On the Problem of the Determination of Causality:
bādhakapramāṇa and *bheda*

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0. Introduction

It is well known that in his *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti* Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) develops the theory of inference by introducing the concept of 'essential connection' (*svabhāvapratibandha*)—classified into two kinds: causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva* or *tadutpatti*) and identity (*tādātmya*)—as a basis of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between a logical reason (*hetu*) and what is to be proved (*sādhya*).

As pointed out by Kataoka [2003], Dharmakīrti applies the method of *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* 'a means of valid cognition which negates the presence of the logical reason in the contradictory to what is to be proved' (abbreviated hereafter as *bādhakapramāṇa*) for the establishment not only of the identity between *hetu* and *sādhya* but also of the causality between them.[1] What is to be noted is that he applies the method of *bādhakapramāṇa* on the basis of the notion of 'difference' (*bheda*) which he strictly defines.

In this paper I shall show, focusing on his establishment of the causality, how his notion of 'difference' is involved in the above-mentioned method.

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[1] Dharmakīrti makes use of the term '*bādhakapramāṇa*' for the first time in his later work *Hetubindu*, in which he discusses how the identity between *hetu* and *sādhya* is to be established. See Ernst Steinkellner, "The logic of the *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*," in *Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference* (Wien, 1991): 243–268.

1. *bādhakapramāṇa* in the Determination of Causality

1.1. According to Dharmakīrti, the causal relation between smoke and fire is known through a single set of observations consisting of perception (*pratyakṣa*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*).[2]

1. non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) of X (e.g., smoke)
2. perception (*pratyakṣa*) of Y (e.g., fire) etc.
3. perception of X
4. non-perception of Y
5. non-perception of X

A single set of these factors is enough to establish a universal causality between smoke and fire.[3] He says:

PVSV22,6–7 (=PVin II 34*,3–4): *sakṛd api tathādarśanāt kāryaḥ siddhaḥ / akāryatve 'kāraṇāt sakṛd apy abhāvāt /*

"Even one observation described in this manner establishes [that X (smoke) is] the effect [of Y (fire)]. For if X were not the effect [of Y], then X would never be produced from the Y which is not a cause (*akāraṇa*)."

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[2] See PVSV22, 2–4 (=PVin II 33*, 33–34*, 2): *yeṣām upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdhaṃ yad upalabhyate / tatraikābhāve 'pi nopalabhyate / tat tasya kāryam /* tac ca dhūme 'sti /* (*Gnoli ed. omits '/'. Em. by Malvaniya ed.)

[3] As is well known, there are two different views among commentators as to how may cognitions this procedure consists of: according to trikavādins it consists of three cognitions and according to pañcakavādins of five cognitions. See Yuichi Kajiyama, "Trika-pañcakacintā: Development of the Buddhist Theory on the Determination of Causality," *Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia* 4–5 (1963): 1–15. See also Inami [1999].

Obviously, Dharmakīrti, unlike Kumārila (ca. 600–660) who holds the doctrine of 'repeated observation' (bhūyodarśana) as necessary in apprehending universal concomitance, asserts that a single instance in which fire is known to be causally related to smoke is enough to generalize the relation in question. As pointed out by Lasic [2003], we can see that there is a sharp contrast between Kumārila's theory and Dharmakīrti's: the former lays stress on the quantity of observations, while the latter on the quality of observational procedure.

1.2. But how is it possible to derive a universal causality between fire and smoke, for example, from the observation of an individual instance that smoke is produced from fire? To solve this problem, Dharmakīrti applies the *bādhakapramāna*.

In this case, *sādhya* is the proposition that X is the effect of Y and *hetu* is one observation of the instance in which X is produced from Y. Thus, the *bādhakapramāna* may be formulated as follows: if X were not the effect of Y, it could never be observed that X arises from Y. Recall that Dharmakīrti states in the passage cited above that if X were not the effect of Y, then X would never be produced from the Y which is not a cause (*akāryatve 'kāranāt sakrd apy abhāvāt*). From this it is clear that Dharmakīrti applies the *bādhakapramāna* to generalize causality.

1.3. When we talk about smoke from a causal point of view, there are four theoretical possibilities to be assumed.

(I) X (smoke) always arises from Y (fire).

(II) X always arises from a thing (Z) other than Y.

(III) Sometimes X arises from Y, but sometimes from Z.

(IV) X has no cause.

In order to establish the *bādhakapramāna*, the following possibility must be eliminated: A thing (X) which is considered to be an effect arises

from a non-cause (*akārana*). In short, possibilities (II)–(IV) must be eliminated.

Possibility (II) is denied because smoke is already known to be causally related to fire through a set of perceptions and non-perceptions. Possibility (IV) is also categorically denied because, if fire has no cause for its presence, it is absolutely impossible that smoke is observed to be causally related to fire.[4] Consequently, if possibility (III) is denied, it follows that possibility (I) is affirmed.

