2) Marlow speaking, and (3) Marlow writing. In terms of the punctuation used to illustrate the narration, the same conventions are used. Embedded within the last 41 chapters are Marlow's discussions with others, which are often narrations within themselves. In the text of Lord Jim that we have used for analysis, Marlow's narration is signalled by a single quotation mark at the beginning of a paragraph (there is no closing of the quotation marks at the end of the paragraph):

> 'My eyes met his for the first time in that inquiry.… (p. 35).

Within Marlow's narration he quotes direct speech by using double quotation marks:

> ' "You Englishmen are all rogues," went on my patriotic Flensborg or Stettin Australian.… (p. 41)

In some instances, Marlow's interlocutor quotes speech, so that there is a direct quotation within a narration within a narration. For example, Marlow talks to Gentleman Brown, who quotes Jim. In this case, single quotation marks (Jim's direct speech) are used within double quotation marks:

> ' "That's what I told him ? I knew what to say," he began again, feebly at first, but working himself up with incredible speed into a fiery utterance of his scorn. "We aren't going into the forest to wander like a string of living skeletons dropping one after another for ants to go to work on before we are fairly dead. Oh no! … 'You don't deserve a better fate,' he said. 'And what do you deserve,' I shouted at him, 'you that I find skulking here …" (pp. 343-344).

At other times a narrator will summarise parts of a conversation, and then continue with direct quotations. For example, Brown states

> ' "…. 'Let us agree', said I, 'that we are both dead men, and let us talk on that basis, as equals. We are all equal before death,' I said. I admitted that I was like a rat in a trap, but we had been driven to it, and even a trapped rat can bite. He caught me up in a moment. 'Not if you don't go near the trap until the rat is dead.' … (p. 343)

What is the effect of these conventions? The first point to make is that they are literary devices. Marlow narrates the story in a way that is unlikely in real life, showing an incredible memory for details and dialogue. However, the construction of the story signals perspectives. Simmons (2003, p. 175) notes that "*Lord Jim* stands at the intersection the old and the new, juxtaposing late-nineteenth century imperial fiction and modern narrative," with the narrations presenting the reader with a non-chronological structure, and important juxtapositions of events.

The story revolves around Jim, and from chapter 5, it unfolds through the prism of Marlow's perception. In some cases, such as Jim's confrontation with Marlow, Marlow can reflect on his own emotions and experiences, articulating them to his audience. However, because of the embedding of narrations there are times when Marlow's interlocutors can do the same. Consequently, when Jim and Marlow talk in the evening, after a confrontation (Appendix 1), Jim narrates his experiences on the *Patna*, and can comment on what was said. Different perspectives are gained through these narrations, and Conrad is careful to make sure that what is understood is done so through such story-telling. Although the first four chapters have an omniscient narrator, we are never really inside the heads of the key characters, as is sometimes the case with a God's-eye third-person view; rather we are listening to their stories, and this leads to the question: How much can one know of another? Regarding Jim, Marlow states "I cannot say I had ever seen him distinctly? not even to this day, after I had my last view of him" (p. 200). However, a few lines later there is a further revealing statement: "I did not know so much more about myself" (p. 200). Given these uncertainties about knowing even oneself, one way forward is to think carefully about the language we use. It is necessary to pay close attention to what is said. In this article, therefore, the focus is primarily on the direct speech cited in the narrations.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Speech Acts within Social Reality: The Eastern Port and Patusan

Before examining specific speech acts within discourse, it is important to consider the social reality that Searle describes. One of its important features is that in everyday life it is difficult to discern because we are so embedded within it. As Watt (1980) observes, social reality is particularly important in the works of Joseph Conrad:

> The special perspective from which Conrad presents his fictional characters is difficult to define; it is broader and yet both more selective and more concentrated than usual in the novel. The perspective is broader because Conrad's characters are not the centers of a largely autonomous world of personal relationships, but beings whose actions are inextricably connected with the mysterious and yet determining forces of social and natural reality. (p. 269)

