

Gamyate, Gamyamāna, Gata, Agata: the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā II, kk. 1–6
Re-examined*

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0. Introduction

A set of six kārikās given by Nāgārjuna at the beginning of the second chapter of his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is highly important in that it presents a model for an argument against action (*kriyā*).¹ The kārikās run as follows:

*gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ naiva
gamyate / gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ
na gamyate // 1 //*

"First of all, it is improper to say that [a path which] has been gone upon is being gone upon (*gataṃ gamyate*). Further it is also improper to say that [a path which] is yet to be gone upon is being gone upon (*agataṃ gamyate*). Moreover, it is improper to say that, separated from [the path which] has been gone upon and [the path which] is yet to be gone upon, [a path which] is being gone upon is being gone upon (*gamyamānaṃ gamyate*)."

*ceṣṭā yatra gatis tatra gamyamāne ca sā
yataḥ / na gate nāgate ceṣṭā gamyamāne gatis
tataḥ // 2 //*

"Where there is a physical activity, there is going. Since such a physical activity occurs on [the path which] is being gone upon, not on [the path which] has been gone upon and [the path which] is yet to be gone upon, therefore there is going on [the path which] is being gone upon."

* This is the revised version of the paper read at the Vienna Forum, June, 1996.

¹PP on MMK II, k. 1: *yady apy utpādapratīṣedhāt
pratītyasamutpādasyānirodhādiviśeṣaṇasiddhiḥ ta-
thāpy anāgamānirgamapratītyasamutpādasiddhaye
lokaprasiddhagamanāgamanakriyāpratīṣedhārthaṃ
kiṃcid upapattiyantaram ucyatām iti /*

*gamyamānasya gamaṇaṃ kathaṃ nāmopapa-
tsyate / gamyamānaṃ vigamaṇaṃ yadā naivo-
papadyate // 3 //*

"How can one justify saying that [a path which] is being gone upon is gone upon (*gamyamānasya gamaṇaṃ*), when it is altogether improper that [the application of the term] *gamyamāna* is made without [resorting to] the act of going."

*gamyamānasya gamaṇaṃ yasya tasya prasa-
jyate / ṛte gater gamyamānaṃ gamyamānaṃ
hi gamyate // 4 //*

"One who accepts that [an entity referred to by the word] *gamyamāna* 'being gone upon' is gone upon would have to accept the undesired consequence that [the word] *gamyamāna* is used with reference to an entity that is not linked with going. For, one who maintains this view argues that [an entity which is devoid of going and which is called] *gamyamāna* is being gone upon."

*gamyamānasya gamane prasaktaṃ gamana-
dvayam / yena tad gamyamānaṃ ca yac cātra
gamaṇaṃ punaḥ // 5 //*

"If, on the other hand, one accepted it as proper to say that [a path which] is being gone upon is being gone upon, then one would have to accept the undesired consequence that there are two acts of going. That is, one which is the basis for applying the word *gamyamāna* and the other [which is the basis for applying the word *gamyate*]."

*dvau gantārau prasajyete prasakte gamana-
dvaye / gantāraṃ hi tiraskṛtya gamanaṃ no-
papadyate // 6 //*

"If the undesired consequence ensued that there are two acts of going, the undesired consequence would also result that there are two agents of going. It is not possible to account for an act of going without someone who performs it."

In this paper I wish to clarify the logic underlying the negation of an action (*kriyāpratiśedha*), that is, the logic of *gamyamānagatāgata* which is applied elsewhere in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* to demonstrate that there never exist acts of seeing (*darśana*), coming forth (*utpāda*), annihilating (*nirodha*), burning (*dahana*), and binding (*bandhana*).² In order to arrive at a better understanding of the logic, I shall analyze the following propositions or sentences (*vākya*) Nāgārjuna refers to, relying on Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*:

(1) *gataṃ gamyate*

"[A path which] has already been gone upon is being gone upon."

(2) *agataṃ gamyate*

"[A path which] has not yet been gone upon is being gone upon."

(3) *gamyamānaṃ gamyate*

"[A path which] is currently being gone upon is being gone upon."

("The path is being gone upon as it is being gone upon.")

The method I follow here to investigate the structure of these sentences is to consider them from the point of view of how they are derived in Pāṇini's derivational system.

Although a large number of studies have been made on Nāgārjuna's arguments against the act of going (*gati*), most of them, especially by Buddhist scholars, seem to have missed the point.

² See fn. 21 below.

To the best of my knowledge, Buddhist scholars who worked on these arguments have paid insufficient attention to what is actually said in the *kārikās* cited above, or even if they did, they did not fully grasp the grammatical basis for Nāgārjuna's arguments. Indeed, one scholar went so far as to say that Nāgārjuna has a linguistic outlook of originality simply because the above sentences, seldom found in common usage, are abnormal.

The first scholar to pay serious attention to the grammatical basis of the arguments of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti was Kamaleswar Bhattacharya.³ Unfortunately, he did not go into the details of how the expressions cited in the *kārikās* are grammatically derived, nor did he avail himself of parallel arguments found in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. Recently, George Cardona⁴ has studied the parallel arguments given by Patañjali and Nāgārjuna. He concludes that "Nāgārjuna doubtless have to concede to a grammarian his particular views based on grammarians' premises." Still, as far as the interpretation of the arguments is concerned, he gave us nothing beyond what Bhattacharya had done.