Dharmakīrti denies possibility (III) as follows: If smoke were to arise from a thing other than fire, such as an anthill, as well as from fire, then fire could not be the cause of smoke because smoke comes into existence without fire when arising from an anthill. But an anthill also could not be the cause of smoke because smoke comes into existence without it when arising from fire.[5] Therefore, neither fire nor an anthill could be said to be the cause of smoke.[6]

1.4. Against this, three objections are raised:

(1) A thing (Z) which is different from Y (fire) produces the thing (X') which looks similar to X (smoke).[7] Due to this similarity, we consider X' as smoke. Therefore, we can say that smoke has two different causes, i.e., Y and Z.

(2) In the case where a causal complex (*sāmagrī*) produces an effect, we assume that many causes (e.g., eyes, an object, light, etc.) produce one single effect X (e.g., visual cogni-

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[4] Dharmakīrti insists that every impermanent entity has its cause. See PV I 35: *nityam sattvam asattvam vā 'hetor anyānapeksanāt / apeksāto hi bhāvānām kādācitkatvasambhavah //*

[5] See PVSV19, 6–8: *idam eva hi kāranasya kāranatvam, yad arthāntarabhāve svabhāvopadhānam / kāryasyāpi tadbhāva eva bhāvah /*

[6] See PVSV22, 10–11 (=PVin II 34*, 15–16): *na / tatrāpi tulyatvāt / tadabhāve 'py agnau bhavatīti /*

[7] See PVSV22, 13–14 (=PVin II 34*, 19–21): *na vai sa eva bhavati tādrśasya bhāvāt /*

tion).[8] In this case, too, it can be said that X has different causes.

(3) There are some cases where things of the same kind are produced from a certain cause on one occasion and from another cause on another occasion. A kind of lotus root, śālūka, is seen to arise from its seed and from cow dung (gomaya).[9]

In denying these objections, the definition of bheda (difference) plays a very important role.

2. The Definition of bheda

2.1. Dharmakīrti gives the definition of bheda as follows:

> PVSV20,21–22 (=PVin II 38*,2–4): ayam eva khalu bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānāṃ viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca /
> "Indeed, difference among things and the cause of the difference among things are [defined] as follows: [The former consists in] the attribution of incompatible properties to each other; [the latter consists in] the difference between their causes."

According to Dharmakīrti, given two things with incompatible properties,[10] one assumes that they are different from each other and that the difference between their causes is responsible for this difference. Dharmakīrti refutes the above three objections relying on the definition of 'the cause of the difference' (bhedahetu).

2.2. He refutes objection (1) as follows: At first, the meaning of 'similarity' (tādṛśa) is interpreted as 'non-difference'. And he remarks that the definition of 'the cause of the difference'

means that non-difference among effects consists in the non-difference among causes. If this were not admitted, then there would occur the absurdity that there is no grounds for the variety of the universe and hence we have to say that everything comes from everything, or that everything occurs by a mere accident.[11] Therefore, as long as the similarity between X and X' is maintained, the similarity between the causes, Y and Z, should also be maintained.

2.3. In the case of objection (2), unlike in the former case, it is admitted that constituent elements of the complex are different from one another. But the difference among the constituent elements need not be taken into consideration, because the effect does not causally relate to one of them but to their unity. According to the theory of causal complex, the effect is produced only when these elements are forming a unity.[12] Therefore, it should be said that X has a single cause.

2.4. In the case of objection (3), it is true that one and the same effect, a śālūka, is produced not only from its seed but also from cow dung; the causes belong to different classes. According to Dharmakīrti, however, the difference in the nature (svabhāvabheda) between two śālūkas which arise from mutually different causes must be found. To explain this, he cites a kadalī tree as an example. A kadalī tree does not bear its fruit when it arises from its seed, while it does

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[8] See PVSV23, 18–19 (=PVin II 36*, 13–15): kathaṃ tarhīdānīṃ bhinnāt sahakāriṇaḥ kāryotpattir yathā cakṣūrūpāder vijñānasya /

[9] See PVSV23, 22–23 (=PVin II 36*, 22–23): yad api kiṃcid vijātīyād bhavad dṛṣṭaṃ gomayādeḥ śālūkādi / Cf. HB 20*, 18–20.

[10] In this case, two types of incompatibility (virodha), namely, sahānavasthāna and parasparaparihāra, are both applicable. See TSP162, 11–12: yau parasparaparihārasthitadharmādhyāsitau tau para-

sparabhinnau, yathā rūpavedane mūrttatvāmūrttatvayukte /, TSP601, 18–19: yau viruddhadharmasaṃsarginau tau bhinnau, yathā śītoṣṇau /

[11] See PVSV22, 14–17 (=PVin II 34*, 21–28): anyādṛśād bhavan kathaṃ tādṛśaḥ syāt / tādṛśād dhi bhavan tādṛśaḥ syāt / anyādṛśād api tādṛśo bhāve tacchaktiniyamābhāvān na hetubhedo bhedaka ity akāraṇaṃ viśvasya vaiśvarūpyaṃ syāt / sarvaṃ vā sarvasmāj jāyeta* / (*Em. by Malvaniya ed.)