One way that Conrad brings this social reality to the surface is by placing his fictional characters in settings that are removed from the culture of their background. Often they are involved in running trading posts. For example, in 'An Outpost of Progress', Kayerts and Carlier are left to tend a far-flung trading post. Similarly, in *Heart of Darkness*, Kurtz is at the inner station, the most difficult post to reach. In *Lord Jim*,

Jim ends up in a trading post in Patusan, as far removed from other Europeans as possible. As Marlow notes:

> 'His fate, whatever it was would be ignored, because the country, for all its rotten state, was not judged ripe for interference. Once he got in, it would be for the outside world as though he had never existed. (p. 209)

Jim's sponsor, Stein has been given a trading concession in Patusan by the Dutch authorities, but they leave the area alone, and Stein is expected to take all the risks. In this way, what happens within Patusan is not regulated by the Dutch. Consequently, there is a striking contrast between the naval environment from which Jim is ejected, and the environment of Patusan, and the differences in the social realities emerge in the speech acts, particularly, the Court of Inquiry into the *Patna* incident, and in the negotiation in Patusan between Jim and Gentleman Brown.

In the Court of Inquiry, there are clear procedures, which end in a sentencing. The key speech act is not narrated by Marlow in its entirety:

> "The Court … Gustav So-and-so master … Native of Germany … James So-and-so … mate … certificates cancelled". (p. 145)

This sentencing alters social reality, and Jim is no longer a naval officer. In contrast, when negotiating with Gentleman Brown in Patusan (Appendix 3), Jim produces the following line:

> "I don't know whether I have the power". (p. 349)

This brings to the surface some of the differences in social reality between the two locations. In his period as a naval officer, Jim has a clearly delineated position within a legal framework. As a naval officer, he has certain responsibilities. There are clear procedures in the Court of Inquiry for investigating his conduct. While the discussion between Jim and Gentleman Brown is a different situation, a negotiation, not a Court of Inquiry, one interpretation of Jim's comment is that he realizes his position is ambiguous. Although he is *Tuan Jim*, an authority figure, he must make a case to the council of elders in Patusan, which is summarised by Marlow, based on a conversation with Tamb' Itam:

> 'He was ready to answer with his life for any harm that should come to them if the men with beards were allowed to retire. (p. 353)

Jim's guarantee leads to his death at the hands of Doramin, and this is another example of a different social reality. Jim could not have made such a bargain in the environment from which he originally came. In contrast to Kurtz in *Heart of Darkness*, Jim has never broken from his ideals, his being romantic ones concerning honour and bravery, and he remains quintessentially himself, but in the social reality of Patusan he has staked his life, which if he honours his word, entails his death.

Speech Acts and Discourse: The Mangy Cur

As noted above, *Lord Jim* is useful as a text for examining speech acts because of its unusual structure, and there are several instances where embedded dialogue can be analysed. A particularly useful passage for analysis occurs in chapter 6, outside the courthouse where the inquiry takes place. Here, Jim believes he has been publicly insulted when he hears the locution "Look at the wretched cur!" He turns and accosts Marlow, who has become separated from the man who actually spoke the words. In terms of turn-taking, there are 22 turns, and the exchange illuminates the importance of the different components of speech acts (particularly the sense and reference of the rhetic aspect) as well as the value of considering implicature.

The first point to note is that Austin's technique for describing speech acts is cumbersome when used for analysing the discourse. The technique is to try to bring illocutionary verbs to the surface through the use of reported speech. Using Austin's technique, the locution can be presented in the following way:

The man said, "Look at the wretched cur!"

To find the illocutionary verb, the sentence is then converted into reported speech:

The man _____ Marlow to look at the wretched cur.

In this case, what might the illocutionary verb be? Encouraged? Advised? Neither of these seems to capture the essence of the illocution. The man has tripped over a dog and, laughing, makes the statement. The illocution is ambiguous. He could be pointing out the dog to Marlow. There could also be an implicature "Look at the wretched cur, causing problems. It should be tied up!" with the man laughing to relieve his frustration.