1. The reason why the logic of the negation of the action is examined in the framework of sentence derivation is this: According to Pāṇinīyas, an action (*kriyā*) stands in correlation with a *kāraka* ('something that directly contributes to its being accomplished'), and the relation of what is to be accomplished and what does the accomplishing (*sādhyasādhanabhāva*) holds between them.⁵ Therefore, in the case in which a certain action is to be brought to accomplishment, one finds certain *kāra*kas participating in the action. In order to convey the situation where an act is to be brought to accomplishment, thus, it

³ Bhattacharya [1980, 1980–1, 1985].

⁴ Cardona [1991].

⁵ VP3.8.1: *yāvat siddham asiddham vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate / āśritakramarūpatvāt tat kriyeta abhidhīyate //*

is necessary to utter both an item denoting the act and one which denotes a participant in bringing it to accomplishment. The item which denotes an action in its intrinsic aspect, that is, as something to be accomplished (*sādhya*), is a verb root followed by a verbal ending (*tinanta*). In general, a verbal ending denotes a *kāraka* like an agent (*kartr*) or an object (*karman*); and who or what the particular *kāraka* is specified by a nominal base which cooccurs with an item ending in the verbal ending. For example, in the utterances *devadatta odanaṃ pacati* ('Devadatta is cooking rice gruel') and *odanaṃ pacyate devadattena* ('Rice gruel is being cooked by Devadatta'), the verbal endings *-ti* in *pacati* and *-te* in *pacyate* denote an agent and an object, respectively; further, who the agent is and what the object is are specified by the nominal bases *devadatta* and *odana*, respectively.⁶

2. Now, by resorting to immediate constituent analysis, we may analyze the utterance under consideration as follows:

- (1) *gataṃ gamyate*
 (*gam + Kta*) + *sU gam + yaK + IAṬ*
- (2) *agataṃ gamyate*
 (*nañ + (gam + Kta)*) + *sU gam + yaK + IAṬ*
- (3) *gamyamānaṃ gamyate*
 (*gam + yaK + IAṬ*) + *sU gam + yaK + IAṬ*
- gata gam + Kta*
 Time reference (*kāla*)
 past (*bhūta*)
 Affix meaning
kartr
karman
bhāva

A3.4.72 *gatyarthākarmakaśliṣaśīnsthāsa-vasajanaruhajīryatibhyaś ca //*

⁶ We must note that, in utterances such as *devadattena sthīyate* 'The action of standing is being done by Devadatta', the verbal ending *-te* is used to denote an act (*bhāva*).

A3.2.102 *niṣṭhā //* (A1.1.26 *ktaktavatū niṣṭhā //*)

A3.2.84 *bhūte //*

agata nañ + gata

*Time reference

future (*bhaviṣyat*)

Affix meaning

kartr

karman

bhāva

A2.2.6 *nañ //*

gamyamāna gam + yaK + IAṬ (→ *ŚānaC*)

Time reference

present (*vartamāna*)

Affix meaning

kartr

karman

bhāva

A3.4.69 *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmake-bhyaḥ //*

A3.2.124 *laṭaḥ śatṛśānacāv aprathamā-samānādhikaraṇe //*

A3.2.123 *vartamāṇe laṭ //*

A3.1.67 *sārvadhātuke yak //*

gamyate gam + yaK + IAṬ (→ *tiñ*)

Time reference

present (*vartamāna*)

Affix meaning

kartr

karman

bhāva

A3.4.69 *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmake-bhyaḥ //*

A3.2.123 *vartamāṇe laṭ //*

A3.1.67 *sārvadhātuke yak //*

vākya {x - sU gam-ya-te}

samānādhikaraṇya

A1.4.107 *śeṣe prathamah //*

2.1. To begin with, the sentences given, *gataṃ gamyate*, *agataṃ gamyate*, and *gamyamānaṃ gamyate*, are all passive sentences. The verb *gam* used in these passive sentences is a 'transitive' (*sakarmakadhātu*), so that its significand, the action of going (*gati*), requires its agent and object. Here, an agent of going, although not explicitly stated, is implied. Consider the following sentences:

- (4) *devadatto grāmaṃ gacchati*
'Devadatta is on his way to the village'.
(5) *devadattena grāmo gamyate*
id. (passive)
(6) *grāmo gamyate*

Clearly the sentences under consideration are comparable to sentence (6).

In this connection, I would like to point out that Pāṇinīyas give a definite meaning to the verb *gam*. According to Helārāja, for instance, the action of going is a continuous flow of acts of leaving a certain point of space and reaching another (*tyāgopādānarūpāvicchinnaṃpravāha*),⁷ which allows one to use a sentence like the following:

- (7) *devadatto grāmān nagaraṃ gacchati*
'Devadatta is going from the village to the city'.

2.2. As stated, the verb *gam* is a transitive verb. The object relative to the action denoted by this verb is a path (*adhvan*) in the given passive sentences, since, as we shall see later,⁸ it is proper to assume that the nominal pada *adhvajātam* 'the path' is elided here. In this connection we have to consider the following sūtra:

⁷ *Prakāśa* on VP3.7.135: *atra yeyaṃ gamikriyā sā dvirūpā bhavati, ākrāntasya patho yo 'tikramaṇīyo bhāgaḥ, tatra tyāgarūpaṃ hīnarūpaṃ kriyāyāḥ / prāpye tv āsādāniye bhāge saṃsargarūpaṃ prāptirūpaṃ iti tyāgopādānalakṣaṇāvayavabhedāt kriyā dvidhā / tathā ca tyāgopādānarūpāvicchinnaṃpravāha-gamikriyākrānto' dhvā . . . /*

⁸ See §2.5.