[12] See PVSV23, 19–22 (=PVin II 36*, 15–21): na vai kiṃcid ekaṃ janakaṃ tatsvabhāvam / kiṃ tu sāmagrī janikā tatsvabhāvā / saivānumīyate / saiva ca sāmagrī svabhāvasthityāśrayaḥ kāryasya / ata eva sahakāriṇām apy aparyāyeṇa jananam /

when it arises from a bulb.[13] Likewise, in the case of the *śālūka*, two different things are only spoken of by the same word.[14] Therefore, two causes, i.e., cow dung and a seed of *śālūka*, produce different effects respectively.

2.5. According to Dharmakīrti, even ordinary people can easily distinguish between two things which arise from different causes. In the PVSV, the form (*ākāra*) of a thing is regarded as the ground for finding the difference between things.[15] But in the PVin II, in addition to the form of a thing, essential properties (*svabhāva*) such as taste and touch are mentioned as this ground.[16] Moreover, in the HB he says that

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[13] See PVinṬ(316b2-3): *sa bon las skye ba'i chu shing ni 'bras bu med pa yin la / sdong bu las skye ba'i ni 'bras bu can yin te / des na de dag ni 'bras bu dang 'brel pa dang ma 'brel pa dag gis tha dad pa yin no //* See also Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubindhuḥ, Teil II. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen* (Wien, 1967), 152.

[14] See PVSV23, 23–25 (=PVin II 36*, 23–27): *tatrāpi tathābhidhāne 'py asty eva svabījaprabhavāt svabhāvabhedaḥ / hetusvabhāvabhedāt / yathā kadalī bījakandodbhavā /*

[15] See PVSV23, 25–27 (=PVin II 36*, 27–29 and 37*, 15–16): *sphuṭam eva tādṛśaṃ loko vivecayaty ākārabhedāt / tasmān na suvivecitākāraṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ vyabhicarati /*

[16] See PVin II 37*, 5–15: *rnam pa tha dad pa 'ba' zhig ni de dang de ma yin pa'i rgyu mtshan yang ma yin no // 'on kyang rang bzhin gzhan yang yin te / bcos ma dang bcos ma ma yin pa'i nor bu dang mu tig dang byi ru la sogs pa bzhin no // kha cig tu ni me tog tha dad pa ste / sngon po dang cig shos kyi me tog can gyi shur pa ka bzhin no // kha cig tu ni 'bras bu ste / 'bras bu med pa dang cig shos kyi kar go ta bzhin no // kha cig tu ni ro las te / nags dang cig shos kyi rgyal mo ga gon bzhin no // kha cig tu ni nus pa ste / reg pa dang myangs pas 'khru ba'i a ru ra bzhin no //* (Skt.: *na cākārabheda eva kāraṇānāṃ tattvātattvanibandhanam api tu svabhāvāntaram api kṛtrimākṛtrimāṇām iva maṇimuktāpravālādīnām tathā hi kvacit puṣpasyaiva bhede nīletarakusumayor iva sūryayoḥ kvacit phale vandhyetarayor iva karkaṭayoḥ kvacid rase vanyetarayor iva bhadratrapuṣayoḥ kvacit svabhāve sparśopabhogagrahaṇyor iva harītakyoḥ.*) See Elliot M. Stern, "Additional Fragments of Pramāṇaviniścaya I–II," *Wiener*

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even if one cannot recognize the difference between their forms one can recognize the difference of classes (*jātibheda*) on the basis of a certain specific property (*viśeṣa*).[17]

3. Concluding Remarks

As we can see, by resorting to the definition of 'the cause of the difference', Dharmakīrti rebuts objections (1)–(3). As a result, possibility (III) is eliminated and only possibility (I) remains. Namely, the *bādhakapramāṇa* is successfully done by virtue of showing that the definition of 'the cause of the difference' is applicable to these three problematic cases.

Dharmakīrti applies the *bādhakapramāṇa* to determine universal causation. This *bādhakapramāṇa* is nothing but a type of *prasaṅga* or *reductio ad absurdum*. It is reasonable that Dharmakīrti who denies the inductive method for determining universal concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*, as adopted by Kumārila, should resort to such indirect reasoning.

References and Abbreviations

HB   *Hetubindu* (Dharmakīrti): Ernst Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Heubinduḥ, Teil I, tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text.* Wien: Herman Böhlaus Nachf., 1967.

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[17] See HB21*, 1–4: *asti ca gomayetarajanmanoḥ svabhāvabhedo rūpasyābhede 'pi, na hy ākāratulyataiva bhāvānāṃ tattve nimittam, abhinnākārāṇām api keṣāṃcid anyato viśeṣāj jātibhedadarśanāt /*

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PVin II   *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), chapter 2:
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PVinṬ   *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Dharmottara) (Tib):
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PV(SV)   *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti):
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           of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with
           the Autocommentary: Text and Critical
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TSP   *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla):
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           saṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with
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