The second point relates to the importance of the rhetic aspect, involving sense and reference, which is crucial in this exchange. The locution makes sense, and is easily comprehensible as a sentence. However, Jim's problem is that he misunderstands the reference. While the speaker of the words is referring to a rather miserable dog that has got under his feet and made him stumble, Jim takes the locution to be a derogatory comment about himself. This leads to the confrontation with Marlow, who does not understand why Jim is so upset. It is only after hearing Jim's accusation "Who's a cur now, hey?" that Marlow understands that Jim has mistaken the referent, and expresses his shock that Jim assumes that he would make such a remark.

Implicature has already been mentioned, but it becomes more important in the charged atmosphere of the interaction. For example, in lines 6 and 7 (Appendix 1) there appears to be a challenge and counter-challenge:

> ' "What did you mean by staring at me all morning?" said Jim at last. He looked up and looked down again. "Did you expect us all to sit with downcast eyes out of regard for your susceptibilities?" I retorted sharply. I was not going to submit meekly to his nonsense. (p. 66)

In contrast to Austin's technique of using reported speech, Widdowson's technique of making overt links in discourse is fairly straightforward, and implicatures can be explored:

Jim: What did you mean by staring at me all morning? (You should not have been staring at me this morning.)

Marlow: (I had every right to stare at you because you are at the centre of the inquiry.) Did you expect us all to sit with downcast eyes out of regard for your susceptibilities?

While Jim accepts Marlow's counter-challenge, he then goes on the offensive again, returning to the issue of the "wretched cur." By seeking out the illocutions, the conversation becomes clearer.

It is also interesting to note that illocutionary verbs are evident in Conrad's use of direct speech and shed some illumination on how Conrad conveys what we can know about another human being.

TABLE 3: Verbs Used for Direct Speech in the Scene Outside the Courthouse (pp. 65-69)

Verbs used for Marlow's Direct Speech	**Verbs Used in Jim's Direct Speech**
said protested affirmed retorted exclaimed went on protested stammered cried repeated said	asked said said pronounced said said said said mumbled persisted said pronounced

The most obvious difference between the verbs used for Marlow and the verbs used for Jim is that most of Jim's locutions are tagged with "he said." One possible illocutionary verb is *pronounce.* In contrast, there appears to be more variation in Marlow's verbs and there are more illocutionary verbs: *protest*, *affirm*, and *retort.* In this particular exchange, it is Marlow who is narrating, so that he is able to convey the intent of his utterances, in contrast to the speech of Jim, which is heard by Marlow, the narrator.

Speech Acts, the Unreliable Interlocutor and the Cooperative Principle

The value of implicature has been illustrated in the previous section. However, there are incidents in *Lord Jim* which challenge the cooperative principle. As we have noted, there is a moral element to the cooperative principle that is absent from speech acts themselves. However, there are two important scenes in the book where the cooperative principle does not serve well: Marlow's conversation with the alcoholic engineer from the *Patna*, and Jim's negotiation with Gentleman Brown. In both instances the interlocutors (the engineer and Brown) are unreliable, but for different reasons.

In the case of the engineer, he is suffering from delirium tremens; as the doctor points out, the engineer had drunk four bottles of brandy a day over a period of three days, noting that the he must be "sheeted like a boiler inside" (p. 52). However, the doctor continues that "the head is gone" (p. 52) but that there is some method in the raving of the engineer. The engineer himself appears to be hallucinating. Consequently, the following utterances of the engineer are a conscious nightmare that requires an analysis of a dream:

I know them brutes… Bash in the head of the first that stirs. There's too many of them, and she won't swim more than ten minutes… Hurry up… They are all awake ? millions of them. They are trampling on me! Wait! Oh wait! I'll smash them in heaps like flies. Wait for me! Help! H-e-lp! (p. 51)

The engineer is referring to pink toads, as big as mastiffs, with one eye on top of their heads and claws around their mouths. Watt (1980) interprets these utterances as the troubled conscience of the engineer, and his fear of the Muslims who have survived the *Patna* incident.