A2.3.12 *gatyarthakarmani dvitīyācaturthyau ceṣṭāyām anadhvani //*

This sūtra provides that a second-triplet ending and a fourth-triplet ending occur when an object of an action denoted by the verb signifying the act of going (*gatyarthakarman*) is to be conveyed, on condition that a physical activity (*ceṣṭā*) actually occurs and the object is not a path. By this sūtra the accusative form *grāmam* and the dative form *grāmāya* in the following utterances are explained:

- (8) *grāmaṃ gacchati*
'He is going to the village'.
(9) *grāmāya gacchati*
id.

According to Kātyāyana, the prohibition that this sūtra does not apply in connection with the path which is an object of going concerns a path on which one has actually set foot.⁹ Consider the following utterance:

- (10) *devadato 'dhvānaṃ gacchati*

In this instance the present sūtra does not apply. If it were to apply here, we would also have the undesired utterance **adhvane gacchati* 'He is going towards the path' (*adhvane* [dat. sg.]). The occurrence of the second-triplet ending *-am* after the nominal base *adhvan* here is only accounted for by A2.3.2 *karmani dvitīyā*, so that, as suggested by the prohibition mentioned above, (10) conveys both that Devadatta is going towards the path and that Devadatta is going along (up-on/over) the path.¹⁰ In his commentary on *MMK*

⁹ *Vt. 2* ad A2.3.12: *āsthitaṃpratiṣedhaś ca //* In the *Nyāsa* the following explanation is given. *Nyāsa* on KV ad A2.3.12: *yena deśaviśeṣeṇa prāpyaṃ grāmādikam prāpyate sa deśaviśeṣo loke 'dhveti rūḍhaḥ / kena ca prāpyaṃ prāpyate / yaḥ panthā ākrāntas tena / tasmāt tasyaivāyaṃ pratiṣedhaḥ /*

¹⁰ Kaiyaṭa explicates *vārttika 2* ad A2.3.12 as follows. *Pradīpa* on MBh ad A2.3.12: *āsthita ākrāntaḥ san yadā panthā gamyate tadānadhvanīti pratiṣedhaḥ / yadā tūtpathena panthā ākrāmitum iṣyate tadā bhavaty eva caturthī /*

1–6, Candrakīrti takes it for granted that (10) is used in the latter sense.

2.3. The word *gata* is the past participle of the verb *gam*, a derivate in a *kṛt* affix in which the verb *gam* is followed by the *kṛt* affix *Kta*. Here in sentences (1)–(3), the *kṛt* affix *Kta* denotes an object and indicates that an action denoted by the base, the verb *gam*, is referred to the past (*bhūta*). With this word one can say:

(11) *grāmo devadattena gataḥ*

'The village which has been gone to by Devadatta/'The village has been gone to by Devadatta'.

(12) *grāmo gataḥ*

'The village which has been gone to/'The village has been gone to'.

2.4. As to the word *agata*, a negative compound of the *tatpuruṣa* class (*nañtatpuruṣa*), the question arises: What is the function of the negative particle *nañ* (*a-*) here? In order to answer this question, let us now take into consideration Patañjali's interpretation of the word *anīpsita* ('undesired') in Pāṇini's rule to define the term *karman* (A1.4.50 *tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam*).¹¹

Consider the following sentences:

(13) *devadatto grāmaṃ gacchati*

(14) *viṣaṃ bhakṣayati*

'He eats poison'.

(15) *grāmaṃ gacchan vṛkṣamūlāny upasarpati*

'While going to the village, he happens to come near to the roots of a tree'.

In (13) the village is that which the agent most wishes to reach (*īpsitatama*), so that it is classed as *karman* by A1.4.49 *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*. In (14) the poison is what is not desired by the agent (*anīpsita*, *dveṣya* 'hateful'). In (15) the tree roots are indifferent things (*udāsīna*).

¹¹ *MBh* ad A1.4.50: *anīpsitam iti nāyaṃ prasajya-pratiṣedhaḥ—īpsitaṃ neti / kiṃ tarhi, paryudāso 'yaṃ—yad anyad īpsitāt tad anīpsitam iti / anyac caitad īpsitād yan naivepsitaṃ nāpy anīpsitam iti /*

According to Patañjali, if the function of the negative particle *nañ* in the word *anīpsita* (*an-*) is taken as *paryudāsa* 'exclusion', the word *anīpsita* means that which is other than *īpsita* (*yad anyad īpsitāt tad anīpsitam*), as a consequence of which it covers that which is hateful (*anīpsita*, *dveṣya*) as well as that which is indifferent (*udāsīna*), so that the poison and the tree roots are classed as *karman* by A1.4.50; if taken as *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* 'negation upon assumption', on the other hand, it means that which is opposite (*pratipakṣa*) to *īpsita*, that is, something hateful, so that, since the tree roots are not classed as *karman* either by A1.4.49 or by A1.4.50, the accusative form *vṛkṣamūlāni* cannot be accounted for.¹²

In the same vein, if the function of the *nañ* in *agata* is taken as *paryudāsa*, then the word *agata* means that which is other than *gata*, that is, an object in relation to the action of going which is referred to the time other than the past. In this case, it would be purposeless to mention sentence (3) independently of sentences (1) and (2). For what is referred to by *gamyamāna* 'that which is currently being gone upon' is subsumed under what is referred to by *agata*. In order to have its own domain of application, consequently, the term *gamyamāna* should refer to what is not referred to either by the term *gata* or by the term *agata* (*gatāgatavinirmukta*). Thus, for the purpose of establishing what is referred to by the term *gamyamāna*, one has to take the function of the negative particle *nañ* in the word *agata* as *prasajyapraṭiṣedha*. In this case, by the term *agata* one can speak of an object in relation to the action of going that is yet to occur and is thereby referred to the future.

¹² *Pradīpa* on *MBh* ad A1.4.50: *yathādharmā-nṛtādibhir uttarapadārthapratipakṣabhūtaṃ vastu tatpratiṣedhadvāreṇa pratipādyate tathānīpsitaśa-bdenāpi dveṣyaṃ vastu yad abhidhīyate tad eva na gṛhyate, kiṃ tu sarvaṃ īpsitād anyad ity arthaḥ /*

2.5. There is a grammatical difficulty in accounting for the derivation of the present participle *gamyamāna* in sentence (3). Naturally the clarification of its derivation will afford the key to an understanding of problems involved in sentence (3).

In deriving the form *gamyamāna*, the following rules are to be considered:

A3.2.124 *laṭaḥ śatṛśānacāv aprathamāsamānādhikaraṇe //*

A3.2.126 *lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ //*

Pāṇini operates with ten abstract L-affixes (*lakārāḥ*), replaced by verb endings or participial affixes. L-affixes occur when an agent, an object, or the mere act (*bhāva*) is to be denoted and when various time references are involved. A particular L-affix, *LAṬ*, is introduced after a verb under a condition of present time reference. A3.2.124, if strictly interpreted, provides that the participial affix *ŚānaC* substitutes for *LAṬ* on condition that *LAṬ* is coreferential (*samānādhikaraṇa*) with a nominal pada which contains an ending of a triplet other than the first (*aprathamānta*). Consider the following sentence:

(16) *pacantaṃ devadattaṃ paśya*

'Look at Devadatta who is cooking'.

Here the affix *LAṬ* which is replaced by the participial suffix *ŚatṚ* in *pacat* (*pac* + *ŚaP* + *LAṬ*) is coreferential with the nominal pada which ends in the second-triplet ending *-am*. In sentence (3), however, the nominal pada *adhvajātaṃ* (Nom. sg. n., 'the path') which ends in the first-triplet ending *-sU* is supposed to be elided.¹³ As sentences (1) and (2) respectively amount to *gatam adhvajātaṃ gamyate* and *agatam adhvajātaṃ gamyate*, so does sentence (3) amount to *gamyamānam adhvajātaṃ gamyate*. The item which is coreferential with *LAṬ* to be replaced by *ŚānaC* is the nominal pada that contains the

¹³ PP on MMK II, k. 1: *tatroparatagamikriyam adhvajātaṃ gatam ity ucyate /*

first-triplet ending, so that the rule in question does not apply here. Consequently, in order to account for the derivation of *gamyamāna*, one has to take A3.2.126 into consideration, as does Cardona, who assumes that a sentence like (3) is only accounted for by A3.2.126 in Pāṇini's derivational system.

According to A3.2.126, on the other hand, the *ŚānaC* replaces *LAṬ* if the verb that *LAṬ* follows denotes an act spoken of as a characteristic or a cause (*lakṣaṇahetvoḥ*) with respect to another action (*kriyāyāḥ*). Consider the following sentences:

(17) *śayānā bhuñjate yavanāḥ*

'Yavanas eat while lying down'.

(18) *adhīyāno vasati*

'He is staying for studying'.

In (17) *śayānāḥ* refers to persons whose act of lying characterizes how they perform the act of eating; in (18) *adhīyānaḥ* refers to someone whose studying is the reason for his staying somewhere. Now, if one interprets utterance (3) according to this rule, the utterance has to be taken to mean that the path is being gone upon as it is being gone upon.¹⁴

However, not only is A3.2.126 irrelevant to the issue at hand since, as far as Candrakīrti is concerned, he does not take into account a characterized-characterizer relation (*lakṣyala-kṣaṇabhāva*) or a causal relation (*hetuhetumadbhāva*) between two acts of going, denoted by *gam* in *gamyamānam* and *gam* in *gamyate*; but A3.2.124 can well explain the occurrence of *ŚānaC* substitute for *LAṬ* in sentence (3), though with Patañjali's suggestion being taken into consideration.

Patañjali suggests that one should interpret the rule so that one can have the replacement of *LAṬ* by *ŚatṚ* and *ŚānaC* even where there is the coreferentiality between a nominal pada terminating

¹⁴ This is the translation of the sentence *gamyamānam (adhvajātaṃ) gamyate* suggested by Cardona [1991: 457].

in a first-triplet ending (*prathamānta*) and *IAṬ*. According to him, the participial affixes *ŚatR* and *ŚānaC* optionally substitute for *IAṬ* on condition that *IAṬ* is coreferential (*samānādhikaraṇa*) with a nominal pada which contains an ending of the first triplet.¹⁵ Thus the utterances *asti brāhmaṇaḥ* 'The brahmin is' and *vidyate brāhmaṇaḥ* alternates with the utterance *san brāhmaṇaḥ* and *vidyamāno brāhmaṇaḥ*, respectively. If one follows his suggestion, therefore, one can have alternately *gamyate* or *gamyamāna* even if *IAṬ* is coreferential with the elided nominal pada *adhvajātam* which contains a first-triplet ending. Thus it follows that the items *gamyate* and *gamyamāna* in the utterances *gamyate adhvajātam* ('The path is being currently gone upon') and *gamyamānaḥ adhvajātam* which alternates with each other are equivalent in meaning with each other.¹⁶ In this equivalency in meaning of the two items *gamyate* and *gamyamāna* lies the core of the problem involved in sentence (3), as is clear from Candrakīrti's argumentations. The items *gamyate* and *gamyamāna* equally denote an object relative to the action of going that is referred to the present.