There are two more interesting incidents in the conversation with the engineer. He says, "Look under the bed." Even though the engineer is clearly delusional, Marlow follows his instruction:

'Of course I stooped instantly. I defy anybody not to have done so.… (p. 50)

Here, there is a clear perlocutionary effect. In some ways, it highlights the power of language, and perhaps adds to Jim's situation aboard the *Patna*, where another instruction is heard, though not primarily directed at him: "Jump!" Is Jim's jump also a perlocutionary effect?

A further incident is Marlow's response to the engineer's enquiry into the pink toads under his bed: "What are they doing down there?" Marlow says "They are all asleep." This comment does not really fit with the analysis in Austin's *How to Do Things with Words* and highlights the difference between analytic philosophy and applied linguistics. From the point of view of examining language in use, it is clear that Marlow is trying to calm the engineer, but it has little relevance to analytic philosophy. Marlow is referring to figments of the engineer's hallucinatory nightmare. Marlow knows that the engineer is hallucinating and exhibits compassion. He says something that he knows to be false in terms of both brute facts and institutional facts.

The second scene, the negotiation between Gentleman Brown and Jim, also raises difficult questions. Marlow gets the story from the dying Gentleman Brown, who relates how he got the better of Jim. With his narration to Marlow, Brown is very reliable, but in his negotiation with Jim, he is very deceitful. Jim, who is a naïve romantic, acts with total honesty in the exchange. Gentleman Brown has no intention of keeping his word. This is not really covered in an analysis of the cooperative principle. However, from a conversational point of view the two men do cooperate.

CONCLUSION

In this article, we have considered *Lord Jim* from a pragmatics perspective to see how well a rough pragmatics framework helps illuminate a particular novel, and how a reading of the novel challenges the framework. In analysing *Lord Jim*, a variety of issues emerge. As noted in the introduction, this article is an initial sketch on which to build.

The Theory as an Aid to the Analysis of *Lord Jim*

Given the amount of dialogue in *Lord Jim* and the complexity of the embedded narratives, a focus on speech acts and their components helps to give an understanding of events, particularly as the book illustrates the limits of our perceptions of each other as human beings. However, it should be noted that with discourse analysis, there are strings of illocutions. Clearly within the strings, some illocutions have much more impact than others. For example, in Jim's negotiation with Gentleman Brown, a key act is the permission to leave, sent in a note: "You get the clear road. Start as soon as your boat floats on the morning tide" (p. 357).

In *Lord Jim*, the distinction between institutional facts and brute facts is valuable for two reasons. There are the two social realities, that of the ports, in many ways an imperial extension of British social reality, governed by a British legal system, and the social reality of Patusan, which is autonomous, free from Dutch control. There is also the possibility, unexplored in this article, of contrasting brute reality with social reality. In the novel, Patusan is an isolated town surrounded by jungle. The complex social meanings of the

town are juxtaposed with the complex non-human forest. This encounter with the autonomous non-human world is a powerful one that can be explored in the novel.

Lord Jim as an Aid to the Development of the Theory

In its complexity, *Lord Jim* presents several challenges to the theory. The most serious challenge is to the cooperative principle. While the principle is valuable in identifying implicatures, the richness and variety of human interaction displayed in the novel create challenges: Human beings can be honest and reliable, but they can also be unreliable, they can lie, they can compete, they can make mistakes. We may use the cooperative principle in many situations, but is there also a competitive principle, and how can that alter the categories and maxims?

Issues for Further Research

A number of issues have been raised, which need to be addressed in subsequent articles: In discourse, involving strings of illocutions, do we need to make a distinction between key illocutions and supporting illocutions? Is the cooperative principle sufficient to accommodate all the interactions that humans engage in? Finally, within pragmatics, we need to consider how well speech acts, social reality, and the cooperative principle fit together. At this stage, we have not considered if the three can be unified within a single theory. These issues will be addressed in subsequent articles.