2.6. As a syntactic feature common to the three sentences in question, one may point out the coreferentiality (*samānādhikaranyā*) between the nominal bases, *gata*, *agata*, *gamyamāna* and the verbal ending *-te*, substituted for *IAṬ*, in *gamyate*. Consider the following sūtras:

A1.4.105 *yusmady upapade samānādhikaraṇe sthāniny api madhyamaḥ //*

A1.4.107 *asmady uttamaḥ //*

¹⁵ MBh ad A3.2.124: *na tarhīdānīm aprathamāsamānādhikaraṇa iti vaktavyam, vaktavyam ca / kiṃ prayojanam, nityārtham / aprathamāsamānādhikaraṇe nityau śatṛśānacau yathā syātām iti / kva tarhīdānīm vibhāṣā, prathamāsamānādhikaraṇe / pacan pacati / pacamānaḥ pacata iti //*

¹⁶ If *IAṬ* is coreferential with a nominal pada containing an ending of a triplet other than the first, the replacement of *IAṬ* by participial affixes is obligatory as in *pacantaḥ devadattaḥ paśya, pacatā kṛtam*.

A1.4.108 *śeṣe prathamaḥ //*

According to A1.4.105, if a form of the second person pronoun *yusmad* that is coreferential (*samānādhikaraṇe*) with an L-affix in a derivation could be used as a cooccurring word (*upapade*), even if it is not actually used (*sthāniny api*), then a madhyama ending (an ending for the second person) is selected to replace the L-affix. If an L-affix replaced by endings is coreferential with the potentially cooccurring item *asmad* (the first person pronoun), then an uttama ending (an ending for the first person) occurs by A1.4.107. Now in the given sentences the L-affix *IAṬ* is coreferential with the items *gata*, *agata*, and *gamyamāna*, so that a prathama ending (an ending for the third person) occurs according to A1.4.108. This clearly shows that the verbal ending *-te* in *gamyate*, which replaces *IAṬ*, is coreferential with *gata*, *agata*, and *gamyamāna*.¹⁷

What is more, as said in §1, by virtue of the verbal ending *-te* in *gamyate* being coreferential with the cooccurring words, *gata*, *agata*, and *gamyamāna*, what is the referent of the ending *-te*, an object relative to the action of going denoted by the verb *gam* in the same item *gamyate* that is currently occurring, is specified by these items. The specification is made as follows: the referent of the ending *-te* is an object which is the path that is an object relative to the act of going that has already occurred (*gata*); it is an object which is the path that is an object relative to the act which has not yet occurred (*agata*); it is an object which is the path that is an object relative to the act which is currently occurring (*gamyamāna*).

¹⁷ A provision proposed by Kātyāyana for the first triplet to occur after a nominal base (vt. 6 ad A2.3.46: *tiṅsamānādhikaraṇa iti cet tiṅo 'prayoge prathamāvīdhiḥ*) also may be adduced as suggesting that there is the coreferentiality between a verbal ending and a cooccurring item.

2.7. There is another important point that we must keep in mind concerning the sentences in question: The items *gata*, *gamyamāna*, and *gamyate* which constitute them are all what Pāṇinīyas call *kriyāśabdās*.¹⁸ Pāṇinīyas class as *kriyāśabdās* items ending in *kr̥t* affixes (*kr̥danta*) and items terminating in verbal endings (*tiñanta*).¹⁹ The items *gata* and *gamyamāna* are the former and the item *gamyate* is the latter.

What is characteristic of an item termed *kriyāśabda* is that it has an action as the occasioning ground for its use (*pravṛttinimitta*). Thus, when one uses the terms *gata*, *gamyamāna*, *gamyate* with reference to a certain entity, it is necessary for there to be the act of going in the entity. It is to be noted in passing that an object as one of the *kāraka* categories basic to Pāṇini's derivational system is regarded as a locus of an action (*kriyāśraya*).²⁰

3. Having given a grammatical analysis of the sentences (1)–(3) and noticed that they have in common the coreferentiality as their syntactic feature and that the bases for application of the terms *gata*, *gamyamāna*, and *gamyate* are taken to be connected with one and the same object, one can then paraphrase the sentences (1)–(3) as follows:

With reference to the object *x* in correlation with the act of going (*x* = a path):

(1) *x* is *gataśabda-vācya* (*bhūta-gamikriyā-āśraya*) and at the same time *gamyateśabda-vācya* (*vartamāna-gamikriyā-āśraya*).

¹⁸ MBh on vt. 1 (Pratyāhāra 2): *catuṣṭayo śabdānām pravṛttiḥ—jātiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā ya-dṛcchāśabdāś caturthāḥ / Uddyota thereon: śabdānām arthe yā pravṛttiḥ sā pravṛttinimittabhedāt prakāracatuṣṭayavatīty arthāḥ /*

¹⁹ Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, Āhnika II [Palsule 1988:12]: *yāvati ca śabde kriyānuṣaṅgo 'sti, sarvasya kriyāśabdātvaṃ kr̥[dan]teṣu tiñanteṣu ca /*

²⁰ KV ad A1.4.45: *ādhriyate 'smin kriyā-guṇaḥ ity ādhāraḥ / karṭrkarmaṇoḥ kriyāśrayabhūtayor dhāraṇakriyāṃ prati ya ādhāras tat kārakam adhikāraṇasamjñāṃ bhavati /*

[A path is referred to by the item *gata* and at the same time by the item *gamyate*; a path is the locus of the act of going referred to the past and at the same time that of the act of going referred to the present.]

(2) *x* is *agataśabda-vācya* (*bhaviṣyat-gamikriyā-āśraya*) and at the same time *gamyateśabda-vācya* (*vartamāna-gamikriyā-āśraya*).

[A path is referred to by the item *agata* and at the same time by the item *gamyate*; a path is the locus of the act of going referred to the future and at the same time that of the act of going referred to the present.]

(3) *x* is *gamyamānaśabda-vācya* (*vartamāna-gamikriyā-āśraya*) and at the same time *gamyateśabda-vācya* (*vartamāna-gamikriyā-āśraya*).

[A path is referred to by the item *gamyamāna* and at the same time by the item *gamyate*; a path is the locus of the act of going referred to the present and at the same time that of the act of going referred to the present.]

According to Candrakīrti, the reason one may not have sentences (1) and (2) is that they incur a contradiction (*virodha*). Concerning sentence (3), furthermore, one cannot have it, for the following reasons: There is no third kind of object relative to the act of going, which one could speak of using the term *gamyamāna*, aside from objects referred to by the terms *gata* and *agata* (*gatāgatavyatiriktagamyamānānupalambha*, *gamyamānābhāva*); one suffers the undesired consequence that one must have two acts of going involved in the sentence, so that the sentence would involve two agents of going (*gamanadvayaprasaṅga*, *gantrdvayaprasaṅga*).²¹ The above

²¹ MMK III, k. 3: *na dr̥ṣṭam dr̥śyate tāvad adr̥ṣṭam naiva dr̥śyate / dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭavinirmuktaṃ dr̥śyamānaṃ na dr̥śyate //*

MMK VII, k. 14: *notpadyamānaṃ notpannaṃ nānutpannaṃ kathamcāna / utpadyate tad ākhyātaṃ gamyamānagatāgatāḥ //*

PP: *yadi hi kiṃ cid utpadyeta tad utpāda utpāda-*

formulations given to the sentences (1)–(3) clearly reveal where in each of the sentences a problem lies and what Candrakīrti means to say by bringing up the difficulties mentioned above about those sentences.

4. virodha

4.1. With reference to sentences (1) and (2), formulations (1) and (2) show, respectively, that the act of going relative to a single object is referred both to the past and to the present at the same time and that it is referred both to the future and to the present at the same time. What is the contradiction? What we have to note in this connection is that the concept of present

yet / na tu kiṃ cid utpadyate 'dhvatraye 'py utpā-dāsambhavāt / etac ca gamyamānagatāgataiḥ prāg evoktam / tatra yathā gataṃ na gamyate, atītavarta-mānavor virodhāt / nāpy agataṃ gamyate, anāga-tavartamānavor virodhāt / nāpi gamyamānam gamyate, gatāgatavyatiriktagamyamānānupalam-bhād ity uktam / evam utpadyamāno bhāvo notpadyate, utpannānutpannavyatiरेkenotpadyamā-nābhāvāt / utpanno 'pi notpadyate, atītava-rtamānavor virodhāt / utpanna ity uparatotpattikriya ucyate, utpadyata iti vartamānakriyāviṣṭaḥ / tatas co-tpanna utpadyata ity ucyamāne atītavartamānavor ekakālatā syāt / anutpanno 'pi notpadyate 'nāga-tavartamānavor virodhāt / tasmād utpādaḥ param utpādayatīti na yuktam /

MMK VII, k. 26: *niruddhyate nāniruddham na niruddham nirudhyate / tathā niruddhyamānam ca kim ajātam nirudhyate //*

PP: *yady anityateti kā cit syāt, sā niruddhasya bhāvasyāniruddhasya vā niruddhyamānasya vā syāt / tatra niruddham nirudhyata iti na yuktam, atītavartamānavor virodhāt / aniruddham api na yuktam, nirodharahitavāt / yad aniruddham eva tat katham nirudhyata iti parasparavirodhāc ca / tathā[pi] nirudhyamānam, na nirudhyata ity anena sambandhaḥ / nirudhyamānam api na nirudhyate nirudhyamānābhāvāt, nirodhadvyayaprasaṅgāc ca / yataś caivaṃ triṣu api kāleṣu nirodhāsambhavaḥ, tasmān nāsty eva nirodha iti /*

PP on MMK X, k. 13: *dagdham na dahyate tāvad adagdham naiva dahyate / dagdhādagdhavinirmuktaḥ dahyamānam na dahyate //*

PP on MMK XVI, k. 7: *baddho na badhyate tāvad abaddho naiva badhyate / baddhābaddhavinirmukto badhyamāno na badhyate //*

time at the level of verbal expression plays an important role here. At the level of verbal expression, if it has begun but not been brought to completion,²² an act is said to occur in the present (*vartamāna*).