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APPENDIX 1. Jim and the Mangy Dog (pp. 65-69)

'Anyhow, a dog was there, weaving himself in and out amongst people's legs in that mute stealthy way native dogs have and my companion stumbled over him. The dog leaped away without a sound; the man, raising his voice a little, said with a slow laugh:

Man (*next to Marlow*): Look at that wretched cur!

Marlow and the man become separated in the crowd. Jim spins around and blocks Marlow's way.

Jim: Did you speak to me?

Marlow: No.

Jim: You say you didn't, but I heard.

Marlow: Some mistake. As far as I know, I haven't opened my lips in your hearing.

Jim: What did you mean by staring at me all morning?

Marlow: Did you expect us all to sit with downcast eyes out of your regard for our susceptibilities?

Jim: No. That's all right – that's all right. I am going through with that. Only I won't let any man call me names outside this court. There was a fellow with you. You spoke to him – oh, yes – I know; 'tis all very fine. You spoke to him, but you meant me to hear ….

Marlow assures Jim that he is under some extraordinary delusion.

Jim: You thought I would be afraid to resent this.

Jim pauses for about fifteen seconds.

Jim: If you were as big as two men and as strong as six, I would tell you what I think of you. You…

Marlow: Stop! Before you tell me what you think of me, will you kindly tell me what it is I've said and done?

Jim: I will soon show you that I am not.

Marlow: I declare I don't know.

Jim: Now that you see I am not afraid you try to crawl out of it. Who's a cur now – hey? I will allow no man …

Marlow: Good God! You don't think I …

Jim: But I am sure I've heard. It wasn't you, then? Very well; I'll find the other.

Marlow: Don't be a fool. It wasn't that at all.

Jim: I've heard.

Marlow: Don't be a fool.

Jim: But the other man said it, you don't deny that?

Marlow: No, I don't deny.

Marlow points to the mangy dog.

Marlow: Nobody dreamt of insulting you.

Jim blushes deeply and walks away.

APPENDIX 2. The Drunken Engineer (pp. 49-52)

'… I produced the word *Patna* wrapped up in a delicate question as in a wisp of silk floss…. He had grown old of minor iniquities and could no longer inspire aversion or pity. He repeated *Patna?* interrogatively, seemed to make a short effort of memory and said:

Engineer: Quite right. I am an old stager out here. I saw her go down. She was full of reptiles. They turned me out of my bunk in the middle watch to look at her sinking. Only my eyes were good enough to see. I am famous for my eyesight. That's why they called me, I expect. None of them was quick enough to see her go, but they saw that she was gone right enough, and sang out together – like this.

The engineer produces a wolfish howl.

Other patient: Oh! Make him dry up.

Engineer: You don't believe me, I suppose. I tell you there are no such eyes as mine this side of the Persian Gulf. Look under the bed.

Marlow stoops to look under the bed.

Engineer: What can you see?

Marlow: Nothing.

Engineer: Just so, but if I were to look I could see – there's no eyes like mine, I tell you. Millions of pink toads. There's no eyes like mine. Millions of pink toads. It's worse than seeing a ship sink. I could look at sinking ships and smoke my pipe all day long. Why don't they give me back my pipe? I would get a smoke while I watched these toads. The ship was full of them. They've got to be watched you know.

Other patient: Don't you let him start his hollering, mister.

Engineer: The ship was full of them you know, and we had to clear out on the strict Q.T. All pink. All pink – as big as mastiffs, with an eye on the top of the head and claws all round their ugly mouths. Ough! Ough!

The engineer's legs twitch and he reaches for something in the air.

Engineer: Ssh! What are they doing now down there?

Marlow: They are all asleep.

Engineer: Ssh! Quiet, steady. I am an old stager out here. I know them brutes. Bash in the head of the first that stirs. There's too many of them, and she won't swim more than ten minutes. **(Screaming)** Hurry up. They are all awake – millions of them. They are trampling on me! Wait! Oh wait! I'll smash them in heaps like flies. Wait for me! Help! H-e-lp!

The engineer screams. Another patient raises his hands to his head. A dresser arrives in the ward. Marlow exits to the outside gallery. On his way out of the hospital he meets a doctor.

Doctor: Been to see your man, Captain? I think we may let him go tomorrow. These fools have no notion of taking care of themselves, though. I say, we've got the chief engineer of the pilgrim ship here. A curious case. D. T.'s of the worst kind. He has been drinking in that Greek's or Italian's grog-shop for three days. What can you expect? Four bottles of that kind of brandy a day, I am told. Wonderful, if true. Sheeted with boiler iron inside, I should think. The head, ah! The head, of course, gone, but the curious part is there's some sort of method in his raving. I am trying to find out. Most unusual – that thread of logic in such a delirium. Traditionally, he ought to see snakes, but he doesn't. Good old tradition's at a discount nowadays. Eh! His – er – visions are batrachian. Ha! Ha! No, seriously, I never remember being so interested in a case of jim-jams before. He ought to be dead, don't you know, after such a festive experiment. Oh! He is a tough object. Four-and-twenty years in the tropics too. You ought really to take a peep at him. Noble-looking old boozer. Most extraordinary man I ever met – medically, of course. Won't you?

Marlow murmurs that he is out of time and starts to leave.

Doctor: I say, he can't attend that inquiry. Is his evidence material, do you think?
Marlow: Not in the least.

APPENDIX 3. Negotiations with Gentleman Brown (pp. 342-350)

Jim: Who are you?

Brown: My name's Brown, Captain Brown. What's yours?

Jim: What made you come here?

Brown: You want to know. It's easy to tell. Hunger. And what made you?

Jim starts. Brown tells Jim that one of the pirates has a rifle aimed at him.

Brown: Let us agree that we are both dead men, and let us talk on that basis, as equals. We are all equals before death.

Brown admits he and his men are caught like rats in a trap, but had been driven to it, and even a trapped rat can bite.

Jim: Not if you don't go near the trap until the rat is dead.

Brown argues that the villagers might do that, but he would have considered it beneath Jim. He, Brown, had wanted to talk, but not to beg for his life. His men were like Jim. All Brown and his men wanted was for Jim and his side to come on in the devil's name and to fight it out.

Brown: God d—n it, you don't want to come out here every day with your glasses to count how many of us are left on our feet. Come. Either bring your infernal crowd along or let us go and starve in the open sea, by God! You have been white once, for all your tall talk of this being your own people and you being one of them. Are you? And what the devil do you get for it; what is it you've found here that is so d—d precious? Hey? You don't want us to come down here perhaps – do you? You are two hundred to one. You don't want us to come down into the open. Ah! I promise you we shall give you some sport before you've done. You talk about me making a cowardly set upon unoffending people. What's that to me that they are unoffending when I am starving for next to no offence. But I am not a coward. Don't you be one. Bring them along or, by all the fiends, we shall yet manage to send half your unoffending town to heaven with us in smoke! We aren't going into the forest to wander like a string of living skeletons dropping one after another for ants to go to work upon us before we are fairly dead. Oh, no!

Jim: You don't deserve a better fate.

Brown: And what do you deserve, you that I find skulking here with your mouth full of responsibility, of innocent lives, of your infernal duty? What do you know more of me than I know of you? I came here for food. D'ye hear? – food to fill our bellies. And what did *you* come for? What did you ask for when you came here? We don't ask you for anything but to give us a fight or a clear road to go back whence we came….

Jim: I would fight you now.

Brown: And I would let you shoot me, and welcome. This is as good a jumping-off place for me as any other. I am sick of my infernal luck. But it would be too easy. There are my men in the same boat – and, by God, I am not the sort to jump out of trouble and leave them in a d—d lurch.

Jim thinks for a while and asks what Brown has done to be so hazed about.