Thus, on the basis of such concept of present time, one may say as follows: That the act of going is referred both to the past and to the present at the same time means that it has been brought to completion and has not been brought to completion at the same time, which is obviously contradictory; and besides, that the act of going is referred both to the future and to the present at the same time means that it has not yet begun and has already begun at the same time, which is also evidently contradictory.

4.2. In this case, it is improper to say that there abide in a single object two different actions: one referred to past or future time and the other referred to the present. For, according to Pāṇinīyas, *kāra*kas, which are considered to be capacities (*śakti*) to bring actions to accomplishment²³ and not substances possessing them, vary from action to action. Consider the following rule:

A2.3.7 *saptamīpañcamyau kārakamadhye //*

This rule explains the occurrence of a seventh-triplet ending or a fifth-triplet ending after an item standing for a period of time or a distance between two *kāra*kas as in *adya bhuktvā deva-datto dvyaha bhoktā dvyahād vā bhoktā* ('having eaten today, Devadatta is going to eat in two days or after two days'). In the sentence quoted as an example, a time interval of two days inter-

²² When he paraphrases *gata* and *agata* as *uparatagamikriya* '[a path] on which the act of going has ceased' and *anupajātagamikriya* '[a path] on which the act of going has not begun' respectively, Candrakīrti does not intend to speak of time in reality but of time as something linked with the act which falls into the field of the verbal expression.

²³ VP3.7.1: *svāśraye samavetānām tadvad evāśrayāntare / kriyānām abhiniṣpattau śamarthyam sādhanam viduḥ //*

venes between Devadatta who is an agent of the action of eating denoted by the word *bhuktvā* ('after eating') and Devadatta who is an agent of the action of eating denoted by the word *bhoktā* ('will eat'). If one says that there can be no interval between two *kāra*kas since it is the same person Devadatta who eats both times, then one cannot have a sentence like this. In order to justify the use of such a sentence, therefore, Pāṇinīyas introduce the notion of *kāra*ka as a capacity (*śakti*), which is also known to Candrakīrti,²⁴ saying that Devadatta's capacity of functioning as an agent in respect of the action denoted by *bhuktvā* is regarded as different from his capacity of functioning as an agent in respect of the action denoted by *bhoktā*. Thus, we have to accept that, since two acts of eating by the same person Devadatta are different from each other because of taking place at different times, one capacity-*kāra*ka in relation to the act of eating that occurs today is different from the other in relation to that which is going to occur.²⁵

Similarly, even if the same path that has already been gone upon can be currently being gone upon, its capacity of functioning as an object relative to past going cannot be said to be identical with its capacity of functioning as an object relative to present going. Consequently the same path has to be differentiated by virtue of the difference in capacity. It is to be noted that, in Candrakīrti's arguments against action, the principle counts for something that a *kāra*ka in correlation with one action is differentiated from a *kāra*ka in correlation with another.²⁶

It thus follows that one cannot use sentences

²⁴ PP on MMK II, k. 6: *śaktir hi kāra*ko na *dra*-*vyam* . . . /

²⁵ MBh ad A2.3.7: *nāntareṇa sādhanam kriyāyāḥ pravṛttir bhavati / kriyāmadhyam cet kārakamadhyam api bhavati /*

Pradīpa thereupon: *kālabhedabhinnabhujikriyānūmitaśaktibhedāśrayo madhyavyapadeśo 'sty eva /*

²⁶ PP on MMK II, k. 6: *kriyābhedāc ca tatsādhanasyāpi śakteḥ siddha eva bhedaḥ /*

(1) and (2) without violating the law of contradiction.

5. *gatāgatavyatiriktagamyamānānupalambha (gamyamānābhāva)*

Validity is denied to statement (3) by dint of an entity referred to by the term *gamyamāna* or *gamyate* not being cognized apart from entities denoted by the terms *gata* and *agata*. We may say that the law of excluded middle is in effect here. And the absence of such an entity is established from three standpoints: The first is that there is no current time; the second is accordingly that there is no act occurring in the present; the third is that, in the light of the fact that there is no *kāra*ka because there is no action, no object is established because no act occurring in the present is itself not established. Based on the third standpoint, Candrakīrti develops an argument against the subsistence of an entity referred to by the term *gamyamāna* or *gamyate*.

His argument is parallel to that reflected in the *Mahābhāṣya* ad A3.2.123, where it is advanced, from the first and second standpoints, that one cannot use a present form like *gacchati*. Here in this paper I need not go into details about arguments presented by Patañjali concerning time and present time; Cardona has treated them elaborately.²⁷ Suffice it to show here what Bhartṛhari sets forth in this context:

²⁷ Patañjali remarks that those who maintain the view that there is no current time cites the following verses. *na vartate cakram iṣur na pātyate na syandante saritaḥ sāgarāya / kūṭastho 'yṃ loko na viceṣṭitāsti yo hy evaṃ paśyati so 'py anandhaḥ // mīmāṃsako manyamāno yuvā medhāvisaṃmataḥ / kākaṃ smehānupṛcchati kiṃ te patitalakṣaṇam // anāgate na patasi atikrānte ca kāka na / yadi samprati patasi sarvo lokaḥ pataty ayam // himavān api gacchati / anāgatam atikrāntam vartamānam iti trayam / sarvatra ca gatir nāsti gacchatīti kim ucyate //* See Cardona [1991: 452–455].

sad asat vāpi vastu syāt tr̥tīyaṃ nāsti kiñcana / tena bhūtabhaviṣyantau muktvā madhyama na vidyate //

"A thing should either be an existent or not; there is no third. Therefore, leaving aside past and future, there is no middle [, which could be called current]."²⁸

According to Helārāja, of all the possible moments in an act, a moment that is past has already come into being (*sat* 'being') and a moment that is not yet existent (*asat* 'not being') has yet to be brought about, is a future one. There is no moment that has both characteristics of being and not being, since it is contradictory for a single entity to have contradicting properties.

6. *gamanadvayaprasaṅga (ganṭṛdvayaprasaṅga)*

6.1. Nāgārjuna, in the second kārīkā, puts forward an argument for establishing the cause for the application of the term *gamyate* to an entity referred to by the term *gamyamāna*. The point made is that the action of going is known to take place where there is a physical activity (*ceṣṭā*) such as moving one's feet; it occurs on an entity referred to by *gamyamāna*, not *gata* or *agata*.

The claim set forth here is also a parallel to that made in a *śloka* cited in the *Mahābhāṣya*.²⁹ For Pāṇinīyas, an action as signified by a verb is a collection of component actions that occur in a sequence—in this sense, an action is said to have two aspects: existence and non-existence (*sadasat*)³⁰—and hence the present time is regarded as a span of time in which an act begins and has not yet been brought to completion.³¹

²⁸ VP3.9. 85.

²⁹ In his *Bhāṣya* on A3.2.123 Patañjali quotes the following verse. *kriyāpravṛttau yo hetus tadartham yad viceṣṭitam / tat samikṣya prayuñjīta gacchatīty avicārayan //* See Cardona [1991: 452–455].

³⁰ VP3.8.6: *kramāt sadasatām teṣām teṣām ātmāno na samūhinām / sadvastuviṣayair yānti sambandham cakṣurādibhiḥ //*

³¹ Vt. 3 ad A3.2.123: *nyāyyā tv ārambhānapava-*

Obviously, Nāgārjuna, by assigning the reason for applying the word *gamyate* to an entity referred to by *gamyamāna* through introducing the notion of *ceṣṭā*, intends to place the question as to the validity of the use of the present form as the one to be considered at linguistic level.

6.2. Using *gamyate*, even if one cannot speak of either what is denoted by *gata* or what is denoted by *agata*, one can certainly speak of what is denoted by *gamyamāna*. The formulation given for sentence (3) in which both *gamyamāna* and *gamyate* are uttered and combined, however, shows that the sentence involves the fault of tautology (*uktārthaprayoga*), as does the utterance *karaṇīyaṃ kāryam* ('What is to be done should be done').³² Then, how can one avoid the consequence of sentence (3) involving tautology?

There are two ways to evade such a difficulty: one is to nullify either the application cause for the word *gamyamāna* or that for the word *gamyate*; the other is to differentiate between the basis for the application of *gamyamāna* and that of *gamyate*. However, if we nullified the application cause for the word *gamyamāna* or *gamyate*, they could never claim to be *kriyāśābdas* which, as stated earlier, requires that the basis for their use, an action, be connected with its referent, that is, the action inhere in its referent. This is nothing less than the claim set forth by Nāgārjuna in the third and fourth kārīkās. When paraphrasing the word *gamyamāne* as *saṃjñā-bhūte gamikriyāśūnye* '[the word *gamyamāna* which] is a name [word] and which is devoid of the act of going' in his commentary on the fourth kārīkā, Candrakīrti clearly means that the nullification of the application cause for the word

rgāt / MBh: eṣa nāma nyāyyo vartamānaḥ kālo yatrārambho 'napavṛktaḥ /

³² Vyādi's *Paribhāṣāvṛtti* 46: *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ // sakṛduktasyārthasya punaḥprayogo na bhavati / kutaḥ / loke dṛṣṭatvāt / tad yathā loke puruṣa ity ukte punas tasyaiva dvitīyaś ca karaṇīyaṃ kāryam iti ca punaḥprayogo na bhavati /*

gamyamāna leads to the consequence that the word *gamyamāna* has to be considered as a *saṃjñāśabda* ('name word') or a *yadṛcchāśabda* ('option word') such as *dittha*, which never requires for its application that one resort to any property that would be assumed to abide in its referent, and whose application depends upon one's wish.³³

As argued by Nāgārjuna in the fifth and sixth kārikās, on the other hand, if we differentiated between the grounds for application of the words *gamyamāna* and *gamyate*, then we would have to accept that there are two acts of going, from which it would necessarily follow that there are two different agents of going in respect of the two different goings, as shown before.³⁴ This is naturally an undesirable consequence.

7. Conclusion

Rejection of any of the sentences (1)–(3) leads to that of an object (*x*) relative to the action of going which one could speak of using the finite verb *gamyate*. When there subsists no object in correlation with the act of going, it is proper to say that one *goes nowhere*. And, in this case, never does the action of going take place. It is clear that Nāgārjuna, when analyzing a sentence like *gatam gamyate*, puts the kriyākāraka relation into his frame of reference, arguing against the subsistence of action on linguistic grounds.

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³³ *Pradīpa* on MBh ad A5.1.119: *ditthādayo ya-dṛcchāśabdā arthagataṃ na kiṃcīt pravṛttinimittam apekṣante, puruṣecchāvaśena pravarttanāt /*

³⁴ See §4.2.

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