Brown: Have we met each other to tell the story of our lives? Suppose you begin. No? Well I am sure I don't want to hear. Keep it to yourself. I know it is no better than mine. I've lived – and so did you though you talk as if you were one of those people that should have wings so as to go about without touching the dirty earth. Well – it is dirty. I haven't got any wings. I am here because I was afraid once in my life. Want to know what of? Of a prison. That scares me, and you may know it – if it's any good to you. I won't ask you what scared you into this infernal hole, where you seem to have found pretty pickings. That's your luck and this is mine – the privilege to beg for the favour of being shot quickly, or else kicked out to go free and starve in my own way.

Brown argues that the smuggling of a few guns is no great crime, and who has the right to say that he has not come to Patusan to beg. The villagers had fired on him without asking questions. Brown whistles and all his men stand in full view of Jim. Brown argues that the killing of the villager was done cleanly with a single shot in the fight, while one of his men had died slowly for six hours with wounded entrails. Anyway, this was a life for a life. Brown asks Jim if he doesn't understand that when it came to saving one's life in the dark, one doesn't care about who else dies – three, thirty, three hundred people.

Jim goes silent.

Jim: Will you promise to leave the coast?

Brown lifts and lets fall his hand.

Jim: And surrender your arms?

Brown: Surrender our arms! Not till you come to take them out of our stiff hands. You think I am gone crazy with funk? Oh, no! That and the rags I stand in is all I have got in the world, besides a few more breechloaders on board; and I expect to sell the lot in Madagascar, if I ever get so far – begging my way from ship to ship.

Jim: I don't know whether I have the power.

Brown: You don't know! And you wanted me just now to give up my arms! That's good, too. Suppose they say one thing, and do the other thing to me. I daresay you have the power, or what's the meaning of all this talk? What did you come here for? To pass the time of day?

Jim: Very well. You shall have a clear road or a clear fight.

Jim turns and walks away.

ABSTRACT

Speech Acts, Social Reality, and the Cooperative Principle in Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*

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In this article, we assess the value of pragmatic theory through an analysis of a particular novel: Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*. We draw on the ideas of three philosophers, J. L. Austin, J. Searle, and H. P. Grice, as well as the work of an applied linguist, H. G. Widdowson. We use ideas on speech acts, social reality, discourse, and the cooperative principle to examine *Lord Jim*, with a particular focus on three pieces of embedded spoken discourse in the novel. By doing so, we examine how well the theory helps with an analysis of the novel, and how a reading of the novel challenges the pragmatics framework that we use.

In our analysis we find that the speech act framework that we use, adapted from Austin's *How to Do Things with Words*, works well in the analysis of the discourse. We also find that Widdowson's technique of expanding discourse to make cohesion between sentences more overt works well for exploring implicature. In contrast, Austin's technique for using reported speech to find illocutionary verbs is problematic. A further problem is that the cooperative principle seems too limited in the diversity of oral interaction within the novel, particularly in relation to interlocutors who are in some way unreliable.

要　約

『ロード・ジム』における言語行為，社会的現実，協調の原理

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本稿では，ジョウゼフ・コンラッドの小説『ロード・ジム』の分析を通じて，語用論理論の有用性を検証する。分析にあたり参照するのは，J. L. オースティン，J. サール，H. P. グライス，以上の三名の哲学者と，応用言語学者 H. G. ウィドウソンによる理論である。言語行為，社会的現実，談話，協調の原理といった概念を援用し，『ロード・ジム』を，作中より抽出された三カ所の会話部分に特に焦点を当てて分析する。これにより，語用論理論が小説の分析にどの程度有用であり，また小説の読解が，本稿における語用論的枠組みにどのような課題を投げかけるかを探る。

分析の中で，オースティンの『言語と行為』に基づく言語行為論の枠組みが，談話の分析に有用であることが示された。また，文同士の結束性を明らかにすることを目的としたウィドウソンの談話分析の手法も，言外の含みを精査する上で有用であった。一方，発話内行為を示す動詞を探るために間接話法を利用するオースティンの手法には問題が見られた。さらに，本小説においては口頭のやりとりが多種多様であることから，どこか信用できない対話者との関わりにおいては特に，協調の原理が限定的である点も問題であった。